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


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VOL. III.

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CONTENTS OF THE FIRST THREE VOLUMES

OF

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

Alchemists, The	Editor.	126
Bénard's Essay on Hegel's <i>Æsthetics</i> (translation).	Jas. A. Martling.	36, 91, 169, 221
Criticism of Philosophical Systems (translation).	A. E. Kroeger.	79, 137
Dialogue on Music.	E. Sobolewski.	224
Editorials.	Editor.	127
Essay on Da Vinci's "Last Supper" (translation).	D. J. Snider & T. Davidson.	242
Fichte's Introduction to the Science of Knowledge (translation).	A. E. Kroeger.	23
Genesis.	A. Bronson Alcott.	165
Goethe's Theory of Colors.	Editor.	63
Herbert Spencer.	Editor.	6
Introduction to Philosophy.	Editor.	57, 114, 187, 236
In the Quarry.	Anna C. Brackett.	192
Leibnitz's Monadology (translation).	F. H. Hedge.	129
Letters on Faust.	H. C. Brockmeyer.	176
Metaphysics of Materialism.	D. G. Brinton.	176
Music as a Form of Art.	Editor.	120
Notes on Milton's <i>Lycidas</i> .	Anna C. Brackett.	87
Paul Janet and Hegel.	Editor.	250
Philosophy of Baader (translation from Dr. Hoffmann).	A. Strothotte.	190
Raphael's Transfiguration.	Editor.	53
Schelling's Introduction to Idealism (translation).	Thos. Davidson.	159
Schelling's Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature (translation).	Thos. Davidson.	193
Schopenhauer's Dialogue on Immortality (translation).	C. L. Bernays.	61
Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Will (translation).	C. L. Bernays.	232
Second Part of Goethe's <i>Faust</i> (translation).	D. J. Snider.	66
Seed Life.	Anna C. Brackett.	69
"The Speculative."	Editor.	2
Thought on Shakespeare, A	Anna C. Brackett.	240
To the Reader.	Editor.	1

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

Preface.	Editor.	iii
Analysis of Hegel's Phenomenology.	Editor.	99, 181
Beethoven's Seventh Symphony.	C. W. Chapman.	37
Beethoven's <i>Sinfonia Eroica</i> .	C. L. Bernays.	241
Bénard's Essay on Hegel's <i>Æsthetics</i> (translation).	Jas. A. Martling.	39, 157
Book Notices.	Editor.	64, 192
Comprehension.	Anna C. Brackett.	123
Correspondence.	D. A. Wasson and Wm. Clay.	245, 247
Cousin's Doctrine of the Absolute.	F. A. Henry.	82
Difference of Baader from Hegel, Rosenkranz on Fichte's "Sun-clear Statement" (translation).	Translated by T. Davidson.	55
Goethe's Social Romances, Rosenkranz on (transl'n)	A. E. Kroeger.	3, 65, 129
Goethe's Essay on the <i>Laokoön</i> (translation).	T. Davidson.	120, 215
Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic.	E. S. Morgan.	208
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (translation).	C. S. Peirce.	193
	H. C. Brockmeyer and W. T. Harris.	94, 165, 229
Ideal, The.	Anna C. Brackett.	189
Introduction to Philosophy.	Editor.	51, 176
Intuition vs. Contemplation.	Editor.	191
Leibnitz on the Nature of the Soul (translation).	T. Davidson.	62
Letters on Faust.	H. C. Brockmeyer.	114
New School of Music.	E. Sobolewski.	171
Nominalism vs. Realism.	Editor and —	57
Pantheon.	A. B. Alcott.	46
Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man.	C. S. Peirce.	103
<i>Sāṅkhya Kārikā</i> .	Kapila (reprinted from Colebrooke).	225
Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.	C. S. Peirce.	140
Statement of the Problem.	Editor.	1
Swedenborg and Speculative Philosophy	R. L. Tafel.	18
What is meant by Determined.	Editor and —	190
Winckelmann's Essay on the <i>Laokoön</i> (transl'n).	E. S. Morgan.	213
Winckelmann's Remarks on the Torso of Hercules (translation).	T. Davidson.	187

CONTENTS OF VOL. III.

Preface to Vol. III.	Editor.	v
A National Institute.	Editor.	93
Bénard's Analysis of Hegel's <i>Æsthetics</i> (translation)	J. A. Martling.	31, 147, 281, 317
Berkeley's Doctrine on the Nature of Matter.	T. Collyns Simon.	336
Elementary School Education.	Editor.	181
Hegel's First Principle (translation).	Editor.	344
"He is not Far" (Poetry)	John Weiss.	177
Is Thought the Thinker?	T. Collyns Simon.	376
Kant's System of Transcendentalism.	A. E. Kroeger.	133, 241
Leibnitz on Platonic Enthusiasm (translation).	T. Davidson.	88
Michael Angelo's "Last Judgment."	Editor.	73
New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge, by Fichte (translation).	A. E. Kroeger.	1, 97, 193, 289
Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology (translation).	Editor.	166
Outlines of Hegel's Logic (translation).	Editor.	257
Practical Effects of Modern Philosophy (translation from Schelling).	Ch. L. Bernays.	190
Problems of Philosophy at the Present Time.	E. V. Hartmann.	372
Sentences of Porphyry the Philosopher (translation).	T. Davidson.	46
The Speculative vs. the Visionary.	H. H. Morgan.	175
The True First Principle.	Editor.	287
Winckelmann's Description of the Apollo Belvedere (translation).	Ella S. Morgan.	94

PREFACE.

In the third volume of the Journal, herewith completed, a more systematic attempt has been made to present the systems of Fichte and Hegel. A complete translation of "The New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge" by the former, together with an excellent essay on Kant's System of Transcendentalism by Mr. Kroeger, will furnish the best available means for studying Fichte's Philosophy. The portions translated from Hegel's Philosophical Propædæutics, embracing the outlines of the Logic and Phenomenology, together with the brief commentary added by the Editor, will prove, it is hoped, acceptable to students of Hegel. The work thus begun, if continued according to the plan laid out for the next volume, will give English versions of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights, Morals, and Religion, together with the outlines of the Encyclopædia of Philosophy. The translation of the Phenomenology begun in the second volume of the Journal, and the analysis and commentary of the same, will again be taken up. Through the activity of Mr. Kroeger another exposition of the Science of Knowledge and one also of Fichte's Philosophy of Rights have been given to the public by the house of Messrs. Lippincott & Co. These works, with the translations of Fichte's popular writings by Smith (published in London), leave very little to be desired by the English student of that system. Such, however, is not the case with Hegel. No one of his greatest works has yet been translated entire into any foreign language. To name these greatest works in the order of importance, one would place—

- 1st. The Logic (3 vols.);
- 2d. The Phenomenology of Spirit (1 vol.);
- 3d. The History of Philosophy (3 vols.);
- 4th. The *Æsthetics* (3 vols.);
- 5th. The Philosophy of Religion (2 vols.);
- 6th. The Philosophy of Rights.

The 7th—the Philosophy of History—has been translated and published in English; the 8th—Philosophy of Nature—has been translated and published in French. The translations that have appeared in English and French give only meagre compends intended for the use of pupils—who were expected to get the full details from the lectures of Hegel himself—or else they consist of weak paraphrases, in which the scientific part of the original is either mutilated or omitted altogether (e. g. Bénard's edition* of the *Æsthetic*, "partly a transla-

* The portion of the work of Bénard given in this Journal professes to be no more than an analysis of the *Æsthetics*; as such it will pay reperusal from the beginning, now that it is completed. The most instructive portion of it is that contained in the first volume of the Journal.

tion, partly an analysis," and Sloman & Wallon's English version of the "Subjective Logic.")

Compends and outlines are useful enough in their way—one may call them indispensable if he will; their function is to keep the attention of the beginner fixed upon the essential features of the whole. But after the outlines become familiar, it is necessary to enter upon the detailed expositions which alone contain the living method of the system.

A word is demanded in this preface on the supposed antagonism of Induction to Speculative Philosophy. So long as the *deductive* and *inductive* methods are contrasted, no fault is to be found. But when the speculative method is identified with simple deduction, a protest must be made.

Deduction is no more speculative than Induction is. Both are defective, and have this peculiarity in common with all partial procedures: they each involve an unconscious procedure entirely the reverse of the conscious one which is named. How, for example, could one ever deduce anything without recognizing in the product something before familiar to him in some inductive shape or other? Let him follow out the strictest dialectical procedure, and commencing with the ultimate abstraction=Being (if he will); in this, what meaning soever he finds, implies other concepts; and since in the definition of his object he is carried beyond it, he calls this *deduction*; but the "other concepts" involved in the first had to be identified and named; they had to be defined before he could call his procedure a progress at all. No deduction was possible, therefore, until he identified those concepts that arose to view, with familiar names of concepts hitherto known to him empirically. The pure thinker who saw the dialectical procedure without being able to recognize its results would never be in a condition to describe it in words. Indeed, the mystics are those who see this movement of pure thought, but are so unacquainted with the scientific vocabulary of their language as not to identify the procedure under the conventional description; they therefore use concrete, sensuous expressions having analogies to the content they attempt to utter. In mystic philosophy, for this very reason, dependence upon the inductive factor is most apparent.

Not less, however, is Deduction an unconscious factor in all Induction. The inductive process could never take the first step above the concrete material before it except by the free process known in pure thought. Classification—indispensable to Induction—not only precedes generalization, but is the result of generalization. The act of induction seized as a whole is as creative as that of deduction. The inductive philosopher steps back from the details he has seized only by means of an act of identification of his pure thought with the con-

tent. The inductive philosopher who knows nothing of the pure thought-movement by itself, is at all times half unconscious of his entire activity. With this unconsciousness comes the danger of mistaking one-sided abstractions for concrete laws. The speculative cognition contains both phases—the deductive and inductive; but not as distinct processes. The syllogism in which the Particular, the Individual, and the Universal are—not successively, but simultaneously—the middle term, is no longer a mere syllogism, but is the form of “knowing by wholes” of which Plato speaks.

But one abstract process necessitates another; and any system of Philosophy which lays undue stress on one side of its content is sure to be accompanied by a system which lays undue stress on the other side. Only by this means can the whole preserve its equilibrium. To have a tension there must be two extremes. And although two systems of Philosophy may form the conscious extremes, yet in every system both extremes will be found—the one consciously and the other unconsciously supported by the philosopher if his system is one-sided. The true speculative system, like that of Aristotle or Hegel, will consciously support both in one. And yet by reason of the fact that for each individual a long process of culture is necessary before he can attain that “knowing by wholes” spoken of, the knowing of most individuals must be *knowing of parts*. Hence the disciples of a comprehensive system of Philosophy branch out in different directions, and soon lose sight of each other and of their master. The Epicureans, the Stoics, the Skeptics, all arise in Aristotle, and so too do the different Eclectic schools, although called new Pythagoreans, new Platonists, &c. It is by these *different* systems alone that the whole truth gets thought, and he who would think truest and deepest must be able to see the eternal verities in the most widely differing systems—adding thereto whatever insight is necessary to see the unconscious implications as well as the consciously assumed positions. Thus the History of Philosophy contains the true exhibition of Philosophy itself.

Again, as to the value which Speculative Philosophy assigns to **FACTS**. The same mistake is current here that obtains in regard to Deduction and Induction. As we have said elsewhere, the man of science and the speculative seer both seek to grasp the *fact*; but what is the compass of the fact? Here it is likely the difference will be found. In proportion as the total or entire fact is seized and treated of—either with or without the details—the book containing the exposition thereof will be called obscure, or “mystical.”

A fact in its narrower compass is easily seized; he who runs may read and understand. But the exposition of a fact in its widest relations is a “mere ingenious arrangement of words” to the one who is not equal to the task of rethinking those relations.

The direct fall of an apple from the tree is a fact to the swine who run to devour it; the thoughtful man, however, sees involved in one fact the fall of the apple and the shaking of the tree by the wind, perhaps the wind occasioned by the southward movement of the sun to the equinox, and this by the inclination of the axis of the earth and the revolution around the sun, and so on throughout the entire complex of existence in time and space. A FACT IS A RELATIVE SYNTHESIS: and since it is determined by all that exists in the universe as the totality of its conditions, we cannot seize any fact in its entire compass except by thinking the universe.

Aristotle's works, taken as a whole, are an attempt to seize the facts of the world in their entirety—each fact in *its* entirety. And he finds that the entirety of each fact—each fact grasped in all its conditioning relations—is the entirety of all facts; in short, that the ultimate fact is one, and that, namely, what Plato calls *the Self-moved One*. Now, it happens that the hundreds who read Aristotle seize readily the many individual facts there treated of, and never mistrust their ability to grasp all that is found in the book; but still they miss the universal fact which Aristotle has undertaken to explicate, and which, indeed, was the sole object he had in writing any one of his numerous treatises.

We hold with convulsive grasp to the sensuous reality, not thinking that the nearer we get to it the more distracted we must become by reason of the eternal change going on in that sphere. "The more real, the more interpenetrated by the time-element," says Heraclitus, i. e. the particular individual is in a process of change. Truth is the opposite of reality in this respect, for the truth is eternal, "far removed from birth and decay." It is therefore a necessity of all thinking spiritual being to *abstract* from the sensuous reality, for by abstraction alone can it become spiritual; he who would attain truth itself must *energize* (to use an Aristotelian expression) to free himself from the changing and the variable. No matter how much one persuades himself that he is holding fast to the sensuous fact, and that he is thereby getting hold of the real, he is nevertheless always engaged in transforming immediate facts into truths; he relentlessly annuls the sensuous condition, and widens the sphere of the object considered, until it loses all the sensuous content it possesses. The *desideratum* is that every one shall become conscious of himself—shall come to know his activity as it truly is and must be. He who does this, will not set up one-sided systems, whether materialistic or metaphysical, but will be a practical thinker.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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No. 1.

NEW EXPOSITION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE by A. E. KOEHLER.

INTRODUCTION.

CONTENTS OF INTRODUCTION:

Part I.—DESCRIPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

1. Preliminary Description of Knowledge by its Construction.
2. Description of the Science of Knowledge as a knowledge of Knowledge.
3. Deductions.

Part II.—ON ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE.

1. Concerning the Conception of Absolute Knowledge.
2. Formal and Word-Definition of Absolute Knowledge.
3. Real Definition of Absolute Knowledge: Description of the Absolute Substance of Knowledge.
4. Same continued: Description of the Absolute Form of Knowledge.
5. Same concluded: Description of the Unity of Absolute Form and Absolute Substance in Knowledge.

Part III.—ON INTELLECTUAL CONTEMPLATION AND DEDUCTION OF THE FIVEFOLDNESS IN THE FORM OF REFLECTION.

1. Union of Freedom and Being in Absolute Knowledge through Thinking.
2. Description of the Absolute Substance of Intellectual Contemplation as the For-itself of that Thinking.
3. Description of the Absolute Form of Intellectual Contemplation as Original Act of Absolute Reflection of that Thinking.
4. The Absolute Ego as the Absolute Form of Knowledge.

Part I.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

- § 1. *Preliminary Description of Knowledge by its Construction.*

This description is called preliminary, not because it will exhaust the conception of knowledge, but merely because it will enable us to point out those of its characteristics which are necessary to be known for our present purpose. The

question, therefore, which we might be interrupted with at the beginning—of what knowledge are you speaking? and what meaning do you attach to this word?—is not here in place. We use the term, referred to, in no other sense than will be explained directly, and mean no more by it than will appear from the following:

Construct a certain angle! we should say to the reader, if we were conversing with him. Now close the angle, thus constructed, with a third straight line. Do you presume that the angle could have been closed with one or more other lines—that is to say, longer or shorter ones, than the one you have drawn to close it? If the reader replies, as we expect him to do, that he presumes no such thing, we shall further ask him whether he considers this to be merely his *opinion*, his temporary judgment on the matter, subject to a future rectification; or whether he believes himself to *know* it, to know it as quite sure and certain. If he replies affirmatively to this question, as we also expect him to do, we shall again ask him, whether it is his opinion that the case mentioned is applicable only to that particular angle, which he happened to construct in that particular manner, and to those particular lines, forming the angle, which also happened to be just such particular lines; and whether other possible angles, enclosed by other possible lines, might not be formed so as to have their two sides united by more straight lines than one? We shall furthermore ask him, after he has answered the foregoing, whether he believes that this fact appears in this particular light only to him, individually, or whether he believes that all rational Beings, who but understand his words, must necessarily partake of his conviction in the matter; and lastly, whether he simply pretends to have an opinion on these matters, or whether he decidedly believes himself to *know* them. If he replies, as we expect him to do—for if only one of his answers should be contrary to our supposition, we should at once be compelled to forego further discussion with him until his state of mind had undergone a change; why? he alone can understand who has answered these questions correctly;—if he replies, that not one of all the infinite variety of possible angles, formed by any of the infinite number of possible lines, can be closed by more than one possible third line—that every rational Being must necessarily entertain the

same conviction, and that he is positive of the absolute validity of this fact, both as regards the infinite variety of angles and the infinite variety of rational Beings, we shall proceed with him to the following reflections :

You affirm, then, to have acquired a *knowledge* by the aforementioned representation, a firmness, and unshakable stability of this representation, on which you can repose immutably, and are sure that you can repose so forever. Now tell me, on what is this knowledge really based? what is this its firm standpoint, and what this its unchangeable object? To begin with :

Our reader had just been constructing a certain angle, of a certain number of degrees, by certain side lines of a certain length. Thereupon he drew, once for all, the third line, and in drawing it declared, once for all, that all further attempts to draw another straight line between the two points would always result only in reproducing the same one line.

In that instance of drawing a line, the reader must therefore have abstained from viewing it as a *present* instance ; he must have considered that it was not the present act of drawing a line, but the drawing of a line under these particular conditions—i. e. for the purpose of closing this particular angle—and in its infinite continuability, which he surveyed at one glance ; and he must really have viewed it thus, if his assertion is to have any foundation. Again : the reader pretended to know that this assertion of his did apply not only to the present angle, which he had just constructed, but to all the infinite number of possible angles. He must therefore have reflected not on the drawing of a line to close *this* angle, but generally on the drawing of a line to close *any* angle, and he must have surveyed this act of his, in its possible and infinite variety, at one glance, if the assertion of his knowledge in this matter is to have any foundation. Again : this assertion of his was to be valid, not merely for him, but for all rational Beings who could but understand his words. He could therefore in nowise have reflected on himself, as such a particular person, nor on his own individual judgment ; but he must have surveyed the judgment of all rational Beings, looking out from his soul into the souls of all rational Beings, if his assertion of the pretended knowledge is to have any foundation. Lastly :

the reader, having joined all these facts together in his mind, asserts to *know* of them, thus confessing that he will not change his judgment of them in all eternity, and making of this, his momentary assertion, an assertion for all time to come as well as for the whole past—if in the past he should ever have had occasion to judge on this matter;—he, therefore, does not regard his judgment on this subject as one of the present moment, but he surveys the judgment of himself and of all other reasoning Beings on this subject for all time, i. e. absolutely timeless, if the assertion of his pretended knowledge is to have any foundation. In one word: the reader claims for himself the power of surveying at one glance *all representation*—of course, of the object we have applied it to. Now, nothing prevents us from leaving unnoticed the fact, that in the quoted example it was the representation of a line between two points, which was surveyed at one glance; and we are consequently justified in asserting the result of our investigation to be contained in the following, merely formal, sentence: To the reader, who has answered our several questions, there is a knowledge; and this knowledge consists in the surveying at one glance a certain power of representing—or, as we would rather say, Reason, but this word is to have no other meaning here than it can necessarily have in this connection,—in its totality. Nothing, we say, can prevent us from making this abstraction, provided we do not thereby intend to extend the result of our investigation, but leave it entirely undecided whether the one case we have quoted is the only object of knowledge, or whether there are still other such objects.

REMARKS.—Such an absolute gathering together and taking in at one glance of a manifold of a representing (which manifold will most probably turn out to be at the same time always of an infinite character), as we have described in the above construction of knowledge, is, in the following treatise, and in the Science of Knowledge generally, termed *contemplation*. In that construction, we have found that knowledge has its basis and consists only in contemplation.

To this uniting consciousness is opposed the consciousness of the particular, which in the above illustration we found exemplified in the *present* drawing of a line between the two

points of an angle. This consciousness we may call perception or experience. It has appeared that in knowledge mere perception must be abstracted from.*

§ 2. *Description of the Science of Knowledge as a knowledge of Knowledge.*

The Science of Knowledge is, as the term shows, a science, a theory of knowledge, which theory is doubtless based on a knowledge of Knowledge, generates knowledge, or in one word, is this knowledge. This knowledge of Knowledge is first, as the words indicate, a knowledge in itself, a taking in of the manifold at one glance.

It is, again, a knowledge of Knowledge. In the same manner as the above described knowledge of the line-drawing between two points is related to the infinitely varying possible cases of such line-drawing, is the knowledge of Knowledge related to any particular knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, presents the view of a manifold, which the knowledge of Knowledge takes in and surveys at one glance.

Or, still more clear and distinct: In all knowledge of the drawing of a line, the relation of the sides of a triangle, or whatever other descriptions of knowledge there may be, this knowledge, in its absolute identity *as knowledge*, would be the real seat and centre of the *knowledge of* line-drawing, relation of the sides of a triangle, &c. In it and its unity we would know of everything, however different it otherwise might be, only in the same manner; but of knowledge, as such, we should know nothing, precisely because we should know not of knowledge, but of the line-drawing, &c., in question. There would be a knowledge, and it would know because it would be; but it would know nothing of itself just because it would merely be. But in the *knowledge of Knowledge* this knowledge itself would be surveyed as such at one glance, and, therefore, as a unity in itself; just as the line-drawing, &c., was regarded, in our knowledge of it, as a unity

* It is therefore an evidence of boundless stupidity when some one asks to tell him how we can know anything except through perception (experience). Through experience we can know nothing at all, since the merely experienced must be thrown aside first in order that we may arrive at a knowledge.

in itself. In the knowledge of Knowledge, knowledge steps out of itself, and places itself before its own eye, in order to be reflected upon.

It is evident that knowledge must be able thus to seize, contemplate, examine, and comprehend itself, if a Science of Knowledge is to be possible. Now it is true, that we might even here from the reality of the consciousness of men deduce a proof, although an indirect one, of the reality and consequently of the possibility of such a knowledge. But the direct proof of it is the reality of the Science of Knowledge, and of this every one can become convinced by realizing it within himself. Relying on this proof by fact, which our present attempt will furnish, we can abstain from all other preliminary proofs, especially as we have commenced this factual proof already by the mere writing down of our § 1.

§ 3. *Deductions.*

1. According to the above, all knowledge is contemplation (§ 2). Knowledge of Knowledge, therefore, being itself knowledge, is contemplation; and being a knowledge of Knowledge, is a contemplation of all contemplation—the absolute uniting of all possible contemplation into one.

2. The Science of Knowledge being this knowledge of Knowledge, is therefore no system or collection of axioms, no plurality of truisms, but altogether one undivided contemplation.

3. Contemplation is itself absolute knowledge—firmness, unwavering stability, and immutability of our representation; but the Science of Knowledge is an undivided survey of all such contemplation. It is therefore itself absolute knowledge, and, as such, firmness, unshakableness, immutability of our judgment (§ 1). Consequently, whatever appertains to the Science of Knowledge cannot be disproved by any reasoning Being; it cannot be contradicted, it cannot be doubted; since no disproving, no contradiction, no doubt is possible except through this science, and is therefore far below this science. So far as individuals are concerned, this science can meet only one difficulty: some men may not possess it.

4. Since the Science of Knowledge is only the contemplation of knowledge (a knowledge of line-drawing, &c.)—which latter

has been and must be presupposed to exist independently of such science—it is evident that this science can open no new and particular branch of knowledge made possible only by it, no material knowledge (no knowledge of something). This science can be nothing but the universal knowledge, which has come to know of itself, and has entered a state of light, consciousness and independence in regard to itself. This science is not an *object* of knowledge, but simply a *form* of the knowledge of all possible objects. This science must on no account be considered as an external object, but as our own tool; our hand, our foot, our eye; and not even our eye, but only the clearness of the eye. The teacher makes it objective merely to the student, who does not yet possess it, and only until he possesses it; for the student's sake only is it explained by words; whereas whoever does possess it, speaks no more of it, but lives and acts it in his other knowledge. Strictly speaking, no one *has* this science, but *is* it; and no one has it until he has become it.

5. The Science of Knowledge is, as we have said, a contemplation of that general knowledge which needs not to be first acquired, but which must be presupposed to exist in every Being, gifted with reason, and which, in fact, constitutes such rational Being. This science is, therefore, the easiest and plainest that possibly can be. To attain it, nothing further is necessary than to turn our reflection upon our self, and to cast a clear glance into our inner Being. The fact that mankind has gone astray in search of this knowledge for so many centuries, and that the present age, to which it has been submitted, has not understood it, proves only that men have heretofore paid more attention to everything else than to their own self.

6. Now, although the Science of Knowledge is not a system of axioms, but an undivided contemplation, it may nevertheless be possible that the unity of this contemplation is not in itself an absolute simplicity, a first element, atom, monad, or whatever else you may call this first thought (perhaps because such a thing does not exist in knowledge or anywhere else); but an *organic* unity, a variety melted together into unity, and this unity diffused at the same time into variety and an undivided unity. In fact, this appears to be the case when we

remember merely that this contemplation is to be a contemplation of all the manifold contemplations, of which latter each one is again to contain an infinite variety of instances.

7. Now, if this should turn out to be the case, it might be possible, also, that we should be unable—not in our presupposed possession of this science, but in its demonstration to others, who are presumed not to possess it—to present this unity to the student in a direct manner. We might see ourselves compelled to cause this unity to organize itself from out of one or the other of the various instances, and then to disorganize it again into these, making the student a witness of this process. It is clear that, under such circumstances, the one instance selected from which to start the organization could not be understood by itself, since by itself it would be nothing; being something only as a part of an organized unity and comprehensible only in this unity. In this manner we could, therefore, never gain admittance into the Science of Knowledge; or if it were possible, and if such an isolated instance could be made clear to the student, it could be done only if the contemplation of this isolated instance should turn out to be accompanied—although in an indistinct and to us unconscious manner—by the contemplation of the whole unity; the isolated instance having its resting-point in this unity, and receiving from it its distinctness and comprehensibility, while at the same time imparting to this unity a peculiar distinctness of its own, when connected with it. Thus it would also be with all subsequent instances, to be taken into consideration. Still more: the first instance would not only throw a peculiar light on the second instance, but at the same time the second instance would reflect back a peculiar light on the first one; since this receives its complete distinctness from the Whole, of which the second instance is a part. In the same way the third instance would not only be illuminated by the first one, but would reflect back upon both preceding ones its own peculiar light; and thus on to the end. In the course of our investigation, each part would consequently be explained by all others, and all others by each particular instance. All investigated parts would have to be kept in mind, since with each step forwards we should get a new view not merely of the new instance, but of all others and *from* all others; and no

instance would be completely explained until all the others had been explained, and until the one clear view, by which all the variety is united into one and the one re-diffused into the variety, had been obtained. The Science of Knowledge would consequently—in spite of the successive demonstration adopted by us—remain the same one and undivided view, which—from the zero of distinctness in which it merely exists, but is unconscious of itself—is elevated in a successive and straightforward manner to that point of clearness and perspicuousness in which it is thoroughly conscious of itself and lives in itself; thus confirming anew what has already been seen, that the Science of Knowledge does not consist in an acquisition or a production of something new, but in illuminating and making perspicuous that which always has been and always has been *ourselves*.

We might add historically, that the method of the Science of Knowledge is really as we have here presumed it to be, and that it is consequently fixed for all time to come. This science is not a drawing of conclusions in a simple, straight line, from some starting-point or other—a proceeding which is possible only in a presupposed lower organism of knowledge, but of no use whatever in Philosophy (being, on the contrary, positively ruinous to it),—but a drawing of conclusions from and to all sides at one and the same time; from a central point to all other points and from all other points back again to the central point, just as in an organic body.

Part II.

ON ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE.

§ 1. *Concerning the conception of Absolute Knowledge.*

In order to pave a way for our investigation, let us first premise that the very conception of *knowledge* precludes all suspicion of its being the *Absolute* itself. For every second word added to the expression, the Absolute, destroys the conception of absoluteness, as such, and makes that word a mere adjective of the noun to which it becomes affixed. The Absolute is not knowledge, nor is it Being, nor is it identity or indifference of these two terms; it is simply and only the Absolute. But as we can never advance in the Science of Knowledge—and per-

haps in all other possible knowledge—beyond knowledge, this science cannot take its starting-point from the Absolute, but must commence with absolute knowledge. The question, how, under these circumstances, we are nevertheless able to assign to the Absolute its place beyond and independent of absolute knowledge—or, at least, to *think* it thus—as we have just now done, and how we could describe it, as we did, will undoubtedly be answered in the course of our investigation. It is possible that the Absolute enters our consciousness (is thought by us) only in the above connection with knowledge—or, as the *form* of knowledge.

The same question in regard to the possibility of thinking the Absolute, which we have just raised, can undoubtedly be objected to the thinking of absolute knowledge, i. e. if it should appear that all our real and possible knowledge is never an absolute, but, on the contrary, always a relative knowledge, limited or determined in a particular manner, and might be answered similarly: that this absolute knowledge can be revealed and is revealed to our consciousness only as the *form*, or, from another point of view, as the material part, or the object of real knowledge. This is the reason why we, having the intention of describing this absolute knowledge, and therefore undoubtedly persuaded that we know something about it, must for the present leave the question undecided how we ever came into possession of this our real knowledge of absolute knowledge. Perhaps we also view it, although as absolute, yet at the same time as never otherwise than in a relation, i. e. in its relation to all relative knowledge. In the description we are about to attempt, we can trust only to the direct contemplation of the reader, and must be content with asking him whether this description will call up in his mind what to him appears and forces itself upon his conviction as absolute knowledge. Or, if even this self-contemplation should desert him, we must wait and see whether in our succeeding paragraphs a light may not break upon his mind in regard to this first point.

§ 2. *Formal and Word-definition of Absolute Knowledge.*

Even if we should be compelled to content ourselves with the fact, which everyone will admit, that all our real know-

ledge is a knowledge of something—*this* something, and not that or the other something—yet every one of our readers will undoubtedly be able to understand, that there could be no knowledge of something if there were no knowledge pure and simple. So far as knowledge is a knowledge of something, it is a different knowledge in every other something of which it knows; but so far as it is knowledge pure, it is the same in all knowledge of something; and always altogether the same; although this knowledge of something might be extended into infinity, and consequently present an infinite difference. Now it is this knowledge, as the one and the same in all particular knowledge, to the thinking of which the reader is invited when we speak of absolute knowledge.

Let us make this thought, which we wish the reader to form, still more distinct by a few additional remarks:—It is not a knowledge of something, nor is it a knowledge of nothing (which would make it a knowledge of something, this something being nothing); it is not even a knowledge of itself; it is altogether no knowledge *of*; nor is it *a* knowledge (quantitative and in shape of a relation), but it is *the* knowledge (absolutely qualitative). It is no act, no fact, no something *in* knowledge, but it is simply that knowledge in which alone all acts and facts which can take place are contained. What use we can, nevertheless, make of this knowledge, the reader must wait to see. It is not opposed to the something of which is known, for in that case it would be the knowledge of something, or this particular knowledge itself; but it is opposed to the *knowledge of something*.

Some one, however, might say that this conception of knowledge pure and simple is after all nothing but an *abstraction* from all the particular of knowledge. To such an objection we must, of course, admit that in the *course of our actual consciousness* we are elevated to a *particular consciousness* of the absolute one and the same in all particular knowledge only by a free depression and subjection (generally called abstraction) of the particular character of a particular knowledge; although there may be another way by which to attain this consciousness, and although this may be the very way we intend to lead the reader. But what we protest against is, that this abstraction be supposed to produce from a multitude of

particulars what is contained in no single one of these particulars; and that such an objection should hold, that that character of knowledge, which every particular knowledge is presupposed to have, is on no account to be presupposed for the possibility of each single, particular knowledge, but enters knowledge only after a number of instances of knowledge have taken place, making then a knowledge what was previously a particular knowledge, although it never was *knowledge*.

§ 3. *Real definition of Absolute Knowledge—Description of the Absolute Substance of Knowledge.*

The real definition of absolute knowledge can be given only by demonstrating this knowledge through immediate contemplation. The reader must not believe that we can arrive at the nature of this absolute knowledge by drawing conclusions in a logical chain of reasoning; for, since this knowledge is to be absolute, there can be no higher, no more absolute point from which our logical chain of reasoning could start. We can form a conception of absolute knowledge only by a likewise absolute contemplation.

It is also apparent that such an absolute contemplation of absolute knowledge, and consequently the real definition of the latter, must be possible if a Science of Knowledge is to be possible; for the contemplation which forms the Science of Knowledge is to survey at one glance all reason and knowledge. The *particular* knowledge, however, cannot be surveyed at one glance, but requires particular glances, each one differing from the other. Knowledge must, therefore, be contemplated from that point of view in which it is one and the same knowledge, i. e. absolute knowledge.

In the description itself we shall assist the reader by the following introduction. Let the reader endeavor to think the Absolute itself, as such. Now, we affirm that he can think it only under these two conditions: 1st, as being *what* it is—reposing within and upon itself, without change or alteration, firm and complete of itself; 2d, as being *what* it is for no other reason than *because* it is—of itself, by itself, without any foreign influence; for everything foreign must vanish when we speak of the Absolute.

(It is possible that this duplicity of conditions, wherewith we designate the Absolute, being unable to designate it in any other manner—a fact rather curious, considering that we are speaking of the Absolute—may be in itself a result of our mode of thinking, as a knowledge; but this we must leave undecided for the present.)

The first condition we can term absolute rest, Being, a state of repose, &c.; the second, absolute change, or Freedom. Both expressions are to signify no more than is contained in the contemplation of the two characteristics of the Absolute, which we have asked the reader to undertake.

Now, knowledge is to be absolute, one and always the same knowledge, the unity of one and the highest contemplation, a mere absolute Quality. The two characteristics of the Absolute, therefore, which we have distinguished from each other above, must unite and become one in knowledge, so as to be no longer distinguishable; and this absolute union of both must constitute the real nature of knowledge, or the absolute knowledge.

I say, the melting together and close union of both into an indivisible unity, by which each part resigns and loses altogether its distinguishing characteristic, and both together form only one and an entirely new One, consequently their *real* union and true organization forms absolute knowledge; but on no account their mere co-existence, concerning which nobody is able to comprehend how they can co-exist with each other, and which would form a mere formal and negative unity; a non-diversity, which could after all (God knows for what reasons) be only postulated, but could never be proved. You must not understand it as if Being and Freedom entered into any particular, consequently presupposed, knowledge, and there uniting formed absolute knowledge by their union, thus constituting another knowledge within the first one. But *beyond* all knowledge, Freedom and Being unite, mix with each other, and this union and identity of both into a new being alone constitutes knowledge, as knowledge, as an absolute *Tale*. Everything depends on understanding this properly, and the neglect to so understand it has caused an infinity of errors.

But it might be asked, how we, who undoubtedly are also

gifted only with knowledge, can undertake seemingly to go beyond all knowledge and construct knowledge itself out of a non-knowledge; or, in other words, how the contemplation of the absolute knowledge, to which we have invited the reader in our demonstration, and which can also be surely only a knowledge, is at all possible—a possibility, however, which we have shown above to be the condition of the possibility of the Science of Knowledge;—and again, how we could undertake to describe this contemplation, or this knowledge, as a non-knowledge, as we have done. The answer to these questions will be found as we proceed. This continual referring to our further progress arises from the peculiar method of the Science of Knowledge, as demonstrated before. A clearness is wanting, which can be found only in a second link of our argument.

It must be considered, however, that the absolute knowledge has here been described simply so far as its *substance* is concerned. Being and Freedom, we have said, *unite* together; *they*, therefore, are the active, if we can speak of anything active in this connection; and are active for the very reason that they are not yet knowledge, but simply Being and Freedom. But as they unite and give up their separate existence in order to form a unity, a knowledge, they are mutually connected with each other; for only thus do they form knowledge; separately they are merely Being and Freedom, and rest now in a state of repose. This is what we term the *substance* of the absolute knowledge, or the absolute substance of knowledge. It is possible that this absolute substance holds the same relation towards the absolute form of the same knowledge which Being holds to Freedom in the absolute substance itself.

§ 4. *Real Definition of Absolute Knowledge continued—
Description of the Absolute Form of Knowledge.*

Not the inactive Being is knowledge, we said above, neither is it Freedom, but the absolute union and fusion of both into one is knowledge.

Hence it is this union, regardless of what it is, that thus unites, which constitutes the absolute form of knowledge. Knowledge is a For-itself-and-in-itself Being, an inner life and

organic acting power. This its being what it is for its self is the light of life and the source of all appearances in the light; it is the substantial inner sight, as such. We do not wish you to believe, that in *knowing* an *object* you draw a distinction between your consciousness (*of* this object) as the subjective, and the object itself as the objective; but we wish you to understand fully and be convinced in your innermost soul that both of these are One and a mutual *Uniting*, and that only after and by reason of this *Uniting* you are enabled to draw a distinction between both. You must be convinced that you do not tie both together, after their dissolution, by a string, which you know not where to get, but that both are and must be organically melted together and united before you *can* divide them.

Or, think again the Absolute as it has been described above. It is simply what it is, and is this simply because it is. But this definition still leaves the Absolute without the power of looking upon itself; and if you demand, *for whom* it is—a question which will occur to you very naturally, and which you will understand immediately when put by another person—you will vainly search for an eye to look upon the Absolute outside of the Absolute. But even should we grant you this eye, which we cannot do, you would never be able to *explain* the connection between it and the Absolute, however loudly you might assert such connection. This eye (this being what it is for its own self) is not outside of the Absolute but within the Absolute, and is the inner life, the organic self-penetration (-comprehension) of the Absolute itself.

Science has given to this absolute within itself moving life, and being what it is for itself, the only appropriate name which seemed to express the idea: *Egohood*. But if the inner eye of any one of our readers is not gifted with the freedom to look away from all outside objects and fix itself wholly upon his self, all explanations and proper expressions will be of no avail in making us understood. Such a reader will misinterpret every new word we might add. He is blind and will remain so.

If, as appears from the above, *this being-for-itself* constitutes the real inner nature of knowledge, as knowledge (as an inner life of light, and inner sight), the nature of knowledge

must necessarily consist in a *form* (a form of Being and Freedom, i. e. of their absolute uniting), and all knowledge must consequently be *formal* in its real nature. And that which we have termed in the preceding section the absolute substance of knowledge—and which will perhaps remain altogether the absolute substance, as substance—appears to us here, where we have given to knowledge its independent existence, as a *form*, i. e. a form of knowledge.

§ 5. *Union of the Absolute Form and the Absolute Substance in Knowledge.*

A. Knowledge is absolute ; it is *what* it is, and *because* it is. For it is only by the uniting and melting together of separates—whatever these separates may be—but on no account by the separates in their separateness that knowledge arises. Being knowledge, it, of course, cannot transcend its own sphere, for, if it did, it would cease to be knowledge ; nothing can exist for knowledge but itself. It is, therefore, absolute for itself, and comprehends itself, and begins as real formal knowledge (a condition of light and inner sight) only in so far as it is absolute.

But we have said that as knowledge it is simply the melting together of separates into a unity ; and—let it be well remarked—this unity is within itself and according to its nature—whatever other unities may be—a melting together of separates, and no other act of unity.

Now, all knowledge begins with this thus characterized unity, which constitutes, in fact, the absoluteness of knowledge, and can never transcend it, or throw it aside, without destroying itself. This unity extends, therefore, as far as knowledge extends, and knowledge can never arrive at any other unity than a unity of separates.

In other words, we have here deduced the assertion of § 1, that all knowledge is the gathering together and reviewing at one glance of a manifold ; and we, moreover, have shown the infinity of this manifoldness, the infinite divisibility of all knowledge, about which we could learn nothing from the mere fact developed in § 1, but had to arrive at through a deduction of the absolute ; and this infinite divisibility is deduced from the absolute character of knowledge, which is *formal*.

Whatever your knowledge may grasp is unity: for knowledge exists and contemplates itself only in unity. But when you now again endeavor to grasp (comprehend) this knowledge, the unity of it will at once dissolve itself into separates; and the moment you try to seize one of these separates—of course, as a unity, since no other way is possible—this one separate part will likewise dissolve into a manifold, and so on, until you cease to divide. When you do cease, you have a unity which is a unity only because you pay no further attention to it. Now keep in mind that this infinite divisibility is within yourself, owing to the absolute form of your knowledge, which you cannot transcend, and which you contemplate—though without a clear consciousness of this fact—whenever you speak of infinite divisibility. Let it, then, nevermore be said by you that this infinite divisibility might have its cause in a *thing per se*, an object of your senses—which, if it were true, would only be confessing that you found it impossible to discover its cause—since this cause has been pointed out to you as existing in your own knowledge, the only possible source thereof, where you can find it whenever you turn your eye with a clear and earnest glance upon your inner self.

But it must be well remembered that knowledge does on no account consist in the *Uniting*, or in the *Dividing*, each by itself, but in the union of both, in their melting together and real identity; for there is no unity without separates, nor are there separates without a unity. Knowledge can never take its start from the consciousness of first elements, which you might possibly put together to a unity; for all your knowledge cannot arrive in all eternity to a consciousness of first elements; nor can it start from a unity, which you might perhaps divide into parts to suit your fancy, conscious that you could pursue your dividing into infinity; for you have no other unity than a unity of separates. Knowledge, therefore, balances *between both*, and is destroyed if it does not balance between both. The character of knowledge is *organic*.

B. Knowledge is not the Absolute, but it is absolute as knowledge. Now the Absolute, when regarded as in a state of repose, is simply what it is. What knowledge *is* in this regard, what its absolute essence, its unchanging *substratum* is, we have seen in the preceding section. But the Absolute

is, moreover, when regarded as in a state of progress or freedom—and it must be considered thus in order to be considered as the Absolute—what it is, simply *because* it is. The same must hold good in regard to knowledge.

It is clear that knowledge, in so far as it is not mere knowledge, but *absolute* knowledge, does not remain closed up within itself, but rises above itself, looking down upon itself from above. We shall not attempt at present to justify the possibility of this new reflection, which is after all self evident, since knowledge is an absolute *For-itself*. The deduction of this reflection, with all the consequences arising therefrom, we shall leave to the future.

But it will perhaps be well to remark, in order to throw all possible light on our subject, that this freedom of knowledge to reflect upon its own nature was silently taken into our calculation in the preceding division, and alone made it possible for us to demonstrate what we did. We said: "Knowledge is a For-itself for-itself, and can, therefore, never go beyond the unity of separates, and consequently can never go beyond the separates." Now there we had to presume, for the mere sake of making ourselves understood, that knowledge was not confined within itself, but had the faculty of expanding itself into the infinite.

But, furthermore, knowledge is as knowledge only for itself and within itself: hence, it can be only for itself because it is; and as knowledge it is because it is only in so far as it is this for-itself (not for any foreign and outside object), but internally for itself; or, in other words, because it posits itself as *being because it is*. Now this *being because it is* is not a characteristic derived from the absolute Being of knowledge (its state of unchanging repose), like the Being described in the preceding section, but is derived from the *Freedom* and from the *absolute Freedom* of knowledge. Whatever, therefore, is understood by and derived from the character of this absolute Freedom does not result from the *Being* of knowledge; this Being might even be possible without it, if knowledge were possible without it. This character, if it is, is simply because it is; and if it is not, simply because it is not; it is the production of the absolute *Freedom* of knowledge, which is under no law, rule or foreign influence, and is itself this absolute Free-

dom. From this point of view the reader must consider what we have just said; not as if we had intended to deduce this Freedom from something else—as we did in the case of the Being of knowledge, which we composed out of the union of the two predicates of the Absolute—but that we absolutely posit it as the inner immanent absoluteness and Freedom of knowledge itself. So much in regard to the formal part of this character of Freedom in knowledge.

Now, as far as its *substance* is concerned: “A knowledge is within and for itself because it is,” means: an absolute act of knowledge is taken—of knowledge, the *For-itself-Being*; consequently, an act of self-comprehension, or of the absolute generation of the *For-itself-Hood*;—and this act is regarded as the ground (cause) of all Being in knowledge. Knowledge is, simply, because it is, for me; and it is not for me, if it is not. An act it is, because it is *Freedom*; an act of *Egohood* of the *For-itself*, because it is Freedom of knowledge; *unity*, an altogether indivisible point of self-penetration in an indivisible point, because here only the act as such is to be expressed, and on no account a Being (of knowledge, of course) which alone involves the manifold, but which here belongs to the grounded and must therefore be carefully separated from the ground. An inner living point, absolute stirring up of life and light in itself and from out of itself.

Part III.

ON INTELLECTUAL CONTEMPLATION.

§ 1. *Union of Freedom and Being in Absolute Knowledge through Thinking.*

A. We have considered absolute knowledge in regard to its inner, immanent character—i. e. with abstraction from the Absolute itself—as absolute Being, and in regard to its inner, immanent generation as absolute Freedom. But the Absolute is neither the one nor the other, but both as a unity; in knowledge, at least, does this duplicity mingle into a unity. But, even apart from this, the absoluteness of knowledge is not absoluteness itself, as the term shows, but is the absoluteness of knowledge; existing therefore, since knowledge is for itself, only for knowledge, which is not possible unless its duplicity

melts together into a unity. There must consequently be within knowledge itself, as sure as it is knowledge, a point where the duplicity of its absolute character unites into unity. This point of union we shall now turn our attention to, having sufficiently described the separates.

At least one of the separates, which we have to unite with the other in knowledge, is the inner Freedom of knowledge. The higher point of union, which we are now to describe, is, therefore, founded on absolute Freedom of knowledge itself, presupposes it, and is possible only under such presupposition. From this reason alone, therefore, is it already evident that this point of union is itself a production of absolute Freedom, and cannot be derived, but must be absolutely posited; it is, if it is, simply because it is; and if it is not, simply because it is not. So much in regard to its outward form.

Again: the presupposition in the absolute reflection of the Freedom of knowledge, described in the preceding section, is, that all knowledge emanates from it as its first source; that, consequently, since Freedom is unity, we must start from the unity to arrive at a manifold. Only by this presupposition of the self-reflection of freedom is the higher uniting reflection (of which we speak now) made possible; but with the first we necessarily have the absolute possibility of the latter. Resting directly upon and emanating from unity, this higher reflection is therefore in its purest essence nothing but an inner *For-itself-existence* of this unity, which is possible in knowledge simply because it is possible, but possible only through Freedom.

(This reposing in the unity and inner for-itself-life, which has been shown to arise only from the exercise of the absolute Freedom of knowledge, is what is usually termed *thinking*. The moving in the manifoldness of the separates is, on the contrary, a *contemplation*. This we mention merely to define the meaning of these two words. But it must be remembered that knowledge does repose neither in the unity nor in the manifoldness, but within and between both; for neither thinking nor contemplation is knowledge, but both in their union are knowledge.)

Again: This uniting reflection presupposes plainly a Being, i. e. the Being of the separates, which are to be united; and

this Being the reflection holds and carries within itself, in so far as it unites them; each, of course, *for itself* as a unity, a point, because the reflection emanates from thinking. In this regard the reflection is, therefore, not a free knowledge, as above, but a knowledge which carries its *Being* within itself; is, hence, *in so far* bound by the law of the Being of knowledge, the law of contemplation: unable ever to arrive at any other unity than a unity of separates. What the reflection *does* is unity, represented by a point; what it does not, but simply *is*, and carries within itself, by virtue of its nature, without any co-operation of its own, is manifoldness; and the reflection itself is *materialiter*, in its inner essence—without regard to the two outer links connected by it—the union of both. What, then, is this reflection? As an act, unity in knowledge, and for itself a *point* (a point in absolute emptiness, wherein it seizes and penetrates itself); as Being, manifoldness; the whole, therefore, a point extended to infinite separability, and yet remaining a point; a separability concentrated into a point, and yet remaining separability. Consequently a living and self-luminous form of line-drawing. In a line, the point is everywhere, for the line has no breadth. In a line, manifoldness is everywhere, for no part of the line can be regarded as a point, but only as a line in itself, as an infinite separability of points. I have said the *form* of line-drawing, for there is no length as yet—this it gets only by grasping and infinitely extending itself;—nor is there even a direction given, as we shall presently see; it is the absolute union of contradictory directions.

B. The uniting reflection is, in its true nature, the for-itself existence of absolute knowledge, its inner life, and eyesight. Let us consider this a little further.

Absolute knowledge is not Freedom alone, nor Being alone, but both; the uniting knowledge must consequently be based on Being, but without detriment to its inner unity; for it is a self-comprehension (penetration) of knowledge; but knowledge comprehends itself only in unity, and this unity, the ground-form of the present uniting reflection, must be preserved to it. Or let us represent the matter from another side and in a more exhaustive manner. The present reflection is the inner nature of knowledge itself, its self-penetration.

Now knowledge is never the *Absolute* itself, but only the melting together of the two attributes of the Absolute into One. Knowledge is consequently absolute only for itself, and in this absoluteness only secondary, but not primary. In this One, simply as such, with total disregard of the infinite separability of contemplation, our present reflection rests and penetrates the same; that is to say, penetrates the oneness and goes beyond it to the attributes of the Absolute, which are melted together in it. To say, therefore, this uniting knowledge is based on, or reposes in, Being, means the same as, it reposes in the Absolute. (This is, in reality, self-evident; for as this reflection is the for-itself existence of *absolute* knowledge, the whole absoluteness of *knowledge*, described above, must appear in it. It is consequently no longer a knowledge imprisoned within itself, as we have heretofore described it, but a knowledge seizing, encircling and penetrating its whole self; from which fact we derive a slight glimpse of the possibility seemingly to go beyond all knowledge, as we did in a previous paragraph. Our mode of doing so was founded on the act of knowledge, whereby it penetrates its own nature, and which we have here deduced. It is, of course, understood that the two attributes of the Absolute are viewed as a unity.)

Now there are two points of repose and turning-points in this reflection, in Being or in the Absolute. Either this reflection reposes on the character of absolute Freedom, which becomes Freedom of knowledge only through further determination, thus simply presupposing Freedom; views only the outward form, the act; and in this respect the absolutely free and, on that very account, empty basis of knowledge appears as comprehending and penetrating itself simply because it does so without any higher reason, and the therefrom arising Being or Absolute (of knowledge) is inner sight, a condition of light. The whole standpoint of this view is simply form, or Freedom of Knowledge, Egohood, Inwardness, Light.

Or it reposes on the character of absolute Being, thus simply presupposing an existence, but making this an existence of knowledge in and for itself; views consequently the inward character of this act of self-penetration, and is thereby forced to subjoin a dormant faculty of such an act to the act itself, a Zero in relation to the act capable of being converted

into a positive fact by simply an exercise of Freedom. The fact *that* the act takes place, in regard to the mere form, is to have its ground in Freedom, as heretofore; but the possibility that the act *can* take place is to have its ground in a Being, and in a Determined Being. Knowledge is not to be, as formerly, absolutely empty and to create light only through an exercise of Freedom, but it is to have the light absolutely within itself, and only to develop and seize it through Freedom. The standpoint of this view of the matter is absolute repose.

Let us now turn our attention to the inner essence of the reflection, as such. It is a for-itself existence of knowledge—which is itself a for-itself existence;—and through this view of the subject, which we have always kept in mind, we gain a double knowledge, one, *for* which the other is (in the contemplation the upper, or subjective), and one, which is for the other (in the contemplation the lower, or objective). Now, neither the one nor the other, nor consequently both, would be knowledge if both together did not unite, and thus form only one knowledge. Let us now view this organic uniting of the reflecting and the reflected in knowledge both in a general way, and especially as it is connected with our present investigation.

1. That which, in uniting, forms knowledge is always Freedom and Being. Now in the reflection, spoken of above, the upper, subjective, with its actual result within knowledge, is a uniting, consequently an act or Freedom of knowledge, which can change into a knowledge only by uniting with a Being of knowledge, closely connected with it. (The line which is to be drawn can occur as line in a knowledge only when drawn within a something itself fixed and unchanging.)

2. Whatever is in the immediate neighborhood of and connected with this act of uniting, is, according to the above, the standpoint of the uniting reflection, in the unity of the point, which standpoint may be a twofold one. In it knowledge appears as an unchangeable Being, a Being simply what it is; consequently, a remaining in the standpoint, on which it happens to rest, without faltering or changing, but on no account a balancing between both standpoints.

Now this uniting reflection, or thinking, must repose either in the first described standpoint of absolute Freedom;—and then

the line is drawn from this standpoint to that of Being; knowledge is regarded as simply its own cause, and all Being of knowledge and all Being for knowledge, i. e. as it appears in knowledge, as having its absolute ground in Freedom. (The material contents of the described line would be *illumination*.) The expression of this view of the matter would be: there is simply no Being (of course, for knowledge, since this view is based on the standpoint of knowledge) except through knowledge itself. (Nothing is to which Being is not given by knowledge.) We will call this line the *ideal*.

Or the reflection reposes on the last described standpoint of the unchanging, the permanent;—and then it describes its line from the point of absolute Being and condition of light to the development of the same through absolute Freedom (and the material of the line would be *enlightenment*). We will call this line the *real*.

But upon *one* of these standpoints the reflection would necessarily repose; and when reposing upon the one, not upon the other; and one of the two directions the line would necessarily receive, and then not the other.

REMARKS.—I. A knowledge which, through its connection with its branch-knowledge, is posited as being simply what it is, is a knowledge of *Quality*.

Such a knowledge is necessarily a *Thinking*, for only thinking reposes upon itself by virtue of its form of unity; contemplation, on the contrary, never arrives at a unity which cannot again be dissolved into separates.

The knowledge of quality, of which we have spoken *here*, is the absolute *for-itself*-existence of absolute knowledge itself. Beyond and outside of this no knowledge can penetrate. Now, qualities are only in knowledge; for the quality itself can be fixed, determined, only by knowledge. The two qualities here deduced, Being and Freedom, are consequently the highest and absolute qualities. This shows how we came to find them above as the not-to-be-united and no-further-to-be-analyzed qualities of *the Absolute*. The Absolute is probably nothing else than the union of the two first qualities in the formal unity of thought.

II. Let us consider the following sentences, which can be proved by the immediate contemplation of every one:

1. No absolute, immediate knowledge, except of Freedom; or immediate knowledge can know only of Freedom. For knowledge is unity of separates or opposites: but separates are united into unity only by absolute Freedom (a point which we have proved above, but which everybody can moreover convince himself of by immediate contemplation). Only Freedom is the first, immediate object of a knowledge. (In other words, knowledge starts only from self-consciousness.)

2. No immediate, absolute Freedom, except in and through a knowledge. Immediate, I say; a Freedom which is what it is, simply because it is; or negatively, which has no other ground of its determined character than itself (no such other ground, for instance, as natural instinct would be). For only such a Freedom can unite absolute opposites: but opposites are united only in a knowledge. (In Being or Determinedness of quality opposites exclude each other.)

3. Knowledge and Freedom are consequently inseparably united. Although we draw a distinction between them—how, why, and in what regard we can do this will appear in due course of time—they are in reality not to be distinguished at all, but are simply one and the same. A free and infinite life—a *For-itself*, which sees *its own* infinity—the *Being* and the *Freedom* of this light, melted together in the closest union: this is absolute knowledge. The free light, which sees itself as Being; the Being, which sees itself as free: this is the standpoint of absolute knowledge. These propositions are decisive for all transcendental philosophy.

4. If this has been understood, the question will arise, how and from what standpoint has it been understood? From what higher truth can it be demonstrated? Everyone who has understood the foregoing will reply: I understand and see that the nature of knowledge must be thus simply because I so understand it; this conviction expresses my original Being.

In the above we have consequently created an immediate contemplation of absolute knowledge within us; and in the present moment, wherein we become conscious of this fact, we have again created a contemplation (for-itself-existence) of this contemplation. The latter is the point of union important to us here.

§ 2. *Description of the Absolute Substance of Intellectual Contemplation as the For-itself of that Thinking.*

We now return to the first contemplation, as the object of ours. In that contemplation, a lower contemplation (view) of knowledge and a *Being* of this knowledge were united. To begin with the former:

1. No immediate knowledge except of Freedom. Here the inner form of knowledge was presupposed, and from this form a conclusion was drawn as to its possible exterior, its object. The point of view was in this form, and this form placed itself before itself as Freedom.

2. No absolute Freedom except in a knowledge. Here the form of Freedom was presupposed; in it the contemplation rested and viewed itself as of necessity a knowledge.

In the first instance we had an absolute for-and-in-itself Being of knowledge, as real unity, dividing itself into an outer absolute multiplicity, founded on Freedom. Its reflex (For-itself existence) lies in the centre.

At present we have an immediate self-grasping of the outward unity (through Freedom) in the multiplicity and melting together of the same to the inner and real unity of knowledge. The uniting reflex is here also in the centre. (*Inner* and *outward* unity we use here merely as temporary expressions to make ourselves better understood until we can explain them.)

Now both is to be simply one and the same: absolute Freedom is to be knowledge, and absolute knowledge Freedom. Both are not *viewed* (contemplated) as One—as we have seen, since we always have to proceed from one of the two points of view to the other;—but they are to *be* one. The middle and turning point, which we characterized above as the reflex of the absolute knowledge, is this one *Being*; and thus it also appears how the two possible descriptions thereof are always merely descriptions of the same Being of absolute knowledge. Unity of this Being and its two descriptions is consequently the lower contemplation.

Let us now approach the real end of our investigation, and make this contemplation again its own object; that is to say, not, let us make an object again of this object-making; but rather, let us ourselves *be* in the following this very contem-

plation, which, as it is the contemplation of the absolute intellectualizing, may well be called *intellectual contemplation*.

We are it in the following manner:—In the above described contemplation, absolute knowledge evidently seizes (grasps) itself, in its absolute spirit, in an absolute manner. 1. It *has* itself from itself, in its absolute nature, in the unity: it is, precisely because it is knowledge, in its existence at the same time *for* itself. 2. It grasps, contemplates and describes itself in this contemplation in the above mentioned manner, as unity of Freedom and of knowledge, which latter is here viewed in a somewhat different manner, and no longer as absolutely *being*.

But for the very purpose of describing itself, it is necessary that it should possess itself *as* knowledge (as realized knowledge). Now, what sort of knowledge is this latter? We have sufficiently described it: a firm, in itself reposing, in and through itself determined (presupposing, in relation to its form, no Freedom, but itself presupposed by absolute *Freedom*) *thought* (act of life, of thinking) of the before-mentioned absolute identity of Freedom and Knowledge (the last expression used in its former and broader sense, as the pure form of the for-itself). This living thought is it which views itself in the intellectual contemplation, not as thought, but as knowledge; because the absolute *form* of knowledge (the for-itself existence, absolute possibility, to be in every Being at the same time the reflex thereof) which lies within it, realizes itself (in making this reflection) because it can so realize itself by virtue of the absolute formal Freedom of knowledge. Thus the thought views itself in this contemplation in an absolute (absolutely free) manner, according to its absolute Essence. This is sufficient so far as the substance of the intellectual contemplation is concerned. Now in regard to its *form*, whereby we in a certain manner keep it no longer within us, but make it an object of our reflection.

§ 3. *Description of the Absolute Form of Intellectual Contemplation as Original Act of Reflection.*

The thought, or knowledge, takes hold of itself with absolute Freedom. This presupposes a previous tearing itself away on the part of the thought from itself, in order to take hold of

itself again, and make itself its own object; presupposes an *emptiness* of absolute Freedom, in order to be *for* itself. Freedom creates itself, and precisely this gives us a duplicity of Freedom, which must be presupposed, however, for the act of intellectual contemplation (and generally for every reflection, in its infinite, ever higher rising possibility), and which consequently belongs to the original nature of knowledge. It is this not-being of absolute Freedom, in order to be, and to enter Being, which we here direct attention to. In the lower (objectivated) knowledge, Freedom *is* and Being *is*. Here both *is* not, but is *in progress of being*.

In this act knowledge stands revealed to itself: 1st, as *Freedom*, whereby it describes Being; and 2d, as *Being*, which is described. In this act *both* is for itself, and without the act neither would be; all would be blindness and death. Through this act Freedom actually becomes Freedom, which is at once apparent; and Thought becomes Thought, which is to be remembered. This act brings *visibility* and *light* into both; creates it within them. It is the absolute *reflection*: and the nature of this reflection is an ACT. (This is of infinite importance.)

No reflection, therefore, as an act, without absolute Being of knowledge; again, no Being (state of repose) of knowledge without reflection; for else it would be no knowledge, and would contain neither Freedom (*which is only in an act*, and receives its Being only through this act) nor Being of knowledge, which is only *for-itself*.

Thus both standpoints are united in this contemplation. Whether you deduce Being from Freedom, or Freedom from Being, the deduction is always the same from the same, only viewed in a different manner; for Freedom or Knowledge is *Being* itself, and Being is Knowledge itself, and there is positively no other Being. Both views are inseparably connected, and should they nevertheless be separated—the possibility of which we can as yet only partially comprehend—they will be only different views of one and the same.

This is the true spirit of transcendental Idealism. All Being is Knowledge, The foundation of the universe is not *anti-spirit*, *un-spirit*, the relation and connection of which with spirit we should never be able to understand, but is itself spi-

rit. No death, no lifeless matter; but everywhere life, spirit, intelligence: a spiritual empire, absolutely nothing else.

On the other hand, all knowledge, if it be a *knowledge*—how error and delusions are possible, not as *substantes* of knowledge, for that is impossible, but as *accidentes* thereof, we shall see in time,—is *Being* (posits absolute reality and objectivity).

Now to the whole of this absolute reflection there is presupposed a Being of Thought as well as of (in this place stationary and existing) Freedom; and here, also, the one is not without the other. At the same time there is in the lower knowledge likewise, as has been shown, Freedom and Being (i. e. possibility of reflection, and the pure, absolute Thought), and either is also not without the other, as above. Finally, the two connections of the same, the upper and the lower, are not without each other; and we thus arrive, when consciousness begins, at an inseparable *Fivefold*, as a perfect synthesis. In the centre of it, i. e. in the act of reflecting, the intellectual contemplation has its place, and connects both, and in both the branch-members of both.

§ 4. *The Absolute Ego as Absolute Form of Knowledge.*

The intellectual contemplation stands in the centre and unites: what does this mean? Evidently, the (lower) Being is *at the same time* in and for itself, and illuminates and penetrates itself in this for-itself-existence. The contemplation, the free For-itself, is consequently essentially connected with it; and only both together are a knowledge; and otherwise Being would be blind. On the other hand, the (upper) contemplation—the free For-itself—is received into the form of repose and determinateness, and only in this union becomes a knowledge; for, in the other case, the Freedom of the For-itself would be empty and void, and would dissolve into nothingness. Thus knowledge is partly illuminating its Being, partly determining its For-itself (Light): the absolute identity of both is the intellectual contemplation, or the absolute form of knowledge, the pure form of the Ego. The *For* is only in the light; but it is at the same time a for-itself—a Being placed in the light before its own eye.

Here—which is very important—the intellectual contempla-

tion dwells within itself; it is inwardly a pure *For*, and nothing else. In order to illustrate this very abstract and in itself incomprehensible thought through its opposite (because this thought, as will soon be shown, is possible only with its opposite): an object, as *Ego* (intelligence) is above, for which there is a lower objective; but this latter is itself nothing but the upper *Ego* (intelligence). In the upper the contemplation reposes and is grounded; in the lower, Being reposes and has its ground: but both are connected in an Identity, so that, if you do think a duplicity—and you cannot think otherwise—you are forced to predicate of *each* the contemplation and the Being. In other words, there are in reality not two members, one upper and one lower, connected by a line, but the whole is one self-penetrating point; consequently, not only the *being*—one of two members, and a knowledge outside of both (as, for instance, the contemplation of an external object), but the contemplation of *their* identity in the form of one *knowledge*. This alone is real consciousness—a remark which it is necessary to make here not only for the sake of the pointedness and clearness of our whole system, but which will turn up again at a future period with a highly important consequence.

Until now we have mounted upwards, have left all the different degrees of our reflection, by which we mounted, behind us, and stand now on the highest point, in the absolute form of knowledge, the pure *For*. This *For*-itself-existence is an *absolute For*-itself, i. e. simply *what* and simply *because* it is, not deriving its being from another object. Its contemplation reposes, therefore, in itself for itself, which we have termed the form of thinking. It is consequently, as an absolute form of thinking, held within itself; but it does not hold itself. It is a stationary, closed, within-itself luminous eye. (There is, as we have already shown in another way, an *absolute*, qualitative, determined knowledge, which simply *is*, but is not made; and precedes all particular freedom of reflection, alone making it possible.)

In this thus closed eye, in which nothing foreign can penetrate, which cannot go beyond itself to something foreign, does our system rest; and this closedness (in-itself-completeness), which is founded on the inner absoluteness of knowledge, is the character of transcendental Idealism. Should it, neverthe-

less, seem to go beyond itself—as we certainly have hinted—it would have to go beyond itself by virtue of its own nature, and this *itself* it would then posit as its self only in a peculiar manner.

And now, since we have discovered the absolute form of knowledge to be simply For-itself, the reflection of the teacher of the Science of Knowledge, which heretofore was active and produced something, which was known only to *him*, withdraws altogether. His reflection is henceforth only passive; and vanishes, consequently, as something particular. Everything, which is to be hereafter demonstrated, lies within the discovered intellectual contemplation, the root of which is the *For-itself* of absolute Knowledge, and is but an analysis of the same; let it be understood, however, not in so far as it is regarded as a simple Being or Thing, in which case there would be nothing to analyze, but in so far as it is regarded as what it is, as knowledge. This contemplation is our own resting-point. Still, *we* do not analyze, but knowledge analyzes itself, and can do so because it is in all its knowledge a *For-itself*.

From this moment, then, we stand and repose in the Science of Knowledge—the object of the science, knowledge, having been determined. Heretofore we sought only to gain admittance into the science.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S ÆSTHETICS.

Translated from the French of M. Ch. Bérard, by J. A. MARTLING.

Part III.

V. POETRY.—Poetry, which is commonly considered as forming a separate domain, should form a part of the general system of the arts. Without it, in fact, this system is incomplete; for poetry is the last form of art, the most perfect and most general expression of the beautiful or the ideal. From another side, the nature of poetry, its laws, and the conditions which belong to it, can be well comprehended only when we

place it in relation to the other arts, to which it is attached by community of aim or principle. It is thus that, having failed to study the respective limits of painting and poetry, some have exaggerated their resemblances and their analogies, and thus have led to conclusions false and prejudicial to art as well as to poetry. We shall not be astonished, then, that this part of the Æsthetics of Hegel, which concludes the theory of arts, terminates with a complete treatise upon poetry. The part which relates to poetry comes strictly within the scope of the work, and the questions which are discussed receive a vivid light from those which have been previously considered.

Without departing from a philosophic plan, the author treats here in detail: 1°. *of the nature of poetry in general*, and of its relations to the other arts, of the characteristics which distinguish its works from those of prose, and in particular from those of history and eloquence; 2°. *of poetic language*, and of the principles of versification; 3°. *of the different classes of poetry*, in their relations, their differences, and their special rules.

We shall endeavor, as in what precedes, to secure a comprehension of the connection of the ideas and the system of principles comprised in this interesting and complete part of German philosophy.

1. The first point concerns the *general character* of poetry and its *connection with the other arts*.

We have seen what a gradation is established in the arts, according to their means of expression. Architecture, sculpture, painting and music form thus an ascending series, where one beholds thought disengaging itself from material forms in order to arrive at self-expression by a sign invisible, unextended, immaterial as thought, by sound, the echo of soul and of sentiment. Such is the reason for the position and the rôle assigned to music in what precedes, and which has furnished us the explanation of its effects.

But from the very fact that music rejects every sensuous and spatial figure appropriate to the arts of design, it finds itself thrown into an opposite extreme. It can express only sentiment. Clear thought escapes it, and, when it wishes to render its object precise, it is obliged to call speech to its aid, that is to say, a means which pertains to a foreign art.

Speech is, in fact, here the adequate and truthful sign of thought. Language alone is able to express all the conceptions of the spirit, the feelings, the status of the soul, and their development in action. The art which has speech as its mode of expression is, then, superior to all other arts. It is the art *par excellence*; it absorbs them, surpasses them, and crowns them. This art is poetry.

Poetry combines the advantages of the arts of design and of music. Like the first, it retraces for the imagination the the picture of external objects. Like music, it expresses feeling in its inmost and profoundest nature. It adds to it the clearness of thought. It alone has the prerogative of presenting an event in all its parts, and the complete course of an action.

Thus, the thing which characterizes and essentially distinguishes poetry is, that it expresses immediately all the conceptions of the spirit by images which address themselves no longer to the senses, but to the spirit itself; it employs a language which, by its clearness and richness, permits it to embrace the whole world of thought.

If we compare it with painting, it too can paint objects. True, it is incapable of attaining to precision of visible forms and of reproducing all their details; it describes them only in succession.

But spirit supplies this defect by the force of imagination. This defect, moreover, becomes an incalculable advantage, for by this very means poetry is no longer confined in a limited space; it can represent its subject in its entire extent and in the whole extent of its successive development.

Poetry is like music in this, that both employ sound as a means of expression. But sound, in music, is not a true sign distinct from the idea: it is confounded with the feeling which it expresses. Thus it is not treated as means but as end. Music elaborates and fashions for itself, and absorbs itself wholly in it. It (music) can embrace only vaguely the multitude of conceptions and ideas of the spirit; it is limited to expressing the feeling of the soul in its vague and indeterminate character. Spirit needs, then, to convert sound into a clear and distinct sign, indifferent in itself and designed solely to transmit thought. Behold, how essentially different are

poetry and music! With music art abandons visible form; with poetry it disengages itself from itself as immediate expression of feeling. It becomes capable of expressing thought as it elaborates itself in the very focus of the imagination. In music, feeling is identified with sounds; in painting, the idea is embodied in form and color. Here, in the sounds of speech, it is the whole thought itself which is expressed for itself by signs which are addressed to the spirit only. These signs are also fashioned by art; but the measure, the rhythm, the harmony of the verses, are only external combinations, not the proper element of art.

What, then, is the proper element of poetic thought? It is invisible, immaterial form; it is the *image*, the image presented to the spirit, the images of things preserved in the spirit and recalled by it. These are the materials which the poet must fashion, as the architect, the sculptor, the painter, or the musician, fashioned marble, brass, colors, musical sounds.

But this is only the form of poetic thought; what is the content? It is the ideas which these images must clothe and color. Here, poetry distinguishes itself from the other arts only by its universality. The ideas which it expresses more completely are the same as they reveal to us. The content of the works of poetry, as of the works of art in general, is the innermost essence of things; these are the universal and eternal verities, the principle of life which animates beings, the laws which make their harmony, the eternal types which appear in nature and the human spirit; in a word, the True, of which the Beautiful is only the splendor and the sensuous image.

All the objects of the physical and of the moral worlds, the phenomena of nature, the events of history, the scenes of human life, may rightfully enter into the domain of poetry. But, let it not be forgotten, it is only by their significant, true, substantial, ideal, eternal side—by their idea, not by their accessories or prosaic accidents.

Such is the true account of the works of poetry. As to the form—that is to say, the image presented to the spirit—it is necessary that it itself be fashioned according to the laws of artistic imagination and of the beautiful, before ever passing into speech and expressing itself in harmonious language.

From these principles it follows that poetry, uniting the materials belonging to the other arts, and surpassing them, is the *universal art*. It is such by another title: not being attached to any determinate form of art, to any particular type, it is adapted to all epochs; for it is capable of expressing every species of ideas, of treating every species of subjects, provided they be susceptible of entering into the domain of the imagination.

Such is the reason why, in the classification and theory of the arts, poetry is placed at the summit as the last stage of their development. And if, in a system like this, it should be treated last, it is because it represents the totality of the ideas and forms through which art has previously passed. We comprehend it perfectly only when we have seen all the limits by which each art is enclosed, one by one fall away.

In adopting this course, we have in fact followed the progress of the forms of art from the first even to the last, even to that where it itself begins to be dissolved, and to make sensible the want of a higher form for the thought. Poetry, in fact, touches upon the domains bordering upon the Beautiful, which are those of religion and science, upon those exalted spheres which lift themselves above that of art, where the spirit frees itself from sensuous images to contemplate Truth, abstract and pure.

After these general considerations upon the nature of poetry and upon the place which it occupies in the system of arts, Hegel enters upon the particular questions which the theory of this art should embrace. The subject which he treats, leads to three principal points: 1°. the nature of poetic work, and the characteristics by which it is distinguished from works of prose; 2°. poetic expression or language; 3°. the different kinds of poetry.

What is the nature of poetic work? In what do works of poetry differ from the other productions of spirit which are the domain of prose? To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine, 1°. what is the peculiar character of *poetic thought*? 2°. what is the *mode of structure* which is adapted to a poetic work? 3°. what are the qualities which are necessary to a poet in order to produce such works?

1. If we consider, in the first place, the essence of *poetic thought*, and that one may wish to find, in order to characterize his object, a more special direction than that which has been given above, it should be remarked that its true domain is the domain of the spirit. The ideas of the intelligence, the feelings, the passions of the soul and its destinies, in whatever they have elevated, substantial, eternal, and true—here is the content of poetic thought conceived in its generality.

Without doubt, the beings of nature and the beauties which it includes occupy a large place in the works of poetry; but their external and material side is not, in reality, what it sings or what it describes. Their concealed invisible element, their essence and their law, that which reveals intelligence in them, the life which animates them, the thought which they express—in a word, the spirit, the soul or that which reflects it—is that which it makes us know and comprehend. Nature herself is the manifestation of spirit; poetry is the interpreter of that divine language.

“Among all the arts, it is principally upon poetry that has devolved the task of revealing to the consciousness the powers of the spiritual life, the passions that move the depth of the soul, the affections of the human heart, the exalted thoughts, the entire domain of ideas and human destinies, the course of the affairs of the world, and the divine government of the universe. It is thus that it has been and is the teacher of humanity, that its influence is the most general and most extended.”

Let us now attempt to determine the characteristics which distinguish *poetic* thought from *prosaic* thought.

The distinction is seen in the first place in the priority of poetry, of poetic language artistically fashioned, to prose and language equally perfected.

But this is not only an external difference; what is important to comprehend is the particular mode of conceiving things which belong to the one and to the other. Now the proper characteristic of poetic thought is, that it seizes the unity, the entirety of objects in their harmonious connection, without distinguishing the parts from the whole, the means from the end, the phenomena from their law, effects from their causes, as positive or ordinary thought does it. It sees things exclusively as forming a living harmonious whole, moved by a common

force and soul. This principle of unity, which is manifest in each part as in the whole, does not appear in an abstract manner, as when objects otherwise separate are connected to each other in logical sequence. On the contrary, the unity which embraces all is the soul which vivifies the whole and its parts.

Thus the poetic thought preserves a *contemplative* character. This character reproduces itself in the expression: even the language is an end; it is fashioned for itself, and it forms a separate domain. Designed to express this harmony of things, it is distinguished from ordinary language, such as is appropriate to the simple expression of thought and to another mode of conception, practical, logical, or scientific.

Such is the manner in which poetry considers things. It is easy to understand the opposing characteristics of prosaic thought. Either this is, in fact, attached to the external and material part of objects, or it considers from the point of view of rational conviction, causes and effects, ends and means, according to the abstract categories of reasoning. Objects then appear distinct and separate the one from the other, or in their reciprocal dependence. The free unity no longer permeates and vivifies them.

Thought goes no further than the particular laws which govern facts; it proceeds by abstraction, analysis, and synthesis; classes them, combines them, and co-ordinates them, according to logical rules.

But the relations of congruity and reciprocity which it seizes are no longer those of harmony and beauty. The free accord, the independence of the parts and that of the principle which develops itself in them, disappears in this conformity to ends or to positive laws. The facts, then, appear either insignificant, isolated, without internal connection, deprived of essence or proper signification, or only attached to causes, to particular ends which cold reason conceives, and which, containing only the abstract, cannot interest the imagination. Their variety has still power to furnish a certain interest and to please the understanding; but they are incapable of satisfying a higher faculty, that which in everything wishes to seize the True, the essence and unity of things, the inner harmony which dwells at the foundation of things, and which is the bond of the various parts of this universe.

This defect disappears in the lofty speculations of thought, when science, penetrating the profound significance of phenomena and their laws, is elevated to the conception of the general order which rules the world. Thereby the poetic and the philosophic thought meet and intermingle. But what distinguishes them is that the speculative thought conceives of the principle of things in an abstract manner, divested of all sensuous form; while in poetry the True remains attached to the form, and cannot detach itself from images which address themselves to sense as well as to spirit. For the poet, the particular and the general, the idea and the form, the fact and the law, the cause and the effects, the means and the end, remain in their harmony and union without his thoughts' being able to conceive them separate, in their abstraction and their generality.

Thus poetry is distinguished from prose not only by language, but by the very content of the thought and the mode of conception.

Hence arise two distinct spheres, that of poetry and that of prose. This opposition characterizes itself in history. At first the separation does not exist: poetry and prose remain confused. Later they become distinct and are opposed; and when the positive thought has obtained the superiority, it is difficult then for it to withdraw itself from its habits of reasoning and reflection, to return to the processes of imagination and inspiration, to take again the point of view of poetic contemplation, to find again the original liberty of which art has need.

From another side, poetry is, it is true, universal art: it has flourished among all people, under all latitudes, and in all ages, in contrast to other arts, which have prospered only in certain conditions and with certain forms of civilization. It embraces the entire human spirit, and it affects an inexhaustible variety in its forms; it is in affinity with the particular genius of peoples whose most original and profoundest thought it represents.

There are, meanwhile, certain countries and epochs more suitable than others to the development of poetry, in which the movement of thought is at least more favorable to poetic conception. Such is the Orient compared with the Occident. The oriental thought is grander and more contemplative; it is

led, in general, to seize the entirety of the phenomena and the laws of the universe, rather than the logical sequence of causes and effects and the particular laws which regulate them. The genius of the Orient has always been that of synthesis and unity. The spirit of the Occident is, on the contrary, that of analysis, which considers things isolatedly, successively. It is the genius of abstraction and science. Greece holds the mean. Accordingly, its productions have been admired from all time as eternal models of perfection and of the Beautiful.

2. After having considered poetic thought in general, if we proceed to examine and compare the works of poetry with those of prose in regard to the *mode of their organism*, this is what can be said conformably to the preceding principles :

Every product of the imagination as expression of the Beautiful ought to present the image of an organized and living whole. Its unity is then the supreme condition.

An idea, a sentiment, a passion, or a principal fact, becomes a centre around which all the parts group themselves naturally, so that all present a free and living totality.

The conditions of this unity are the following :

The idea which constitutes the content of a poetic work should not be an abstraction, but a sentiment, an action, or a complete passion, where the whole man reveals himself, and which addresses itself to all his faculties. Even if its content is a general idea, its exposition, in place of being abstract, must be living and animated. Finally, this idea should offer a real centre of interest, not an aggregation, a collection, a vague whole. A vast assemblage of ideas does not suffice ; for the work should form an organic whole. The unity ought to develop itself from within ; the parts should be its members, its different sides. This law, evident enough for the arts of design, applies also to poetry.

As to the parts themselves, the first rule is that they should be in their turn developed in themselves and separately. The poet should confine himself to describing them as a complete whole ; just as, in organized beings, nature fashions with care the smallest details. He should not lose himself in a minute description of objects, but should dwell upon them sufficiently to produce a living and animated image. Through this par-

ticular care with which they are elaborated, the parts appear independent and like the free members of an animated and living body, not as the wheel-work of a piece of mechanism. This independence does not proceed to the extent of isolation; it allows the real bond, the unity to be seen—the unity which embraces and penetrates them. This harmony, opposed to prosaic conformity to an end, is the supreme condition of art and of poetry. It is the essence of beauty.

To recapitulate, two conditions should preside at the organization of a poetic work: 1°. a fundamental idea, a principle of vital unity, for the whole; 2°. parts not isolated, but preserving their proper vitality, independent without being isolated, deriving their value and their origin from the principal idea. The poetic work is thus full of a high interest for the spirit, and at the same time rich in its particular developments. It presents that harmonious unity where unity and variety are combined without being confused. This unity has nothing in common with the prosaic unity of simple conformity of parts to an end or to an abstract idea, such unity as presides in the organization of works of science, where the understanding rules.

These differences become more striking when we come to compare the works of poetry with those productions of human thought which most nearly approach those of art and even participate in them, but which belong to the domain of prose. We refer to *historic* narration and the works of the art of oratory.

History is not a cold and inanimate recital, a simple collection of facts and dates, where events succeed one another and confusedly accumulate. To interest, the historian should vividly bring up before us the picture of events and the images of persons, with their original physiognomy and their individual character; he ought to call them forth into life, to resuscitate them through thought and the power of his imagination. He ought, further, to co-ordinate them in such a manner as to present a whole, easy to grasp; a clear and faithful picture of the manners, of the spirit of an epoch or of a nation. Doing this, history is an art. All the grand historians — Herodotus, Thucydides, Tacitus — have been great painters, true artists.

But, in spite of these resemblances, history has its special conditions and its particular rules which do not permit its works to assimilate to those of art or of poetry. These differences hold both in content and in form.

History commences precisely where the poetic age, properly speaking, finishes, when the prosaic sense and the positive reason awake in the mind of nations. It is then alone that events assume that precise character, and offer that degree of clearness, which no longer permits fiction to interfere to pervert them or to embellish them.

History demands, further, an organized, an established society, fixed institutions, and legislation. Upon this solid and firm base, events unfold themselves and real personages appear. These derive their value from the interests of their time, and are in the service of its ideas; powerless by themselves, they fill a part dictated by their situation and by circumstances. Such is the historic personage, different from the poetic personage—from the epic hero, for example, who controls events, determines their object, and marches freely to the accomplishment of his designs. Here, the end and the means, the moral character and the development, harmonize and interfuse. In historic personages, on the contrary, the opposition between the ideas of the time, the general interests and the personal views, the passions, the accidents of a thousand kinds which are detrimental to the clearness of the whole, to the ideal simplicity and liberty of the characters, breaks out continually and introduces prosaic elements into the picture. In poetry, the accordance of the events with the general thought maintains itself intact, and overcomes all that constitutes a hindrance. Finally, the historic personage, in order to realize his designs, is obliged to employ a multitude of means, of preparations, which demand qualities other than poetic, a positive and calculating spirit, and a technical knowledge of military art, of finance, etc.

So much for the content. As to the form, the supreme rule of historic exposition is exactness and fidelity. Here poetic verity and historic verity are opposed. The first is nothing but conformity of facts and characters with the general thought, aim, and centre of the composition; it has no other limit than probability. Historic truth is the expression of the real;

but the ideally True may be really false, just as what is real may be poetically false and contrary even to poetic probability. According to this law, the historian has no right, in order to make a fact more interesting, to alter it, to change it, to suppose circumstances or to suppress its essentials. Granted that he can and should neglect insignificant details, should seek to seize and to discover the meaning, the spirit of the facts which he exhibits—he has the liberty neither of inventing, nor of suppressing, nor of arranging them conformably to a purely artistic end. Although rising to the conception of the general ideas and principles which determine the course of human events and decide the destiny of nations, he seeks to penetrate the divine plan of the moral world, he is not the less forbidden to alter the progress of those events frequently unforeseen and capricious, at least in appearance, or to assume the poet's privilege of hovering above the real.

Eloquence, no doubt, is also an art, and by a more rightful title than history. In the manner of treating his subject, the orator appears freer than the historian. He disposes and arranges his discourse according to his liking. In the employment of his means he only takes counsel of himself and of his genius. He does not wish merely to convince the understanding of his auditors, but to strike their imagination, to move their feelings. He appeals to all the powers of the soul at once.

But oratoric art has a side by which it passes out of the proper domain of art, and enters that of prose, to wit, the necessity of conforming to a practical end. Its first law is not the Beautiful but the Useful.

In fact, discourse at first derives all its power from a general truth which is its basis and object, and whose triumph it is destined to accomplish. This principle being given, the orator ought to conform to it all the means he uses and all the parts of his discourse. If we analyze it, the real content of such a work is a logical operation consisting in setting the particular case side by side with the general principle, and pointing out their agreement or opposition.

In so doing there is nothing which resembles a living picture or a representation whose only end is to adduce an impression of the Beautiful.

The difference in the object involves that of the procedures. The orator is under the law of that necessity which imposes upon him an obligation of causing all the means used, to converge towards the positive end which he proposes to himself. He ought, for example, when necessary, to abandon himself to abstract reasonings, to extended and pure discussion, to the full analysis of the principal fact and the circumstances. He still remains free to use the necessary means for moving and for exciting the feelings and striking the imagination of his auditors. But all these means are subordinate to a thousand conditions independent of his will, which force him to vary their use and nature. For the end of eloquence is not artistic effect, which is sufficient for itself. This effect itself here is only accessory and subordinate to the principal end, which is the triumph of the cause, or persuasion—an end outside of art. Emotion, in the same way, is only a means for obtaining the assent of the auditor, a judgment, a vote, an action, etc. The result, finally, does not depend alone upon the discourse. In a work of art, the effect is closely bound to the work itself; for if it is beautiful, it produces necessarily the impression of the Beautiful. But the most admirable discourse may fail in its effect, as that depends upon circumstances, or upon unexpected accident.

For all these reasons, the idea of eloquence differs from that of poetry. Discourse has nothing in common with the free organization of poetic work. The law of conformity to a practical end pierces and rules all. To this the orator must subject his plan, all the parts of his work, and all its means. One seeks in vain here for that liberty of inspiration and of creation which characterizes an artistic production.

In this dependence upon external conditions, neither the whole nor its parts can spring from a free soul. The work is under the control of logical principles and relations, of deliberate adaptation, reflected from means to end and from the laws of reasoning. It is not that living harmony where relations are lost sight of, where the Beautiful is the only object, the impression of the Beautiful the only end sought and produced.

From these differences result certain laws applicable to poetry in *its relations to history and the art of oratory.*

When poetry finds itself upon the same territory with history, it should treat the facts which it exhibits or recounts, in a manner altogether different from that of history. The exact duty of the poet is to seize the inmost signification of an event, an action, of a historic character, and to divest it of the accidental circumstances which may mar the effect or the poetic clearness. He may modify them or even change them for that purpose. He has the right himself to define the limits of his subject, to extend or contract it according to his taste, to give it a centre, and to connect therewith all the parts in order to make of them a harmonious whole.

If the subject has only a distant connection with history, the poet's hand is still more free. He then employs facts and historic events only as a general frame-work, or as a garment suited to clothe an idea with an individual form. He changes or discards in part the characteristic circumstances which do not conform to his fundamental thought. Nevertheless, reality has still its inviolable rights. He must not belie known facts or contradict our recollections. Moreover, the change needed must have its justification in the necessity of a more vivid form for the thought, not in ignorance of history, nor in caprice, nor in search for or love of singularity.

As opposed to eloquence, poetry must place itself on its guard against all that reminds us too directly of a practical end, foreign to art, and above all must not suffer a discord to appear between the demands of art, and political, moral, or religious designs. Without this, art is no more than an instrument. Subjected to a foreign end, it loses its own independence. Doubtless poetry may be an auxiliary; its employment is a strong support to religion, morality, etc.; but it should maintain itself in its serenity, ignore this pre-meditated purpose, preserve its characteristic free inspiration, revolve in its proper sphere, and not forget that its real, essential aim is the impression of the Beautiful, the representation of an ideal, superior to the wants and the interests of life.

This is not saying that it ought to isolate itself from the sublime interests of humanity; on the contrary, it ought to inspire itself with them, to ally itself to the great events and ideas of an epoch, to present in this sense a character of actuality. But it confines itself to causing their deep significance

to appear. If it attempts preaching or teaching, if it attempts either to persuade, to instruct, or to convert, it loses its serenity, its inspiration, its liberty. It should preserve this calmness and this independence even when it retraces the events of the day. Thus it possesses itself of them, and fashions them according to its pleasure. The actual fact is no longer its end, but its means. It is material in which the poet finds spur for his talent and an occasion of inspiration. Far from servilely imitating the real, he creates a higher and truer image of real life; an image which without him would not exist, and which he makes eternal more than the historian, more than the orator; if he have well seized the idea, he gives to it imperishability, and poetry becomes truer than history. Thus have Homer, Dante, and Milton, wrought.

3. If we now examine what are the *qualities* necessary to a poet in order to realize works of such a character, there are some general ones which he shares with the painter, the musician, and other artists; e. g. imagination, taste, genius, originality, etc. But there are others which result from the special nature of poetry, and from conditions peculiar to this art.

In other arts, the materials which the artist employs—stone, marble, colors, sounds—exact a particular, special talent, and a long-practised, technical skill. In poetry, the material being no other than images presented to the spirit, and the words which express them, the talent necessary to fashion them is and must be more general. It demands only the gift of a rich imagination, and the feeling of the laws of the harmony of language. In this respect the task of the poet seems more easy; he is freed from a multitude of difficulties which may overcome the artist, and which demand a long apprenticeship. But he has certain conditions to fulfil, and certain problems to solve, which other artists have not to face at the same point, and which demand a higher development of the human faculties. The more the poet is capable of attaining to the sensuous representation of things by visible images, the further he ought to penetrate into the secrets of artistic expression, to supply this defect by depth and vivacity of conception, and by richness of imagination. Through the very fact that speech is his medium of expression, he must always border upon prose, and avoid other forms of thought, religious, scientific,

moral, oratoric, and historic. If he wishes to preserve to poetry and its language their proper character, he must break away from the common habits of thought and reflection.

Finally, it is to the poet above all, that it is given to descend into the depths of the soul, and to lift the veil from its mysteries. He unfolds his subject to its vastest extent. In his living picture of human life, the whole physical and moral universe must be reflected,

He must, then, have observed nature and its phenomena, and above all, must have acquired a profound knowledge of the human heart; he must have enriched his intellect with a multitude of forms and ideas, must have assimilated them and have transfigured them in his imagination. To do this, the innate talent, the genius, must be slowly developed by a long apprenticeship at life, and by the contemplation of nature—a calm and serene contemplation which suits old age better than the passions of youth. Thus the most perfect works of poetry—those of Homer, of Sophocles, of Milton—belong to the mature life of those poets, or are even the productions of their old age.

THE SENTENCES OF PORPHYRY THE PHILOSOPHER.

Translated from the original Greek by THOS. DAVIDSON.

[As an appendix to his edition of Porphyry's *Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμφύχων*, Vettori, in 1548 (Florence), gave to the world for the first time the printed text of twenty-eight sentences purporting to have been written by Porphyry. Their existence had been made known previously through a Latin version executed by the famous Platonist Marsilius Ficinus, who entitled them *De occasionibus sive causis ad intelligibilia nos ducentibus*. Vettori published a second edition in 1620. Lukas Holste, better known as Holstenius, by drawing upon Stobæus and two MSS. in the Vatican, was able to add to the previous twenty-eight sentences seventeen more. He published the whole forty-five, along with several other works of Porphyry, in three editions, one at Rome in 1630, and two at Cambridge in 1655. The title given by him was *Sententiæ quæ ad intelligibilia ducunt*. Little attention seems to have been paid to these sentences till in 1807 Tennemann gave some extracts from them in his *History of Philosophy*. The learned Creuzer next undertook an edition of them, which is to be found inserted as an introduction to the Paris edition of Plotinus (1855). It is from this that the following translation is made.

In an article (*Ueber eine philosophische Propädeutik aus der Schule der Neuplatoniker*)

ker) in two recent numbers of the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* (vol. 52, No. 2; 53, No. 1, Halle, 1868), Dr. A. Richter shows that the sentences thus brought together and regarded as belonging to one work by Holstenius and Creuzer, really belong to two, or perhaps even three, different works, which, however, had all one aim, viz. the elucidation of the doctrines of Plotinus as laid down in the Enneads. This view is based mainly upon a passage occurring at the end of Porphyry's Life of Plotinus. It runs thus:

"The books therefore, numbering fifty-four, we arranged in this manner in six Enneads. Without any attempt at arrangement we have written down commentaries to some of them at the request of our friends, who urged us to write on those points in regard to which they wished to attain clearness. Moreover we have also arranged summaries of all the books except the one *On the Beautiful*, which went missing, according to the time of the appearance of the books. But in this are contained not only the summaries arranged in the order of the different books, but also essays which are numbered along with the summaries."

Here are mentioned commentaries, summaries, and essays, and all that has come down to us representing these is the collection of fragments before us. Dr. Richter considers all the fragments derived from Stobæus and the Vatican MSS. as belonging to the commentaries, while the twenty-eight sentences first published by Vettori would contain specimens of the essays and summaries. It is a pity that no thoroughly competent scholar has hitherto undertaken a critical edition of these valuable relics, amending the text and punctuation, settling the character of each fragment, and arranging the whole in such an order as to give some idea of the entirety of that great temple of thought whereof they are but broken columns, plinths, and bas-reliefs. As they stand at present in the Paris edition, they are arranged *ἀτάκτως* in the strictest sense. Not only are parts brought together which treat of utterly different subjects, but parts are separated which plainly belong together. This is owing, no doubt, in a great measure to the fact that the fragments belong to different works. The text is in such a condition that the best Greek scholar in the world could not interpret it as it stands. Creuzer was singularly unfortunate in his attempts to improve the readings. In several places his proposed emendations would entirely destroy the meaning of a phrase already clear enough.

The greater part, it might almost be said the whole, of the Neo-Platonic philosophers failed in the attempt to reduce their philosophic views to a system. The most successful of them was Plotinus; but even he, according to the admission of his most enthusiastic admirers, has rather left materials from which a coherent system might, by careful study and comparison, be deduced, than worked out a system himself. As the *Sentences* of Porphyry are connected, in the manner stated above, with the works of Plotinus, any system there may have been in the former will best be made apparent by reference to the latter.

In the eyes of all ancient philosophers, philosophy was at once the truth and the life. It never ceased, even in its highest flights and most abstruse forms, to have a direct and powerful influence upon its votaries. In the words of Hieroklēs, "Philosophy is the purification and perfection of human life—purification from material unreason and mortal body, perfection inasmuch as being a resumption of its own true life leading it back to similarity to God." Particularly is this true of the philosophy of Plotinus and Porphyry. With these men the all-important question was: How can the soul free itself from its present limitations, and attain that repose and satisfaction which it aspires after? and the whole of their philosophy was an attempt to answer the question. This led them to examine the nature of the soul, the character of its limitations and aspirations, and all the subjects

which an investigation of these involves. The ethical question was still the principal one; but though it lay at the basis of the whole, it had of necessity to be considered last. They saw very clearly that any absolute theory of life must rest upon the final ground of all things—upon Being itself,—and they strove with all their might to bring everything into evident relation to that.

The Neo-Platonic philosophy may be said to comprise five principal branches:

1. Metaphysics, or the doctrine of Being.
2. Theology, treating of the intellectual world (*κόσμος νοητός*).
3. Physics, or Nature-Philosophy, treating of matter and form.
4. Psychology.
5. Ethics, the doctrine of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True, the means by which the soul is enabled to climb out of the physical world to the heights of being.*

Note by the Translator.]

(1.) All body is in space: no one of the things which in themselves are incorporeal, or anything of such nature, is in space.

(2.) The things which in themselves are incorporeal, from the fact that they are superior to all body and space, are everywhere; not in a sundered, but in an undivided condition.

(3.) The things which in themselves are incorporeal are not locally present in bodies, but are present in them when they wish, inclining to them in the manner in which it is their nature to incline. But though not locally present to them, they are present by relation.

(4.) The things which in themselves are incorporeal are not present in reality and essence; for they are not commingled with bodies; but by the existence consequent upon their inclination, they impart a certain power which is immediate to the bodies. For the inclination gives existence to a second power, which is immediate to bodies.

(5.) The soul is a somewhat mediate between the essence which is undivided, and, as regards bodies, divided. But the intellect is undivided essence only; bodies are divided only; qualities and material species are concerned with bodies as divided.

(6.) That which acts upon something else, does not do what it does by approach or contact: but even those things which do perform an action by approach and contact, employ approach by accident.

(7.) [The] soul is bound down to the body by adverting to

* See Richter's *Plotin's Lehre vom Sein*, pp. 16, 17.

the passions arising from it, and it is loosed again by impassivity to it.

(8.) What Nature has bound, Nature also looses; and what the soul has bound, that it also looses. Now Nature bound the body in the soul; but the soul bound itself in the body. Nature, accordingly, looses the body from the soul; but the soul looses itself from the body.

(9.) Death, therefore, is twofold, that which is generally recognized, when the body separates from the soul; and that of the philosophers, when the soul separates from the body. And the one does not at all follow the other.

(10.) We do not think in the same manner in all things, but in a manner consonant with the essence of each. In intellect, for example, we think intellectually; in soul, logically; in plants, seminally; in bodies, phantasically; and in what transcends these, inconceivably and superessentially.

(11.) The incorporeal existences in descending are divided and multiplied into atomic things by a remission of power, whilst in ascending they are unified, and revert to inseparateness by superabundance of power.

(12.) Not only in bodies is there ambiguity [variety of things included under a common name], but life also is of those things that are in many ways. For the life of a plant is one, that of an animal another; that of the intellectual is one, that of (the nature of) the transcendent another. One belongs to the soul, another is intellectual. For these things also live, even although no one of the things that exist from them possesses similar life.

(13.) Every thing that generates from its own essence generates something inferior to itself, and everything that has been generated adverts by nature to that which generated it. But of the things which generate, some do not advert at all to the things generated, while some partly do and partly do not advert, and some advert only to the products from not advertising to themselves.

(14.) Everything generated from another contains the cause of the generation, since indeed nothing is generated without a cause. But of things generated, those that possess being through composition (synthesis) would for this very reason be destructible; whereas those things which, being simple and

incomposite, possess being in the simple [fact] of existence, being indissoluble, are also indestructible, and are said to be generated, not because they are composite, but because they depend on some cause. Bodies, therefore, are generated in two senses, i. e. they either depend upon a cause which produces them, or they are composite. Soul and intellect are generated things, only as depending upon a cause, not as being composite. Some bodies, therefore, are generated and dissoluble and destructible; others are ungenerated in so far as they are incomposite, and hence indissoluble and indestructible, but generated as depending upon a cause.

(15.) Intellect is not the beginning of all things; for intellect is many. But before the many there must be the one. And that intellect is many is evident; for it always thinks thoughts which are not one, but many, and are not other than it. If, then, it is [one and] the same with them, and they are many, the intellect also must be many: and that it is the same with its intelligibles [objects of thought] is shown thus. For if there is anything which contemplates, it must contemplate what is contained in itself as such, or as placed in another. And what does contemplate is plain, for along with thinking there must be intellect. Being deprived of thinking, it is deprived of essence. Wherefore, directing our attention to those states which are incident upon cognitions, we must trace out its intuition. And the cognitive powers in us are, in general terms, perception, imagination, intellect. That which extends its activity to external things by means of perception, contemplates by contact, not by union with the things which it contemplates, but merely receiving a representation of them from its application to them. When, therefore, the eye sees the seen, it is impossible that it should have come into identity with the seen; for it would not see if it were not at a distance. In a similar manner, that which is touched would be destroyed by coming into identity. From which it is evident that both perception and that which uses perception are always directed outward, if they are to seize the perceptible. Similarly also the imagination is always directed outward, and by its tension it brings into dependent existence an image, or, in other words, it prepares outside, by its very tension outwards, an exhibition of

the image as being without. And the act of seizing by these powers is such, that none of them, by converging or contracting into itself, would meet with either perceptible or imperceptible form; whereas in the case of the intellect, the act of seizing is not in this manner, but [takes place] by its converging into itself, and contemplating itself. For by going beyond the viewing of its own energies, and beyond being the eye of its own energies, and the spectacle of essences, it would think nothing. Thus then, in the same manner, as there are [as we have seen] perception and perceptible [object of perception], so also there are intellect and intelligible. The former contemplates, by extending outwards, finding the perceptible contained in matter. But the intellect does so by drawing together into itself, and not at all by extending outwards; although some have held the contrary, thinking that there was merely a difference of name between the existence of the intellect and that of the imagination; for the imagination in the logical animal had appeared to them action of intellect. But for those who make all things depend upon matter and corporeal nature, the logical conclusion is that intellect also depends on these. Whereas intellect, in our sense, is the spectator of corporeal and other essences. Where, then, shall it find and seize them? Since they are things outside of matter, they cannot be anywhere. It is manifest, therefore, that intellectual things must be connected with action of intellect. And hence, if intellectual things are for the intellect, it will contemplate both the intelligible and itself in thinking intelligible things. And withdrawing into itself, it thinks through withdrawing into these. And since intelligible things are many (for the intellect thinks many and not one) the intellect itself must be many. But before the many lies the one, so that the one must be prior to intellect.

(16.) The memory is not a conserver of imaginations, but of those things which have been meditated to be put forward anew as problems.

(17.) The soul contains the reasons of all things, and energizes according to them, either when provoked to outward effort by something else, or when directing itself inward upon them. And when called out by something else, it extends its perceptions as to things without; but sinking into itself,

towards intellect, it becomes engaged as in the acts of intellect. Therefore, neither are the perceptions nor the acts of intellect outside of the imagination, one might say; [nor is perception or action of intellect anything else. Further,] as in the animal, perceptions do not take place without an affection of the perceptive organs, so the acts of intellect do not take place without imagination; or, to keep up the analogy, as impression is an accompaniment of the perceptive animal (animality) so the image of the animal accompanies the intellectual action of the soul.

(18.) The soul is an essence without magnitude, immaterial, indestructible, with life which has living from itself, possessing being.

(19.) The affection of bodies is one, that of incorporeals another. For the affection of bodies is accompanied with change, whereas the intimacies and affections of the soul are energies, which have no similarity to the heatings and coolings of bodies. Wherefore, if the affection of bodies is always accompanied with change, we must affirm that all incorporeal things are impassive. For the things that are separate from matter and from bodies are [as we saw] the same *in actuality*; whereas those things which approach matter and bodies are themselves impassive, and those in which they are contemplated are affected. For whenever the animal perceives, the soul resembles a separate harmony, moving the strings in tune out of itself; while the body resembles the harmony in the strings, which is inseparable. The cause of the moving is the animal, and this from its being endowed with life. It (the animal) may be compared to the musician [who moves the strings], from being endowed with harmony. The bodies affected by a perceptive affection resemble the tuned strings. For there the harmony, which is separate, is not affected, but the string. And the musician moves [the strings] according to the harmony which is in him. Surely the string would not be moved musically, even if the musician wished, unless the harmony dictated it.

(20.) The names of incorporeal things are not imposed from community in one and the same genus, in the same manner as [those of] bodies are, but from their naked privation with respect to bodies. Hence they are not prevented, some from being

existent, others from being non-existent. Thus some are before bodies, and some with bodies; some are separate from bodies, and some inseparate; some are existent by themselves, and some require others in order to be; some are the same with energies and self-moved lives, and some for their lives depend upon particular energies. For it is from a negation of what they are not, and not from a positing of what they are, that they are named.

(21.) The properties of matter, according to the ancients, are these: [It is] incorporeal, because it is other than bodies; lifeless, because it is neither intellect nor soul, nor aught living in itself; formless, other, infinite, impotent. Wherefore it is not even existent, but non-existent. It is not a non-existent as motion is, but a veritable non-existent. It is an image and phantom of mass; because it is that which is primitively in mass, it is the impotent, it is a striving for existence, a posited not in position, a somewhat always appearing its opposite in itself; small and great, less and greater, deficient and excessive; always becoming, and not remaining, nor yet able to flee; the deficiency of all the existent. Hence, in all that it professes, it lies. Even though it appear great, it is small; for it is like a toy, fleeing to the non-existent. For its flight is not in place, but in desertion from the existent. Hence, the images in it are in a worse image. As in a looking-glass, what is situated in one place is what appears in another. And it is full to appearance, while it contains nothing and seems everything.

(22.) The affections all relate to that to which destruction relates. For the admission of affection is the path to destruction, and destruction belongs to that to which affection belongs. But none of the incorporeal things perish. And some of them either are or are not, so that they are not at all affected. For that which is affected must not be of this character, but susceptible of becoming other, and of being destroyed by the qualities of those things which assail it and impart the affection. For that which is in a thing cannot be changed by anything that happens. Hence, for example, matter is not affected; for in itself it is without quality; nor are the forms which it takes, and which go in and come out. But the affection has relation to composition, and belongs to

that which has its being in composition; for it is this that is contemplated as suffering amid opposite forces, and the qualities of those things which assail it and cause affection. Hence, also, those things whose life is from without and not from themselves are capable of being affected by living and not living. Those things whose being is in an impassive life, must necessarily remain in life; just as affection does not belong to lifelessness, as far it is lifelessness. As, then, change and affection are in the composite, or what is made up of matter and form, as we saw that body is, whereas the same is not true of matter: so also living and dying, and affections of this kind are conceived in the compound of soul and body. This, of course, does not happen to the soul, for it is not a thing composed of lifelessness and life, but of life and that alone. And it is so from being simple essence, and because the reason of the soul is self-moved.

(23.) The intellectual essence is homogeneous, so that the things which are, are in the universal soul and in the particular. But in the universal even particulars are universally, whereas in the particular even universals as well as particulars are particularly.

(24.) The death of the essence whose being is in life, and whose affections are lives, must itself lie in a kind of life, not in an absolute deprivation of life; for the lifelessness in it is not an affection or path to non-living altogether.

(25.) In the case of incorporeal lives progressions take place, while the former ones remain firm and immovable, and do not lose anything of themselves into the existence of things below them, or change in anything. So that not even the things called into existence are so called with any loss or change; nor is this aught begotten, like generation, which partakes of decay and change. They are, therefore, ungenerated and indestructible, and, in this sense, begotten ungeneratedly and indestructibly.

(26.) In regard to that which transcends intellect, much is said in accordance with the acts of intellect; but it is contemplated by the absence rather than the presence of intellectual action. Just as many things are said in regard to the sleeping-state, through waking, whereas it is only through sleeping that cognition and comprehension [of sleep] are. For like is

known by like, since all knowledge is an assimilation of the known.

(27.) Non-being we partly produce by being separated from being, partly preconceive by adhering to being. For, of course, if we are separated from being, we do not preconceive the non-being that is above being: but we give birth to a false feeling, that, namely, which takes place in the case of a person who goes beyond himself [rises into ecstasy]. For every individual, as being actually and through himself, must have the capability of being carried up to the non-being which is above being, and along to the non-being which is the decease of being.

(28.) To that which is in itself incorporeal, the existence of the body offers no obstacle preventing it from being where it chooses and as it pleases. For as that which has no mass is inapprehensible to body, and is nothing in relation to it, so also that which has mass cannot come in the way of the incorporeal, and stands to it as non-being. Neither locally does the incorporeal move where it chooses (for space is an attribute of mass); nor is it confined by the presence of bodies; whereas whatever is in any way in mass can be confined and makes transition locally. That which is altogether without mass is also without magnitude, incapable of being seized by those things which are in mass, having no participation in local motion. Accordingly it is found in a sort of relation, wheresoever it is related, being everywhere and nowhere. Hence it is by a sort of relation that it is contained, either beyond heaven, or in some part of the cosmos. But when it is contained in any part of the cosmos, it is not seen by the eyes, but its presence becomes manifest from its acts.

(29.) When we say that the incorporeal is contained in body, we do not mean that it must be shut up like wild animals in a cage, for nothing corporeal can shut up or embrace it; nor as a skin-bottle contains liquid or air; but it must [be supposed to] call into existence powers which incline from unity as related to it, outward, and by which then it descends and is interwoven with bodies. Its coercion into body, therefore, is through an ineffable extension. But neither does anything else bind it down, but it does so itself. In the same manner it does not free the body when broken down and

decayed, but it frees itself by turning away from passivity [to the body].

(30.) Of essences which are whole and perfect no one turns towards its own offspring. But all the perfect essences are carried up to the things which produced them, from the cosmic body upwards. For it, being perfect, is carried up toward the soul, which is intellectual. And for this reason it moves in a circle. And the soul of it [is carried up] toward intellect, and intellect again toward the First. All things, therefore, make their transitions toward it, beginning at the extreme end, each according to its powers. But the ascent towards the First is, nevertheless, either immediate or mediate. Hence these things might be said not only to strive after the deity, but to partake of him according to their power. On the other hand, it is an attribute of divided existences, and those which are able to incline to many things, to turn toward their offspring. Hence, also, in these there must have been error, in these scoffing unbelief. These, then, matter defiles, because they are capable of turning to it, while having the power to be turned toward the divine. So perfection makes a separation of existence between the second and the first, preserving those which are turned towards the first things, whereas imperfection turns the first even toward the last, and makes them love those things which turned away (lapsed) before them.

(31.) God is everywhere because nowhere; and intellect is everywhere because nowhere; and soul is everywhere because nowhere. But God is everywhere and nowhere among the things that are after him; and he is there only as he is and desires. Again, intellect is in God, and everywhere and nowhere among the things that are after it. And soul is in intellect and in God everywhere, and nowhere in body; and body also is in soul and in God. And since all things that are and that are not are from God and in God, he is not the things that are and that are not, nor is he in them. For if he were only everywhere he would be all and in all; but since he is also nowhere, all things are produced from him and in him, because he is everywhere, and are other than he, because he is nowhere. Thus also intellect, being everywhere and nowhere, is the cause of souls and the things that are after them. And itself is not soul or the things after soul, nor is it in

these, inasmuch as it is not only everywhere in the things that are after it, but also nowhere. And the soul is not body or in body, but the cause of body, because, while being everywhere in the body, it is nowhere. And the progress of the Universe is to that which is capable of being neither everywhere at once nor nowhere, but which partakes partially of both [modes].

(32.) As it is a property of soul to be upon the earth (not to walk upon the earth as bodies do) and to preside over body, which does walk on the earth, so also it is the property of soul to be in Hades when it presides over a shade, whose nature it is to be in space, but which possesses its essence in darkness. So that if Hades is a dark subterranean place, the soul, though not abstracted from being, comes into Hades, drawing the shade after it. For when it has gone out from the solid body, the spirit which it has collected to it from the spheres follows it. But as, from its sympathy with the body, it has its reason, as a partial one, projected, according to which it had its connection with such and such a body in living, from this sympathy an impression of the imagination is imparted to the spirit and thus it draws the shade to it. It is said to be in Hades because the spirit partakes of the invisible nature, and the murky one. And since the heavy, humid spirit passes down even to the subterranean places, the soul itself is said to depart under ground: not because the same essence traverses places, and comes into places, but because it adopts the relations of bodies whose nature it is to traverse places, and to have places assigned to them, such and such bodies receiving it according to their aptitudes, from their particular disposition toward it. For, according to the manner in which it is disposed, it finds a body determined in rank and properties. Hence, with a soul more purely disposed is united the body approaching the immaterial, viz. the ætherial one; while with one who has gone beyond reason into the projection of the imagination is united the solar one, and with one that has become effeminate and is impassioned after form, the lunar one is connected. After it it has lapsed into bodies, when, to accord with its shapelessness, there have risen appearances composed of humid vapors, there follows complete ignorance of being, and darkening, and childishness. And indeed also in its egress, when it still has its spirit defiled through

the humid evaporation, it draws to it a shadow and is weighed down, inasmuch as such a spirit by nature hastens to depart to a recess of the earth, if no other reason draws it back. For just as the soul which wears the terrene shell must adhere to the earth, so also one that draws to it a humid spirit must wear a shade. And it draws a humid one to it when it studies continually to hold converse with nature, whose operations are in the humid, and mostly subterraneous. But when it studies to withdraw from nature, it becomes a dry splendor, shadowless, cloudless. For humidity in the atmosphere forms cloud, whereas dryness produces from vapor dry splendor.

(33.) These are the things which can be affirmed with truth regarding the perceptible and the material: that it is universally diffused, that it is changeable, that it has its essence in otherness, that it is composite, that it has [no] existence in and for itself, that it is intuited in place and in mass, and so forth. On the other hand, [the things that can be affirmed] of that which essentially is, are, that it exists in and for itself; that it is always situated within itself, and similarly that it always is in the same manner; that its essence is invested with identity; that it is unchangeable in its essence; that it is incomposite, indissoluble, and not in place, or diffused into mass; that it neither becomes nor decays, and so forth. Adhering to these [distinctions], we ought not, in speaking, to make any confusion between their different natures, or to listen to others when they in speaking do so.

(34.) One set of virtues belongs to the citizen, another to the man who ascends to contemplation, and who is called for this reason contemplative, and even a contemplator. And different still are those of the intellect, in as far as it is intellect purified from soul. Those of the citizen, consisting [as they do] in moderation of passion, are to follow and to conform to the conclusions based upon a calculation of what is proper or expedient in actions. Hence, because they have in view a social organization which shall not inflict injury upon its members, from the aggregation of the civil community they are called political. And prudence is conversant with that which is reasoned; valor with the passionate; temperance lies in the agreement and harmony of the desires and affections with rational calculation; while justice is the simultaneous limiting of each of

these to its own sphere of action, in respect to ruling and being ruled. On the other hand, the virtues of the man who tends to contemplation lie in withdrawal from things here [below]; hence these are also called purifications, being viewed as [consisting] in abstinence from actions requiring the coöperation of the body, and from sympathies with it. For these belong to the soul which withdraws toward true being. But the political virtues adorn the mortal man, and the political ones are preparatives for the purifications. For the man who is adorned with these must withdraw from doing anything by predilection with the body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with the body, but to energize, alone constitutes right thinking, and it is perfected through thinking purely. Again, freedom from sympathies [with the body] constitutes temperance. Not to fear, when withdrawing from the body, as if it were into something empty and non-being, constitutes valor. And when reason and intellect lead and nothing opposes, this is justice. The disposition, therefore, which is based upon the political virtues may be stated as consisting in moderation of passion, having for its aim to enable a man to live as a man according to nature. The disposition based upon the contemplative virtues consists in apathy, the end whereof is assimilation to God. But since purification [has a twofold meaning], being either that which performs the purifying function, or a property of those who are purified, the contemplative virtues are viewed with reference to both the significations indicated of purification. For they purify the soul, and are with it when it is purified. For the end of purifying is to be purified. But since purifying and having been purified are the removal of all that is alien, the good must be [something] other than the purifying. For if previously to contamination the process of being purified were good, purification would be sufficient. And purification does suffice; but what remains after it is the good, not purification. But the nature of the soul is not a good, but capable of partaking of the good, and having the form of the good. But the good for it is to be united with that which produced it, and evil for it is to be joined with what is after it. The evil is twofold, [first,] the being united with these, and [secondly,] being so with excess of passions. Hence all the political virtues, which free it at least

from one evil, have been called virtues and honorable ones. But the purificatory virtues are more honorable, and free the soul from the evil which belongs to it as soul. Wherefore, when it has purified itself, it must unite with that which produced it. And virtue [predicable] of it after its adversion (ascent) consists in cognition and knowing of that which is. Not that it does not have this [knowledge] in itself, but because, without that which is before it, it does not see the things of itself. There is, therefore, a third class of virtues besides the purificative and political, those, namely, which belong to the soul energizing intellectually. Wisdom and prudence lie in contemplation of the things which intellect has, whereas justice is self-related action in the progress toward intellect, and the energizing toward intellect. Temperance again is the turning inward toward intellect. Fortitude is absence of passion, in assimilation to that toward which it looks, and which is by nature passionless. And these follow each other in turn, as others do. There is a fourth species of virtues, namely, the pattern ones, which are in the intellect. These are superior to those of the soul, and are the patterns of those to which the similitudes of the soul belong. For intellect is that in which all things are as patterns. Science is prudence; wisdom is the intellect cognizing; self-relatedness, temperance; peculiar function, self-related action. Valor is sameness, and a remaining pure in self-dependence, through abundance of power. Four kinds of virtues, therefore, have been shown; [first,] those which are of the intellect, exemplars, and concurrents of its essence; [second,] those of the soul already looking inward toward intellect, and filled from it; [third,] those which belong to the soul of a man purifying itself, and purified from the body and irrational passions; [fourth,] those belonging to the soul of man which adorns the man, by setting limits to irrationality and inculcating moderation of the passions. He who has the greater, has, of necessity, the less; but by no means *vice versâ*. Moreover, from the fact of having the less, he who has the greater will no longer energize according to the less by predilection, but only in consequence of the circumstance of birth. For, as has been said, they have a generic difference of scope. The scope of the political ones is to set a limit to the passions as far as regards the practical energies

that have reference to nature; that of the purificative ones is to free entirely from the passions; that of those which relate to the intellect is to energize, without [those who practise them] ever coming to a recollection of the freeing from the passions. The scope of the others is in a manner analagous to those mentioned. Hence he who energizes according to the practical virtues is an earnest man; he who energizes according to the purificative ones, is a demonic man or even a good demon. He who energizes according to those alone which relate to intellect is God. He who energizes according to the pattern virtues is the father of the gods. We ought, therefore, to direct our attention chiefly to the purificative virtues, considering that the attainment of them is possible in this life. And it is through them that the ascent to the more honorable virtues is. Hence we must consider how far and to what extent purification can be carried. For it is a withdrawal from the body and the irrational movements of the passions. How it may be carried out and how far must be stated.

In the first place, then, the foundation, as it were, and basis of purification is self-knowledge—knowledge that one's soul is bound up with an alien substance of different essence.

In the second place, that which is seen from this basis is [how] to collect oneself from the body, and that which, as it were, is extended in places, and certainly stands in apathetic relation to it. For a person who energizes continually according to sensation, even if he does not do so with sympathy and enjoyment of pleasure, is, nevertheless, distracted by the body, being connected with it through sensation. And we share in the pleasures or pains of the objects of sense with a sympathetic inclination and approval. From which disposition it is incumbent upon a man to purify himself above all things. And this must take place if one partakes only of necessary pleasures, and of the sensations only as far as is necessary for health, or as a relaxation from labor, in order that he may not be fettered. Pains also must be removed; but if this is not possible, they must be borne meekly, and diminished by withdrawal of attention (sympathy) from them. Passion also, as far as possible, must be taken away, and must not be brooded over at all. If this cannot be done, the will, at least, must not be allowed to commingle with it, but must

be free from all preference for anything else. But the involuntary is weak and small. And fear must be absent always, for a man must have no fear with regard to anything. The involuntary applies here also. Nevertheless passion and fear must be used in exhortation. Again, desire for everything evil must be exterminated. And he will not indulge in food and drink, in as far as he is self. In [the exercise of] the natural sexual passions the involuntary must have no part, except to the extent of the sudden imagination which takes place during sleep. In a word, let the intellectual soul of the man who is becoming purified be itself pure from all these things. And let it desire that that which moves in the direction of the irrationality of bodily appetites, be moved without sympathy or attention, so that the movements may be cancelled immediately by the presence of that which reasons. There will thus be no combat as the purification progresses; but henceforth reason, being present, will suffice. The inferior will reverence it, so that even the inferior itself will be indignant, if it is at all excited, because it did not keep silence when its master was present, and will reproach itself with weakness. These, then, are the moderations of passion which assume a tendency toward the absence of passion. And when the sympathetic has been thoroughly purged away, the apathetic succeeds it, inasmuch as even the affection derived its movement from the ratiocination which through inclination gives the key-note.

(35.) Everything, according to its own nature, is somewhere; if only it is somewhere, it is not contrary to nature. For body, therefore, which exists in matter and mass, to be somewhere is to be in place. Hence also for the body of the world, which is material and in mass, being everywhere, is being in extension and place of extension (distance), whereas for the intellectual world, and generally for that which is immaterial and in itself incorporeal, as being unconnected with mass and distance, there is no being in space. So that for the incorporeal, ubiquity is not spatial; and, furthermore, there is not one part of it here, and another part there. For in that case it would not be outside space, or unextended; but it is entire wheresoever it is. Nor is it present in one place and absent in another; for in this way it would be comprehended by space; but

it is withdrawn from the hither. Nor is it far from this and near that. For the far and the near are spoken of as having reference to things which are by their nature in space, to measurable distances. So that the world is extendedly present to the intellectual, whereas the incorporeal is present to the world undividedly and unextendedly. And the undivided exists (becomes) entire in the extended, through every part, being the same as one in number. In that, therefore, which is by nature multiplied and magnified, the undivided and unmultiplied is magnified and multiplied; and thus it partakes of it according to its own nature, not according to that of the former. For the undivided and by nature unmultiplied, on the contrary, the divided and multiplied is undivided and unmultiplied, and thus it is present to it; that is to say, it is present without division or multiplication or position, according to its own nature, to that which is divided and multiplied and in space. But that which is divided and multiplied and in space is present to the *other* of these, which is external, without division or multiplication or space. Hence in conducting our considerations, we must seize the peculiarity (property) of each, and not confound their natures; especially we must not imagine or fancy the things which are present to bodies, as connected with the incorporeal. For no one must ascribe the properties of the purely incorporeal to bodies. For with bodies every one has a familiarity; but of the others (incorporeal things) one arrives at a knowledge with difficulty, being undetermined with regard to them, and never coming in direct contact with them so long as he is determined by imagination. You might state it thus:—If the one is in space and outside of itself, inasmuch as it has passed over into mass, the intelligible is not in space, and is in itself inasmuch as it has not passed into mass. If the one is image, the other is archetype. The one possesses being as in relation to the intelligible, the other in itself. For every image is an image of intellect. So, remembering the properties of both, we must not wonder at the interchange which takes place in their conjunction, if indeed we can say conjunction at all; for we are not considering conjunction of bodies, but of things that lie altogether outside of each other in the properties of their existence. Hence, also, conjunction lies outside those proper-

ties that are wont to be attributed to things of like essence. There is, therefore, neither fusion, nor mixture, nor conjunction, nor apposition; but their mode is different, appearing on the occasion of the mutual communications that take place in any manner between things of like essence, but lying outside of all the things that fall under perception. In infinite parts, if the unextended, being present entire, meets the extended, it is neither present as divided, giving part to part, nor, though multiplied, does it present itself to multitude as manifold. But it is present to all the parts of that which is in mass, to each unit of the mass, and to the whole mass and the whole multitude without division or multiplication and as one in number. But the partaking of it dividedly and discretely is the attribute of things which have their power divided into parts, and to these it often happens that they falsely cloak their own deficiency under the nature of another, and are at a loss in regard to the essence, which is wont to pass from its own [essence] into that of another.

(36.) True being is neither great nor small; for great and small are attributes of mass properly. It lies outside the great and the small, and is beyond the greatest and beyond the least, being the same as one in number; although it is found to be partaken of by every greatest and every least. Wherefore you must not conceive it as a maximum, otherwise you will be puzzled as to how, being a maximum, it is present in the smallest masses without being diminished or contracted; neither as a minimum, otherwise you will again be at a loss to conceive how, being a minimum, it is present in the greatest masses without multiplication or increase or extension. But taking together that which goes beyond the greatest mass into a maximum, and the smallest mass into a minimum, you will perceive how it is viewed at once in individuals and in universals, by multitudes and masses, being the same and remaining within itself. For it coexists with the magnitude of the world, according to its own properties, without division or magnitude, and, notwithstanding its own indivisibility, it comprehends the mass of the world and every part of the world. So, again, the world in its manifold divisibility is conversant with it, as divided into many parts, and as far as possible. Yet it is not able to include it either totally

or to the full extent of its power; but in everything it encounters it as infinite, and incapable of being gone beyond; and this principally for the reason that it is free from all mass.

(37.) That which is greater in mass is less in power, as compared, not with similar genera, but with things different in species, or through otherness of essence. For as mass was seen to be a going outside of itself, and a division of power into small particles, so, that which excels in power is alien to all mass. For the power, returning into itself, is filled with itself, and strengthening itself maintains its own might. In this manner body, passing over into mass, departs, in diminution of power, from the power of incorporeal true being, to the extent to which true being is not exhausted in mass, remaining in the magnitude of power which is the same through absence of mass. Thus, as true being has neither magnitude nor mass as related to mass, so the corporeal in relation to true being is weak and powerless. For that which is greatest in magnitude of power is destitute of mass. So that the world being everywhere, and everywhere meeting true being—in the sense in which it is said to be everywhere—can not comprehend the magnitude of power. But it meets it as something not dividedly present to it, but present without magnitude or limitation. The presence, therefore, is not spatial, but assimilative, as far as it is possible for body to be assimilated to the incorporeal, and the incorporeal to mirror itself in body assimilated to it. Hence also the incorporeal is not present, in so far as the material cannot be assimilated to the purely immaterial. And the incorporeal is present to the corporeal in so far as it can be assimilated to it; not certainly by inception, for in that case both would be cancelled, the material receiving the immaterial through change into it, and the immaterial becoming material. Assimilations, therefore, and participations of powers and impotences take place reciprocally between things thus differing in essence. So there is great distance between the world and the power of being, and between being and the impotence of the material. But that, which lies between, assimilating and assimilated, uniting the extremities, has been the cause of error in regard to the extremities, by adding, through assimilation, dissimilars to the dissimilar.

(38.) True being is said to be many, not from difference of place, or dimensions of mass, nor from accumulation, or from circumscription or comprehension of divided parts; but from otherness, which is immaterial, destitute of mass, and unmultiplied as regards discrete multiplicity. Hence it is one, not as one body, or as in one place, or as one mass, or as one many; inasmuch as, in so far as it is one, it is other; and its otherness is discrete and united. For its otherness is not acquired from without, nor is it adventitious, nor by participation in somewhat else, but it is many in itself. For with all its energies it energizes, remaining (unchanged), inasmuch as it constitutes its whole otherness through sameness, not reflecting itself in difference between one [part] and another, as in the case of bodies. In the case of these the opposite is true, and oneness consists in otherness, otherness in them being the leading [characteristic], and oneness being adventitiously superinduced from without. Whereas, in the case of being, oneness and sameness are the first, and otherness is produced from the oneness, being energetic. Wherefore the latter is multiplied in indivisibility, whereas the former is unified in multitude and mass. The latter also is situated within itself, being at one in itself; the former is never in itself, as having its constitution in extension. Accordingly, the One is all-efficient (universally-energetic), while multitude is in process of unification. Hence we must examine closely how the latter is one and other, and again how the former is multitude and one, and not interchange the properties of the one with those which belong to the other.

(39.) We must not think that on account of the multitude of bodies a multitude of souls were produced, but that before bodies there were many and one, without the one and universal's preventing the many from being in it, nor the many's dividing the one among them. They are distinct without being sundered, or having divided up the universal soul among them. And they are present to each other without being confounded, or making the universal soul an agglomeration: for they are neither separated by limits, nor again are they confounded; just as the sciences (knowledges), though many, are not confounded in one soul. Again, they do not inhere, as bodies do in soul, with a difference of essence. But they are

a kind of energies of the soul; for the nature of the soul is of infinite power, and throughout every particular of it, it is soul; and they are all one, and, again, the universal soul is other than they all. For as bodies, when divided *ad infinitum*, do not finally merge into the incorporeal, having their difference in the mere mass (bulk) of the parts, so the soul, being a vital form, includes forms *ad infinitum*. For the differences which it contains are specific ones, and the universal soul is with or without these. If there were anything like action in it, there would be otherness, while sameness remained. But if, in the case of bodies in which otherness prevails more than sameness, nothing incorporeal being superinduced broke the union, but all [parts] remained united according to their essence, but distinct as regards qualities and other determinations, what must be said and supposed in the case of specific, incorporeal life, in the case of which identity has prevailed over otherness, and nothing is hypostatized foreign to the form, and from which arises unity in bodies. And not even body when it is added to it breaks the union, although, as regards its energies, it hampers it in many respects. But its identity itself, through itself, does and discovers all things by means of its *ad infinitum* specific energy, although each individual part is capable of all things when it is purified from bodies, just as each individual particle of seed has the power of the whole seed. And as seed contained in matter is contained in proportion to the capability of each individual in the seeds [parts] of matter, and everything that is drawn together within the power of the seed has the whole power of it in each of its parts; so, also, that which is thought under the form of a part of the immaterial soul has the power of the whole soul. But that which has inclined to matter, though receiving the form to which it has inclined, will also be capable of associating with an immaterial form even if it meets with matter in itself, when, withdrawing from the material, it reverts to itself. And since, when inclining to matter, it experiences a lack of all things, and an emptying of its own individual power, and when carried up into intellect, it experiences possession of the fullness of itself according to the power of the whole, those who first recognized this fullness of the soul, enigmatically called the former Poverty, the latter Satiety, and with reason.

(40.) The ancients, wishing to exhibit the nature of incorporeal being, as far as possible, in words, when they had called it one, immediately added [that it was also] all things, such as the things cognized by the senses are individually. But when we had reflected that this one is diverse, not seeing in the perceptible this whole as One, or that it is all, in the same sense that it is one, from the fact of the All's being the One itself, they added "the One in as far as it is one," in order that we might think being-all-things, when predicated of being, as an incomposite somewhat, and might be rid of [the idea of] agglomeration. And when they have said it was everywhere, they add that it is nowhere. And when they say it is in all things, and in each individual capable of receiving it sufficiently, they add that it is whole in whole. And generally they express it by means of the most contradictory terms, putting these together in order that we may eliminate from it those conceptions modelled upon bodies which obscure the characteristic properties of being.

(41.) When you grasp an eternal essence infinite in itself in the extent of its power, and begin to think a substance unwearyed, unabating, nowhere deficient, raised aloft in the most utter life, full of itself, situated within itself, sated from itself, and not seeking even itself; [and] if you add to this the [notion of] place or of relation, by the diminution [arising] from lack of place or from relation, you have not at the same time diminished it. On the contrary, *you* have swerved (deserted), taking as a cloak the obtrusive imagination of the reflection. For, such a thing you will neither exceed or go beyond, nor will you give it position or dependence, nor will you diminish it even to a small extent, since it can part with nothing in a process of gradual diminution. For it is more unceasing (inexhaustible) than all fountains, being the ever-flowing, thinking, and incessant. If you cannot encounter it directly, you will not, by comparison of it to all things, be making any inquiry about being. Or if you do make any such inquiry, you will miss your mark and look at something else. But if you make no search, taking your stand upon yourself and your own essence, you will be assimilated to the all, and will not be contained in any of the things that are [derived] from it. And if the All is not limited, neither are you; for, having

put away limitation, you have become all. Notwithstanding, you were all even before; nay, even something was added to you besides the all. And you became less by the addition, because the addition was not of being. For to it you can add nothing. When, therefore, space is produced from non-being, it is accompanied with poverty, and is lacking in all things. When, however, it puts away non-being, then it is itself all fulness of self. So that * * * * * recovers itself, putting away the things that have degraded and belittled it; and particularly when one supposes himself to be the things which are small by their nature, and not what he is in truth. He revolted from himself at the same time when he revolted from being. But when anyone is present to his present self, then he is present to being which is everywhere. And when he let go himself he revolted also from it. Of such value is it to be present with that which is present in self, and absent from that which is outside of self. If being is present with us, non-being is absent; but while we are with other things, it is not present with us. It did not come to be present; but we depart when it is not present. And what is strange in this? For you, by being present, are not absent from self; and [yet] you are not present with self, though present; present and absent being the same when you look at other things, and neglect to look at yourself. And, if thus, while present to self, you are not present, and for this reason are ignorant of yourself, and discover those things which are present to you. and yet far from you, rather than the self which is by nature present to you, why do you wonder if the not present is far from you, who have become far from it, by becoming far from yourself? For the more you belong to yourself, although present and undisjoined (for self is in proportion as it belongs to itself), the more you will belong to it, which is thus indeed inseparable from you in its essence as you are from yourself. Thus it is in your power to know exhaustively what is present to being and what is absent from being, which is present everywhere and again is nowhere. For to those who are able to retire intellectually into their own essence, and to cognize their own essence, and in this cognition and knowledge of cognition to recover themselves in the identity of the cognizing and the cognized, to those, being present with themselves,

being also is present. But from those who go beyond their own being to other things, inasmuch as they are absent from themselves, being also is absent. And although we are so constituted as to be placed in the same essence, and to enrich ourselves from ourselves, and not to depart to that which we are not, and to be impoverished of ourselves, and through these again to be mated with poverty, even when self is present; yet, while we are not separated from being either by place or essence, or cut off from it by anything else, we separate ourselves from it by adversion to non-being, and accordingly pay this penalty, that, by turning away from being, we turn away from ourselves and are ignorant of ourselves. On the other hand, by adverting to love of ourselves, we recover ourselves and are united to God. Hence it has been well said that the soul is enclosed in the body as in a kind of prison, and that it is there bound with chains as runaway slaves are wont to be. Now it must strive to loose itself from these chains. Inasmuch as it has turned to the here, and deserted its divine self, it is, as Plato says, a fugitive and a wanderer from God. Every evil life is full of slavery, and hence is godless and unjust. There is in it a spirit full of impiety, and hence of unrighteousness. Wherefore it has rightly been said that by self-determination it finds the just, and that in awarding to each of one's fellows his due lies an image and shadow of true righteousness.

(42.) That which has its being in another, and which has no essence in itself apart from another, if it turns to itself in order to cognize itself apart from that in which it has its essence, separating itself from that, is itself corrupted and destroyed, inasmuch as it withdraws itself from being. But that which is capable of knowing itself without that in which it is, when it recovers itself from itself, and is capable of doing this without destruction of itself, cannot possibly have its essence in that from which it is able to turn itself away without destruction of itself, and to cognize itself without that. Now if seeing and all perceptive power, neither is a perception of self, nor when separating itself from the body, lays hold of itself, or is preserved; while intellect, when separating itself from the body, then acts most intellectually, and turns to itself and is not destroyed; it is plain that the perceptive powers possess

their energy through the body, whereas the intellect does not possess its energy or its being in the body, but in itself.

(43.) Incorporeal things are named and thought accurately by negation of body, as matter, according to the ancients, and the form of matter, when thought separate from matter, and natures and powers; so also space, and time, and limits. For all these things are named by negation of body. But besides these there are other things which are by an abuse of language called incorporeal, not from negation of body, but because it is altogether contrary to their nature to beget body. Wherefore that which has reference to what is first indicated, exists in relation to bodies; whereas those which have reference to the second, are completely distinct from bodies, and from the incorporeal things which have relation to bodies. For bodies are in space, and limits are in body. But intellect and intellectual reason exist neither in space nor in body. They neither immediately posit body, nor are posited by body, or by the things which are called incorporeal from negation of body. And though, for example, a void can be thought as incorporeal, it is not possible for intellect to be in a void. For the void would be receptive of body. But it is impossible to separate energy from intellect, or to give space to energy. As the *Genus* appears double, one phase of it the disciples of Zeno do not accept at all; whereas, accepting the other, and observing that the first is not similar, they cancel it, instead of regarding it, as they ought to do, as a different genus. Because it is not the other, they ought not to regard it as not being at all.

(44.) Intellect and intelligible are one thing, perception and perceptible another. With intellect is correlated the intelligible, and with perception the perceptible. But neither perception seizes itself by itself, nor does the perceptible. And the intelligible being the correlate of intellect, the intelligible also falls in the sphere of intellect, and by no means under that of perception. But the intelligible falls in the sphere of intellect. If, therefore, intellect is intelligible and not perceptible, it must be an intelligible. And if it is intelligible by intellect and not by perception, it must be an intelligent. The same [intellect], therefore, which is the subject and object of intelligence is the whole of a whole, and does not stand in the rela-

tion of rubber and rubbed. It is not, therefore, thought with one part, while it thinks with another [i. e. one part is not the object, another the subject of intelligence]. For it is indivisible, and the whole is intelligible to the whole. And it is intellect throughout, having no knowledge of absence of intelligence in itself. Hence, not one part of it thinks, while the other does not think; for in so far as it does not think, it will be unintelligible. Nor does it withdraw from one thing and pass to another thing. For that from which it withdraws, it ceases to be able to think. But if it is not true that one thing after another is within its range, it thinks all things at once. Since, therefore, it thinks all things at once, and not one thing now and another then, it thinks all things now and forever at once [i. e. in one eternal *now*]. If, therefore, the now belongs to it, the past and the future are removed from it, in this spaceless, present, timeless self-possession. So that the together (simultaneity), as regards both multitude and temporal distance, belong to it. Wherefore all things are as one, and in one—a One spaceless, timeless. This being the case, there is also no whence [or] whither for intellect, and hence also no movement; but energy as one, in one, free from increase and change and all evolution. But if multiplicity is as one, and energy is also timeless, a subordinate attribute of such an essence must be being-always-in-one. But this is eternity. Wherefore an attribute of intellect is eternity. But to that which does not think as one in one, but discursively and in movement, and in leaving one thing and seizing another, and in dividing and going-beyond, there belongs the attribute of time. For such movement presupposes a future and a past. Soul, for example, passes from one thing to another, taking up concept after concept, not because the first disappear, or that the second introduce themselves from elsewhere; but the one set have as it were departed while they remain in it, and others as it were are succeeding from elsewhere. But they do not come from without, but from its self-movement of itself into itself, and its passing of its eye over the things which it has part by part. For it is like a fountain whose waters do not flow away, but which spouts up what it contains in a circle into itself. Now the movement of this presupposes time; whereas the enduring of intellect in itself demands eternity,

not separated from it as time is from soul. In the former the presuppositions are united. That which moves counterfeits eternity, by the mere immeasurableness of its movement producing an impression of eternity. And also that which endures, in relation to that which moves, counterfeits time, going beyond and multiplying as it were its now-there (everlasting present there) in imitation of time. For this reason, some have thought that time could be regarded as at rest, no less than as in motion, and eternity, as we have said, as infinite time. Thus the one imparts its own properties (conditions) to the other, the moving always copying eternity from the stable, as if eternity were identical with its own Always (unceasing duration); and the stable, in the identity of its energy, connecting time with its own enduring, from the energy. Further, in perceptible things, distinct time is one for one thing, another for another. For example, it is one for the Sun, another for the Moon, another for Lucifer, and so forth. Hence one has one year, another another. And the year that includes these is consummated in the motion of the soul, inasmuch as all other things move in imitation of it. The movement of it being different from the movement of these, the time also of it is different from the time of these. The latter is extended both as regards locomotion and transition.

"THE LAST JUDGMENT,"

AS PAINTED BY MICHEL ANGELO.

[An Essay read before the St. Louis Art Society.]

At the commencement of the Western or European epoch of the World History we have two nationalities sharply contrasted: the one, the Greek civilization, seizes upon and represents in the form of sensuous individuality its idea of the Rational; the other, the Roman civilization, seizes the realized *will* as the highest goal, and accordingly exalts the interest of the state above all merely *individual interest*. The Greek

Homer paints for us the beautiful individual—Achilles, or Helen, or Paris, or Hector; so throughout Grecian history we are always called upon to admire the individual: the graceful symmetry of character, whether it be of Theseus or Ulysses, of Pericles or Socrates, of Aristotle or Alexander. The general interest does not overshadow the individual; the *Iliad* tells us how Achilles, by his wrath against the king Agamemnon, can thwart the purposes of the whole assembled army of the Greeks.

With Rome, the interest is not this interest in individuals centered wholly in themselves. We admire Numa and the elder Brutus, Curtius and Cincinnatus, Fabius Maximus and Regulus, Scipio and Cæsar, not for individual perfection so much as for their devotion to the state—for their self-sacrifice, and hence for their *personality*; for man becomes a person when he subordinates his mere individual will to the general will of the state.

Greece is comparatively external in her earlier civilization, Rome comparatively internal. The former prefers what pertains to bodily form and to urbane manners—in short, to the arbitrary side of humanity,—while the latter prefers what belongs to the inner character, to the deeper, more mediated, and hence more substantial culture.

Greece is the art nation and Rome the prosy nation of legal forms; art personifies all nature and makes every stream a river god, every fountain the dwelling of a nymph, every grove and mountain the haunt of dryads and oreads. Out of that land of childhood, peopled by fancy and imagination, we step into Italy as the land of manhood, wherein the spirit no longer dreams of air-castles, but plies the daily care, looks with sober eye upon the world and sees *things—prose facts*—and makes no more personifications.

In the course of events, "when the fullness of time had come," Christianity came into the world and found in Rome the ripest field for its insition and growth. It found its way also into Greece. The Christian spirit was more akin to the Roman life than to the Greek life: its penances and mortifications of the flesh were all foolishness to the Greek, but the Roman was used to personal sacrifice for the state. Hence Christianity had many a hard conflict with the Eastern life that

it did not encounter in the West. It had all the time a tendency to degenerate into image worship. How natural to pass from the worship of Venus, or Diana, or Juno, to that of the Madonna! Toward the close of the fourth century this became very prevalent and increased until Leo III., the great Iconoclast, effectually checked it. The strange inversion that then appeared is this: Greece, transformed by Christianity, goes to the opposite extreme and destroys all images, while Italy, whose prosy formality is broken up by the miraculous element in the Christian doctrine, goes over to the sensuous so far as to refuse to give up image worship, and to secede from the East. Their principle carries the day, and the Nicene Council makes it a Christian doctrine. Soon after, about A. D. 1000, the veneration for saints and sacred relics leads to the practice of canonization, somewhat after the style of deifying departed heroes in a remoter antiquity. This was the basis laid for a future period of art in the Christian Church. But the Crusades had to come first, and fill all minds with lofty aspirations that must be realized in some way. First by knightly deeds, personal prowess; and next the faint aurora of Modern Art arose above the horizon with Cimabue, Arnolf di Lapo, and Giotto. Then with Dante the new age began, Christianity had found poetic expression, and the Medici family a century after stimulated Art to its career of greatest splendor. Perugino, founder of the Roman school of Painting, is the precursor of Raphael, who finished his "Transfiguration" two hundred years after the death of Dante. Leonardo da Vinci, that universal genius, is a fitting precursor to Michel Angelo, the man in whom that age reaches its climax, whether we consider him as architect of St. Peter's Church, as sculptor of the statues in the church of San Lorenzo, as engineer of the fortifications about Florence, as writer of sonnets profound and subtle in thought, or as painter of the frescoes on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, and finally of the "LAST JUDGMENT," called the "grandest picture that ever was painted," and "the greatest effort of human skill as a creation of Art." In order to appreciate this great master-piece, we have to bear clearly in mind the antecedent phases of Art and the limits of their achievements. We have Symbolic Art for the Orient, Classic Art for Greece, Romantic

Art for modern times—this, if we take as our basis the generalizations of the best writers on the theme. In the Symbolic Art—the Egyptian architecture, for example, with its rows of sphinxes and huge pillars—we have a gigantic struggle—a vast upheaval—spirit struggling and upheaving matter to get free and say something. This something it can never quite say. It is a riddle to it, and hence the sphinx looks inquiringly to the blue vault overhead—an eternal question. Or the Memnon statue sounds at the rising sun, but can articulate no oracle that shall break this spell. Truth to the Oriental peoples has not yet got separate from the mere symbol. In Classic Art, on the contrary, the statue of Apollo stands opposed to the sphinx; it is the achievement of what in Egyptian Art is only struggled after. Spirit stands revealed in the posture and mould of every limb. The beautiful divinities of Olympus offer us the realization of this complete union of form and matter, of spirit and sense. The completest "repose" is the result—no struggle disfigures the placid seriousness, the flesh is completely plastic to the indwelling soul. Why is not this the highest that Art can do? It is, if the highest goal of spirit is simply to live a sensuous existence. In all modern time we have those who defend Classic Art as the sole form of art worthy of imitation. But the Christian era brought in an idea that contradicts at once the basis of Classic Art. The soul shall be purified only through renunciation—the hair-cloth shirt, the knotted scourge, the hermit's cave, the monk's cell, plenty of fasting and watching, these shall fit the soul for divine life. But not so can one gain a beautiful physique. Haggard, and lean, and gaunt, is Saint Anthony or Simeon Stylites—not at all like the Vatican Apollo or the boy Antinoüs.

So Modern Art must leave the repose of Greek sensuousness and return again to the struggling of the soul. But this time it is not a vain struggle as in Symbolic Art, wherein no free expression is reached; but Romantic Art represents to us the overpowering predominance of the soul over the body. Everywhere the latter is degraded, the former exalted. There seems to be an aspiration for the Beyond, *the supersensuous*, that which "passeth show," and hence there is a contradiction in it. You look to see—what it tells you distinctly that you can

not see—the truly beautiful, with the senses. But at the same time the soul is sent back to itself, and its inner spiritual sense is awakened to see the Eternal Verities themselves. Thus in the highest painting of this form of art—"The Transfiguration"—we are referred upward and beyond from the demoniac boy to the disciples—by them to Christ, who again, with upturned gaze, refers us to the invisible source of light beyond our ken. Aspiration—*infinite Aspiration* is the content of this art. But what shall we say? Does art stop here? Is there not a higher art than Romantic Art—an art in which we have presented to us the Total—the aspiration and its fulfilment? Such a stage of art does indeed exist, and deserves to be called "Universal Art." It is cosmical—because it is so comprehensive as to exhaust all phases of the subject it treats. Inasmuch as it resembles the Classic Art in its reaching a point of repose, it may be called New Classic Art. Such art is exhibited in a few great master-pieces: they are, chiefly, Dante's *Divina Commedia*—presenting the drama of human life as viewed from the Christian Ideal; Goethe's *Faust*—presenting the series of phases passed through by the individual who ascends from the abyss of skepticism to the complete appreciation of the spirit of Modern Civilization and what it presupposes; Beethoven's Great Symphonies and a few of his Sonatas—like the great F Minor, for example; Shakspeare's "Tempest" and perhaps the "Midsummer Night's Dream"; Michael Angelo's plan of St. Peter's Church and his "Last Judgment."

The Old Classic Art realizes its repose in the individual—this is true even in the *Laökoön*. But the Romantic presents the individual, or series of individuals, aspiring for a beyond, hence as out of repose; but the New Classic adds the goal of aspiration, and hence restores repose again. So the New Classic—the Michel Angelo form of art—differs from that of Agesander and Praxiteles as the full grown oak does from the acorn. The acorn is complete as an acorn, but the full grown tree is cosmical in its completeness; Romantic Art is the sapling oak—neither the repose of the acorn nor of the tree.

All these distinctions must be borne in mind if one would rightly appreciate the great work before us.

HISTORICAL.

The "Last Judgment," painted on the end wall of the Sistine Chapel at Rome, is 45 feet wide by 57 feet in height. It was completed and thrown open to the public on Christmas-day, 1541. We owe the work to the ambition of Pope Paul III., who wished to immortalize his Pontificate by finishing the decorations of the Sistine Chapel. We learn that a large copy of this picture, in oil, was made by Marcello Venusti for the Cardinal Alessandro Farnese; this copy is said to have come into the possession of the King of Naples. The most famous engraving of it is by Piroli—executed in 1808—in 17 plates, which can be united into one by skillful adjustment. Another and larger print is that of C. Metz (1803), in 15 plates, which are also to be united into one. (It is probable that our large photographs are taken from this engraving.*) The fine engravings contained in the large work "*Il Vaticano*" are from different engravers—some of them from Piroli.

To find a description of the picture in detail one searches diligently the works by Duppa, Condivi, Vasari, Kugler, Harford, and the rest, but the result is after all very meagre when the gleanings are carefully collected. The immense number of figures in the picture makes necessary a long familiarity to seize the *motives* which connect the different groups, indeed it seems to require a life-work to exhaust it completely.

DESCRIPTION.

In this picture there are upwards of four hundred human forms presented. They separate naturally into fifteen groups, as follows:

* A large engraving by Gio. Mantuano, in 11 plates, is also to be mentioned. Some parts of it, engraved by Domenico Fiorentino, are said to be more in the style of the original than any others. The books generally give us a few anecdotes and unimportant incidents—telling, for example, the story of Messer Biaggio da Cesena and of his features given to Minos, and of Paul IV. and Daniele da Volterra—identify two or three of the self-evident figures, and finish by a disapproving criticism of the execution of the work: "Christ is like a gladiator; the figures are muscular Titans," &c. Or they exhaust their wit in discovering that some portion of it "was borrowed by Michel Angelo from the 'Last Judgment' of Andrea and Bernardo Orcagna at the church of Sta. Maria Novella in Florence, or from Signorello at Oviato," or they praise the pictures of Fra Angelico at the expense of this one. All this is done in the same style in which criticisms are made upon Goethe's Faust, a work in the same mould.

- I. Christ as Judge sentencing the wicked.
- II. Group of Angels bearing the cross and instruments of the Passion.
- III. Cherubim and Seraphim hovering above.
- IV. Angels bearing the pillar, sponge, and ladder.
- V. Group on Christ's left, in which Peter is most prominent.
- VI. Group on his right, with John the Baptist in front.
- VII. Group of Sybils on his extreme right.
- VIII. Group of Saints on his extreme left.
- IX. Martyrs below him and to his left.
- X. Group of Angels with trumpets and books.
- XI. Righteous ascending on their right.
- XII. Wicked dragged down on their left.
- XIII. The Dead quickened and slowly rising.
- XIV. The mouth of the Pit.
- XV. Charon's boat and the Inferno.

I. (*Group.*) Christ sits on the "great white throne" in the midst of an immense throng of prophets, saints, and martyrs. The Virgin Mother sits at his right side, and leans towards him, while averting her face with sorrow from the wicked. Christ raises his right hand, not any more to threaten than to exhibit in the centre of it the scar of the wound caused by the nail; his other hand is also held in such a position as to show a similar scar. The feet, too, plainly show the nail-prints; and the wound under the right breast is the place where he was pierced by the spear. It is not a look of spite and malice that clouds his brow—but unutterable sorrow and tenderness mingled. For it is not *he* that hurls them down—it is their own deeds, done on him and on these martyr witnesses, that seals their doom, and makes them wish for mountains to cover them from this all-revealing moment. These reprobate souls have crucified their own everlasting life.

From this central figure streams the light in all directions, illuminating the angelic groups, the troops of blessed spirits, and the graves beneath giving up their dead. It meets the murky smoke and lurid flames of the Inferno, by which a ghastly glare is spread over the faces of the demons.

II. & IV. Above, on the right and left, the celestials are elevating to the view of the assembled universe the symbols of the mediatory acts of Christ. By these all shall know that he is of right the Judge of the world. By the sight of these, the wicked shall recognize their own just punishment, and the righteous shall see therein the seal of their salvation.

On the right is upborne the cross; the just made perfect are

drawn from the graves below by its sign. Angels, to the left of this, hold up the crown of thorns, the dice with which the soldiers cast lots for his garment, the scourge, and the nails. On the left side is seen the pillar at which Christ was scourged; back of this, angels are bringing the ladder up which he was lifted to the cross, and by which he was taken down therefrom. An angel with a lovely face is flying hitherward with the sponge that brought the only physical relief during that hour of suffering.

III. Overhead the cherubim and seraphim are seen hovering, and expressing their joyful recognition of the final justification of the righteous, and the supremacy of good over evil.

V. On the left of Christ, the most prominent figure is the form of Peter, bending forward, in the act of delivering the keys that open the doors to happiness or misery.* Just beyond his face is that of Paul (or Moses?). Kneeling between Peter and Christ, with his right hand upraised, is St. John; and lower down, with hands clasped, is Stephen. The face of Dante peers out between the limbs of Peter and Paul. Following the line back from Peter and Paul, we meet several of the prophets and church fathers.†

VI. On the right of Christ, John the Baptist is in front, distinguished by his camel's-hair garment; David (Christ was "the son of David") between the Baptist and Christ, his back partly turned toward us, his harp on his right arm. He reaches back to make room for the patriarch (Jacob?) to come to the front. Another ancient patriarch (Abraham?) can be seen through an opening below. Back of these, in the same group, some of the prophets(?) who have foretold Christ—(Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and others). They are intent upon hearing the words of doom pronounced.

* The gold key which opens the gate of heaven may be known by its cross-shaped ward; the other, the iron one, opens the gate of the Inferno.

† The curious student, who knows well the features of the figures painted on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, may identify several of them in this and the next group. Daniel (?) is a very prominent figure, with his hand stretched toward Christ. At his right and beyond him is St. Bernard (founder of the Cistercian order) and St. Francis, who is to be distinguished by the *stigmata* on the hand he holds out. Just beyond St. Francis (founder of the Franciscan order) is St. Augustine, known by his turban; near him are St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, and St. Gregory. Beyond these—the four Latin Fathers—are, perhaps, the four Greek Fathers.

VII. On the extreme right, the sybils and heathen poets (Virgil, &c.) who have foretold Christ, mingle with the elect, and the famous women of Scripture(?).

It seems that the prophets who foretold his coming are in the group nearest Christ on his right, and the heathen who foretold him are on the same side in the outer group; thus, those on the right side stand in contrast to the martyrs on the left, who have borne witness by *deeds*.

VIII. On the extreme left appear immense throngs of blessed spirits; many, full of joy at meeting long lost friends, embrace in pairs. The very old man in the rear of Peter is said to be Adam, and the woman averting her face behind his shoulder, Eve. This is very doubtful, however—like much else that is suggested concerning the individual figures.

IX. The martyrs are easier to identify: below the Virgin Mary, St. Lawrence is seen with the gridiron on which he was martyred.* To the left sits St. Bartholomew, holding in his right hand the knife with which he was flayed, and in his left the skin of which he was bereft. St. Stephen appears just behind him. Further to the left may be recognized St. Simon with his saw (St. Jude, perhaps, near him); St. Philip with a cross, St. Hippolytus with the iron currycombs, St. Catherine with her wheel, St. Sebastian with his arrows, and above him St. Andrew on his cross.

X. Below the centre group is the group of angels. Seven blow the trumpets. The one acting as leader stops one that is pointing his trump towards the Inferno, and directs him to sound it towards the graves on the right. One of the "recording angels" holds the small Book of Life towards the rising just ones, and two angels hold the great book containing the names of the wicked towards those departing for the Inferno. The cheeks of the trumpeters are distended while they fill the air with their blasts.

XI. On the right of the last group are seen the ascending righteous, with the cardinal virtues—Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice, and others—allegorically assisting in drawing them up. (Prayer is drawing up two by a string of beads.) The attraction of the cross far above is felt.

* Is the female form behind him Santa Barbara?

The looks of recognition, as the ascending spirits perceive long lost friends encouragingly holding out their hands from the clouds, are particularly affecting.

XII. On the left hand is seen the struggle of the wicked trying to escape from the Inferno. The seven mortal sins, as demons, are dragging them down. Lust, at the left, is pulling down a cardinal whom Michel Angelo knew; Intemperance (gluttony), at the right, is grievously beset; Pride is lowest down; Avarice has a pope by the head (keys and bag of money to be seen); while Anger, Envy, and Indolence, have each their victims, and the angels above are actively repelling the wicked ones who struggle to escape.

XIII. At the bottom, on the right of the Pit, the graves are opening, and all stages of decay are being quickened into life. As they get free from the earth, they turn their anxious gaze upwards—some to the books open before them, some to the ascending spirits above them, some to Christ sitting on the throne. Some are bewildered and rise with a sleepy look, and try to see whence proceeds the sound of the last trump. Some are tearing the grave clothes from their bodies.

Near the Pit, an exciting contest is going on with the demons, who have issued from an opening and have seized those rising from the graves. Those dragged towards the Pit are crying for help and struggling to get free, while angels are assisting them to resist the demons.

XIV. The fiends of the Pit can be seen slightly illuminated by the lurid glare of the flames below. Malignity is stamped on their features and gestures.

XV. The corner on the left represents the Inferno as described by Dante. Charon, "with eyes of burning coal," is beating with his oar the lagging spirits who hesitate to land from his boat upon the Stygian shore. Some hold their hands over their ears to shield them from blows, or cover the whole head with their mantles. As they get over the edge of the boat demons of various descriptions seize them. One is taken on the back of Apolyon (a winged demon); some are pulled down by hooks as described by Dante. They encounter Minos, towering aloft, who twines around him the serpent tail to indicate by the number of coils in what circle of the Inferno they must be punished.

MOTIVES AND UNITY.

So vast a picture taxes genius to the utmost to preserve its unity. This can only be done by giving to each group some action that has reference to other groups.

I. The visible unity, or point of Repose, from whence all action springs, is Christ; but he holds up his hands against the contrasted group of reprobate spirits who are ferried to the Stygian shore. This is the first antithesis: The celestial light rejected and fled from; The lurid glare of the flames of the Inferno.

II. The Martyrs hold up the emblems of their torture to the gaze of the wicked: they refer to Christ as Judge while so doing: thus a double reference connecting still more closely the parts.

III. Above in the corners are the symbols of Christ's passion. Some of the angels bearing them are looking at Christ. The movement has the same meaning that the martyr group has: it exhibits to the resurrection of just and unjust the test by which they are to be tried. Have they helped crucify the Lord—have they helped martyr any of the saints? Or, have they suffered any of those things for Christ's sake? As they answer, so they are judged.

IV. Relating to Christ, also, are those groups on the right and left which either have in some way foretold his coming, or borne witness to him by a holy life. These on the left express by their gestures their appeal to him as Judge of their lives. Those on the right are intent upon seeing him whom they foretold. The spirits of the inner circle hovering over him are rather those who have been his representatives on earth, and the founders of his church.

V. The second range of groups from below presents to us the process of judgment. Those on the right ascending to the home of the blest, those on the left repelled by their own sins in the form of demons. The centre group, the awakening forces which blow the trumpets of conscience and hold up the books of memory.

MICHEL ANGELO vs. LEONARDO DA VINCI.

Leonardo da Vinci is said to have preferred oil painting to fresco. "He gave in his pictures sentiment rather than form

and character. He seemed to see no outline in objects." But Michel Angelo turned his whole attention to FORM as expressive of character. Herein is the grand reason of his success in painting the "Last Judgment." By the former means—Leonardo's—the passive side of the individual is presented; by the latter, the active. But we are not to be judged for what we are by nature, i. e. for our passive life, but solely for our "deeds done in the body"; in other words, for our own acts—the exercise of the Will. Our voluntary acts are performed physically by means of muscles, and hence they express positive character. The adipose matter of the body does not have this function. This is the reason why Michel Angelo has represented such muscular figures in his picture. We are responsible only for our characters as embodied wills, and of this our muscles are the immediate corporeal expression; hence, the Day of Judgment is very properly represented as an occasion wherein the entire form expresses the positive character. The face may change instantaneously, and is not so reliable an index to the true character as the body is.—Peace and hope are expressed in the forms of the elect, malignity and remorse in those of the reprobate!

A tame "Last Judgment" would have been painted had it been done on the principles of Leonardo; for in that case we should have missed the lines of human freedom, and instead thereof we should see the lines of fate—the expression of nature and circumstances rather than that of free will.

THE CONTENT.

What is the content of this picture as a work of Art? How shall we state its significance to the Heart in the terms of the thinking Reason?

We have presented to us in this work the "supreme moment" of the life of humanity.

Every work of Art must seize the supreme moment of the collision it professes to depict. These collisions may be of more or less general importance. In Christ's life we have three grand moments adapted to the highest Art—passing by the birth and the minor situations which have been used so frequently by Romantic Art. These are the Crucifixion, the Ascension, the Transfiguration. Mediation is the general

significance of his life: that man may, by self-renunciation or the sacrifice of the particular for the general, elevate himself above the finite. He dies that all may be saved. In the Crucifixion this is seized in its most negative phase, in the Ascension in its most abstract one, while the Transfiguration gives us the concretest phase. In it we have exhibited to us the elevation of the human to the divine. Raphael has chosen this as the theme of his greatest work, and reached therein the highest plastic phase of Romantic Art. The other scenes in Christ's life from his birth to his death are also proper subjects for Romantic Art, but not for such a form of art as we call the highest. They are fragmentary.

Michel Angelo passes by all subordinate scenes and seizes at once the supreme moment of all History—of the very world itself and all that it contains. This is the vastest attempt that the Artist can make, and is the same that Dante has ventured in the *Divina Commedia*.

In Religion we seize the absolute truth as a process going on in Time: the deeds of humanity are judged "after the end of the world." After death Dives goes to torments, and Lazarus to the realm of the blest.* In this supreme moment all worldly distinctions fall away, and the naked soul stands before Eternity with naught save the pure essence of its deeds to rely upon. All souls are equal before God so far as mere worldly eminence is concerned. Their inequality rests solely upon the degree that they have realized the Eternal will by their own choice.

But this dogma as it is held in the Christian Religion is not merely a dogma; it is the deepest of speculative truths. As

* The immense significance of the Christian idea of Hell as compared with the Hades of Greek and Roman Mythology we cannot dwell upon. This idea has changed the hearts of mankind. That man by his will determines his destiny, and that between right and wrong doing there is a difference eternally fixed—this dogma has tamed the fierce barbarian blood of Europe, and is the producer of what we have of civilization and freedom in the present time. In the so-called heathen civilizations there is a substratum of fate presupposed under all individual character which prevents the complete return of the consequences of individual acts upon their author. Thus the citizen was not made completely universal by the laws of the state as in modern times. The Christian doctrine of Hell is the first appearance in a conceptive form of this deepest of all comprehensions of Personality; and out of it have grown our modern humanitarian doctrines, however paradoxical this may seem.

such it is seized by Dante and Michel Angelo, and in this universal form every one must recognize it if he would free it from all narrowness and sectarianism. The point of view is this:—The whole world is seized at once under the form of Eternity; all things are reduced to their lowest terms. *Every deed is seen through the perspective of its own consequences.* Hence every human being under the influence of any one of the deadly sins—Anger, Lust, Avarice, Intemperance, Pride, Envy, and Indolence—is being dragged down into the Inferno just as Michel Angelo has depicted. On the other hand, any one who practises the cardinal virtues—Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude—is elevating himself towards celestial clearness.

If any one will study Dante carefully, he will find that the punishments of the Inferno are emblematical of the very states of mind one experiences when under the influence of the passion there punished. To find the punishment for any given sin, Dante looks at the state of mind which it causes in the sinner, and gives it its appropriate emblem.

The angry and sullen are plunged underneath deep putrid mud, thus corresponding to the state of mind produced by anger. If we try to understand a profound truth, or to get into a spiritual frame of mind, when terribly enraged, we shall see ourselves in putrid mud, and breathing its thick, suffocating exhalations. So, too, those who yield to the lusts of the flesh, are blown about in thick darkness by violent winds. The avaricious carry heavy weights; the intemperate suffer the eternal rain of foul water, hail, and snow (dropsy, dyspepsia, delirium tremens, gout, apoplexy, &c.)

So Michel Angelo in this picture has seized things in their essential nature: he has pierced through the shadows of time, and exhibited to us at one view the world of humanity as it is in the sight of God, or as it is in its ultimate analysis. Mortals are there, not as they seem to themselves or to their companions, but as they are when measured by the absolute standard—the final destiny of spirit. This must recommend the work to all men of all times, whether one holds to this or that theological creed, for it is the Last Judgment in the sense that it is the ultimate or absolute estimate to be pronounced upon each deed, and the question of the eternal punishment

of any individual is not necessarily brought into account. Everlasting punishment is the true state of all who persist in the commission of those sins. The sins are indissolubly bound up in pain. Through all time anger shall bring with it the "putrid mud" condition of the soul; the indulgence of lustful passions, the stormy tempest and spiritual night; intemperance, the pitiless rain of hail and snow and foul water. The wicked sinner—so far forth and so long as he is a sinner—shall be tormented forever; for we are now and always in Eternity. "Every one of us," as Carlyle says, "is a Ghost. Sweep away the Illusion of Time; glance from the near moving cause to its far distant mover; compress the threescore years into three minutes,—are we not spirits that are shaped into a body, into an Appearance, and that fade away again into air and invisibility? We start out of Nothingness, take figure, and are apparitions; 'round us, as 'round the veriest spectre, is Eternity; and to Eternity minutes are as years and æons. Tones of love and faith, like the songs of beatified souls, come as from celestial harp-strings. And again we squeak and gibber (in our discordant screech-owlsh debates and recriminations); and glide bodeful, and feeble, and fearful; or uproar and revel in our mad Dance of the Dead,—till the scent of the morning air summons us to our still home, and dreamy night becomes awake and day. Alexander of Macedon with the steel host that yelled in fierce battle-shouts at Issus and Arbēla; Napoleon with his Moscow retreats and Austerlitz campaigns!—were they other than the veriest spectre hunt, which has now (with its howling tumult that made night hideous) flitted away? Ghosts! there are nigh a thousand million walking the earth openly at noontide; some half a hundred have vanished from it, some half a hundred have arisen in it, ere thy watch ticks twice.

"We are in very deed ghosts! These limbs, this stormy force, this life-blood with its burning passion, they are dust and shadow—a shadow-system gathered round our *Me*; wherein, through some moments or years, the Divine Essence is to be revealed in the Flesh. Thus, like a God-created, fire-breathing spirit-host, we emerge from the Inane, haste stormfully across the astonished earth, and plunge again into the Inane."

Thus by the Divine Purpose of the Universe—by the Absolute—every deed is seen in its true light, in the entire compass of its effects. Just as we strive in our human laws to establish justice by turning back upon the criminal the effects of his deeds, so *in fact* when placed “under the form of Eternity” all deeds do return to the doer; and this is the final adjustment, the “end of all things”—it is THE LAST JUDGMENT. And this judgment is now and is always the only actual Fact in the world.

LEIBNITZ ON PLATONIC ENTHUSIASM.

Translated from the original Latin by THOS. DAVIDSON.

[*Epistola ad Hunschium de Philosophia Platonica, sive de Enthusiasmo Platonico.*]

1. Your little work* on Platonic Enthusiasm I have read with much pleasure, and I think you are doing valuable work along with those who are throwing light upon the philosophical teachings of the ancients. As to whether Pythagoras and Plato learned anything from the Hebrews, I am not prepared to dispute with anyone; thus far, I have seen no evidence of it. I acknowledge that the worship of one God was restored by the Hebrews, after it had been nearly obliterated in the human race. That Homer and Hesiod visited Egypt, I hardly believe. No such circumstance is mentioned by the author of the Life of Homer, who is supposed to have been Herodotus. At the same time I am ready to admit that the Greeks owed the beginnings of their sciences to the Egyptians and Phœnicians. It is reasonably believed that Abraham, who belonged to Chaldea, taught the Egyptians some things. The most ancient doctrine of the immortality of the soul seems to have received the addition of metempsychosis from the Hindoos, and may be supposed to have passed from them to the Magians and Egyptians. Pythagoras introduced it into the West, and Plato generally follows him.

* *Hanschii Diatriba de Enthusiasmo Platonico.* Lips. 1716. 4. *Leibn. Opp.* Ed. Dutens. Tom. II., P. I., p. 222.

2. None of the ancient philosophies came nearer Christianity than Platonism did, although it is a reprehensible error to suppose Plato reconcilable with Christ. But the ancients ought to be pardoned who denied that the world had a beginning,—denied the creation, and the resurrection of the body. These things, indeed, can be known only from revelation.

3. At the same time there is exceeding beauty in many of the views of Plato upon which you touch; for example, that the cause of all things is one; that there is in the divine mind an intelligible world, what I am in the habit of calling the region of ideas; that the objects of true knowledge are τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, that is, simple substances, which I call Monads, and which, once existing, endure forever, πρῶτα δεκτικὰ τῆς ζωῆς, that is, God and souls; and the supreme intellects of these, images of godhead, begotten of God. The mathematical sciences, which deal with eternal truths rooted in the divine mind, prepare us for the knowledge of substances. On the other hand, sensible things, and things altogether composite, or, so to speak, substantiated, are in a flux, and become, rather than exist. Moreover, every intellect (as Plotinus rightly affirms) contains in itself a kind of intelligible world; at the same time, in my opinion, it represents this world to itself as a sensible one. But there is an infinite distance between our intellect and the divine one, inasmuch as God sees all things adequately at once; in us very few things are cognized distinctly; the rest lurk in confusion, so to speak, in the chaos of our perceptions. There exist, however, in us the seeds of those things which we learn—namely, ideas—and eternal truths springing from these; nor is it strange that we find in ourselves Being, the One, substance, action, and the like; and we know self-consciously that the ideas of these are in us. Far preferable, therefore, are the innate notions of Plato, which he veiled under the name of reminiscence, to the *tabula rasa* of Aristotle, Locke, and others in recent times, who philosophize exoterically. I am of opinion, therefore, that Plato might advantageously be united with Aristotle and Democritus in trying to philosophize correctly. But certain *χόρια δόξαι* would have to be expunged from each. The Platonists are not far wrong in recognizing four faculties of knowing in the mind, Sense, Opinion, Science, Intellect; in other words, Experiment, Conjecture, Demonstra-

tion, and pure Intellection which beholds the bond of truth by a single flash of the mind ; what is competent to God in all things, is given to us only in simple things. However, in demonstration we approach intellection in proportion as we behold a greater number of things in a shorter time. I think, however, that though our mind continually depends upon God for its existence, as every other created thing does, it is not unaided by his peculiar coöperation, in addition to the laws of nature, in its perceptions. I think that by an inborn faculty it deduces *à posteriori* concepts from *à priori* ones in an order prescribed by God, as Rølius, whom you cite, rightly affirms. This doctrine I would extend even to the perception of sensible things. For, since they are not introduced by God miraculously, and cannot be imparted naturally by the body, it follows that they are produced in the soul by a fixed law, through a Harmony divinely preëstablished in the beginning. This is more worthy of an all-wise Author than continually by new impressions to violate laws given to body and soul. At the same time, in view of the divine coöperation which imparts to every creature whatever perfection there is in it, it may be said that God alone is the external object of the soul, and that, in this sense, God is to the mind what light is to the eye. This is the divine Truth which gleams forth in us, and which is so often spoken of by Augustine, and after him, by Malebranche.

4. That the soul is in this body as in a prison can be understood in a reasonable sense. But we must reject the opinion of the ancient philosophers, that the body is a prison in which the soul is punished for sins in a former life. The ancients were right in holding that the soul is in the body as at a post, which it is not allowed to leave without the order of the commander-in-chief. It was no unworthy idea to say that we are governed by providence, whereby we follow reason through the agency of fate, and like a machine, whilst we are carried along by effects. For from the Preëstablished Harmony it is now clear to us that God has ordered everything so wonderfully that corporeal machines are servants of minds—and what in mind is providence, in body is fate.

5. In regard to the virtues, also, the ancient Platonists and Stoics thought nobly, and Augustine is too severe, when, not

content with finding perpetual sins in their virtues, he thinks that even the precepts of the philosophers were altogether evil, just as if they had done everything, in the name of uprightness, with a view to pride and vain-glory. Notwithstanding, it is certain that they often recommended the wise man to practise right action, not from hope of reward or fear of punishment, but from love of virtue; it is also plain that this love of virtue did not differ from the love of righteousness which Augustine inculcates, and which he refers to essential justice, that is, God himself, in whom is the fountain of the Good and the True—a fact which Plato was not altogether ignorant of, inasmuch as he is continually looking back to the Self-true (*αὐτοαληθές*). But Augustine objects that the philosophers did everything with a personal reference, thus preferring the creature to the Creator.

6. I am afraid, however, that this is too much subtlety, similar to that of certain persons who have lately been insisting that we should love God without any reference to ourselves; for it is impossible, in the nature of things, that a person should have no regard to his own happiness. But in those who love God, that love of itself produces happiness. Therefore, even before the controversy came up in regard to the distinction between mercenary love and true love, I had seen the difficulty, and in the preface to the "Code of International Law" had solved it, by giving a definition of love, which met with high approval from intelligent men, and was held to settle the question. For true love, which is opposed to mercenary love, is that affection of the mind which leads us to delight in the happiness of another. For what we delight in, we desire for its own sake. Further, since divine felicity is the union of all perfections, and delight the feeling of perfection, it follows that the true happiness of a created mind lies in the feeling of divine felicity. Therefore, those who seek the right, the true, the good, the just, more because they delight in them than because they are profitable—although in reality they are the most profitable of all things—are best prepared to love God, even according to the opinion of Augustine himself, who shows admirably that the good desire to enjoy God, the wicked to use Him: and proves, in accordance with the Platonic doctrine, that it is the exchanging of divine love for transitory

love that is the cause of the lapse of souls. Thus our happiness cannot be separated from the love of God.

7. Hence there is reason for condemning the false mysticism of the Quietists, who deny property and action to the blessed soul, as if our highest perfection consisted in a kind of passivity, whereas, on the contrary, love and cognition are operations of mind and will. The happiness of the soul consists undoubtedly in union with God; but we must not suppose that the soul is absorbed in God, losing that property which alone gives distinct substance, and action; for this would be a false enthusiasm (*ἐνθουσιασμός*) and an undesirable deification. To be sure, some ancient as well as some modern philosophers have affirmed that God is a Spirit diffused through the whole universe, and that when It meets an organic body It animates it, just as the wind produces music in organ-pipes. Perhaps the Stoics were not free from this opinion, and this may have been the meaning of the Active Intellect (*Intellectus agens*) of the Averroïsts, and of Aristotle himself, which is the same in all men. At death, [they believed,] souls returned into God, as streams to the ocean. Valentine Weigel, who not only explains the blessed life for the free individual as deification, but frequently recommends this sort of death and quiet, did not, I think, give us any ground for suspecting that he held a view of this sort, which is insisted upon, mainly, by the *soi-disant* Silesian, Joannes Angelus, the author of some not inelegant sacred poems, bearing the title, *Der Cherubinische Wandersmann*. Spinoza, in a different way, tended in the same direction: according to him, there is one substance, God; creatures are modifications of it, like figures in wax, continually arising and perishing through motion. He therefore holds, with Almeric, that the soul does not survive except through its ideal existence (*esse*) in God, just as it was in Him from all eternity.

8. But I do not find anything in Plato to lead me to suppose that minds do not preserve their own substance. This, indeed, to any sane philosopher is not a matter of question, nor can the opposite opinion be conceived unless it be supposed that God and the soul are corporeal, for on no other supposition can we rend away souls, as particles, from God; but such a notion of God and the soul is otherwise absurd.

The mind is not a part, but an image of divinity, a representative of the universe, a citizen of the divine monarchy. And for God, no substance in the universe—that is to say, no simple substance—perishes, and no person perishes in his kingdom. Irrational souls have substance, but are incapable of happiness and misery. But I do not wish to digress to things which do not relate to your dissertation, and in concluding this rather prolix letter, I congratulate you on so well combining erudition with wisdom, and exhort you to continue in this noble cause.

Hannover, July 25, 1707.

A NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF LETTERS, ARTS, AND SCIENCES.

For the reason that here in America all forms of external authority are constantly losing their power, it is clear that a National Academy cannot have the same significance in America that it has had in Europe. It will, however, have a more important indirect influence. It will concentrate the attention of all thinkers upon the vital questions which it proposes for discussion. Emulation and opposition vitalize individual labor as nothing else can. The chief use of organization lies in the fact that it gives to the individual member of it a feeling of security in that the interest of the whole is cared for by the whole, and not allowed to suffer, while he converges all his activities on a single focal point. Only by such concentration on the part of individuals can valuable results be attained, and this concentration can be sustained by the individual only when he stands in organic relation to a system of individuals who are devoted to the other phases of the subject.

An Academy of Metaphysical and Ethical Sciences could not fail to stimulate the thinking minds in this country. It would be its province to state articulately those problems which our theoretical and practical life involves. All questions, however practical in their nature, involve, when sifted down, certain pure elements which are simply and solely questions of Speculative Philosophy. Great service is done for thought when these questions get stripped of their adventitious wrappings and are articulated clearly. The great theoretical question of the day—as all new books on Mental

Philosophy attest—is that of the objective validity of the laws of thought. Since Kant, or rather Descartes, started it, all modern thinkers are obliged to set out with the attempt to bridge the chasm presupposed between subject and object; in short, they start with the *problem of certitude*. But after the problem of certitude comes the distinction of Certitude from Truth. This involves a far deeper question and touches all our practical life. It is the question of INDIVIDUALITY. What validity is given to *individuality* in a system of Philosophy? This question is a touchstone. The Comtian or correlationist does not find the individual to be substantial; to him there is in the last analysis no individual, but only an abstract force which cancels all individuality by the negative might of its cycles. On the other hand, Speculative Philosophy finds all substance to belong to conscious individuality, and hence it finds God, Freedom, and Immortality, certain beyond all question (as Leibnitz does in the letter published in this number). It will be seen that a question so vital as this affects every institution of our civilization, so soon as man begins to act rationally, i. e. in accordance with his intellectual conviction.

THE APOLLO BELVEDERE.

[This description is from Winckelmann's *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums*, Wien, im akademischen Verlage 1776, p. 814. We are indebted to Mrs. E. S. Morgan for the translation.—ED.]

It is probable that the statue of Apollo Belvedere and the falsely so-called Gladiator of Agasias of Ephesus were among the statues in the Villa Borghese; for they were both discovered at Antium, now called Porto d'Anzio; and this was the place where Nero was born, on whose decoration he expended large sums, and whose widely scattered ruins are still to be seen, extending down to the sea.

The statue of Apollo is the highest ideal of art among the works of antiquity which have escaped destruction. The artist has created this work entirely from an ideal, and has employed only so much material as was necessary to carry out and make visible his design. This Apollo surpasses all other statues of the same as much as the Apollo of Homer excels those of succeeding poets. His stature towers above that of mortals, and his attitude bears witness to the grandeur

with which he is filled. An eternal spring, as in the happy Elysium, clothes the noble manliness of mature years with pleasing youth, and plays with soft tenderness over the haughty structure of his limbs. Rise in spirit to the realm of immortal beauties, and attempt to become a creator of a divine being and to fill the soul with beauty exalted above nature: for here there is nothing mortal, nor aught that appertains to human feebleness. No veins or nerves excite and rouse this body, but a divine spirit, which is diffused like a gentle stream, manifests itself as it were in every outline of the figure. He has pursued the Python against which he first bent his bow, and has overtaken it with his powerful stride and slain it. From the height of his all-sufficiency his inspired glance pierces beyond his victory as if into the infinite: contempt sits on his lips, and the indignation which he suppresses expands his nostrils and rises to his proud forehead. But the peace which hovers around the brow in a holy calm remains undisturbed, and his eye is full of sweetness as if among the Muses who seek to embrace him. In all the statues of the Father of the Gods which remain to us, and which Art reveres, he does not approach so near to the greatness with which the mind of the divine poet conceived him, as here in the face of his son, and the single beauties of the other gods are here united as in Pandora. A brow of Jupiter when about to give birth to the Goddess of Wisdom, and eyebrows which by their movement explain his will: eyes of the Queen of the Gods, arched with greatness, and a mouth such as he formed who infused voluptuousness into the beloved Branchus. His soft hair plays round his godlike head like the tender and flowing tendrils of the noble vine, moved as it were by a soft breeze; it seems anointed with the oil of the gods, and is bound by the Graces on the crown of his head with charming comeliness.

I forget all else at sight of this marvel of art, and I assume a more sublime position that I may be worthy to look upon it. My breast seems to expand and rise with reverence like those I see filled with a spirit of prophecy, and I feel myself transported to Delos and into the woods of Lycia, places which Apollo consecrated with his presence: for my statue seems to receive life and motion like the beauty of Pygmalion. How is it possible to depict and describe it? Art itself must

counsel me, and guide the hand skilfully to complete these characteristics which I have here but sketched. I place the conception, with which the figure inspires me, at its feet, as they who could not reach the head of the gods, whom they wished to crown, placed their wreaths.*

The idea of an Apollo at the hunt, which Bishop Spence wishes to find in this statue does not at all agree with this description, and especially with the expression in the face. If any one does not find in the dragon Python an adversary sufficiently noble, he may explain the attitude of this Apollo by his contest with the giant Tityas, who was slain by him while scarcely a youth, because he had offered violence to his mother Latona.

* [The following passages from the same work will prove interesting in this connection.—T.A.]

The highest conception of ideal, manly youth, is remarkably embodied in Apollo, in whom the strength of mature years is united with the soft outlines of the most beautiful spring-time of youth. These outlines are striking in their youthful simplicity,—not those of a favorite cherished in cool shades, whom Venus, as Ibycus says, fed on roses, but those of a noble youth born to great purposes: for this reason Apollo is the most beautiful amongst the gods. In this god there is the bloom of health, which is the forerunner of strength like the morning-red of the beautiful day. However, I do not assert that all the statues of Apollo have this remarkable beauty. [p. 278.]

The most beautiful head of Apollo after that of the Belvedere is, without doubt, that of a little noticed statue, in a sitting position, of above life size, in the Villa Ludovici; and it is in a good state of preservation, and a better representation of the benign, quiet Apollo. This statue is noticeable as the only one which is known from a symbol which accompanies the Apollo—a crooked shepherd's staff, which lies on the stone upon which the figure sits—and from which Apollo the Shepherd (*Nomios*) was copied—to indicate his condition of shepherd with King Admetus in Thessaly. One can form an idea of the head-dress which the Greeks called *krōbulos*, and of which we have no accurate description in writing, from the head of a statue of Apollo in the Villa Belvedere at Frascati; also from the breast and the uninjured head in the ruins of the conservatory of Campidoglio: and equally well from two other heads of this same god, one of which is to be found in the Museo Capitolino, the other in the Farnesina: all four of which exactly resemble each other. The word *krōbulos* signifies in the case of a young man what is called *korymbos* in the case of a young woman; that is to say, hair which is gathered together at the back part of the head. In the case of a young man, the term signified hair which was drawn up and around and fastened on the crown of the head without any visible bands to confine it. The hair is arranged in just the same manner in a female figure of one of the most beautiful Herculaneum pictures, which rests on one knee near a tragic figure and writes upon a tablet. This similarity of head-dress for both sexes may excuse those who have given the name of Berenice to a beautiful bronze bust of Apollo in the museum at Herculaneum which has the hair so arranged, and is in this particular exactly like the four heads of which we have spoken; we may the more readily excuse the mistake as these four heads could not have been known to them. [p. 279.]

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NEW EXPOSITION OF
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE by A. E. KRÖGER.

Part First.

*Knowledge posits itself as a Power of formal Freedom of
Quantitating determined through an absolute Being.*

CONTENTS OF PART FIRST.

§ 1. SYNTHESIS OF QUANTITY AND QUALITY IN KNOWLEDGE.

- A.—Knowledge posits itself as primarily determined by its Being, and hence as limited.
- B.—But by positing itself Knowledge posits a free act of reflection as ground of its being.
- C.—Hence Knowledge must posit itself as both : an original determinedness of Freedom, and a Freedom as the ground of its original determinedness; or, as a formal Freedom of Quantitating.

§ 2. SYNTHESIS OF OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY, OR REALITY
AND IDEALITY, IN THE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE.

- A.—Knowledge posits itself *for* itself, or thinks itself in factual knowledge as *necessarily* such Power of formal Freedom, and hence as determined in its absolute character as a Knowledge of Quantitating: Objective condition of the Ego.
- B.—But knowledge in positing itself *for* itself posits itself as free, and hence as dependent only upon its Freedom: Subjective act of the Ego.
- C.—Both are one and the same: Knowledge is necessarily free if there is a knowledge, but that there is Knowledge depends upon absolute Freedom; its thinking itself free and its being free are one and the same; the condition is not without the act, nor the act without the condition.

§ 3. SYNTHESIS OF THINKING AND CONTEMPLATION, OR SUB-
STANCE AND ACCIDENCE IN ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

- A.—Knowledge posits itself *for* itself as a Self-originating, and hence posits a Not-Being of Itself, or an Absolute Pure Being (Check), as its origin and limit: Thinking or Substance.

- B.—But Knowledge posits itself as a Self-originating for-itself, and hence originates itself in this self-positing or preposits itself: Contemplation or Accidence.
- C.—Both are one and the same: Contemplation, or the Freedom of undetermined Quantitating, can be thought only as determined by the original Thinking of an Absolute Being, and the thinking of an Absolute Being is determined by the Contemplating of a Quantitating: neither is without the other.
- D.—Results.

§ 1. SYNTHESIS OF QUANTITY AND QUALITY IN KNOWLEDGE.

- A.—Knowledge posits itself as primarily determined by its Being, and hence as limited.

Knowledge has now been found, and stands before us as a closed eye, resting upon itself. It sees nothing outside of itself, but it sees itself. This self-contemplation we have to exhaust, and with it the system of all possible knowledge is exhausted, and the Science of Knowledge realized and closed.

Firstly: this knowledge sees itself (in the intellectual contemplation) as absolute knowledge. This is the first consideration which we must make clear, for only by its means has our investigation acquired a firm standpoint.

In so far as knowledge *is* absolute for itself, it reposes upon itself, and is completed in its being and its self-contemplation. This has been explained above. But the Absolute is at the same time, *because* it is. In this respect, likewise, knowledge must be absolute for itself, if it is to be an absolute knowledge *For-itself*. This is its eye and standpoint in the intellectual contemplation.

The absolute knowledge is for-itself *because* it is, signifies therefore: the intellectual contemplation is for itself an absolute self-generation out of nothing; a free self-grasping of light, which thereby becomes a stationary glance and eye. No fact of knowledge (no being or determinedness thereof) without the absolute form of the For-itself, and consequently without the possibility, freely to be reflected upon.

But absolute knowledge must be for itself *what* it is. The just described *Because* must melt together with the inner simple *What*, and this melting together itself must be inwardly and for itself. This can be very easily expressed in the following exposition: Knowledge must be for itself simply *what* it is for the immediate reason *because* it is. The determinedness of the *What* has not its ground in the *Because*, but, on the contrary, has its ground in the Being of knowledge; the *Because*

containing merely the naked fact as such, or the *That* of a knowledge, and of a knowledge of something. Or, Freedom is here, also, purely formal; demanding only, that a knowledge, a For-itself existence, be generated; and is not material, or, does not demand that *such* a particular knowledge be generated. If knowledge did not find its nature to be generative, it would not find itself at all, and would have no existence, and of a What or a Quality of knowledge we should find it impossible to speak. But finding itself generative, it finds immediately, without generation, its *What*, and without this *What* it does not find itself generative; and this not in consequence of its Freedom, but of its absolute Being. Having thus discovered, at least, that we have to unite in knowledge not simple points, but even syntheses, we now proceed to the other links of our main synthesis.

The absolute What of Knowledge is here, as is well known, also but a mere form, the form of thinking, or of the in-itself confinedness of Knowledge. As this *What*, it is to find itself independently of all Freedom, just as Freedom finds itself. But all contemplation is Freedom — *is*, consequently, absolutely *because* it is (absolute self-generation from nothingness, as above). If this *Because* were therefore to contemplate itself, the *What in its absolute character would be annihilated*. The form of this contemplation is annihilated by its substance and vanishes in itself. It is indeed a knowledge, a For-itself, which is, however, again simply *not* for itself, a knowledge without self-consciousness; an altogether *pure* Thinking, which vanishes as such the moment we become conscious of it: an absolute knowledge of a What, without the possibility to state *whence* it comes, which Whence would be its genesis.

Here likewise there is a duplicity as there is everywhere: a Being, and a free contemplation lifting itself above the Being. But both links are not again united and melted together in the present instance as they were in the previously deduced synthesis of Freedom and Being, when we found the For-itself and the What, Contemplation and Thinking, to be melted together in the absolute unity-point of consciousness. The synthetical point of unity is here, therefore, not discoverable, and is not possible; there is a *hiatus* in the knowledge. (Each

one when asked whence he knows that he *does* this or that, replies: I know that I do such and such a thing *because* I do it;—he presupposes, consequently, an immediate connection between his doing and his knowledge, an *inseparability* of both—and since all absolute knowledge is a *saltus*—a continuity of knowledge over and beyond this *saltus*. But if you ask some one: whence he knows, for instance, that everything accidental must have the ground of its determinedness in something else, he will reply: It is absolutely so; without pretending to give a reason for the connection of this his knowledge with his other knowledge or doing. He confesses the *hiatus*.)

But both (in their immediateness separate) links form only in their unity absolute knowledge; and this absolute unity, as such, must be for itself as surely as absolute knowledge is for itself. But this unity—to explain the proposition by its opposite—would be no absolute, but merely a factual unity having its ground in Freedom, as such, if we were to express it, for instance, in this manner: “While reflecting, my reflection hit upon this”; so that it might equally as well have hit upon something else; or, “I found this while *reflecting*”; so that it might possibly have been found also by some other process. The proper expression, on the contrary, is: From the What there results absolutely *such* a reflection (not the reflection itself as a fact, for in that light it does not result at all, and is simply a *free* act, as we have abundantly shown); and from the reflection, after having been presupposed as a fact, results *such* a What.

The immediate insight into this necessary consequence—for that is what we mean by the For-itself of that unity as absolute unity—would thus be itself an absolute Thinking (an absolute contemplation of the Being of knowledge), directed upon the form of pure Thinking (as described above), as having already a for-itself existence, and upon the free reflection as a fact, and contemplating both as *being*, and as being absolutely joined together.

In this thinking, or contemplation, the whole intellectual contemplation, as we have described it above, as an absolute—not Thinking or Contemplation, but real unity of both—would be placed before its own eye as what it really is: a firm know-

ledge, reposing upon the firm ground-form of knowledge already deduced. The intellectual contemplation reflects itself; and since this cannot be done accidentally, as if the intellectual contemplation could cease to do so and still *be*, the more proper way to express is, not to say, it *does* it, but it *is* this reflection of itself. Neither can it be said that the present reflection throws its light on the previously described and (*according to our propositions*) within itself blind and in a separated duplicity disunited contemplation; for this reflection has no light within itself except what is derived from the latter, in which the For-itself of knowledge has originally realized itself. It is, consequently, always one and the same point of contemplation, absolutely illuminating itself from itself, which we have been describing throughout the whole of our investigation, although at first simply according to its outward Being (when we took the light from ourselves), and only afterwards according to its inner light.

B.—But by positing itself knowledge posits a free act of reflection as ground of its Being.

Knowledge *is* absolute *for itself*, reflects itself, and only thus does it become a knowledge. Finally, having thus become knowledge—i. e. in our successive demonstration of the subject—it is *knowledge* for itself, and reflects itself no longer as Being, for as such it does not reflect itself at all, nor as a For-itself Being, but as both in their absolute union; and only thus is it now *absolute* knowledge.

This reflection is absolutely necessary like the former one (the original reflection, which constitutes knowledge), and is simply a result of the former, of a For-itself-being of knowledge, from which it is separated only by our Science.

The characteristic nature of this reflection is at once apparent from the fact, that, making knowledge, as such, its object, composing and genetically describing it, itself must penetrate beyond this knowledge, adding and adducing links, which, although existing in the reflection—and hence for our Science which makes this reflection a knowledge, also *in* knowledge—have no existence whatever *for* knowledge itself, which we have here made the object of our reflection, and which even do not belong to absolute knowledge (for this is also em-

braced by our present reflection). (Here the self-forgetting and self-annihilating character of knowledge appears in a still clearer light.) But how it is possible for us thus seemingly to penetrate even beyond absolute knowledge, can appear only at the close of our investigation, when our Science must fully and completely explain its own possibility.

Let us immediately enter the innermost synthetical central point of this reflection. The central point of the former reflection was *absolute* knowledge, as *pure* thinking and contemplation together: Freedom of reflection determined in regard to its What, by an *absolute* What. (This was expressed as follows: Knowledge must be for-itself simply *what* it is, for the immediate reason *because* it is, &c.) Now, this knowledge reflects itself as a knowledge, and as an absolute knowledge. This does not mean on any account: it is externally for itself; as it appeared to us in our scientific reflection of the foregoing paragraph, with the present additional assurance that it is absolute, although we did so express it temporarily; but it looks through and penetrates with its glance its own nature, according to the point of union and of division thereof, and by reason of the knowledge of this point of union *is* it absolute, and does it know itself as absolute in our present reflection.

In the preceding description of knowledge the *act* of reflecting was posited as independent of its material determinedness, while on the other side its determinedness was posited as independent of the act, and it was absolutely known that these thus separated parts did nevertheless form no twofoldness. But since the point of union in which they unite—although they may remain forever divided from another point of view, which we shall not here consider—was not known, that knowledge did not really penetrate itself; and though it *was* absolute knowledge, it was not absolute knowledge *for itself*.

The last ground of the act, which as act of free reflection must always remain absolute, is its *possibility*, which lies in the absolute *form* of knowledge to be for itself; the ground of the *determinedness* of the reflection is the primary *absolute* determinedness; the ground of the absolute unity of both is understood, signifies: it is understood that the act of that reflection would not be possible (consequently could not be) without

that absolute determinedness, which is the first basis and original starting-point of all knowledge.

C.—Hence Knowledge must posit itself as both: an original determinedness of Freedom, and a Freedom as the ground of its original determinedness; or, as formal Freedom of Quantitating.

The centre of the present synthesis was absolute knowledge, encircling, determining and passing beyond all real knowledge: and we had discovered that knowledge *formaliter* could only be free, could explain itself only out of itself, and posits its ground only within itself; and that it could not be possible in any other way. But in consequence of its immediateness and of the original determinedness inseparable therefrom, which, in its infinity, can be determined, distinguished, and at the same time related only by Thinking, knowledge commences with a determined, necessary Thinking, which in the present connection can be only the absolute Thinking, and consequently *making necessary* (for absolute Thinking and necessity are one and the same) of Freedom itself. It is considered so immediately in view of its being a knowledge, a factual existence of Thinking. But in the higher reflection it is recognized as generated through absolute Freedom, through the confinedness of original Freedom to a state of immediate determinedness; and at the same time as a free passing beyond this separable determinedness, in order to relate it (by Thinking): consequently, as unity of the fixed state of determinedness and the free passing beyond this determinedness, of *Being* and *Freedom*. (The difference between absolute Being and factual Being is to be well remembered; for both determinations are transferred to one object—Thinking—and are consequently only different views of what is really one and the same.)

But—thus we argue for the present—if all knowledge is determined by this absolute law, then the knowledge of this law, as a knowledge—with which something else in knowledge is to be connected—must also be determined by it: this knowledge must consequently view itself as really generated or illuminated by Freedom; or, in other words, it must be in and for itself.

(Every one will perceive that the knowledge which in our former reflection seemed to have penetrated beyond itself,

here returns again within itself; or that only a double view of this self-encircling and self-determining knowledge is possible as an *inner* and as an *external* knowledge, and that the real focus of absolute consciousness lies probably in the uniting point of this duplicity, in the balancing between both views.—This will appear also from another representation of the subject, for example: The Thinking, that the knowledge referred to is generated by Freedom, since no knowledge can be generated in any other manner, is, as we have represented it, in reality itself a free Thinking, the subjecting of a particular instance under a general rule. Consequently, this rule must appear in and be accessible to that free Thinking. But that free Thinking signifies the freely generated actual Thinking—and this consequently presupposes itself in fixing the rule.—Or still another example: If I transfer by my own *free act* Freedom to the presupposed knowledge, I must first have this Freedom in my own free knowledge. In short, it is the same proposition which we have met in advancing all our reflections. In order to direct my knowledge with freedom upon any subject, I must know already of the subject on which I am to direct it; and in order to know of it, I must have directed my Freedom upon it; and thus on infinitely, which infinite *regressus* must even here be stopped by an absoluteness which we have now to discover.)

It is understood that this affirmation applies not only to the centre of knowledge, but through it and from it to all its syntheses.

We approach now the exposition of this knowledge in its centre. The knowledge that knowledge is *formaliter* free, is to be within and for itself. To begin with the easiest point: the first result therefore is that Freedom *is in itself* and reposes upon itself: it contemplates itself, or—which means the same, since only the inner reposing upon itself of Freedom is called contemplation—the contemplation rests; which is a balancing of knowledge between the undetermined separability (the not yet separated and distinguished infinity).

But this contemplation is not merely to *be*; it is, moreover, to posit itself as *formaliter* free; containing the *That* (to posit itself) of this Being within itself; and this formal freedom of the contemplation is to contemplate itself. (How could we possibly create this contemplation without imagination? Our

imagination furnishes the substance of the contemplation. But as we do not imagine idly at hap-hazard, but direct our imagination to the special point of our investigation, Thinking takes also part in it.) No doubt every one will find this as the result: Freedom, dissolved and running over into the undetermined separability, must, in order to become contemplation, gather itself together and seize itself in *one point*—duplicate itself—it must be even *for* itself. Only thus can it become a point of light *from* which to distribute light over the undetermined separability.

I say, only in this One point does the contemplation become light to itself; from this point, therefore, a light arises not only upon the separable, as I said just now, but also upon the two views of the separable. These two views are: a dissolving of the light within itself, and a seizing and fixed taking hold of the light; the latter from a central point, which is wanting when the light dissolves. From this standpoint we must therefore say: The focus of this contemplation of formal Freedom is neither in the central point (the *penetrated*), nor in its two qualitative *terminis* (the *penetrating*), but *between* both. In so far as the light has penetrated itself in such a unity point, and contemplated such penetration, and the manifoldness which is inseparable from this contemplation, as penetrated from out this unity point, the light has been factically, and the formal Freedom the *That*, has been immediately posited. But in so far as the light, in order to contemplate *itself*, *penetrating* the central point, now contemplates the manifold as an infinity without unity, it destroys and puts an end to the fact; and this absolute balancing between creating and destroying the fact (destroying it in order to be able to create it, and creating it in order to be able to destroy it) is, viewed from the standpoint of contemplation, the real focus of absolute consciousness. (Both united are exemplified in every contemplation: the contemplation of *Here*, for instance, is the annihilation of the undetermined infinity of *Space*, and the contemplation of *Now* the annihilation of the undetermined infinity of *Time*; while at the same time the infinity of both *Space* and *Time* is contained in the contemplation of *Here* and of *Now*, and annihilates them again in their turn. The contemplation of the determined *This* ($=x$) separates this x (a tree, for instance) from the infinite chain

of all the other These (trees and not-trees), and thus annihilates the latter; while, *vice versa*, all these others must be contemplated, and consequently posited as existing, if x is to be contemplated as x —that is to say, if x is to be distinguished from any other object, &c.)

It is further to be remarked here, that the Quantity—even the infinite separability—is here immediately connected with Quality, and proved to be inseparably united with the latter, as undoubtedly we were compelled to prove in explaining the idea of absolute consciousness. For the formal Freedom, which here becomes contemplation, what else can it be but the *absolute Quality* of knowledge externally? and the *contemplation* of this formal Freedom itself, what else is it than the absolute but *inner* (For-itself) Quality of Knowledge, as a knowledge? And thus we have found, even in contemplation itself—and nowhere else can we find it, since the contemplation is absolute contemplation and absolutely nothing but contemplation—that formal Freedom views itself only as the contraction of a dissolving manifoldness of *possible* light into a central point, and the distribution of this light from out this central point over a manifoldness held and really illuminated only by the central point. (The fountain of all Quantity is consequently only in *Knowledge*—that is to say, in real knowledge, in a more contracted sense of the word—in knowledge which comprehends itself as such. Every one can comprehend this sentence who has but gained a clear insight into his knowledge; and thus new light is thrown on real transcendental idealism and its caricatures. The absolute One exists only in the form of Quantity. How does it come into this form? That we see here. How does it come into knowledge itself, the qualitative, in order thereafter to enter its form of Quantity? Thereof now.)

§ 2. SYNTHESIS OF OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY, OR REALITY AND IDEALITY, IN THE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE.

A.—Knowledge posits itself *for* itself, or thinks itself in factical knowledge as *necessarily* such power of formal Freedom, and hence as determined in its absolute character as a knowledge of Quantitating: Objective condition of the Ego.

Absolute Being is, as we know, in absolute Thinking. This absolute Being has entered free knowledge, signifies: the contemplation, described in the preceding § 1, with its immediate

facticity, and at the same time with the annihilation of that facticity, is on that very account one and the same with thinking; and it is this in knowledge—that is to say, it is known to be the same, and is thus absolutely known. Now, what sort of a consciousness is this? Evidently a *uniting* consciousness of the absolute contemplation of formal Freedom, with an absolute going beyond this contemplation to a Thinking. In short, a taking hold of itself on the part of knowledge as terminated here and absolutely fixed in this termination. Knowledge *thinks* itself only by such a grasping of itself; it goes beyond itself only in thus grasping its *end*; consequently, in positing an *end* for itself. The manifestation of this is the feeling of *certainty*, of *conviction*, as the absolute form of feeling, and arises conjointly with the self-substantialization of knowledge—that is to say, with the knowledge that a manifold (what this manifold is, the reader will please leave undecided) *exists*.

Now this formal Freedom is the absolute ground of all knowledge—for us, as teacher of the Science of Knowledge, and—which forms the contents of our present synthesis—for *itself*. It is absolute for itself means: this Freedom, and the knowledge which it generates, are thought as simply all Freedom and all knowledge: it is *thought* as a reposing in an absolute unity. Knowledge encircles and completes itself in this Thinking *as* the one and entire knowledge. If we consider thinking and contemplation as two separates, their union is evidently *immediate and absolute*; it is the absolute knowledge, but which knows not nor can know anything about itself; in one word, it is the immediate feeling of *certainty** (that is to say, absoluteness, immutability) of knowledge. (We here discover once again the absolute junction of contemplation and Thinking, which we found to constitute the ground-form of knowledge; and this time explaining itself genetically in the Being of knowledge itself.)

(In order to elucidate this proposition, which it might be difficult to comprehend in this simplicity of its immediate evidence, let the reader consider the following: Above we said—

* It is for this feeling of certainty, which accompanies all true knowledge, that Fichte uses the word *Intuition* as an equivalent.

Freedom must direct itself upon something which is presupposed as determined; but in order to be able to take this direction it must know beforehand of the object, which knowledge it can have acquired only through Freedom; and since this knowledge presupposes again a determined object, we are thus thrown into an infinite progress. This progress is now done away with. Freedom requires no point outside of itself to give it a direction; Freedom is in and for itself the highest Determined—hereafter the substance of knowledge—and is posited as self-sufficient *absolutely*.

Or, since knowledge has been considered from the first as the gathering together of an undetermined manifold, the knowledge of knowledge depends on this, that we know we have comprehended the altogether uneradicable unity-character of all particular acts of knowledge, however infinitely different they may be in all other respects. But how can we know this? Not by considering and analyzing the particular, for we should never get through with it. Consequently by, in a manner, prescribing a law to the particular by this very unity. Now the question is at present about absolute knowledge; consequently, about the unity of all particular determinations of knowledge—and of the objects of knowledge, which is the same thing. A law must therefore be prescribed to this absolute knowledge, so that it can recognize itself as one, as always the same eternal and immutable One, and can thus be included in its own unity. This we have done here, and in the manner just described.)

Being is consequently united with knowledge in this way, that knowledge comprehends itself as an absolute and unchangeable Being (a Being what it is, wherein it finds itself originally confined.) The difference and the connection with our former argument is very apparent: it lies between *Freedom* and *not-Freedom*. Freedom (i. e. always the formal Freedom, with the material or quantitative freedom we have nothing to do in this whole chapter) is itself *not free*; i. e. it is latent Freedom, or Freedom in form of necessity, if there is a knowledge. Possibility of knowledge only through Freedom, necessity of the latter for actual knowledge: this is the connection with our former argument. The problem is solved, and the centre of the former synthesis is itself absorbed

in knowledge; i. e. the centre of the present synthesis is fixed. Knowledge has its end in itself; it encircles and rests upon itself *as* knowledge.

B.—But knowledge in positing itself for itself posits itself as free, and hence *as* dependent only upon its Freedom: Subjective act of the Ego.

I. As we argued in C of § 1, so here. The formal Freedom which begins all actual knowledge (because it alone can give the latter a *For*, a light-point) has been thought as the absolute condition of the possibility of all knowledge, or as the necessity which conditions the character of knowledge. This thinking, by which we fuse Freedom and necessity together, must be *for itself*, must become a knowledge returning back within itself. Consequently even this knowledge, which encircles and penetrates all actual knowledge, goes again beyond itself to construct itself within itself. (In the same manner factual knowledge went beyond itself in order to arrive at the present knowledge of it. There is a triplicity, as every one can see now, and the present synthesis is again a synthesis of the two last ones.)

We enter into the centre of it. It is not at all the question and the object of our new synthesis to discover how in the uniting knowledge anything can be known of the formal act of Freedom, for the latter is the absolute contemplation itself, and absolutely originates factual knowledge from itself and by itself, but how anything can be known of necessity, and of necessity simple and pure, independently of its application to formal Freedom in the uniting Thinking.

Necessity is absolute fixedness of knowledge, or absolute thinking, and therefore excludes from its character all mobility and all penetrating beyond itself to ask for a *Because*, and it is not what it is unless all this is excluded. Now it is to be applied in a knowledge to contemplation; consequently it must nevertheless enter knowledge, assume the form of the *For-itself*, contemplate itself, &c. But in contemplation it would see itself no longer merely as simply *what* it is, but as what it is *because* it is.

This contemplation consequently cannot contemplate itself, can arise to no knowledge of itself, because in doing so it would annihilate its form by its substance. We thus obtain

a knowledge, or (since we speak of forms generally) the *form* of a (perhaps later to be exhibited) knowledge, which absolutely does not posit itself as knowledge, but as (of course, formal) *Being*, and as *absolute upon itself reposing Being*, and which cannot be penetrated, nor permit questions about its *Because*, and which moreover does not itself go beyond itself, nor explain itself, and which finally is not either a knowledge for itself, nor anything of the kind that could be characterized as knowledge.

We have here discovered the real focus and centre of absolute knowledge. It is not to be found in the taking hold of itself on the part of knowledge (by means of formal Freedom), neither is it in its self-annihilation, in absolute Being, but simply *between both*; and neither is possible without the other. It cannot take hold of itself as the *absolute* (of which we speak here, the One always coëqual, unchanging) without viewing itself as necessary, and consequently forgetting itself in this necessity; and it cannot *take hold* of necessity without *taking hold* (that is to say, without creating it) for itself. It floats between its Being and its not-Being, as it indeed must, since it carries its absolute origin *knowingly* within itself.

II. The centre and turning point of absolute knowledge is a floating between Being and not-Being of knowledge, and consequently between the being absolute and the being not absolute of Being; since the Being of knowledge cancels the absoluteness of Being, and since absolute Being cancels the absoluteness of knowledge. Let us make our standpoint firmer by a further vigorous investigation of the distinction between the Being of knowledge and absolute Being.

In order to connect our remarks with one of the links in the chain of our argument—it matters not which—let us argue thus: Knowledge cannot take hold of itself as a *knowledge* (as eternally the same and unchangeable) without viewing itself as necessary. But at present knowledge, in regard to its Being (Existence), is not at all necessary, but is grounded in absolute formal Freedom; and this must remain true as well as the former.

Now what is this peculiar Being of knowledge, in regard to which it is first necessary and not free, and at another time free and not necessary? It is true, this necessity is no other than

that of Freedom (and there can never be any other); but nevertheless it is necessity, Freedom in bondage. Hence this difficulty will easily be solved in the following manner: *If* there is a knowledge at all, it must be necessarily free (latent freedom); for freedom constitutes its character. But *that* there is a knowledge at all, depends altogether upon absolute Freedom, and it might therefore just as well be not. We will assume this answer to be correct, and see how it is *possible*. (In this investigation it will doubtless appear that it is both correct and necessary.) Knowledge was posited in this answer as that which might and might not be; we call this *accidental*. Let us describe this knowledge. It is evident that in this knowledge Freedom (formal Freedom, with which alone we have to do here) is *thought* (not contemplated) as realizing itself; for then knowledge *is*. It is *thought*, I say, and is thought, of course, as *Freedom*, as undecidedness, and indifference, in regard to the act; as melting together *Being* and *not-Being*; as pure possibility, as such, which neither posits the act, for it is at the same time checked—nor checks it, for it is at the same time posited. In short, the perfect contradiction, as such. (We try to discover here everything in knowledge, for we teach the Science of Knowledge. Thus absolute Being was nothing else to us than absolute Thinking itself, the fixedness and repose in itself, which can never can go beyond itself, the altogether ineradicable characteristic of knowledge. In like manner absolute Freedom is here the absolute *unrest*, mobility without a fixed point—the dissolving within itself. Hence thinking here annihilates itself; it is the above-mentioned absolute *hiatus* and *saltus* of knowledge which arises absolutely with all Freedom and all *originating*, and hence whenever *reality* originates from necessity. It is clear that through such a positive not-Being of itself knowledge passes to absolute Being. It is, of course, evident and admitted that of itself it is nothing; indeed, none of the links of our chain of reasoning is here for itself. It is a turning-point of absolute knowledge.

(Everything but this the logically trained Thinkers can comprehend. They shrink back from the *contradiction*. But how, then, is the proposition of that logic of theirs possible which says that no contradiction can be thought? They must have

taken hold of or thought this contradiction in some manner or another, since they make mention of it. If they would only once carefully question themselves, how they come to the Thinking of the *merely* possible, or the accidental (the not-necessary), and how they manage to do it. Evidently they jump *through* a not-Being, not-Thinking, &c., into the absolutely immediate, the free, the in-itself-originating—precisely the above contradiction actually realized. The impossibility to comprehend this produces in logical Thinking nothing less than a complete denial of Freedom, the absolute fatalism, or Spinozism.)

But this Thinking of formal Freedom is again, as we have seen above, possible on condition that the formal Freedom inwardly realizes itself in the manner described above. This realizing is now also *thought* in the present connection; for the entire disposition of knowledge, as regarded here, is one of *rest* and fixedness in itself. By this means, the lower contemplation becomes itself (i. e. to the reposing Thinking) a *Being* (condition, state), which, although it is and remains within itself agility, nevertheless conditions thinking, since it takes it from its balancing between Being and not-Being, in which it rested while a mere possibility, and fixes it down to positive Being.—Here we begin to get a clear view of subjectivity and objectivity, of ideal and real activity of knowledge. This duplicity arises from Thinking (which originates out of mere possibility) and from contemplation, which generates itself absolutely from itself (from realized Freedom) and is added as a new link.

Contemplation as contemplation, as that what it is, is only in so far as it realizes itself for itself with absolute Freedom. But this Freedom is posited in Thinking, so that this act, which produces the contemplation, could also be *not*, and only on this supposition is it an *act*; and since it is nothing else but an act, is it at all. Here, consequently, we already discover, through an easy and surprising observation, Contemplation and Thinking inseparably united in a higher contemplation, and the One not possible without the other. Knowledge, therefore (in the more limited meaning of the word, i. e. the actual knowledge which posits itself as such), does no longer consist in the mere contemplation, or in the mere Thinking,

but in the melting together of both. The form and the substance of Freedom is united, and so is also reality and possibility; since reality (as could not be otherwise) is merely the realization of possibility, and possibility (from this point of view, for we may arrive at another view of it) is nothing but a degree of reality; or, more strictly, is the reality, which is checked, in the reflection, in its transition from its possibility to its realization.

Let us ascend now to an adjoining link, which can receive nowhere so much light as in this connection. We introduced this argument by saying: *That* a knowledge is at all is accidental; but *if* a knowledge is, it is necessarily grounded in Freedom. The first part of this proposition we have explained; in the latter part, we evidently mention something concerning a knowledge which *may* be posited simply by means of the *If*, but which otherwise has neither been posited, nor not been posited. We go beyond this knowledge, and assert something about it with absolute necessity. Evidently this assertion is an absolute, unchangeable, in-itself-reposing Thinking of knowledge according to its absolute Being and Essence. Everyone sees that this assertion is not produced indirectly by the mere actual knowledge that a knowledge is (for the present instance, let us say) and has been produced by absolute Freedom, but that it must have an entirely different source; and here we arrive by another way to a more thorough and connecting reply to the question, how a knowledge of necessity can be possible? For as sure as the absolute knowledge (in the infinite facticity—actual existence—of each single knowledge) is only in the absolute form of the *For-itself*, so sure each knowledge goes also beyond itself; or, viewed from another point, is in its own Being absolutely outside of itself, and encircles itself *entire*. The *For-itself* Being of this encircling, as such, its inwardness and absolute reposing upon itself, which is of course necessary since it is a knowledge, is the just described Thinking of the necessity of the Freedom of all knowledge. The pure, inner necessity consists in this very reposing upon and not being able to penetrate beyond itself of *Thinking*; its expression is absolute essence or fundamental character (here, of knowledge); and the external form of necessity, the universality, consists in

this, that I absolutely can think every factical knowledge, however distinct and different it be from other knowledges, as a factical knowledge only with this defined fundamental character. Where, then, does all necessity come from? From the absolute comprehension of an absolute *Form of Knowledge*.

We have thus arrived at a new union. The contemplation of absolute knowledge, *as accidental* (containing an actual substance, determined in one way or other), is united with the Thinking of the necessity (i. e. the necessity conditioned by Being) of this accidentalness; and in this absolute knowledge reposes, and has exhausted its fundamental character *for itself*.

To explain:—Some one might say, all knowledge (in its infinite determinability, the source of which we, it is true, do not know as yet, but which we presuppose in the meanwhile historically) is comprehended and discovered as absolutely generating itself, which is impossible for two reasons, the second of which we have just mentioned. The real state of the matter, however, is as follows:—Knowledge is the contemplation of the described absolute Thinking of the accidentalness of the (factical) knowledge. Knowledge *is* not free because it is thought free, nor is it thought *free* because it *is* free, for between both these links there is no Why or Therefore, no distinction whatever; but the *Thinking itself free* and the *absolutely being free* of Knowledge is one and the same. We are speaking of a Being of Knowledge, consequently of a *For*; of an *absolute* Being of Knowledge, consequently of a *For* in *Thinking* (a reposing within itself), in which it completely penetrates itself to its very first root.

C.—Both are one and the same: Knowledge is necessarily free if there is a knowledge, but that there is Knowledge depends upon absolute Freedom; its thinking itself free and its being free are one and the same; the condition is not without the act, nor the act without the condition.

Back to the standpoint of the complete synthesis.

Through the itself realizing contemplation, the previously free and in-freedom-reposing-thinking becomes fixed; being no longer a *real*, factical, conditioned thinking;—and this thinking is thus fixed for itself. In *actual* thinking, as such, formal Freedom is annihilated; it is a contemplation, but on no ac-

count is this same contemplation at the same time not. The Not-Being, which was thought together with it in formal Freedom, is here (i. e. in so far as the Real and not the merely Possible is thought) annihilated; and this very annihilation of formal Freedom must be thought if the real Thinking is to comprehend itself as real and confined—if, therefore, it is to be for itself. (Hence the Subjective and Objective, the Upper and Lower in knowledge; the unchangeable Subjective, or the ideal activity, is the formal Freedom: either to be, or not to be: here, however, viewing itself as cancelled; the unchangeable Objective, the Real, is the confinedness as such, through which formal Freedom, however, as indifference of Being and Not-Being, is cancelled. We have explained here also the Thinking of the Accidence, or what in the Science of Knowledge signifies the same thing, of the Accidence itself. It is a Thinking in which formal Freedom is posited as cancelled; a confined Thinking, as all Thinking is, which, however, at the same time, is thought as confined for and within itself.)

All this becomes clear and productive only when we compare and connect it with its nearest adjoining links.—We said above: We cannot think a fact, as such, without thinking at the same time that it could also *not* be. Here again we thought accidentalness and united formal and real Freedom, the existence of the former and its cancelling through the latter, in one thinking, just as we do here. Now, are both one and the same, or different? The more similarity there is between the two, the more necessary is it to distinguish them, and the more productive of results the distinction; for, I say, both are not the same at all.

That previous thinking starts from the thinking of Freedom, reposes in this Nothing and contradiction of pure undecidedness (B) as its focus; and is consequently, whenever it reflects upon and seizes itself (as it does in the above thought) in order to get out of itself to the fact, a mere nothing, it is ephemeral, dissolving and cancelling itself. Consequently the fact, seized in such a moment, which is to be, although it could just as well *not* be, is likewise reflected and seized only as undecided and dissolving within itself, as the external form of a fact, without inner reality and life; as a point, it is true, but as a point which is never at rest, and which strays in the infinite

empty space, in a pale, lifeless picture; nothing but the mere beginning and attempt of a real thought and determining which never arrives at a real fact.

(It seems to us, that Philosophy might explain itself without difficulty on this question as something generally known not only to not-philosophers and to the empty, purely logical philosophers, but also to the public at large. For this sort of thinking is of the very kind which they have been cultivating the greater part of their lives; *that empty, desultory thinking which results when somebody sits down in order to think and reflect, and cannot tell you afterwards what he has thought about, or what thoughts have really occupied his time.* Now, how have these people existed during this time, since they must have existed in some way! *They have floated in the not-Being of real knowledge, in the standpoint of the absolute*, but where from sheer absoluteness no thought was able to form itself. It will appear, that the greater part of the system of knowledge of most men remains stuck in the Absolute; and that to us all the whole infinite experience which we have not yet experienced,—in short, *eternity*—and hence, indeed, the objective world remains also hidden in that very Absolute.)

The present thinking, on the contrary, stands within itself in its own confinedness; reposes, if we may say so, as if lost in this confinedness, in order to proceed progressively from it to the understanding that formal Freedom has been cancelled in this confinedness. In its root it is always factical, and proceeds only thence to the absolute, and only to the mere negation of it; while the former thinking was absolute in its root, and proceeded merely to an empty picture of a fact.

Now this confinedness is, as we know, a taking hold of itself on the part of knowledge, and its result is contemplation or light. To this therefore, to this state of light, thinking is confined by the above described cancelling and fixing of formal Freedom; or, to use a more common expression, by *Attention*, which is nothing but Freedom surrendered to the object you pay attention to, a forgetting of self, a confinedness, fixedness of thinking, &c., &c. It is apparent, therefore, that formal Freedom is *Indifference* to Light and Attention; it may surrender itself to them, or it may not; the very desultory,

in-itself-dissolving thinking, mentioned above; the floating in the absolute.

Now, how does knowledge know that it has thus taken hold of and holds itself? Evidently, immediately; for the very reason that it knows or thinks itself as the Holding; in short, through the *That* of formal Freedom. Again, how can knowledge obtain a sight of this *That*—the same formal Freedom—except by having sight (by being a For-itself)? Its light is dependent upon its Freedom; but since this Freedom is *its own*, Freedom is again dependent upon light, is only *in light*. Knowledge knows that it holds itself and is thus the absolute source of light, and this constitutes its absoluteness; and, *vice versa*, it knows and has light only in so far as it holds itself with absolute Freedom (is *attentive*), and knows that it does so. It cannot be free without knowing, nor know without being free.

Ideal and *real* views are altogether united and inseparable; the condition with the act, the act with the condition; or rather, in absolute consciousness they are not all divided, but are One and the same.

This absolute knowledge now makes itself its own object; firstly, in order to describe itself as absolute. This is done, according to the above, by constructing itself from out of not-Being; and this construction is itself internally an act of Freedom, which is however here lost within itself.

It is evident, however, that it cannot so construct itself without being; consequently without having, in some view, a fixed existence. If, in one of these views, it starts from its condition of Light, it will posit the *act*, Freedom, as the cause of Light; and should it reflect again upon itself in this positing, it will become aware that it could not see this act, unless by the pre-supposed light, immanent within itself, and then it will obtain an *idealistic* view of itself. If, on the other hand, it starts from Freedom as the act, it will view the light as the product of this act, and will thus be led to view the *original* Freedom as the *real* ground of Light, and view itself realistically.

But according to the true description of absolute knowledge which we have now drawn, it views itself in the one way as well as in the other only onesidedly. Consequently neither the one, nor the other view, in contemplation, but both united

in Thinking, constitute the true view, which is the basis of both these contrary views of contemplation, and upon it alone shall we be able to build anything.

§ 3. SYNTHESIS OF THINKING AND CONTEMPLATION, OR SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENCE IN ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

A.—Knowledge posits itself for itself as a Self-originating, and hence posits a Not-Being of Itself, or an Absolute Pure Being (Check), as its origin and limit: Thinking or Substance.

The conception of absolute knowledge having been exhausted in all respects, and we having found at the same time how it could thus exhaustively comprehend itself, or how a Science of Knowledge could be possible, we now rise to its highest origin and ground.

Besides the conception of the Absolute, established at the beginning, we have in our last investigations obtained a still clearer conception of the form of the Absolute: namely, that in relation to a possible knowledge it is a pure, altogether and absolutely within itself confined Thinking, which never goes beyond itself to ask the Why of its formal or material Being, or to posit a Because of it, even though it were an absolute Because; in which, on the very account of this absolute negation of the Because, the *For-itself* (knowledge) has not yet been posited, and which, consequently, is in reality a mere pure Being without knowledge, although we have to make this Being discernible in our Science of Knowledge from the standpoint of the absolute pure form of Thinking.

Knowledge therefore, as *absolute* and confined in its origin, must be designated as the *One* (in every sense of the term, of which indeed it receives several only in the relative), as ever the same unchangeable, eternal, and ineradicable *Being* (God, if we persist in connecting him with knowledge and leaving him a relation to it), and in the state of this original confinedness as *Feeling*=A.

Nevertheless, this Absolute is to be an absolute *knowledge*; it must therefore be *for* itself, which it can become, as we have seen, only in a fact, through the absolute realization of Freedom—in so far being simply *because* it is—by going beyond itself, and again generating itself, &c., which ideal series we have also completely exhausted=B.

Now—which is least important, but cannot be neglected—since as knowledge it generates B with absolute Freedom, but *within* knowledge—it will probably know also of this Freedom as the ground of this knowledge ($=F-B$).

Again—which is more important—this B is not to be merely a knowledge for and of itself as the product of Freedom,—which, even though it were possible in itself (although it cannot be so according to all former explanations, since the consciousness of Freedom can develop itself only in and *from out* of its own confinedness) would result in a completely new knowledge not at all connected with A; but B, according to our former deductions, is to be a *For-itself* of A in and through B. B must not tear itself away from and lose A.; for if it did, there would be no absolute knowledge at all, but merely a free, accidental, empty, unsubstantial knowledge.

From this follows, first of all, a simply immediate, and in-itself- absolute connection of A and B, $\left(\frac{A}{+B}\right)$ which, it is true, is not without B (the realization of Freedom); but which, if B is, arises altogether in an immediate manner, and arrives at a consciousness of itself according to its character in A itself; which is consequently known as a *feeling* of dependency and conditionedness; and in this respect we have called A Feeling.

Again: the knowledge B is a knowledge, a *For-itself*. This signifies now not only: it is a knowledge generated through Freedom; but, at the same time, it is a knowledge connected with and expressing the Absolute through the above connection +. (In the foregoing exposition A is added to F; consequently, $A-F-B$.) We have, therefore,

1. A *For-itself existence*, a reflection of absolute knowledge, which presupposes in itself that absoluteness (A). This reflection undoubtedly obeys its own inner laws regarding the *form* of knowledge, and with the clearer exposition of this reflection we shall soon have to busy ourselves.

2. A appears visibly twice, partly as presupposed prior to *all* knowledge, the substantial basis and original condition of it, and partly in *free* knowledge (B), in which it becomes visible to itself and enters into light (in accordance with the absolute form of the *For-itself*, expressed in the sign +). Where,

then, is the seat of absolute knowledge? Not in A, for then it would not be knowledge; not in B, for then it would not be absolute knowledge; but between both in +.

From this there results the following:

1. Absolute knowledge $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} A \\ + \\ B \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ is for itself (in B) just as absolutely *because* it is, as absolutely *what* it is. Both, though it seems to be contradictory, must, as we have shown, be kept together, if there is to be an absolute knowledge. The way and mode of this remaining together is to be found in knowledge itself, and constitutes the *formal laws* of knowledge, according to which the entire B is $= A - F - B$. In other words, the whole contents, A, must enter, through the realization of Freedom, F, in the form of light, B.

2. It is *For-itself* ($=F$) simply *what* it is ($=A$)—which expresses the contradiction in the most positive manner—can signify only: its *Freedom* and its *For-itself* or its knowledge is (and for this very reason for *itself*) at an end. It discovers in itself and through itself its absolute *end* and its limitation; in itself and through itself, I say; it penetrates knowingly to its absolute origin (from the not-knowledge), and arrives thus through itself (that is to say, in consequence of its absolute transparency and self-knowledge) *at its end*.

Now this is precisely the mystery which no one has been able to perceive because it lies too openly before our eyes, and because *in* it alone we see everything! If knowledge consists just in this, that it views its own origin; or, still more definitely and with abstraction from all duplicity, if knowledge itself signifies: *For-itself Being*, inner life of the *origin*; then it is very clear that its end and its absolute limit must fall also within this *For-itself*. Now, according to all our explanations and the evident perception of each, knowledge does consist in this very penetrability, in the absolute light-character, subject-object, Ego; consequently, it cannot view its absolute origin, without viewing its non-Existence or its limit.

3. What then, now, is absolute Being? It is the absolute origin of knowledge comprehended in knowledge, and consequently the not-Being of knowledge. It is Being-in-knowledge, and yet not Being of knowledge; *absolute Being*, because the knowledge is absolute.

Only the beginning of knowledge is *pure* Being; wherever knowledge is, there is *its own* being already; and everything else which might be taken for Being (for something objective) is this Being and obeys its laws. The pure knowledge viewed as *origin* for itself, and its opposite as not-Being of knowledge—because otherwise it could have no origin—is *pure Being*.

(Or let us say, if people only will understand us correctly, the absolute creation, as creation and by no means as the created substance, is the standpoint of absolute knowledge; this creates itself from its simple possibility, and this very possibility is pure Being.)

That is, this is pure Being for the Science of Knowledge and precisely because that science is a science of *knowledge*, and deducing Being from knowledge as its negation and being. It is consequently an ideal view of Being, and its highest ideal view. Now it may well be that here this negation is itself the absolute position (affirmation), and that our position itself is in a certain respect a negation, and that in the Science of Knowledge, though subordinated to it, we shall find a highest real view, according to which knowledge also does certainly create itself—and accordingly everything created and to be created—but only according to the form; according to the substance, however, after an absolute law (into which the Absolute Being now changes), which law negates every knowledge and being as the highest position. A pure moralism, which is realistically (practically) exactly the same that the Science of Knowledge is formally and idealistically.

B.—But Knowledge posits itself as a Self-originating for-itself, and hence originates itself in this self-positing or preposits itself: Contemplation or Accident.

a. The in-itself-confined thinking in A can be viewed as inwardly and originally (not factically, since this is denied by its essence) in itself confined and unable to go beyond itself. Such would indeed be its character in relation to a possible consciousness, the origin and foundation of which would be this very in-itself-confinedness, and at the same time the *consciousness* of this confinedness; we have therefore called it *Feeling*;—Feeling, even of this absoluteness, unchangeableness, &c., from which, it is true, we can derive nothing at present, and which is to serve us only as a connecting link. Besides,

it would be a realistical view, if it were and could be any view at all.

b. This A, however, is known in B, though altogether independent of it in *form*, and is viewed in it as an absolute origin, to which, in the same knowledge, a *not-Being* of knowledge necessarily attaches itself from the very nature of knowledge, which otherwise could not be a knowledge or viewing of its own origin. Here A seems to have arisen out of B, and the view is idealistic.

c. Now the important matter here is to us, that this knowledge *inwardly* and *for-itself*, and, let us add, in its immediateness (in its form), is *absolute*; or, which is the same, that the contemplated origin is absolute, or that the not-Being of knowledge is the absolute—expressions which all mean the same, and follow one from the other. It *is* this, means: it is so without the coöperation and independently of Freedom, consequently in a *Feeling* of confinedness; through which the above described feeling of absoluteness enters knowledge, and with it together constitutes the absolute A as real and as independent of Freedom. Thus the realistic and idealistic views are thoroughly united, and a Being appears which exists in Freedom, whilst also a Freedom is made apparent which originates *from out* of Being (it is the moral Freedom, or creation which comprehends itself as absolute creation from Nothingness); and both therefore—and with them Knowledge and Being—are united.

Let us explain:—1. In actual knowledge this is the feeling of certainty, which always accompanies a particular knowledge as a principle of the possibility of all *knowledge*. Evidently this feeling is absolutely immediate; for how could I ever, in mediated knowledge, draw the conclusion that anything is certain unless I presuppose a premise which is absolutely certain in itself? (For where is the drawing of conclusions to commence otherwise? or is absolute Unreason to precede reason?) But what is this feeling in regard to its substance? Evidently a consciousness of an unchangeableness (an absolute in-itself-determinedness of knowledge, of which the *That* is well known; but by asking after its Why or Because, we lose ourselves in the absolute not-Being of knowledge (=to the absolute Being). In certainty, therefore (=the *for-itself* of absoluteness of know-

ledge), ideal and real, absolute Freedom and absolute Being, or necessity, unite.

2. The *For-itself existence* of the absolute origin is absolute Contemplation, fountain of Light, or the absolute *Subjective*; the not-Being of knowledge and the absolute Being, which necessarily connect with the *For-itself existence*, are absolute Thinking—fountain of *Being* within the Light; consequently, since it nevertheless is within knowledge, the absolute *Objective*. Both fall together (unite) in the immediate *For-itself* of Absoluteness. This, therefore, is the last tie between subject and object, and the entire synthesis here established is the construction of the pure, absolute Ego. This tie is evidently the fountain of all *knowledge* (i. e. of all certainty), from which it follows that, in the particular case of this certainty, the subjective agrees with the objective, or “the representation of the thing with the thing itself.” This is only a modification of the discovered ground-form of all knowledge. (It is therefore very wrong to describe the Absolute as Indifference of the Subjective and Objective, a description which is based on the old hereditary sin of dogmatism, which assumes that the absolute Objective is to enter into the Subjective. This supposition I hope to have rooted out by the foregoing. If Subjective and Objective were originally indifferent, how in the world could they ever become different, so as to enable any one to say, that *both*, from which he starts as different, are in reality indifferent? Does, then, the absoluteness annihilate itself in order to become a relation? If this were so, it would become absolutely Nothing, as it indeed is the contradiction which we have pointed out above, only in another connection; and this system, instead of absolute identity-system, ought to be called absolute nullity-system. On the contrary, both are absolutely different; and in their being kept apart by means of their union in absoluteness, knowledge consists. If they unite, Knowledge and with Knowledge, they also are annihilated—and pure Nothingness remains.)*

d. We have said the origin is an absolute one, from out which and beyond which it is impossible to go. It seems, therefore, to be unchangeable in this *For-itself*; and yet it is

* This is a polemic against Schelling.—*Translator.*

presupposed by it. But the origin is not in this For-itself, except in so far it is realized through absolute formal Freedom (as we have learned to know this Freedom as that which can and cannot be); the origin is not contemplated unless it makes itself; it does not make itself unless it is contemplated (a difference of subject and object which, strictly, ought to be annihilated here in a unity of the subject, in fact in an *inwardness* of the origin); and it is not contemplated except in so far as this Freedom as such is for itself, or is viewed as in-itself-originating (itself realizing).

If I reflect upon the latter, knowledge appears in regard to its Being generally as accidental; in regard to its substance, however, which is nothing else than that knowledge is absolute, as necessary. From this the double result follows: that a knowledge is *at all*, is accidental; but that it, if it is, is *thus*—i. e. a knowledge reposing upon itself, For-itself existence of the origin, and on that very account not-Being, Contemplation and Thinking together—is absolutely necessary.

What, now, is that *Being* of Knowledge (inwardly; not according to the external characteristics, which we have become sufficiently acquainted with), and what is, on the contrary, this *Thus-Being* (Determination) of knowledge? The first, like all Being, a confinedness of Thinking, but of *free* Thinking; the latter a confinedness of the not-free, but absolutely in its own origin already confined Thinking. The Thinking is therefore only the formal, the enlightening, but not the generating of the material of the *Thus-Being*; the latter must be presupposed by the former.

But now both are altogether the same, and the only distinction is that in the latter Freedom is reflected upon and everything viewed from its standpoint, while in the former Freedom neither is nor can be reflected upon: that here knowledge, therefore, separates from itself, since in the higher thinking it does not presuppose, but generates itself, and in the lower thinking, on the contrary, presupposes itself for itself.

We have arrived at a very important point. The fundamental principle of all reflection, which is a disjunction and a contradiction, has been found: all knowledge presupposes in the same manner, and from the same reason, its own Being, that it presupposes its not-Being. For the reflection, standing

as it does on the standpoint of Freedom, is a for-itself Being of the origin as an *originating*; and thus the present proposition differs from the former. But the originating, as such, presupposes a not-originating, consequently a Being; and if we speak of the originating of knowledge, as we must, since only knowledge originates (Knowledge=Originating), a Being of knowledge; and if we speak of a confinedness to originating, as we have done here, an equally confined Being, or *Thus-Being* of knowledge: and *this* is the object of the reflection. Knowledge cannot generate itself without being already, nor can it be for itself and as knowledge without generating itself. Its own Being and its Freedom are inseparable.

Visibly the reflection, therefore, reposes upon a Being; is *formaliter* a free, and, in regard to the material, a fixed Thinking, and the result is therefore this: If the formal Freedom—which, to be sure, in itself always remains, but can just as well not be (not realize itself)—does realize itself, it is simply and altogether determined by the absolute Being, and is in this connection material Freedom. Thus the synthesis is completed, in which we can now move freely, and describe it in all directions.

C.—Both are one and the same: Contemplation, or the Freedom of undetermined Quantitating, can be thought only as determined by the original Thinking of an Absolute Being, and the thinking of an Absolute Being is determined by the Contemplating of a Quantitating: neither is without the other.

Let us describe it, then, from a new point of view.

1. A (the absolute Being, pure Thinking, Feeling of dependence, or whatever else we choose to call it, since it really presents itself in these different aspects as the reflection progresses) is reflected *with* absolute formal Freedom. I have said, *with*; the Freedom is added, might be and might not be. But this Freedom is an absolute For-itself; knows, consequently, in this its realization of itself. *What* it reflects, however, is the absolute Thinking; i. e. it thinks absolute; or, the formal Freedom is admitted in this absolute Thinking, and receives therefrom its substance, since it might just as well not be as be, but when it is, it *must* necessarily be *thus*. (Moral origin of all Truth.)

Remark here the absolute disjunction, and in two directions:

a. Knowledge is chained down in A: again it tears itself loose from itself in order to be for itself and form a free Thinking. Both statements are absolutely contradictory; but both are, if there is to be knowledge, *equally* original and absolute. This contradiction therefore remains and can never be harmonized; and this is an external view for knowledge, since its focus is really in us.

b. Let us now approach the inner view by throwing the focus into the reflection itself. The reflection knows immediately of the absolute Freedom, with which it realizes itself, knows free, or knows of Freedom. But now it also thinks confinedly. Both statements are in contradiction, and remain equally always contradictory. (The ground of all opposition, of all manifoldness, &c., is to be found in *confined* Thinking.) But both are also united in this, that the absolute Thinking is the principal, nay, the only possible origin of all free reflection; and thus Freedom is subordinated to absolute Thinking. Here is the ground of all substantiality and accidentality: freedom as *substratum* of the accident can and cannot be; but if it is, it is unalterably determined through absolute Being as the substance. (Spinoza knows neither substance nor accident, because he knows not Freedom, which connects both. The absolute accident is not that which can be *thus* or otherwise; for then it would not be absolute, but merely that which can be at all or not be; which, however, if it is, is necessarily determined.)

The turning-point between both is formal Freedom, and this turning-point is (not arbitrary, but *determined*) ideal and real. My knowledge of the absolute (the substance) is determined through the free reflection, and—since this is also confined, as we have shown—through its confinedness=accidentality. (We know of the substance only through the accident.) Or, *vice versa*, placing ourselves on the standpoint of Being, the determinedness of the accident is explained to us by means of the substance; and thus the in-itself eternally and absolutely disjoined is united by the necessity to proceed from the one to the other.

2. Formal Freedom, as we have seen, must in this reflection know of itself; otherwise it would not be subordinated to absolute Being, but would dissolve in it. But it knows of itself,

as we are aware, only through contemplation, which is an altogether free floating within the unconditioned separable, and over all quantitability. (That this whole quantitability is altogether a result of the self-contemplation of Freedom, we have proved sufficiently; but it must not be forgotten, since the neglect to remember it leads to dogmatism.) It views itself as free, means: it views itself as quantitating in the unconditioned, expanding itself over *infinity* and contracting itself in a seeming light-point. From this arises, therefore, still another material determinedness, which here, it is true, remains only determinability, and which arises simply from Freedom and its absolute representation in the reflection itself.

Here is visible the disjunction between the absolute formal Freedom (which can only be or not be) and the quantity-contents of it. The first is a Thinking, but a free Thinking; the latter a contemplation, and a *formally* confined contemplation. (I say, formally; for quantitability only, and not a determined quantity, has been posited as yet.) Both are united by the in-itself-dissolving form of Freedom, without which, according to our former conclusions, neither would be at all. It is further evident that this is the groundform of all *causality*. The actual Freedom is ground (cause), the quantity (no matter what quantity), result, effect. It is clear that the *Ideal* and *Real* thoroughly unite here. (Let no one say, that in knowledge a conclusion is drawn from the effect to the cause, although the cause is to be the real ground. Here effect is not at all without immediate cause; both fall together and unite.)

3. Now, according to 1, Freedom is to receive a material determination, i. e. absolute Being. In its nature Freedom is confined to a quantitating, but it has not *within* itself a determining law for this quantitating. (If it had, the necessity for that material determinedness would be done away with.) That material determinedness must therefore apply in the same manner to Freedom as to quantity. (The reader will remark how this is proved.)—Now pay particular attention to the following: The Ego—the immediate, real consciousness—knows not generally, nor does it know particularly of the determination of Freedom through the Absolute, except in so far as it knows of Freedom, or as it posits itself quantitating. Both (1 and 2) are mutually determined through each other.

Both consequently ought to unite—if a knowledge is to be; the determination of Freedom through the Absolute as a material determination—not a formal one, for that is included in the form of Knowledge—consequently as a limitation of the quantitating—and a certain, no longer arbitrary, but through the Absolute determined quantitating; and of both must be known absolutely because it is known—as is always known—and that this is absolute knowledge must also be known in the same immediate manner.

Thus there would occur in no knowledge the determination of the throughout formal pure Freedom through absolute Being, nor, if Freedom be already materialized, the consciousness of the quantitating as the product of that relation; as if this consciousness would first look at that relation, and then quantitate itself accordingly with Freedom; no less would there be found in any knowledge a *quantum* limited through absolute Freedom, as if knowledge could now relate this *quantum* to the original determination of Freedom through absolute Being: but a *quantum* is found with the immediate consciousness that it is determined by the absolute Being, and from this finding all knowledge commences. The union of both links, as a *fact*, takes place outside of (beyond) consciousness. (The result is plain: Truth cannot be seized outside of and without knowledge, and knowledge then be arranged to suit such truth; truth must and can only be *known*. *Vice versa*, we cannot know without knowing something—and if it is a knowledge and knows itself as such—without knowing *truth*.)

D.—Results.

We contract all the preceding into a common result.

1. Knowledge, if it contemplates itself, finds itself as an inner and for and in itself originating. *If* it contemplates itself, I say; for just as well as it might not be at all, it might not be for itself. Its duplicity as well as its simplicity depend on its Freedom. The entrance into the Science of Knowledge is Freedom; therefore this science cannot be forced upon any one, as if it had already an existence within everybody's knowledge, merely requiring to be developed by analysis; but it rests upon an absolute act of Freedom, upon a new creation.

Again: It contemplates itself—this is the second part of our assertion—as *absolutely* originating; *if* it is, being simply because it is, presupposing no condition whatever of its reality. This comprehension of the absoluteness, this knowledge which knowledge has of itself and what is inseparable therefrom, is absolute, is *Reason*. The mere simple knowledge, which does not again comprehend itself as knowledge, is *Understanding*. The common, also philosophical, knowledge understands, it is true, according to the laws of reason (of Thinking), and is forced to do so, because otherwise it would not be knowledge at all; it *has* therefore reason, but it does not comprehend its reason. To such philosophers their reason has not become something inward, something for itself; it is outside of them, in nature—in a curious sort of soul of nature, which they call God. Their knowledge (understanding) posits therefore *objects*, precisely externalized reason. All the certainty of their mere understanding presupposes in an infinite retrogression another certainty; they cannot go beyond this retrogression, because they do not know the fountain of certainty (the absolute knowledge). Their actions (prompted merely by the understanding) have an *end*, also externalized reason from another view; and even this separating of reason into a theoretical and practical part, and of the practical part into the opposition of *object* and *end*, arises from neglect of reason.

2. In this contemplation of the originating, knowledge discovers a not-Being, which moves up, if we may say so, to the former without any coöperation of Freedom; and in so far as this originating is absolute, this not-Being is also an absolute not-Being, which can be neither explained nor deduced any further. The not-Being is to precede the originating as a fact; from not-Being we are to proceed to Being, and by no means *vice versa*. (This moving up of not-Being, and its position as the primary, rests also upon immediate contemplation, and by no means on a higher knowledge, &c. True, everybody will say: "Why, it is natural that a not-Being should precede an origin, if it is to be a real, absolute origin; this I comprehend immediately." But if you ask him for the proof, he will not be able to give it, but will plead absolute certainty. His assertion is consequently our absolute contemplation, expressed in

words, and is derived from it, not *vice versa*; for our doctrine remains one of contemplation.)

3. Now let this thus described knowledge again reflect upon itself, or be in and for itself. This it *can* do necessarily, as sure as all knowledge can do it, according to its ground-form; but it is not compelled to do so. If, however, only the first and ground-view is to remain *permanent* and *standing*, and not to vanish like a flash of light, giving place again to the former darkness, then this reflection will follow of itself; indeed it is nothing else than the making that fundamental view permanent.

This reflection, or this new knowledge, comprehending the absolute knowledge, as such, cannot penetrate beyond it, nor wish to explain it any further; for then knowledge would never come to an end. It attains a firm standpoint, a reposing, unchangeable object. (This is very important.) So much about its form. Let us now investigate its substance.

There is thus evidently in this reflection a double knowledge: 1st, of the absolute originating, and, 2d, of the not-Being accompanying it, which was above a not-Being of all knowledge, but is here, as the reflection must *know* of it, merely a not-Being of the originating; hence a knowledge of a reposing absolute Being, opposed to knowledge, and from which Knowledge, in its originating, starts.

4. Let us view the relation of this twofold in the reflection of it. The comprehending of the absolute Being is a Thinking, and, in so far as it is reflected upon, an inner Thinking, a Thinking for itself. The For-itself of the originating, on the contrary, is a contemplation. Now neither the one nor the other alone, but both are reflected as the absolute knowledge. Both, therefore, must be again joined together in their mutual relation as the absolute knowledge. And firstly, since Freedom for itself is an undetermined quantitating, but is only through absolute Being (original Thinking, or whatever you choose to call it), this determination in knowledge must be that of a quantitating. (I say, expressly, in knowledge, as such, and thereby knowledge rises above itself, comprehending and separating *its own*, immanent law from the absolute.)

This is comprehended as absolute knowledge, means:—some particular quantitating is immediately comprehended as

that which is demanded by absolute Being or Thinking, and only in this falling together of both does *consciousness* arise. It is to be hoped that the whole matter is clear now, and every one can judge whether he understands it by answering the following questions :

Ques. In what standpoint or focus does absolute knowledge commence? or—which is the same—where does all relative knowledge stand still, where is it at an end, and where has it encircled itself?

Ans. In the knowledge of a particular quantitating as determined through absolute Being=A. Not in the knowledge of the quantitating by itself, nor of the determinedness of the same through absolute Being; but in the—not *Indifference*, but—*Identity-point* of both; in the imperceptible, consequently not further comprehensible or explainable, unity of the absolute Being and the For-itself Being in knowledge, beyond which even the Science of Knowledge cannot go.

Ques. Whence then, now, the *duplicity* in knowledge?

Ans. *Formaliter* : from the absolute *For-itself* of this very knowledge, which is not chained down to, but penetrates beyond, itself; from its absolute form of reflection, which on that very account includes infinite reflectibility: the free talent of knowledge (which can therefore be or not be) to make each of its own states its object, and put it before itself to reflect upon. *Materialiter* : Because this thus *found* and not *generated* knowledge is a *Thinking of an absolute quantitability*.

Ques. Whence, then, now in knowledge the *absolute* Being and the *quantitability*?

Ans. Even from a disjunction of that higher, the Thinking and the Contemplation in reflection. (Knowledge finds itself and finds itself ready-made; applied *Realism* of the Science of Knowledge.)

Ques. Is then, now, the Contemplation equal to the Thinking, or the Thinking equal to the Contemplation?

Ans. By no means. Knowledge *makes* itself neither of these two, but finds itself as both; although, *as* finding itself constituted by both, it indeed makes itself, since it elevates itself by its own Freedom (free reflection) to this highest idea of itself.

Now, in this very point the knot of the absolute misunderstanding of our science is to be found. (I shall never live to experience that this *is understood*, i. e. penetrated and applied!) Knowledge makes itself, according to its *nature*, its *ground-substance*: this is half, superficial *Idealism*. The Being, the Objective, is the first; knowledge, the *form* of the For-itself-Being follows from the nature of this Being; this is empty *Dogmatism*, which explains nothing.—Both must be kept apart in the conception of them and both also must be reconciled and united, as we have done here, according to their relation and position in reality—and this is *transcendental Idealism*. This discovered duplicity, however, is nothing else than what we have heretofore termed *Thinking* and *Contemplation* in their most original significance, and their relation to each other, whereof now.

Ques. Whence then, now, the relation of both to each other in knowledge? (I say, in knowledge, since only in knowledge a relation is possible.)

Ans. Because Thinking is the in-itself *firm* and *immovable*—penetrated by the real, by Being, and penetrating it—subjective-objective in *original* unity; therefore absolute cognizability, the real substantial basis of all knowledge, &c., &c.;—and because contemplation is *mobility* itself, expanding the above substantial (of Thinking) to the *infinity* of knowledge; because, therefore, the latter is brought to rest by the former, and thereby fixed *for the reflection*, thus becoming an *absolute* and at the same time *infinite* substantial—not a passing-away and in-itself-dissolving—*knowledge*.

This is the *conception* of absolute knowledge; and at the same time it is explained—from the absolute form of knowledge—how knowledge (in the Science of Knowledge) can comprehend and penetrate itself in its absolute conception. The Science of Knowledge explains at one and the same time, and from the same principle, itself and its object absolute knowledge; it is therefore itself the highest Focus, the self-realization and self-knowledge of the absolute knowledge, as such, and in that it bears the impress of its own completion.

KANT'S SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTALISM.

By A. R. KNOSSEN.

I.

In our days the word Philosophy has ceased to have the meaning attached to it in the last century, as the name of an in-itself absolutely closed Science of Pure Reason, or Science of Knowledge. It is now again held to signify merely a more or less connected argumentation on any kind of matters and things, and embraces almost any class of writings wherein but the shadow of argument presents itself. Philosophy is no longer conceived to be a science of *a priori* universal principles; but the crudest individual reflections of men like Herbert Spencer and Stuart Mill are classified under its name. Any author who collects the notions that may chance to run through his brain, or even those that have run through the brains of others, is now-a-days called a Philosopher. The sacred importance connected with that word in the times of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte, has been lost to the present generation, which cannot conceive anything higher than infinite "fine reflections" and "beautiful thoughts," and stands aghast at the possibility of a science which proposes to cut off all those infinite reflections and thoughts in their very root, by establishing a universally valid system of all reason.

By the student of Kant, however, it must be borne in mind, that in his days the word Philosophy did stand for such a closed science, and not for infinite reflections. The neglect to remember this has been one of the reasons why Kant has been so woefully misunderstood. He does not intend to be a mere arguer and setter forth of opinions—at least, not in his works of pure philosophy—but the teacher of a specific science; indeed, of the Science of all Sciences. There are two other reasons why Kant has been so lamentably misrepresented, more particularly in English literature; the first one being, that the English translations of his Critic of Pure Reason suffer from serious defects; and the second one, that only this Critic

has been translated, whereas the other two Critics constitute equally important parts of Kant's system. Concerning the latter subject, however, Kant himself may deserve some censure in that he named his first Critic "*The Critic of Pure Reason*," thereby suggesting it to constitute the whole of his system, whereas he should have published his whole system under the general title: *Critic of Pure Reason*; with the three subdivisions—*Critic of Theoretical Reason*, *Critic of Practical Reason*, and *Critic of the Power of Judgment*. That he did not do this happened probably because the full conception of his system was not in Kant's mind when he set out upon his work; or because the word *Reason* was not taken by him at first as involving all the faculties of the Ego. For the Ego is not merely a power of theoretical cognition, which power alone is treated of in the *Critic of Pure Reason*; it is also a power of practical acting or willing, and finally a power of relating its cognitions to its willing, or a power of judgment. But if the full conception of his work was not thus clear in Kant's mind at the outset, it certainly became so at the end, when he wrote his Preface to the *Critic of the Power of Judgment*, wherein he not only develops this triplicity in the Ego, but moreover assigns its ground; which ground is, that every synthetic science must necessarily treat, 1st, of the Condition; 2d, of the Conditioned; and 3d, of the Conception which results from the union of the Conditioned with its Condition.

It is, however, to be remembered, that the latter part as connecting with the first two parts, need not be separately treated in an artistic representation of the whole Science of Reason, but may—and perhaps with better effect—be treated along with those first two parts. Kant, indeed, suggests this course to the future completer of his system, and Fichte, in dividing his Science of Knowledge, followed Kant's advice. In the Science of Knowledge there are only two parts: the theoretical (*Critic of Pure Reason*), and the practical (*Critic of Practical Reason*); the *Critic of the Power of Judgment* being divided, in its fundamental principles, between the two parts.

The great discovery which led Kant to undertake the immense labor of gathering all the material for a complete system of reason, and which initiates one of the most momentous epochs in the development of our race, was this: that a

Science of Philosophy could not be possible as a Science of so-called Metaphysics, but only as a Science of Reason or Knowledge; and that hence the Science of Metaphysics, in so far as it pretended to furnish theoretical cognitions of supersensuous objects, dwelt in an utter illusion; the only supersensuous cognitions possible being cognitions of cognition itself. Hence his two problems were:

1. To prove an absolute Science of Reason possible.
2. To prove a Science of Metaphysics impossible.

It was owing to this twofold, and, at first glance, apparently contradictory object of his labors, that Kant was so generally charged with doublesidedness and contradiction. His critics could not understand how the same man could be so zealous in pleading the *a priori* absoluteness of the categories, and so earnest in overthrowing all theoretical proofs of God, Freedom, and Immortality. The theological arguers grew wrathful because he destroyed their proofs of those three principles; while materialistic arguers were equally indignant because he demonstrated, that knowledge would not be at all possible unless we had absolute *a priori* knowledge.

Probably every reader of the Critic of Pure Reason has, at the first reading, been struck by a difference even of tone between the first two books and the third book of that work. The cause of that difference arises precisely from the reason stated. In the first two books, wherein the two questions—How is a science of pure mathematics possible? and, How is a science of pure physics possible?—are investigated, the answer runs: they are absolutely possible; for if we had not *a priori* contemplations of time and space wherein to place our sensations, and *a priori* conceptions of the forms of relations whereby to relate and connect those sensations, experience would be impossible. In forcibly insisting upon the absolute character of those contemplations, as well as of the forms of relation or categories, Kant appears as an unwavering idealist, who bases all knowledge upon the Ego, and shows that, unless it were so based, knowledge itself would be impossible. The very character of the proof required, namely, a positive character, gives to Kant's language, throughout these two books, an energy and vehemence of conviction which is strikingly in contrast with the style of the third book.

In that third book Kant answers the third of the three questions whereinto the fundamental question of a Science of Reason—How are synthetical cognitions *a priori* possible?—had been shown to separate. That third question was: How is a Science of Metaphysics possible? Now, as a Science of Metaphysics meant, in Kant's time, a science of supersensuous objects—that is, of God, Freedom, and Immortality—and not a Science of Knowledge, Kant's proof in this book had to be negative, and moreover partly qualified, which naturally gave a less decided character to the style. That answer, it will be remembered, runs: precisely because we could have no experience (empirical knowledge) unless we had *a priori* absolute contemplations of time and space, and *a priori* absolute forms of relation whereby to connect the objects in those contemplations, can we have no experience of any objects not determined by those contemplations and categories. Hence theoretical cognition of God, Freedom, and Immortality, is a contradiction and impossible. In uncompromisingly insisting on this impossibility—though suggesting another mode of cognition for those objects—Kant appeared to many a rooted realist, if not materialist, who denied the possibility of any cognition not grounded in sensation. Now, it must be confessed, that in so far as Kant, in his Critic of Pure Reason, had never touched upon the origin of the *sensations* in the Ego, the Ego throughout that Critic appeared to that extent dependent upon a foreign Other, which gave it the sensations; which foreign Other the last named class of Kant's opponents concluded to be Matter; but as Kant had been careful not to touch that question at all, as not belonging to the Critic of Theoretical Reason, there was no warrant for such an inference.

The ground for the mistake has already been mentioned. The Critic of Pure Reason investigates merely the power of theoretical reason, or of cognition through the intellect. Hence the question where the intellect gets the sensations which it casts outside of itself, and objectivates in time and space, is not considered in it. These sensations are assumed as given; and an investigation of theoretical reason shows merely that reason furnishes out of itself the forms under which it knows of these sensations. In short, the theoretical faculty appears

to be legislative and absolute only in so far as it prescribes to itself the rules under which alone it can take knowledge of the manifold in time and space; that is, it is only *formally* absolute; but in so far as that manifold is not shown to be *produced* by the intelligence, the theoretical faculty appears dependent upon a Given, a foreign Other, a Non-Ego. In the merely theoretical part of a Science of Reason the Ego posits itself as only *formally* self-determined, and as *actually* limited by a Non-Ego.

It is one of the most difficult problems in philosophy to make the full significance of this result clear to the student, or to show that the merely theoretical intellect cannot do otherwise than posit itself as limited. It seems so contradictory that the intellect should posit itself (by an absolute free act) and yet posit itself as dependent. The solution is, that we call the theoretical faculty of the Ego that faculty which cognizes under the forms of time and space and the categories. Hence it comprehends only by means of the causality-relation; and on that very account it can never rise to the conception of any first cause or origin, becoming self-contradictory and absurd when trying to do so.*

Hence, even when thinking itself, the theoretical faculty cannot think itself otherwise than as already determined; and applying the causality relation to this determinedness, it necessarily posits an Other, a Non-Ego, as the ground thereof. At the same time the Ego can know of this its necessary procedure, can know that it does so and why it must do so, and through this knowledge, therefore, can rid itself of that dependency. This, however, is only an ideal riddance, and furnishes only the conception of *negative Freedom*; while practically the Ego remains dependent. Every system, indeed, which views the Ego as merely a theoretical faculty, as merely a thinking power, must necessarily teach the dependency of the

* It is astonishing that sensible men should still continue to search for the origin of the world, the origin of man, and the origin of language, as if those problems were not by their very nature removed from search; and it is still more astonishing that this search should be kept up chiefly by men who scoff at transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy has never been guilty of such a transcending of the limits of reason; nor, indeed, of such unwarranted metaphysical speculations as crowd the writings of men like Comte, Mill, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Vogt, Moleschott, and Buechner.

Ego. Spinoza's system* is the most illustrious example, and is, indeed, the offspring of that view. Kant's Critic of Pure Reason, although it also shows that the Ego must think itself as dependent upon a Non-Ego, partly removes that dependency, as we have seen, by showing it to be simply the result of the Ego's own laws of thinking. Partly, but not wholly; nor could the difficulty ever be wholly removed were the Ego a mere power of thinking.

But the Ego is not only a power of theoretical cognition; it is moreover a power of practical acting, and in so far an actual determining of the Non-Ego, provided this acting may be viewed as simply the self-determination of the Ego. Upon this question hinges, indeed, the whole sanctity and absoluteness of reason, and the possibility of a Science of Practical Reason. Should this question be answered in the affirmative, the Ego would no longer determine the Non-Ego merely ideally, but likewise really—although it might appear that the latter determining could never be completed in any time.

As the Critic of Pure Reason had for its chief problem the question: How are synthetical *cognitions a priori* possible? so the Critic of Practical Reason must propose to itself the question: How are synthetical *principles a priori* possible? Or, since practical principles involve in Kant's terminology two classes of rules, whereof he calls the one that announces a determination of the will, which is valid only for the will of the *subject*, Maxims, and the other, which are recognized as valid for the will of *all* rational beings, Laws—How are synthetical practical *laws a priori* possible?

Now it is clear that no practical law of rational activity can

* Spinoza's system is merely the Theoretical Part of the Science of Knowledge; and it is because his system lacks the Practical Part that it is one-sided. In his system the Ego, therefore, posits itself as dependent upon an unknown Non-Ego, which Spinoza sometimes calls God, and at other times Nature or Substance. His system is the most logical development of that view, as Fichte already observed; and every system which holds the Ego to be merely a power of thinking must lapse into Spinozism. There is in his system neither positive freedom, nor free design; his Ethics is, indeed, the saddest book ever written; blind fatality rules everywhere. Jacobi, in his famous writings on Spinoza, took particular pains to show that all speculative reasoning must lead to Spinoza's results; and, in so far as he understood reason to signify merely the power of thinking, he was correct enough; but Kant first, and Fichte after him, showed that the practical power of the Ego is even superior to the ground of its theoretical function.

be *objectively* valid, i. e. valid for all rational beings, and can therefore be known to be the result of absolute self-determination, unless it is in the form of an *Imperative* (of a *Shall*); that is, unless it is not the product of self-conscious reason as a general rule of action; for such a rule applies merely to the subject which produces it in so far as it suits its own subjective inclinations: whereas Imperatives are characterized by an objective compulsion, and signify that the reason which utters them would without fail act them out if reason alone determined the will. But to be objectively valid, practical laws must be not only in the form of an Imperative; this Imperative must, moreover, be unconditioned or categorical. For if the Imperative addressed itself to the will not simply as will, but conditionally, or subject to the possibility whether the will *can* execute the Imperative or not: they would not be necessarily *valid*, but made dependent upon pathological facts.

All those practical principles, therefore, which presuppose an object of desire as determining the will, can never rise to the dignity of objectively valid laws, being firstly empirical, and secondly valid only for the subject; and since ALL *material* practical principles do presuppose an object of desire as determining the will, or since they all rest upon self-love or pursuit of happiness, it is evident that practical laws or categorical Imperatives, if at all possible, must be purely *formal* laws; that is, that they can involve only in *form* the ground of determination of the will.

At this result Kant, in his Critic of Practical Reason, pauses a while to demonstrate at length that *all* material practical rules of action presuppose an object of desire so determining the will, and hence are all based on selfishness; and to indulge in a polemic against those who think that they can arrive at moral laws by discriminating in the character of the desire which determines the will in such cases. Kant shows, that whether this desire arises from an enjoyment which we expect to derive through the senses, or from one which we expect to obtain through the understanding, does not at all change the fact, that in all such cases we are merely impelled by a desire for pleasure. We may justly enough call some pleasures coarser and some finer; "but on that account to say that the

latter constitute a mode of determining the will otherwise than through the senses, when they presuppose for their possibility a capacity for such pleasures in us, is just as absurd as when ignoramuses, who like to dabble in metaphysics, think of matter so fine, so superfine, that they get dizzy in their poor heads, and then believe that so doing they have thought a *spiritual*, and yet also *extended* Being."

The problem, therefore, is to discover a will which may be determinable by the mere *form* of a law. Now such a form of a law is clearly a pure thought of reason, and in no manner whatever an object of the senses or an appearance. Hence it is also not thought to be subject to any of the categories that apply to the world of appearances, and can in no manner be thought as determining the will in the same way as the law of causality is thought as determining objects in the world of nature. For under the law of causality the determining ground is always itself again thought as determined by a previous determining ground, and so on *ad infinitum*. It is evident, therefore, that the will, which is to be discovered, must be thought—if it is to be thought as determined solely by this form of a law—as altogether independent of the world of causality which rules in nature. Such independence is called freedom, and a will which is determinable only by the form of a law will therefore show itself to be, if we succeed in finding it, a *free* will. Can we, then, find a free will determined solely by the form of a law?

Now the important point here is to confess that the answer to this question cannot be demonstrated theoretically, just as little as you can demonstrate to anyone that he is an intelligent being: each one must look into himself and find whether or not he discovers such a will there. Meanwhile Kant asserts that it is in every rational being, and that its determination through the form of a law is known in language as the Moral Law. But this can be shown: that if there does occur in rational consciousness such a fact as Moral Law, then that Moral Law is identical with freedom, i. e. with positive freedom, and in fact is nothing but the Absoluteness and Self-determination of Reason in general or of the Ego. For we cannot obtain knowledge of positive freedom—as distinguished from that negative freedom which is merely an independence

of determinations of nature, and which certainly arises in immediate consciousness—in any immediate manner, such immediate consciousness being able to express only negative freedom; nor through external cognitions, since these are all subsumable under the conception of causality and mechanism; and hence we should have no way of arriving at the conception of a positive freedom did there not occur within our consciousness the phenomenon of a command—Thou shalt?—utterly opposed to and overthrowing the determinations of our nature. It is, therefore, only through the occurring of this phenomenon that human reason has ever been impelled to consider the conception of positive freedom; and he who has but once experienced that the command, *Thou shalt*, or *Thou shalt not*, does utterly override all the impulses of his nature, has thereby become conscious of absolute freedom, and proved to himself that there does occur in the Ego a power of determining the Non-Ego, and hence has proved to himself the absoluteness and self-sufficiency of the Ego. Moral Law, therefore, or conscience, or the inner voice of God—whatever it may be called—is nothing but the manifestating and realizing itself of the absolute self-determination of the Ego; and that absolute self-determination or self-sufficiency is nothing but the Moral Law or positive freedom.

The first section of the Analytic of Practical Reason having thus shown that pure reason is practical, or can absolutely determine the will—which proof it has furnished by the fact of the occurrence of the Moral Law in us, which is inseparable from, nay, identical with the consciousness of freedom—that section seems utterly to overthrow the result of the Critic of Pure Reason, that we can have knowledge only of a world of internal perception, and that we are, in all our knowledge of it, determined by it. Hence this fact, which everyone can verify for himself, furnishes us the strange manifestation of a world determined by reason alone, existing together with a world determining reason: a moral world and a world of nature; a world of freedom and a world of mechanism; a *natura archetypa* and a *natura ectypa*!

Now this is certainly calculated to shock one at the first glance; for what are we to place trust in? The *fact* which asserts a Moral Law, but confesses the impossibility theoreti-

cally to explain it, or the *theoretical faculty* which we accept as our guide in all other matters, but which declares itself impotent to explain a fact which forces itself upon us every moment of the day.

This duplicity in human reason is developed quite at length by Kant in two appendices to the first section of the *Analytic*, headed "Concerning the Deduction of the Principles of Practical Reason" and "Concerning the right of Pure Reason in its practical function to an extension which is not permitted in its speculative function."

The grounds of this duplicity we have already shown as in its very root the impossibility of the Ego in its theoretical function to do otherwise than apply the laws of that function (and hence the causality-relation); from which impossibility it results that the Ego cannot *in reflection* posit even itself free. The Ego can only *be* free; but the moment it reflects upon its freedom, its freedom is again thought under the laws of reflection—that is, under the causality-relation—and hence as not freedom.

By this insight the great difficulty in the way of demonstrating real freedom is removed. For when it has been shown, that the fact of an absolute impulse in reason to determine itself cannot be theoretically proved from the very nature of the case, no one can require anything more than to experience the fact in himself, and cannot ask for a theoretical proof without stultifying himself. The impulse would not be an absolute impulse, and hence the freedom would not be true freedom if it could be demonstrated.

Thus the very impossibility of a theoretical proof turns out to be, after all, merely the result of the supremacy of the practical power. The Ego in its fundamental essence is not a thinking, but an acting power; not theoretical, but moral; not limited, but absolute; and all its limitedness is simply the result of the theoretical faculty of the Ego, which requires that this acting shall become visible to itself. All limitedness is the result of reflection, of a making-clear-unto-itself. Originally the whole activity of the Ego extends into the Infinite; but because this activity is not to be a mere appearing of the Ego, but is to be such an appearing of the Ego *for the Ego itself*, it is reflected back, checked, and is a Non-Ego posited as the

ground of that check. To ask that this duplicity of reason should be removed, is to ask that reason should cease to be reason; for it cannot be reason unless it is an acting, and it cannot be an acting *for itself* unless its acting is checked and the check ascribed to something not itself.

By showing, therefore, in consciousness the fact of a Moral Law, we obtain the practical certainty of freedom; as by demonstrating that the Ego posits the causality-relation between itself and the Non-Ego, and thus makes itself dependent upon the latter merely by virtue of its own laws of thinking, we rise to the comprehension of its ideal freedom.

The result of the investigation undertaken in the first section of the Critic of Practical Reason may, therefore, be popularly summed up as follows:—There appears in all finite reason an impulse to act in a certain manner altogether independent of any external purpose or motive, and merely for the sake of such acting, and this impulse is called the Moral Law. It is a determinedness of freedom: freedom determined by its own absoluteness, and may be put in a formula as follows:

Act in such a manner that the maxim of your will can be valid always as the principle of a universal legislation.

For this formula expresses the form of a law, and the only possible form of a law which can be thought as determining the will of all rational beings absolutely, and which has therefore the same validity for practical reason as the categories have for theoretical reason; since to act so that the maxim of my will can be always valid as principle of a universal legislation, means simply to act in obedience to an *absolute* form of a law, or an absolute impulse.

In the second section of the Analytic of Practical Reason, "Concerning the Conception of an Object of Practical Reason," Kant renews the proof of the absolute fact of the Moral Law in all rational beings by showing that the conceptions of the only two possible objects of practical reason—namely, the Good and the Bad*—far from determining in our mind the Moral Law, rather are determined by it, and could not possibly arise in our mind except through the conception of that

* The German words *das Gute* and *das Böse* express much more unambiguously the purely moral character of the two conceptions for which they stand.

Law. For if the conception of Good, for instance, were not determined by the absolutely *a priori* Moral Law, it could arise only through comparison with a feeling (of pleasure or pain) in us, and hence the conception of Good could not be in the nature of a universally valid law, but merely of a practical rule to promote our happiness; a rule which would differ in every individual and change according to external circumstances, so that it could never be foreknown.

The fact, therefore, that there are such conceptions as those of Good and Bad as distinctively moral conceptions, which have no reference to empirical feelings of pleasure and pain, gives additional proof to the *a priori* character of the Moral Law; and these conceptions having been established as the only possible objects of practical reason, there remains merely the question: how the Moral Law as a law of freedom can possibly become applicable in a world which stands under the law of causality and mechanism. It will be noticed that the difficulty is of the same nature as one that occurs in the Critic of Pure Reason, where we have pure *a priori* conceptions, and cannot at first see how they, as altogether supersensuous can possibly become relatable to a manifold of empirical objects; a difficulty which is removed by showing that all sensations of empirical objects are after all given to reason (as schemes) in the two likewise *a priori* forms of contemplation: time and space.

But, in the present case, the objects of practical reason, the Good and the Bad, cannot be made relatable to the supersensuous *will* by means of contemplation, since they do not enter the form of contemplation. Nevertheless—precisely because, in the present case, it is a relation to a *will* and not to a power of cognition—the application can be made possible. Not, however, by means of a scheme of sensuousness, but by a law. In short: the supersensuous will can apply the Moral Law in a world of mechanism by subsuming the conception of that law under that of the law of causality, which rules in the sensuous world, and thus by changing the formula of the Moral Law into the following:

Act in such a manner that if that act should occur through a law of nature you could look upon it as possible through your will.

This formula Kant calls the *Typus* of the Moral Law—the universality and absoluteness of the law of causality in the natural world typifying the universality and absoluteness of the Moral Law in the supersensuous world;—and this *Typus* is quite proper so long as we transfer merely the *form of lawfulness*, and not its sensuous contemplations, from the world of nature to the Moral World.

Having thus established in the first section of the Analytic the general principle of the Moral Law, in the second section the objects of that principle, and in the third the possibility of applying that principle to those objects in a sensuous world, Kant in the concluding section treats of the relation of practical reason to sensuousness, and of its necessary, *a priori* cognizable influence upon it. The beauty of Kant's *style*—which has so unjustly been condemned as rough, intricate, heavy and unartistic, whereas it is generally of wonderful clearness and finish—finds here occasion to develop his most heartfelt convictions, highest emotions, and noblest aspirations; giving proof, if any were needed, that the Critic of Practical Reason was written by him not as a concession to popular prejudice, but rather with more enthusiasm and interest than the Critic of Pure Reason. Characterizing the nature of that influence as reverence, Kant thus speaks of it:—"Reverence always relates to persons, never to things. The latter may inspire *affection*; and in the case of animals, as horses, dogs, &c., even *love*; or *fear*, as in the sea, volcanoes, &c.; but never *reverence*. . . . A man also may be the object of love, of fear, or of admiration, even to a high degree, and yet he may not be to me an object of reverence. . . . Fontenelle says: 'I bow down before a noble, but my spirit does not bow down'; and I add: but my spirit does bow down before a common citizen in whom I perceive honesty of character to a greater degree than I am conscious of possessing myself; and my spirit does so bow down whether I will or not, and however high I carry my head in order to show him my superior rank."

"Far from being a feeling of enjoyment, reverence is rather a feeling to which we submit very unwillingly in respect to another person. We always try to discover something which might diminish this feeling in us, some kind of fault to hold us harmless against the humiliation which such an example

inflicts upon us. Even the dead, particularly if their example appears to be beyond our reach, are not always secure against this criticism. Nay, the very Moral Law itself, in its solemn majesty, is exposed to this tendency in man to escape the reverence it compels. Or, why that constant desire to drag it down to the level of an ordinary inclination, and that persistent endeavor to make it a favorite prescription for our own advantage and enjoyment, unless it is to escape that terrifying reverence which holds up to us so severely our own unworthiness? Yet again there is so little of disagreeableness in the feeling, that, if we have once thrown aside our self-merit and have admitted that reverence to practical influence upon us, we can never get satiated with the glory of this law; and our soul seems to elevate itself in the same degree as it sees this holy law elevated above itself and its sinful nature."

That this feeling of reverence is *a priori* cognizable Kant establishes by showing that the Moral Law is a restriction upon all our inclinations, our self-esteem included, by the condition of obedience to that law; and that hence it would be merely of a negative nature and humiliating for our sensuous character were it not at the same time elevating for our moral nature. As such a positive influence, Kant calls reverence the *incentive* of pure practical reason, which incentive awakens gradually a moral *interest*, and finally leads to the establishing of moral *maxims*.

The act which that Moral Law prompts, Kant calls Duty. Being prompted purely by that law, exclusive of all motives of inclination, this Duty involves in its conception practical compulsion; that is, a determination to act, however disagreeable it may be to us. The feeling which arises from this consciousness of compulsion is not pathological, but altogether practical, and hence as submission under a compulsory law, far from being accompanied by pleasure, is rather accompanied by aversion; but at the same time, precisely because it is a compulsion of our own *reason*, independent of all external motives and incentives, does it also elevate us in our feeling, in which shape we call that feeling self-approval or self-reverence; and it is of the greatest importance to remember that in finite rational beings the Moral Law always must assume this shape of compulsion, and that the Holiness of

Will, which implies a perfect harmony between the Moral Law and the Will, and hence no compulsion, can never be reached by us. Kant loses no occasion to insist that this conception of Duty must be held in its strict purity as an absolute compulsion, and that it is both absurd and harmful, as leading to *Schwaermerei*,* to teach that morality ought to be practised for the love of it. It is absurd to require love for a command, and it is harmful to mix up a pathological affection with the highest manifestation of reason, with that which has its ground in absolute freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature: duty for the mere sake of duty! "The venerable character of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own peculiar law and its own peculiar tribunal. Nay, even if we should try ever so much to mix both together like medicines, in order to give the draught thus mixed to the sick soul, they yet will immediately separate of themselves; and if they do not separate, then the former will not operate at all. But even if physical life should gain some strength by this mixture, moral life would die out beyond redemption."

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S ÆSTHETICS.

Translated from the French of M. Ch. Bérard, by J. A. MARLING.

II. We understand the nature of poetry in general and that of the poetic thought, the characteristics which distinguish the works of poetry from other productions of the human intelligence. We must now approach the questions relating to *expression* or to *poetic language*. This subject, which occupies so much space in ordinary treatises upon poetry, should not be neglected in a philosophic theory. Hegel bestows upon it all the attention which it merits. Without entering into the technical details of a treatise on versification, he seeks to give an account of the necessity of poetic language and of its forms, and proceeds then to a learned analysis of

* Carlyle has done little service to an introduction of this word into the English language by giving *Swarmery* as its equivalent. *Schwaermerei* is a transcending of the limits of reason practised on principle.

the two principal systems of versification which have for bases the one, rhythm, and the other rhyme, of *rhythmic* versification and *rhymed* versification.

Let us follow him in this interesting research, whose merit consists, above all, in showing throughout the necessary agreement of the forms of language with the modes of thought which they are designed to express.

The origin of poetic language ought to be sought, neither in the choice of words nor in their combination and the harmony of rhythm or rhymes, but in the manner in which the imagination itself conceives objects—that is to say, in the nature of the poetic thought.

Hence the necessity of considering, in the first place, the *poetic image* in the spirit, and the form which it takes therefrom, before passing into discourse. Then alone will it be proper to consider expression from its grammatical side, the particular turns which affect poetic diction in opposition to prose; to study, finally, versification, which is the musical part of it.

We know that the peculiarity of poetic thought is to be figurative; to present itself to the spirit accompanied by an image which represents objects not in an abstract manner, but concrete and living. The idea and the sensuous form appear to us simultaneously, as forming a single whole, which is the poetic image itself. It is, in fact, the essence of poetry, as of art in general, to represent to us ideas under sensuous forms, the species or the type in a living individuality. Just so the poetic image presents the inmost sense of things, their idea, combined with the richness of the forms of nature.

The first effect of this image is to detain the spirit with the external form, to interest us in it as expressing the thing in its living reality, to give to it importance, to heighten and embellish it. Also, poetic thought affects, in its language, the form of periphrasis: it describes an attribute, a characteristic accessory, as an ornament designed to elevate the object, to picture it, to draw a clear and vivid image of it in the spirit. Epithets—those of Homer in particular—which frequently appear insignificant, and recur unceasingly, have this design of figuring forth the objects and of engraving their image in our thought.

Such figurative expression is not, therefore, unessential. Unessential expression describes an object by name of another, through an analogy which exists between them. Such are metaphor and comparison. They are simply ornaments. Expression proper does more: it characterizes. Its images, borrowed from nature, serve to develop, to explain thought. Fashioned by the spirit, they show its richness and productivity. The metaphorical employment of language becomes itself an end: the imagination amuses itself in showing its genius and fecundity. It embellishes itself with ornaments, and delights in its peculiar activity, which it displays on all sides.

To poetic expression is opposed prosaic expression. Here the image loses its value. In this, the sense, the idea is the essential and the end. It may still be useful for indicating with force and vivacity the external side of objects; but this is not done when we design to paint thought. Fidelity and clearness form the first or only law of language. In poetry, exactness and perfect conformity of expression to the simple thought are not the principal objects. It must, first of all, conduct us into a sphere where sensuous forms furnish a body for ideas. The spirit, attaching itself to the image, in this living form, finds itself free from the exclusive preoccupation of the idea. It inhabits two worlds at once, the world of sense and that of thought.

In simple (*naïve*) epochs this language, wholly of images, is easy: thought naturally puts on this figurative form. In the ages of reflection, where logical and prosaic habits rule, poetry has need of a premeditated energy in order to liberate itself from abstract formulas, and to re-establish the harmony of the faculties of the soul.

If we now consider poetic language in itself in its *form* and its *grammatical* structure, a few words will suffice to characterize it.

1°. There exists, above all, in certain idioms, a wholly poetic vocabulary. There are particular forms of speech in poetry, strange to common use, nobler terms, expressions new or borrowed from the old language. The great poets reveal thus the power of their genius in creating new words, in fixing, in ennobling the vulgar language.

2°. The disposition of words, the signs of language, poetic turns, inversions contrary to logical arrangement, and blunt, vivid expressions, offer means full of resources.

3°. The period, with its simple or complete texture, its movement gentle or rapid, its unexpected transitions, corresponds to analagous movements of thought.

We should distinguish, in the epochs of language, the same difference as in those of poetic thought. A simple, natural, vivid, original, ingenuous manner of expression characterizes primitive epochs. The speech of the poet is then itself something new, which awakens admiration: it is a living creation, a species of revelation. There are none of the trite and common forms which mediocrity and the spirit of imitation make use of, a sort of current money whose stamp is worn off. Nor does one find there any of those artifices of language, those nice shadings, those adroit transitions which characterize the development of art and language in later ages; but a simple, ingenuous, original and strong diction—a natural, energetic expression, full of freshness and brilliancy. The precise distinctions between that which is vulgar and that which is noble does not yet exist. The language is rich, although simple; figurative, and not charged with metaphors. Such is the language of Homer and Dante.

Later, when combinations of thought are multiplied, language affects a more deliberate and more skilful movement, and poetry takes a different position as opposed to prose. It is then that their distinction appears well defined. The poet is compelled to elevate himself above ordinary language. Other conditions are imposed upon him: the artistic calm, the sentiment of harmony, the demands of good taste, more toil, and disguised effort. Then, too, a poetic production, because of these very difficulties, may make of the form of the language a principal object. We seek polish, elegance, and the effects of rhetorical style. Throughout these the toil of reflection, applied to the perfecting of the form, becomes felt. Such is the character of certain epochs and of the poetry of certain nations. True poetic diction escapes the two extremes. While wholly admitting the pleasure of a learned structure and of a beautiful style, it abstains from declamatory rhetoric and false elegance; it observes an exact admeasurement. The content

is not forgotten for the form; but the two elaborated, each for the other, make only one. A harmonious, true, living language seems to have sprung from the thing itself.

The third side of poetic language, distinct from image and diction properly so called, is versification. Without it, it is true, the thought, the language even, can be poetic; but they have not their true form; the musical element is lacking.

The necessity of versification, as an essential form of poetic language, is easy to demonstrate. Poetry is the art-form of speech. Speech is composed of sounds: it has this in common with music. These signs, no doubt, are signs which represent thoughts and images. They are, not the less, materials of art. As such they strike the ear more or less harmoniously. Now, since they appertain to art, they fall under its laws. The Beautiful here is harmony. Measure or rhyme is, then, absolutely indispensable. They introduce us into a world into which we can enter only by abandoning the habits of prose. The poet is compelled to move outside the limits of ordinary language.

That is, then, a superficial and false theory which has wished to banish versification from poetry under the pretext of making it more natural and free. The Natural, the True, here, is the Beautiful; it is harmony: the False is the Real; it is prose. Undoubtedly, the making of verse may be a shackle for thought; but these bonds are the laws of art themselves. The true poet bears this yoke easily; far from cramping the flight of his thought, this necessity sustains it, elevates it, excites it; it favors inspiration. Those who cannot talk this language are not true poets. Poetic prose is bastard and spurious. The sound of words, that material element of poetry, should not remain unformed; it should be fashioned according to the laws of harmony. Thereby language tempers the gravity of thought; it transports the poet and the auditor into a superior sphere, where grace and serenity reign. Just as in music, rhythm and melody ought to harmonize with the subject; versification ought to conform itself to the movement and character of the thoughts. The measure of the verse should reproduce the tone and the spirit of the whole poem.

After having thus demonstrated the necessity of versification in poetry, Hegel devotes himself to characterizing the two

great systems of versification which are adapted to ancient poetry and to modern poetry.

We shall not follow him in the parallel which he establishes between the two systems, of which the one has rhythm, the other rhyme for its basis, but shall confine ourselves to marking their general characters.

The system of *rhythmic versification* rests upon the duration of sounds, and the measure of long and short syllables. The accent, the cæsura, which give to verse more animation and variety, depend equally upon the external side of language, not upon the very sense of the words and the intonation which it determines. The words do not attract attention because of their signification, but through their external form. Accent and rhythm are independent of sense and thought. In modern versification, on the contrary, it is no longer the duration of sounds or the quantity which is the basis. They still preserve some importance; but the principle of measure is not now the length or shortness of syllables; it is their number, and even the sense which is attached to words. The expression concentrates itself upon the radical syllable, which draws the attention to it. The *signification*—in that, definitively, is the preponderating reason which determines the value of syllables. Thus the form of verse assumes a character less material and more spiritual.

As consequence of this principle, the expression, concentrating itself upon the radical syllable of words, in which, above all, their signification resides, and not upon the general form of words, it follows that the learned combination of modes and flexions which constitutes the rhythmic system is broken up. Hence, all fixed rules about the feet of verse, solely regulated by quantity, disappears, and the whole system which depends upon the measurement of time is necessarily destroyed. There is no more occasion to measure syllables, but to *count* them, to calculate their number, as in French and Italian verse.

Rhyme is the only possible compensation for the loss of these advantages. As the duration no longer co-ordinates and regulates itself, nor, on the other hand, is the spiritual sense found in the radical syllables, there is nothing else remaining, as material element, freed from the measurement of time

and the accentuation of syllables, than the sound itself of the syllables equally and alternately repeated.

What conditions must rhyme fulfil to answer to this condition?

In the first place, in order to draw attention and to make compensation for the cadenced sound of syllables in discourse, or for the organized measure of verse, this sound ought to be much more thoroughly marked. It needs, also, counterpoises to accentuation and to the signification of words. In opposition to the delicate movements of rhythmic harmony, rhyme would then be an external agreement which has no need of a finely practised ear such as Greek verse exacts.

Rhyme, in this respect, appears somewhat more material than the metre in rhythmic versification. But, from another side, the more abstract principle of the repetition of equal and exact sounds, in the rhymic harmony of words, is more favorable to thought, and invites more to reflection. The spirit is not distracted by that music of language which turns solely upon the external feature of the duration of sounds and their cadenced movement. The attention of spirit and ear is drawn simply to the repetition of similar sounds, a return in which the soul recognizes itself and satisfies itself as in a reflex of its own identity. The system of ancient versification has the more plastic character, rhyme the more profound and emotional. We find here the difference in character between classic and romantic poetry.

It is not, in fact, by accident or by artificial invention that this change is effected, and that the new system of versification has succeeded the ancient. The depth of modern feeling and thought demand an analagous form of versification. Unquestionably this revolution has its principle in the nature of modern idioms, but they represent the modern thought itself. The languages of the north are distinguished by their sentimental and spiritual character. Their inner structure, their laws, are its consequences. The two systems may, up to a certain point, coalesce; and many idioms—the German, for example—lend themselves to this alliance. But the rhythmic element subordinates itself, and is only accessory. The reason is easy to comprehend. Rhythmic versification, resting solely upon the length and shortness of syllables, has a fixed

measure, independent of the signification of words. Modern idioms, on the other hand, are deprived of this natural measure, because the verbal accent given by the signification may render a short syllable long and *vice versa*. All, then, becomes uncertain and unsteady: nothing fixed, compact, solid. The spirit is liberated from that material and temporal side of quantity and mathematical laws which distinguish ancient idioms, or that element has become purely accessory. Thus conformably to the nature of modern thought and language, it is not possible to attain to the plasticity of antique metre. Those who have believed in it have tried it to no purpose. If we wish to combine the two systems, the only compensation is the accent of the verse and the cæsura, which, combining itself with the verbal accent, stands out in a most expressive manner. But this means is itself imperfect.

III. From the exposition of the general principles of poetry, Hegel passes to the examination of the *different varieties* which it allows, and which serve to class its works. Without entering into the study of accessory forms and particular rules which belong to a course of literature, he devotes himself to observing the real nature and the essential characteristics of the principal varieties—*epic*, *lyric*, and *dramatic* poetry. Each of these forms of poetry is the object of a profound and elaborate theory, wherein it is studied in itself and in its connection with the two others. It remains for us to follow the author in this part of his work, which interests the scholar no less than the philosopher.

Observe how the three varieties characterize themselves, and how the division which comprehends them justifies itself.

In the first place, poetry presents to us a picture of the moral world in its external existence. It represents it under the form of a great action in which gods and men take part, and which evolves itself in the midst of a vast complication of particular incidents. That variety which recalls the figurative arts reveals to us the *objective*, impersonal side of existence, in this sense, that the action which makes its content takes the form of an event in the presence of which the poet sinks himself, and which accomplishes itself independently of the

will of men by an external fatality. Such is the general character of *epic poetry*.

To the epic is opposed *lyric poetry*. Its character is personal or subjective. It represents the inner world of the soul, its sentiments, its conceptions, its joys, and its sufferings. It is his personal thought, as profound and true, which the poet expresses as his proper disposition, the living and inspired production of his spirit.

Dramatic poetry combines the two preceding characteristics. Like epic poetry, it represents an action in its successive phases, together with the personages who play a part in it. But this action, in place of being determined by general causes and an external fatality, seems to come forth alive from the will of the characters, who themselves create for themselves their peculiar destiny. In place of a calm and equable recital of a past event, it is a vision which is given to our eyes by the means of actions and the accessories of scenic representation.

These three varieties embrace all poetry. The others are either mixed varieties or modifications of the preceding. The latter differ from the former only to approach prose, as do didactic and descriptive poetry.

EPIC POETRY.—Epic poetry should, in the first place, be considered in its *general character*.

Many inferior sorts may prepare us to comprehend the epic, properly so called; they are, *the epigram, the ancient elegy, gnomic poetry, cosmogonic or philosophic poems*. These forms of poetry may be considered as belonging to the epic variety in this, that the fact, or the idea which is the content of the poem, is presented for its own sake, without the poet's mingling therewith his reflections, his personal sentiments. The discourse (*ἔπος*) and the subject make but one thing. It is sometimes the expression of a fact accomplished (*epigram*), sometimes a series of maxims and sentences (*gnomic poetry*) where moral truth is strongly characterized, sometimes descriptions of grand scenes of nature, the recital of the origin of things and the revolutions of nature, or the poetic expression of the laws of the universe and the first speculations of science. But all these productions, although they have the epic tone, do not constitute the true epic.

"This has for subject a past action, an event which, in the vast compass of its circumstances and the richness of its relations, embraces a whole world; the life of a nation and the history of an entire epoch." It is the national book, and, like the Bible of a people, it presents a faithful and complete picture of its genius, its manners, and its character.

As presenting the artless thought of a nation under the poetic form, the true epic poem appears at an era intermediate between the barbarous and the civilized state. Later, when the individual spirit has detached itself from the general thought, when a political organization and fixed laws have established themselves, the soul creates for itself a distinct and independent world; it enters into itself and conceives an ideal from reflection and sentiment. The poet expresses lyrically his personal impressions. As this individual force increases, and as the sentiment of personality becomes marked in the character and the passions, the necessity of representing this principle leads to *dramatic* poetry.

We shall, nevertheless, distinguish the heroic age, which furnishes the material for the epic, from the era in which the epic poem takes its rise. Homer and his poems are many ages later than the war of Troy. But in spite of the distance which separates the poet from his subject, a strict connection should subsist between them; he must live again in similar ideas, manners, and beliefs; without this his work affords a striking contradiction between present and past ideas. It is only a learned combination, the effort of a skilled reflection, without proper sap or vitality. The learned epic displaces the primitive epic.

We see from this the qualities and the position of the epic poet.

Although the epic may be the faithful picture of the civilization of a people, it is none the less the free product of individual thought. In such a work appears all the boldness of creation of a man of genius, who is inspired with the events, with the spirit and the character of his nation and of his time. It is necessary that the poet, in order to be the interpreter of general thought, necessarily vague, give to it a more precise form; that he be conscious of himself and of the freedom of his genius. Otherwise he cannot realize so grand a work. But in spite of the independence of his creations, he should remain

national in the ideas, the passions, the characters of his personages, and thus in the coloring of his pictures. It is necessary that the nation recognize itself in him, and his work be the image of its spirit.

Because of this objective character of the epic, the poet ought to sink himself in the presence of his subject, to absorb himself completely in the world which he unfolds to our eyes. In such a work created by his imagination, in which he has placed his soul and his genius, nowhere ought his person and his hand directly to betray themselves. The poem seems to sing itself. The edifice rears itself; the architect remains invisible.

But an epic poem should not the less be the work of a single man. We cannot stand up too strongly against the opinion which considers, for example, the poems of Homer as a succession of songs collected, and afterwards arranged, as a collection of rhapsodies. Such an hypothesis is counter to the very notion of art. Every work of art, in fact, explains itself only through the original thought of a single individual. The spirit of the age, of the nation, is the general cause, the basis of his work; but this spirit must concentrate itself in the individual genius of the artist or poet who inspires himself with it. A poem is an organic whole; only a single man can conceive and organize a uniform whole. Unity, that supreme law of art, exacts a homogeneous thought, an intelligence which conceives and develops it. The contrary opinion is barbarous; and when we reduce it to its just value, we see that what it has of truth is this, that the poet sinks himself in the presence of his work which is to be his most beautiful panegyric.

B. If from the general characteristics we pass to examine the *particular characteristics* which distinguish epic poetry, the principal points to be considered are:

1°. The state of civilization suited to the epic; 2°. the nature of epic *action*, its personages and their character, the movement and the development of the action, the superior powers which direct it and determine its *denouement*; 3°. lastly, the unity of the epic poem in its totality and its general development.

1°. As to what concerns the *social form proper to the epic*, that subject has already been treated in the first part, in con-

nection with the determination of the *ideal*. It is sufficient to recall what was then said, adding thereto some new considerations.

The state of society suitable as a foundation for the epic, is what we may term the *heroic age*. It is an epic where the ethical life, the organization of the family and the nation, present already a certain degree of development, but not a regular and fixed form. A positive constitution and legislation take from the personages their independence and the spontaneity of their character.

Perfect liberty of action and of will, joined to a simple life which permits man to preserve his relations with nature, and to display his activity in enjoying its productions or in combatting its obstacles—this is what characterizes the existence of heroes. It is an intermediate state between barbarous and the prose of civilized life, where all is regulated, arranged,—where each has his function and his appointed place. There is no fixed hierarchy to establish relations of dependence and obedience essentially adverse to the individuality of epic figures.

The picture of this social state must, furthermore, embrace the entirety of national knowledges, the richest and most varied painting of the manners of foreign peoples. It is thus that Homer places under our eyes, all the earth and the whole of human life painted on the shield of Achilles, with the usages, the legislation, and the marriages, or a complete abridgment of human knowledge.

Nevertheless it is always the national character, the particular spirit of the nation, which should reflect itself in it. In this respect the epic is the Bible of a people, its book, as immortal as itself. Such is the reason of the enduring interest which it excites. It is the living image of this people, reproducing all its traits, moral, religious, political, and physical. This it is which constitutes the immortal interest of the works of Homer, independently of the beauty of the composition.

2°. To describe this form of society is not, for all that, the object of the epic poem. It is only the foundation on which an event develops itself—that is to say, the *epic action*. This action should be determined by moral causes of the highest order, and accomplished by the *dramatis personæ*. The epic

world must then be seized in such a particular *situation* as gives birth to action, in a *collision*.

What should be the nature of this collision compared with dramatic collisions?

The situation most proper for epic action is the *state of war*—that is to say, a conflict between peoples. War shows a nation wholly in movement; it is at the same time the grandest occasion which it has for coming to an understanding with itself, obliged as it is to display all its energies in a heroic effort. Further, this is the object of all the great epics. War-like courage is the principal interest. Bravery is a quality of the soul which has need of a vast field of action; it reveals the natural side of character rather than the pathetic side of its passion; and it pursues ends which incline it to recount rather than to represent. In the epic, the works of the will and the chances of events ought to coalesce; just as, in the drama, the march of the action and its *denouement* explain themselves through the motives and the characters of the *dramatis personæ*.

These situations open a vast field for the epic. It is to be remarked, further, that the situations truly epic are the wars of nations foreign to each other. Subjects taken from civil wars, like the *Pharsalia* of Lucan, and the *Henriade*, have not been successful. The conflict of political parties is more favorable to the drama than to the epic, for these events lose their grandeur and clearness: they become embroiled and entangled, and leave too large a field for intrigue. A struggle for the position and the integrity of a nation, of a race, is alone worthy of an epic.

Let us add to this the defense of a just cause, the vindication of a universal right. Then only the spectacle of a great enterprise, not an arbitrary and personal plan of conquest, unfolds itself to our vision: an event of sublime necessity which takes place in the order of the world—such is the subject of all the great epics.

The content of the epic is then a national enterprise, on which the character and genius of a nation imprints itself. This enterprise should have a determinate end, certain motives, to be realized under the form of events and through certain personages. This constitutes *epic action*. It presents

two aspects: the internal side, the end, the motives; and the external side, the physical and moral circumstances which appear as obstacles or means. That which distinguishes an *action*, properly so called, from an *event*, is, that in the former the internal side predominates; while in an event the external preserves its absolute right.

Now the problem of epic poetry consists in representing the principal action as an event or series of events, consequently in according to external circumstances the same importance as to the will of the personages.

As to the nature itself of the aim of the action, that aim in the epic cannot be an abstract idea, like the state, the native country, but something living and individual. The enterprise must have for motive the will, the misfortune, the exploit of a particular hero, an insult to avenge, a right to vindicate, love, etc. Without this, events appear in their frigid succession, as in a history of a people. This is the reason why epics where one has wished to represent the history of the whole world do not furnish real interest. They lack the character of individuality which is essential to art. An action of which the world is the theatre and humanity the hero presents nothing precise to the imagination. It is a frigid allegory, a phantasmagoria where grand historic figures pass an instant before the eyes to disappear and make room for others which the flood of time brings on forever.

Epic action, then, can attain the poetic vitality only as it concentrates itself in a single hero, who marches at the head of events and to whose person they attach themselves.

As to the *personages of the epic*, whose actions, interests, misfortunes and destiny, form, as in the drama, the principal interest, it is important to mark with precision the distinction between them and *dramatic* personages.

In the epic the principal figures should present a combination of the traits which represent completely human nature and the national character. Such are Achilles and the *Cid*. Tragic characters may have in reality an equal richness; but the action being confined in narrow limits, an equal variety cannot be developed. This would be impossible and superfluous. The epic hero represents an entire people, an entire form of civilization. He belongs to a period of simplicity where

the whole character exhibits itself. The natural has the largest place in him. The moral has little right to demand account of his acts and his passions. Such is Achilles. Such noble persons take up into themselves, with glory, whatever is scattered through the national character—its defects as well as its positive qualities.

Dramatic characters are not thus exalted nor thus complete. They do not reach that elevation where all that was at the base becomes concentrated and completed in a summit. The aim is more personal—the motives more individual.

Another difference is this, that the dramatic personage concentrates all his energy into the pursuit of one end. Now this constant preoccupation with a single aim is foreign to the heroes of the epic poem. They accomplish their destiny; but events, external circumstances, effect as much as they. Obstacles, dangers, adventures, do not arise so directly from the action itself as in the drama. They rather produce themselves for his occasion.

Other differences cause themselves to be remarked in the *form of events*, their *progress*, the *necessity* which determines them, and the general powers which govern them.

In the drama, as has been remarked, the passion or the will of the personages is the essential principle which determines their destiny. The events appear to depend on their character and the ends which they pursue. And, too, the principal interest concentrates itself on the ethical side of the action. External circumstances have no value except through the advantage which the personages themselves reap from them. In the epic, events, external accidents, and actions emanating from the will of personages, have equal importance. Human actions assimilate themselves to events which evolve themselves under our eyes. Thus the personage is not free; he is thrown into the midst of a vast complication of events, in appearance controlled by chance; in reality ruled by necessity.

And now appears an essential difference upon this important point of *fatality* or *destiny*.

The dramatic personage himself creates his own destiny. The destiny of the epic hero is the result of the force of things. The power of circumstances imprints upon the action its particular movement and determines the issue of events. There

remains for man only to follow that fatal and necessary order, and to suffer his doom. The spectacle which presents itself to our view is that of a grand general situation. This fatality is also a providential justice. Still, man is less judged in his acts, as a moral person, than in the things which he personifies. The grandeur of the events crushes the individuals, who themselves represent races or peoples. There hovers also a tone of sadness over all. That which is most noble is condemned to perish. Such is the destiny of Achilles, of Hector, of the heroes involved in the destruction of Troy, or dispersed after its fall.

This necessity may be represented in various ways. Sometimes it springs from a single exhibition of the action. The general tone of the recital causes us to feel that it concerns itself with events whose necessity is the effect of a mysterious power. Sometimes the poet places over the actions of men certain superior divinities who govern and direct their course, by their will and their decrees.

This is the Marvelous, properly so called. But it is necessary also to state the nature of the Marvelous in the epic.

A rule already established elsewhere is, that, in the combined action of gods and men, there must be maintained the poetic relation of respective independence, without which the gods are abstractions, or the men instruments, machines. This is the defect of the Indian epics. The Greek epic has resolved the problem in the happiest manner: it presents this harmonious fusion of the human will and the divine will. The heroes and the divinities preserve an immovable power and an individual liberty perfectly independent.

We must here insist upon the distinction of *primitive* epics and *artificial* or learned epics; the first, where the poet is still in harmony with the beliefs of the epic which he traces; the second, where his beliefs are different from those of the world which he wishes to represent. Thus in Homer the gods float in a magic light between reality and fiction. The Marvelous presents a solid, substantial, true character.

It is the property of a fresh and simple imagination to communicate to the Marvelous this stamp of naturalness and truth. The divinities of Virgil, compared with the gods of Homer, are certain imaginary beings coldly invented or imitated, a

kind of artistic machine. The Marvelous in modern epics, in the *Paradise Lost*, the *Henriade*, the *Messiah*, etc., is also far from this truth. The poem of Klopstock, in particular, is full of abstract fictions, which, in spite of beauties of the first order, render the reading of it fatiguing.

3°. After having considered the epic poem in relation to the action which forms its content, the personages which play a part in it, and the superior powers which direct its events, there is left for us to examine it as a whole, in its *mode of organization* and its *unity*, as also in its movement and its development. It is here, above all, that the principal rules of the epic have their place.

The basis of epic action is the entire world of the nation: this, like the idea of a picture, is the ground-plan. Above appear the gods who direct the action. Upon an intermediate plane there is delineated the picture of human life, public and private. Upon the foreground appear the personages, with their sentiments, their designs, their passions. All these parts ought to be strongly bound together, not to remain isolated.

Now the bond of *unity*, the centre, is the particular event of which the epic traces the development, the limited action to which all the details attach themselves.

Through this the poem presents individuality, richness, life, and unity. The recital is not a simple description of different objects. The particular event absorbs the national idea no further than that the latter appears simply in the service of the action.

The general rule is that the two sides, the particular action and the general picture, be so combined, that they preserve, in spite of their reciprocity, an independence which permits them to develop themselves in free harmony. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* furnish us models. The anger of Achilles, which is the centre of the action, suffers events to evolve themselves freely. The voyage of Ulysses presents the same spectacle in a variety of adventures related to the same end, and which seem to succeed each other at random.

As to the individual action itself, in order that it may have unity, there is necessary to it in the first place a definite point of departure. A general collision does not suffice. Thus for the *Iliad*, though the Trojan war is the basis, the poem com-

mences with the quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon. The action is thereby confined within a clearly traced circle.

The point of departure fixed, what is the *mode of development* which befits it? If one wishes here again to remark the differences between epic and dramatic poetry, the principal points to be considered are: 1°. *the extent of the epic poem*; 2°. *the connection of the various parts and the episodes*; 3°. *the manner of contriving the movement of events*.

In order to resume in general the development of epic action, particularly in opposition to dramatic poetry, to render account both of its extent and of the progress of events towards the final consummation, we ought to say that the evolution in the epic poem not only delays for the description of external circumstances and ethical situations, but also in other respects it opposes itself to the *denouement*. It retards in particular by *episodes* the accomplishment of the particular aim, which dramatic poetry may not lose from sight an instant amid the conflicts which continue without interruption in a logical and consequent manner. But it is not necessary that such obstacles should appear like means employed for an external end. The entire course of events ought to spring out of itself by the force of circumstances, and this by an original design, distinct from the personal intentions of the poet.

In concluding, it is proper to state precisely what constitutes *unity of action* in the epic poem.

We have already refuted the opinion which pretends that the epic poem is formed by the successive addition of many songs which may continue indefinitely. The falsity of this becomes manifest when we comprehend perfectly the nature of the unity which constitutes the essence of the epic work, just as of every work of art in general.

Unity is not a vague and common term. Each event may, it is true, prolong itself indefinitely, may extend into the past and into the future. If, then, one only has regard to succession, or even to the connection of facts, the epic could have neither beginning nor end. The exemplification of this is given us in cyclic poems, prosaic works compared with those of Homer.

The error arises from this, that there is no clear idea of the nature of an action, and of the difference which there is be-

tween an action and a simple fact. Facts interlink or succeed one another. In order to an action there is needful something more than a similar external bond; action presupposes a determinate *end* and motives. Thus an end clearly conceived, and a motive in like manner determined, which pushes the personage to the completion of that end—this is what constitutes an action. Hence the realization of this action has a significance, a determined character, a beginning, a middle, and an end. The passions, the character of the persons, the situations, the events, are attached to a common idea. The action has a centre towards which converge all the parts of the poem. All which does not strictly belong thereto ought to be excluded.

The anger of Achilles, in the *Iliad*, is the centre of the poem, the fact to which all the events attach themselves.

Thus what constitutes the unity of the epic, is an individual action having a determinate and precise end, a comprehended motive of the personages, whose accomplishment thenceforth has a beginning, a middle, and an end.

In what, then, differs the unity of epic from that of dramatic action? The difference has been already remarked above. In the epic, the action develops itself from the bosom of a vast national unity. This introduces into the representation a multiplicity of situations and events which the drama does not admit of. This is a vaster picture; herein a whole world reflects itself. The unity here is complete only when, on the one side, the particular action is achieved; and when, on the other side, the entire world wherein it moves is represented in its perfect wholeness; which opens an immense career, and permits a great variety of episodes.

C. This exposition of the principles of the epic concludes by indicating some inferior varieties which belong to it, such as the *idyl*, the *pastoral*, the *descriptive* poem, which have already been spoken of elsewhere. But the variety which approaches the nearest is the romance, which Hegel characterizes thus:

The *novel* is the *social epic*. It presupposes a prosaically organized society, and its aim is to restore to poetry its lost rights. Its content is the collision between the poetry of the heart and the prose of the social relations. It is a protest

against the actual organization of society, an effort to substitute for this prose of reality a form which approaches more nearly to the beauty of art. The novel demands, like the epic, the painting of an entire world, and the picture of real life. As to the conception and the execution, the career of the novelist is freer, since, though in his descriptions he cannot dispense with the prose of real life, he is not himself obliged to remain in the prosaic and the vulgar.

After developing this theory, the author, in a rapid sketch, traces the *development of epic poetry*, and briefly characterizes the great poems of this class which belong to the principal epochs and the different historical nations.

OUTLINES OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY.

[In 1840, the Editors of Hegel's works published a small volume with the title, *HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL PROPÆDEUTICS*. The work, which was edited by Karl Rosenkranz, contains substantially the original outline of the Course of Instruction in Philosophy which Hegel gave at the Gymnasium at Nürnberg in 1808-1811, together with sundry additions made from notes taken at the lectures and other sources. We give the entire exposition of the Phenomenology as it occurs in the second year of the course. (The entire course was divided into three years: *1st year*, Science of Rights, of Morals, and of Religion; *2d year*, Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic; *3d year*, Science of the Idea and Philosophical Encyclopædia. The whole is preceded by an admirable preface by the Editor.) After the three Parts of Hegel's Phenomenology which we gave in Volume II. of this Journal, it seemed well to give an outline of the whole subject in order to assist the reader in his labors upon the third (Force and Understanding). Nothing so much restores confidence after hard and apparently fruitless study of the detailed dialectical procedure as a short and clear outline. It seems like a gleam of light, and sometimes suggests at once the significance of the whole.—EDITOR.]

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Our ordinary Knowing has before itself only the object which it knows, but does not at first make an object of itself, i. e. of the Knowing. But the whole which is extant in the act of knowing is not the object alone, but also the Ego that knows, and the relation of the Ego and the object to each other, i. e. Consciousness.

§ 2. In Philosophy, the determinations of the Knowing are not considered exclusively in the phase of determinations of things, but likewise as determinations of the Knowing, to which they belong, although in common likewise to things. In other words: they are not taken merely as objective but also as subjective determinations—or rather as definite species of relation of the object and subject to each other.

§ 3. Since things and their determinations are in the Knowing, it is quite possible, on the one hand, to view the same as in and for themselves outside of Consciousness—as given to the latter in the shape of foreign and already existing material for it;—on the other hand, however, for the reason that Consciousness is essential to the Knowing of these, the view is possible that Consciousness itself posits this world, and produces or modifies the determinations of the same, through its mediating relation and its activity, either wholly or in part. The former mode of view is called “Realism,” the latter, “Idealism.” Here are to be considered the general determinations of things only as the definite relation of object to the subject.

§ 4. The subject, more definitely seized, is Spirit (the Mind). It is Phenomenal when essentially relating to an existent object; in so far as it is Consciousness. The Science of Consciousness is, therefore, called The Phenomenology of Spirit (or Mind).

§ 5. But the Mind, according to its self-activity within itself and in relation to itself independent of all relation to others, is considered in the Science of Mind proper, or “Psychology.”

§ 6. Consciousness is in general the knowing of an object, whether external or internal, without regard to whether it presents itself without the help of the Mind, or whether it is produced through this. The Mind is to be considered in its activities in so far as the determinations of its consciousness are ascribed to it.

§ 7. Consciousness is the definite relation of the Ego to an Object. In so far as one regards it from the objective side, it can be said to vary according to the difference of the Objects which it has.

§ 8. At the same time, however, the Object is essentially determined (modified) through the mediating relation to Con-

sciousness. Its diversity is, therefore, to be considered as conversely dependent upon the development of Consciousness. This reciprocity continues through the Phenomenal sphere of Consciousness and leaves the above-mentioned (§ 3) questions undecided.

§ 9. Consciousness has in general three phases, according to the diversity of the object. It (the object) is namely either the object standing in opposition to the Ego, or it is the Ego itself, or something objective which belongs likewise equally to the Ego: Thought. These determinations are not empirically taken up from without, but are moments of Consciousness itself. Hence it is

- (1) Consciousness in general;
- (2) Self-Consciousness;
- (3) Reason.

FIRST PHASE.

Consciousness in General.

§ 10. Consciousness in general is (1) Sensuous; (2) Perceiving; (3) Understanding.

A.—The Sensuous Consciousness.

§ 11. The simple sensuous Consciousness is the immediate certitude of an external object. The expression for the immediateness of such an object is that "it is," and moreover a "This," a "Now" according to time, and a "Here" according to space, and different from all other objects and perfectly determined (definite) in itself.

§ 12. This Now and this Here are vanishing somewhats. Now is no more while it is and another Now has entered its place, and this latter Now has likewise vanished. But the Now abides all the same. This abiding Now is the general Now, which is both this and that Now, and is likewise neither of them.—This Here which I mean, and point out, has a right and left, an above and a below, a behind and a before, &c., *ad infinitum*; i. e. the Here pointed out is not a simple and hence definite Here, but a unity including many Heres. Therefore, what in truth is extant is not the abstract, sensuous determinateness [the simple "it is"], but the General.

B.—Perception.

§ 13. Perception has no longer for object the Sensuous in so far as it is immediate, but in so far as it is general. It is a mingling of sensuous determinations with those of Reflection.

§ 14. The object of this Consciousness is, therefore, the Thing with its Properties. The sensuous properties are (a) *for themselves* immediately in sensation, and likewise determined and mediated through the relation to others; (b) they belong to a thing, and are in this respect, on the one hand, embraced in the individuality of the same; on the other hand, they have generality, according to which they transcend this individual thing, and are at the same time independent of each other.

§ 15. In so far as the Properties are essentially mediated, they have their subsistence in another and are subject to *change*. They are only *accidents*. Things, however, since they subsist in their properties (for the reason that they are distinguished by means of these), perish through the change of those properties, and become an alternation of birth and decay.

§ 16. In this change it is not merely the somewhat that cancels itself and passes over to another, but the other itself changes. But the other of the other, or the change of the changeable, is the Becoming of the Abiding—of the in-and-for-itself Subsisting and Internal.

C.—The Understanding.

§ 17. The object has now this character: it has (a) a purely accidental side, and (b) also an essentiality and an abiding side. Consciousness, for the reason that the object has for it this character, is the UNDERSTANDING—for which the “*things*” of perception pass for mere phenomena, and it (the Understanding) contemplates the “Internal of things.”

§ 18. The Internal of things is that in them which, on the one hand, is free from the Phenomenal manifestation—namely, their multiplicity—which constitutes an External in opposition to it (the Internal); on the other hand, however, it is that which is related to them through its comprehension (ideal totality or “definition”). It is therefore: (1) simple force, which passes over into extantness, its “utterance” (or manifestation).

§ 19. (2) Force remains with this distinction the same in all the sensuous variations of the Phenomenon. The Law of the Phenomenon is its quiet, general image. It is a mediating relation of general abiding determinations whose distinctions are external to the law. The generality and persistence of this mediating relation lead to the necessity of the same; yet without the distinction's being an in-itself-determined or internal one, in which one of the determinations lies immediately in the comprehension (total definition) of the other.

§ 20. This Comprehension—akin to Consciousness itself—gives another phase thereof. Hitherto it was in relation to its object as somewhat alien and indifferent. Since now the distinction in general has become a distinction which at the same time is no distinction, the previous mode of the distinction of Consciousness from its object falls away. It has an object and relates to another, which, however, is at the same time no "other"; in fine, it has itself for object.

§ 21. In other words: the "Internal of things" is the thought or comprehension thereof. While Consciousness has the Internal as object, it has thought, or its own Reflection, or its own form—and, consequently, itself as object.

SECOND PHASE.

The Self-Consciousness.

§ 22. As Self-Consciousness the Ego intuits itself, and the expression of the same in its purity is Ego=Ego, or: I am I.

§ 23. This proposition of self-consciousness is devoid of all content. The impulse of self-consciousness consists in this: to realize its comprehension ("true nature") and to become conscious of itself in every respect. It is therefore: (1) active in cancelling the otherness (alien-being) of objects, and in positing them like itself; (2) in making itself valid externally, and thus giving itself, through this, objectivity and extantness. These two are one and the same activity. The becoming-determined of self-consciousness is at the same time a self-determining, and conversely. It produces itself as object.

§ 24. Self-Consciousness has in its culture, or movement, three stages: (1) of Desire in so far as it is related to other things: (2) of the Mediating relation of master and slave (dominion and servitude) in so far as it is related to another self-

consciousness not identical with itself; (3) of the general Self-Consciousness which recognizes itself in other self-consciousnesses, and is identical with them as well as self-identical.

A.—Desire.

§ 25. Both sides of self-consciousness, the positing and the cancelling, are thus united with each other immediately. Self-Consciousness posits itself through negation of otherness and is *practical* consciousness. If, therefore, in the real consciousness, which also is called the *theoretical*, the determinations of the same and of the object changed or varied *of themselves*, now it happens that this change occurs through the activity of the Consciousness itself and *for* it. It is conscious that this cancelling activity belongs to it. In the comprehension of self-consciousness the not-yet-realized distinction lies as a characteristic. In so far as this distinction makes its appearance, there arises a feeling of otherness (dependence on others) in consciousness—a feeling of negation in itself, or the feeling of deficiency, a *want*.

§ 26. This feeling of its otherness contradicts its identity with itself. The necessity felt to cancel this opposition is Impulse (or appetite). Negation, or otherness, presents itself to the consciousness as an external thing different from it, which however is determined through the self-consciousness (1) as a somewhat suited to gratify the appetency, and (2) as a somewhat in itself negative whose subsistence is to be cancelled by the Self and posited in identity with it (i. e. made identical, or assimilated).

§ 27. The activity of desire thus cancels the otherness (alien element) of the object and its subsistence, and unites it with the subject, and by this means the desire is appeased. This is conditioned thus: (1) through an object existing externally or indifferent to it, or through Consciousness; (2) its activity produces the gratification only through destruction of the object. The self-consciousness arrives through this at its feeling of Self.

§ 28. In Desire, Consciousness stands in relation to itself as individual. It relates to an object devoid of selfhood, which is in and for itself another than the self-consciousness. The latter for this reason only attains self-identity as regards the

object through destruction of the latter. Desire is in general (1) destructive, (2) in the gratification of its wants, therefore, it comes to the conscious feeling of its for-itself-being as individual—to the undefined Comprehension of the subject as connected with objectivity.

B.—The Relation of Master and Slave.

§ 29. The comprehension of self-consciousness as Subject which is at the same time object, gives the mediating relation: that *another* self-consciousness exists for the self-consciousness.

§ 30. A self-consciousness which is for another is not as a mere object for it, but as its *other self*. The Ego is no abstract generality in which there is no distinction or determination. Since an Ego is thus the object of the Ego, in this respect there is the same for it as object that it is in itself. It intuits itself in another.

§ 31. This self-intuition of one in another is (1) the abstract moment of self-sameness. (2) Each has, however, also the peculiarity that it manifests itself to the other as an external object, and in so far as an immediate sensuous and concrete existence. (3) Each is absolutely for-itself and individual as opposed to the other, and asserts its right to be such for the other and to pass for such, and to intuit its own freedom as a for-itself-existent in the other and to be recognized by it.

§ 32. In order to make itself valid as a free being and to obtain recognition, self-consciousness must exhibit itself to another as free from natural existence. This moment (i. e. the being-for-another) is as necessary as that of the freedom of self-consciousness *in itself*. The absolute identity of the Ego with itself is essentially not an immediate, but such a one as has been achieved through the cancelling of sensuous immediateness, and the exhibition of the self to another as free and independent from the Sensuous. Thus it shows itself in conformity with its comprehension (ideal), and must be recognized because it gives reality to the Ego.

§ 33. But Independence is freedom not *outside of* and *from* the sensuous immediate extant being, but rather as freedom *in* the same. The one moment is as necessary as the other, but they are not of the same value. For the reason that non-

identity enters—that to one of two self-consciousnesses freedom passes for the essential in opposition to sensuous extant being, while with the other the opposite occurs—with the reciprocal demand for recognition there enters into determined actuality the mediating relation (of master and slave) between them; or, in general terms, that of service and submission, in so far as this diversity of independence is extant through the immediate agency of nature.

§ 34. Since of two self-consciousnesses opposed to each other, each must strive to assert and prove itself as an absolute for-itself-existence against and for the other, That one enters into a condition of slavery who prefers life to freedom, and thereby shows that he has not the capacity to abstract from his sensuous extant being by his own might for his independence.

§ 35. This pure negative Freedom, which consists in the abstraction from natural extant being, does not correspond to the definition (comprehension) of Freedom, for this latter is the self-identity, even when involved with others: partly the intuition of itself in another self, and partly the freedom (not *from* the existent, but) *in* the existent, a freedom which itself has extantness. The one who serves is devoid of selfhood and has another self in place of his own, so that for his master he has resigned and cancelled his individual Ego and now views his essential self in another. The master, on the contrary, looks upon the servant (the other Ego) as cancelled and his own individual will as preserved. (History of Robinson and Friday.)

§ 36. The own individual will of the servant, more closely regarded, is cancelled in the fear of the master, and reduced to the internal feeling of its negativity. Its labor for the service of another is a resignation of its own will partly in itself, partly it is at the same time, with the negation of its own desire, the positive transformation of external things through labor; since through labor the self makes its own determinations the forms of things, and thus views itself as objective in its work. The renunciation of the unessential arbitrary will constitutes the moment of true obedience. (Pisistratus taught the Athenians to obey. Through this he made the Code of Solon an actual power; and after the Athenians had learned this, the dominion of a Ruler over them was superfluous.)

§ 37. This renunciation of individuality as self is the moment (phase) through which self-consciousness makes the transition to the universal will, the transition to positive freedom.

C.—Universality of Self-Consciousness.

§ 38. The universal self-consciousness is the intuition of itself, not as a special existence distinct from others, but an intuition of the self-existent universal self. Thus it recognizes itself and the other self-consciousnesses in itself, and is in turn recognized by them.

§ 39. Self-consciousness is, according to this its essential universality, only real in so far as it knows its echo (and reflection) in another (I know that another knows me as itself), and as pure spiritual universality (belonging to the family, the native land, &c.) knows itself as essential self. (This self-consciousness is the basis of all virtues, of love, honor, friendship, bravery, all self-sacrifice, all fame, &c.)

THIRD PHASE.

Reason.

§ 40. REASON is the highest union of consciousness and self-consciousness, or of the knowing of an object and of the knowing of itself. It is the certitude that its determinations are just as much objective, i. e. determinations of the essence of things, as they are subjective thoughts. It (Reason) is just as well the certitude of itself (subjectivity) as being (or objectivity), and this, too, in one and the same thinking activity.

§ 41. Or what we see through the insight of Reason, is: (1) a content which subsists not in our mere subjective notions or thoughts which we make for ourselves, but which contains the in-and-for-itself-existing essence of objects and possesses objective reality; and (2) which is for the Ego no alien somewhat, no somewhat given from without, but throughout penetrated and assimilated by the Ego, and therefore to all intents produced by the Ego.

§ 42. The knowing of Reason is therefore not the mere subjective certitude, but also TRUTH, because Truth consists in the harmony, or rather *unity*, of certitude and Being, or of certitude and objectivity.

SPECULATIVE *vs.* VISIONARY.

By H. H. MORSEAN.

As most men fall far below the attainable ideal of manhood, many fallacies in regard to life pass the longer unquestioned; and yet, since mistakes in thinking should be avoided rather than corrected, it seems worth while to suggest a few thoughts whose truth none can deny, but whose value few appreciate.

Custom has divided men into Theorists and Men of Action: into those who are learned and those who are skilled: those who are students and those who are to live entirely in a world of never-ceasing activity. Reasonable as this classification seems, it nevertheless involves one of the most pernicious of fallacies. To confound the thinker with the visionary; to identify the man of narrow comprehension and quick decision with the practical man, and thus to exclude the thinker, the most practical of all men, this is to offer a choice between an inefficient life made acceptable by a larger meed of admiration, and a seemingly lower but more satisfying life which will place at one's feet the wealth and enjoyment of the world; this is to insure a contemptuous pity for the nobler part of us, and to determine the end of many lives as a simply sensuous gratification. It is true, that the age, that philosophy, that religion, call upon us for practical works; but a want of knowledge as to what is practical brings the evils of this fallacy into every trade and calling.

Must we not consider as practical, concrete, useful, those things which concern man's life? and must we not consider them practical, concrete, useful, just in proportion as they do so relate themselves to our living? Should not those be considered theoretical, abstract, futile, which do not connect themselves to the life which we are living, and which as means do not attain the ends which they themselves propose? We must, then, carefully distinguish between the thinker and the visionary, and by their works must men know them. Among students there are those with ability for acquiring knowledge while they themselves remain unchanged: men who are merely media for the transference of knowledge: men whose power lies wholly in their receptivity. But there are those who not

only acquire but assimilate: who, with each addition to their knowledge, become stronger for both thought and action: who reap the same harvest from their mental activity that the orthodox practical man gains from a new suggestion. The thinker, he whose mind is not simply receptive but productive, never presents the anomaly of a man who has seemingly grasped all knowledge, and is yet unable to utilize any of it. The thinker has far more in common with the man of action than he can have with the visionary; indeed, he has the same kind of culture, and gains even higher results, than the merely "practical" man: results higher, because the thinker adds to all the resources of the so-called man of action, the accumulated records of experience as given him by the past. "The mass of men, simply because they are a mass of men, receive with difficulty every new idea, unless it lies in the track of their own knowledge;" and therefore, as visionaries are many and thinkers are few, this distrust of men of deep thought is intensified, and there continues this exaltation of the man who is called practical simply because he realizes more than he who pursues some phantom of an abstraction. If it be true that many who are called thinkers are merely visionaries; that many who are considered wise are simply learned—is it not equally true that many who arrogate to themselves the merit of being practical, are yet the most stupid of visionaries? It is natural to receive with suspicion the advice of him who leads a life of seclusion; but to confound this man with him who, while always in full communion with the world, renders tributary to him all the resources of thought, whether delivered orally or in writing, and who, in addition to this, always analyzes and seizes the whole complex of any problem which is presented; to fail to distinguish between this man and the visionary; to fail to honor this man as the most eminent of practical men,—this is to stultify ourselves. It has been said that the thinker and the visionary are utterly unlike; that the thinker and the orthodox practical man have much in common, and, indeed, differ only in the wider grasp which the former takes. The practical man is he who discerns and uses the best means for the attainment of his ends; who unites to a quick perception the instant execution of his judgments. But do not such men revolve

any new problem until they see the bearing of every part? Is not their superiority over their fellows entirely attributable to their superior power of analysis? And is not this the very characteristic of a true thinker; of him who never develops abstract and curious theories; never expects to find the universal solvent; never forgets the aid to be derived from the suggestions and criticisms of even the most ignorant; of him who considers all that is truly useful as the result of thought—utilized thought—and who always seeks the fundamental truth, neglecting the merely accidental accessories?

It is true that most men will be either actors or dreamers; it is true that even the thinker may not find his development co-ordinate and harmonious; but it is also true that the thinker can develop the active side so as to realize his thoughts and reach the highest eminence; that he will be conscious of an universal adaptability, and that he can compete successfully with those whose experience is more extensive, but necessarily not so profound. Doubtless the thinker is less common than the visionary, whether the latter be a student or a man of action; but all the great "practical" men of the world, those who have added to our wealth either material or intellectual, all these men have been *thinkers*.

HE IS NOT FAR.

By JOHN WHEAT.

"'Now, it seems, he wishes to go away in search of life's good.' 'But isn't that just what the old crone did?' 'The old crone?' 'Yes; she who went away to fetch the sunshine, instead of making windows in the wall to let it in.' — BRUNSON'S "ANNA."

Not far? Is, then, the mole's our plight,
Whose burrowing makes no claim on light?
Not far? Then why appears the Whole
Scarce ankle-deep to wading soul?
Why have an eye whose orbit takes
All orbs, nor spills a drop, nor shakes
When all the waves of distance lap
Its brim? Why strings that never snap
When hearts explore their own recess
Of Love, to find it fathomless?
Why rated in the hold so high,

With minnows in a pool to ply?
 To dangle chafing at the wharf
 In tides around the keel that scoff!
 They ebb, as dogs that fain would lure
 Their masters toward a game secure.
 See how they fawn, and run before!
 Up anchor; let us leave the shore.

Cast loose, and lifted o'er the bar,
 Thought went elate from star to star.
 As children drop and lift the hook
 Before the poises in a brook,
 My bait to every glittering scale
 I hung, nor did one venture fall.
 All night I drew them to my boat,
 My mood, built on the dark to float:
 From shoals that 'round Orion feed,
 And fainter fires we scarce surmise,
 They brood so deep we cannot heed,—
 The plummet floats before they rise.
 And scales that shed a shier ray
 Off land no mortal foot can keep,
 This time upon my deck they lay—
 The midnight's litter; gunwale deep
 My mood, ill-built for such surprise,
 Went staggering through the fertile skies.
 How name and how appraise the spoil?
 The slippery hints, the vague turmoil;
 Feeling that cannot grow to thought,
 Can scarce to prophecy be brought,
 And thoughts that come half-made from hope,
 Yet back again to guesses grope:
 And longings to express the Whole
 That find the Least too far a goal:
 The mind's demand that all the deep
 Shall come and in its shallows creep,
 Run up the creeks of all its names,
 And lap its blazons and its blames:
 The tender afterthoughts that yield
 To God His Kosmos unrevealed:
 The thirst that drinks this tenderness
 In rage the Godhead to possess;
 The hungry gaze that cannot sup
 Except it swallow planets up;
 The drooping lid of each relapse
 From Must and Shall to faint Perhaps;
 The calm that God, to ease my dearth,
 Has borrowed from a silent earth,
 And strengthened from a silent sky,
 From worlds that roll without a sigh,
 From silence that is space itself,—
 All this, my spoil, my midnight pelf,

My moment of possession,—how
To sort my creels and clear my bowl

No need; the happy strike pursue;
It is myself that leaps to view:
My waiting is the firmament,
Its floating prey is each intent.
Not every night so glittering charms
My being into Being's arms,
Nor often do the shoals so thrive
That keep my winter lamp alive.
For God, who 's neither near nor far,
I trolling go from star to star.

Which of them all some day will be
The harbor of my liberty,
With piers by deep-sea-fishing piled,
By deeper tales my rest beguiled:
Among these sands of suns above
Where shall my anchor cease to rove?
My keel upon Orion grate,
Or by that speck of older date?
Quick—let the God within divine
The shore that some day shall be mine.
My thoughts to yearning all have fled
To know my palace overhead,
A vault that shall not pinch the brain,
Demesnes with weather void of pain,
With scents from an immortal sod
At windows open wide to God.

Oh, now my luck began to fall:
Some shivering prose athwart the gale
That fed my course, to baffle crept;
By better self no longer kept,
Myself declined the mystic way:
Or was 't the breaking of the day
That bade my selfish dream begone?
With golden prow against the morn
The earth went glorying, o'er the sky
The freshet of the light was high;
The stars at which I touched were drowned,
In all the galaxy no ground;
Upon the morning-moon the blue
Broke, running up the yellow strand,
And left, of all her midnight hue,
But one faint curve whereon to stand.
To this my reverie fled—in vain;
This, too, submerged th' unbitted main.
And back to earth my scurrying mood,
Spoils dropping o'er the amplitude
To bribe pursuit, came, hot to feel

He is not Far.

Home's threshold underneath the keel.
 But, anchored at the garden-gate,
 My soul, repair thy damaged freight;
 Morning's the current in the street,
 My dreams are not so fair, so fleet;
 Their dew was death-damp—feel the sun
 Tear off each glister, one by one:
 Of all my midnight waifs bereft—
 Save faith in daylight—that is left.
 The mystic eyes for God that glowed,
 Now see Him coming down the road;
 He is the green in every blade,
 The health in every boy and maid,
 In yonder sunrise-flag He blooms
 Above a nation's well-carved tombs:
 That empty sleeve His arm contains,
 That blushing scar His anger drains.
 That flaunting cheek beneath the lamp
 He hoists for succor from a heart
 Where Love maintains a wasted camp
 Till Love arrive to take its part.
 This bloodless face against the pane
 Goes whitening all the murky street
 With His own dread, lest hunger gain
 Upon His love's woe-burdened feet.
 The freedman's knock His errand brings,
 The nurse's plea His mercy sings:
 My daughter's phrases from His lips
 Their sweetness steal, and 'tis His hand
 Thrills through her rosy finger-tips
 To wake me, as light wakes the land.
 He is the friend to whom I cling:
 The rifed bee that sheathes its sting
 In rifed sweets: the rose is He
 That's sucked to sweetness by the bee.
 With every maid He loves to sit,
 His beauties in her color flit,
 His guilelessness that plots when she
 A man enslaves to set Him free.

The eagle's talon-glance the sun
 May seize, but cannot sweep away
 For stars to tread their maze at noon:
 Their partners in the twilight stray,
 To whisper whither light has fled:
 With spies on God consort no more
 In hope by hide and seek to catch:
 Thy vigils leave, and leave thy bed:
 Behold, His hand is on the door,
 And fumbles at thy rusty latch.

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL EDUCATION.

The most significant phase of modern culture is the immense impulse given to the study of physical science. Dealing with sensuous objects, and gaining the mastery over them by means of the intellectual tools of classification and analysis, the empirical sciences furnish a field of mental activity so elementary that all people may enter successfully, while the results there achieved have so immediate a bearing upon man's physical well-being that the charm of scientific study becomes greatly enhanced.

In the progress of human culture, which consists in the transition from a blind use of means to the conscious possession of all which they involve, it is the physical sciences that furnish the most elementary training. It does not by any means follow from this that school education should give a large place to branches of natural science, although it is quite natural for the devotees of the latter to claim such. The culture derived from natural science has value chiefly for its effect upon the general consciousness—in the influence it has (1) negatively in freeing the mind from presuppositions, (2) and positively in the element of seriousness and earnestness which it brings with it. So likewise the immense production and consumption of Romance literature works as a counter-irritant upon the general consciousness, unfolding the world of phantasy and genius side by side with the prose world which science reveals. One might as well claim an exclusive school culture in the direction of the phantasy as in that of the understanding.

While the discussion is going on with reference to "The culture demanded by modern life," it will not be amiss to examine the course of elementary instruction which has been long established in our schools, and see its bearing upon the general question.

Without venturing to dogmatize upon the relative value of national ideals—the end and aim of the systems of culture—it is sufficient to call up their general characteristics.

Oriental states fix the *status* of the individual far more definitely than do the western. If one is born a sudra, he is pre-

destined to the basest of employments. His neighbor, the son of a Brahmin, was foreordained to the highest life. Where the caste system does not prevail, some other form of external authority places its hard limits around the infinite possibilities of the individual. The institutions of oriental society seem a vast web of fate overshadowing all, and preventing that mobility which is thought essential to human development in Europe and America.

In Europe this mobility is not realized anywhere to the extent that it is in this country. There is to a greater or less extent an hereditary ruling class and a tendency to keep distinct the other classes—the proletary below, the property-holding middle classes above them. The tendency under a monarchical form of government must always be to throw obstacles in the way of the mobility here spoken of. The people will receive by early education a proclivity to remain in the same class—the children of the proletarians to remain such, and those of the higher classes to continue in their caste; at least, this is far more the case there than it is at present in America. Mobility of classes is not directly encouraged to any great extent in Europe, and even in America the natural obstacles of the family nurture are scarcely overcome by the other influences. Yet the whole organization of modern society is undergoing reconstruction so as to realize more than aught else this necessary condition. The utmost possible result from each individual is the desideratum. The accident of birth shall not count against self-determination.

Migration has become a principle within this century. The avatar of steam and the telegraph has made possible a general movement of the human race which will result in the most wonderful combinations conceivable. A new synthesis of races is going on at numerous and widely extended bases. And wherever such a synthesis of different national idiosyncrasies takes place, there is the greatest opportunity for free development of the individual. Each man is waited upon by the totality of surrounding conditions, and pressingly invited to show his full capacity. Manifold spheres of activity open toward him, and in a new country he always has the occasion furnished him for great deeds. Thus we might call this mobility the means for the realization of free individuality, and

could affirm with truth that its first realization was the physical means of transportation and instant communication, and then, its utilization in commerce; and later, the general movement of peoples to the frontiers—Australia, South America, the Pacific coast of America, &c. Hereafter, the circulation between the centres of population and the frontiers is destined to give the peculiar character to the epoch upon which we now enter.

Under these circumstances, is it probable that the elementary education of youth is likely to be more special in its nature—"practical" it is called—or will it tend to what is universal in its nature, so that, as far as it goes, it shall fit the pupil for all spheres, whether high or low? Whether it has been so hitherto or not, it will undoubtedly take the direction of liberal training in the future. Education will be of such a nature as to give to the pupil whose character is as yet unformed, the key to his capacities, and thereby enable him to choose freely his own vocation and determine his own destiny.

It is clear at this point that before we can say exactly what the branches taught in such a liberal system should be, or before we can pass judgment upon those now prescribed in the schools, we must summon before us the totality of conditions in which the individual finds himself (at least in its outlines), and see what is required for its mastery. It is, above all, certain, that man cannot be "master of his conditions" without knowing them; hence his elementary education must embrace those branches that severally initiate him into these conditions.

The wants of man as a physical being are all mediated through his relation to society. Food, clothing, and shelter, are wrested from nature not by the unaided might of the individual but by the might of society—an organization in which the individual loses himself in order to find himself again (and that too "raised to a higher power"). It is through society and its institutions that man is elevated above his mere animal existence to the universal life of Spirit. Man as a mere individual is a savage. Elevated by means of his social institutions, he partakes of the life of the vast organism known as humanity, and is shielded by it from rude nature—is fed, clothed, housed, and educated by it. The mite which each

individual contributes towards the welfare of the whole, is returned to him by the whole through the organization of society. Thus the social organization acts as a seive, which sifts out the selfishness and consequent savageness from each man. What he does for himself must be indirect; he must work for others, and let them work for him. This interchange, brought about through the division of labor and commerce, is the corner-stone of civilization—an exchange not merely of the elements of food and clothing, but of arts, institutions, and ideas. The latter function of exchange is education in its widest compass. It is a part of the grand social organization by which each individual is made the recipient of the labor of the race. The education in the school has this special function to perform: it gives to each individual the language of that social organization, and the common stock of ideas which govern it. It gives man the theoretical tools by which he obtains the mastery over the realms of nature as well as over those of mind.

By reason of the fact that the individual man is mediated through society directly, and finds it as the presupposition of his existence—other conditions are secondary as compared with it*—it happens that education busies itself chiefly with initiating the individual into the conventionalities of society. From birth this training of the individual begins and consists, first, in acquiring the use and wont—the general habits of its fellow-men. It is, however, in the school that he brings to consciousness the elements that underlie this organism.

The rational basis of the ordinary course of study in the elementary school may now become apparent. It consists of the Rudiments:

- I. Reading and Writing;
- II. Arithmetic;
- III. Geography;
- IV. History;
- V. Grammar.

* Thus it happens that a man cannot appropriate nature directly, but must *get* this recognition of society before he can use it for food, clothing, or shelter. He must, for example, *own* what he is to use; and *to own* implies the recognition of society.

By the first of these he issues forth from the circumscribed life of the senses, in which he is confined to the narrow circle of individuals which constitute his acquaintances; he issues forth from this immediate enclosure, and finds himself in the community of the world at large. He is comparatively emancipated from the Here and Now; for the page of the book or newspaper gives him a survey of the life of the globe. The libraries open their doors, and he associates with and listens to Socrates and Plato, Confucius and Zoroaster, and no empty gossip escapes from those lips! Faint echoes come down to him from the Chaldean oracles and the wisdom of the Egyptians—from the remoter antiquity of Phœnicia. Not merely this: he can write his own thought, and thus be present to others far separated in time and space. This branch is the introduction and alphabet of the rest.

By the second of these studies—Arithmetic—he becomes master of numerical quantity, and therewith of the practical side of exchange. Food, clothing, and shelter, are first quantified, and then become practically attainable. Number standing midway between sensuous concrete things and pure thoughts is the first instrument which intelligence uses to gain its victory over nature. It renders social combination possible in its commercial aspect.*

By the third branch—Geography—man brings to consciousness his spatial extent in the world. Since his wants relate him to the different countries, these latter form a part of his estate. He contributes to the world and receives from it through commerce. What he owns directly—his house, garden, field, workshop—yields him return for his activity; so does the world at large; and as self-knowledge includes a knowledge of his possessions, his knowledge of the geographical world is a knowledge of his patrimony, and properly self-knowledge. Every civilized man has a personal interest in the wheat crop of Illinois, the iron crop of Missouri, and the manufactures of England or Massachusetts, just as really,

* The culture gained in the study of mathematics is of a very important character, although it is exclusively elementary. It is not a training in "causes and effects," for these imply quality as well as quantity. It is the first elevation over the Sensuous, and its course of training involves attention and abstraction, the two processes which lie at the basis of all intellectual culture.

though not so vitally, as the farmer of Illinois, the miner of Missouri, or the manufacturer of Manchester or Lowell.

Just as Geography is man's knowledge of himself in space—of his net-work of relations traced out on the globe—so History is the record of his past existence; for his presuppositions and precedent conditions belong to and are a part of his actual existence.

Grammar gives to the pupil the first consciousness of the mind itself as manifested in its greatest instrument. The power of insight into the social existence itself is communicated at the same time. The formation of language exhibits the stages by which pure intellect becomes object to itself. Hence it is the most potent discipline of the whole course. The profound analysis and superior grasp of thought which this study gives as compared with Mathematics and the Physical sciences, has long been noted by educators. It is emphatically a *culture-study*. Through it the pupil is turned within and trained to recognize his own essence in its pure ideal form.

Thus these branches are initiative to self-knowledge, and by this the individual transcends his immediate sensations (within whose narrow sphere he is as a brute knowing neither good nor evil, for good and evil are *relations* and not immediate sensations), and traces out his existence through the regions of space which it involves and the æons of time which are its conditions. He finds that his existence is no private, isolated affair, but a vast system—a process which has become through time and is becoming; a process embracing all nations and all climes;

“He omnipresent is,
All round himself he lies,
Osiris spread abroad
Up-staring in all eyes.”

These five elementary branches are of infinitely more importance in a course of education than any others in their places, for this reason: the pupil who is taught how to master these subjects, is at the same time taught how to master all branches of human learning. “How important, then, that each branch be taught in the spirit of the whole!” Most true! In teaching Reading—a branch which stands apart from the others as one of transcendent importance, or, indeed, forms

rather the centre from which they ray out—the pupil is to be initiated into the realm of Literature—the morning-land of Phantasy and Imagination. Science and History are its adjacent provinces. But, in order to reinforce this culture, there is added a special training in the cardinal directions which branch out from literature as a centre. Arithmetic gives a drill in the severe methods of mathematical and physical sciences, while Geography introduces the method of Natural History. Grammar, on the other hand, opens the method of Philosophy and Philology, and added to History leads to the Social and Political sciences.

Two questions which have arisen may be answered at this point. When it is asked whether it would do to substitute some other branch for one of these on the list—say Chemistry or some one of the Physical sciences for Grammar—the reply is: By so doing you would contribute, in so far, to close the eyes of the mind to that wonderful realm of social existence which is vitally essential to man. By Grammar the pupil gets the tools—the microscopes and telescopes by which he can summon the social existence before him and examine it. So, too, should one (as by the so-called “Object-lesson” system) make education a more exclusive training of the senses, he would undervalue the mastery of the printed book and tend to reduce man from being a member of the organized system of society back to the rank of a mere individual dependent on his own immediate senses for his knowledge. He would thus be degraded from the lofty position of mastership over the acquirements of the senses of all mankind through all ages, to that of his own narrow limitation in space and time. And this is not the worst: so much over-cultivation of his own external senses would be done at the expense of insight into the realms of Poetry and Philosophy, and of the Social and Political sciences—his organs for the perception of these being undeveloped.

To the other question: as to the importance of higher education, and what its direction should be, one may say in general that there is a tendency now to make the individual independent of the personal teacher and the university, by means of the printed page and its universal diffusion in the shape of books and periodicals. Once it was necessary to resort to the

university to hear the master speak on his theme, for his knowledge was nowhere to be found written. Then came the first ages of printing, and universities were resorted to for the advantage of their valuable libraries. The personal influence of the professors and fellow-students has become the most important advantage left in our day. Whatever information one wishes to circulate is committed at once to paper. When the pupil has learned the method of mastering books, he has learned the art of Education. Books have certain peculiar advantages over oral instruction. The personal influence of the teacher who presents his subject orally, tends to produce dogmatic habits in his pupils. It tends to create respect for mere authority as such. The printed page is cool and dispassionate. If the reader finds heat or light there, it must be through his own activity. To this is to be added the important consideration that the contents of a book are more carefully digested than a course of oral statements. The author is perforce on his guard with reference to authenticity; he is careful to be exhaustive, and not to give undue prominence to special features.

The era of public and private libraries and of the newspaper brings the university to every individual in the most essential particulars. But there remains still the function of discipline in method, which may be carried on indefinitely in the cardinal directions already pointed out. Thus the high school (next above the district or grammar school) continues the same symmetry of system, and with powerful effect follows up the training already begun.

Reading and Writing are continued into Elocution, Composition Writing, and the systematic study of Literature. From Arithmetic the pupil passes on to Geometry and Algebra, and is thus initiated into distinctions of Spatial Mathematics and the Higher Analysis. He also takes up at this time Natural Philosophy. From Geography he has ascended to Physical Geography.* In Natural Philosophy he finds the technics of the Physical sciences (i. e. of the quantitative or mathematical sciences of Nature); in Physical Geography, the technics of

* Political Geography in its commercial aspect unfolds the first principles of Political Economy; the classes of employments and the relations growing out of these.

the branches of Natural History (i. e. the qualitative branches of Natural Science).*

History passes from that of the United States to General History, and side by side with it is taken up the study of the form of Government—the Constitution—thus preparing the insight into the necessity of the State.†

Finally, the study of English Grammar unfolds into the study of foreign languages and Mental Philosophy. It is an easy step from the study of Syntax (analysis of the sentence) to Logic. Of foreign languages, the Latin stands first in order of importance to the English scholar. It furnishes the root words to that part of the English vocabulary which is more especially the language of thought and reflection, while the Teutonic or Gothic groundwork is the language of the sensuous experience and of common life. Hence the culture of the individual is immensely facilitated by the study of Latin, even though pursued for a very limited time. French, German and Greek follow Latin at a considerable distance, though they are of far more value than any other foreign tongues after Latin.

Thus High School studies follow the channels begun in the lower schools, and have in view the plan of giving to the youth

* Thus Nature has two aspects for Science: 1st. Dynamical and quantitative—which is investigated in Physics. (Here come Pneumatics, Hydraulics, Optics, Electricity, Magnetism, Astronomy, and the like.) 2d. The teleological and qualitative, *Organic Nature*, which is investigated in Natural History. (Here belong treatises upon such subjects as Meteorology, Geology, Botany, Zoology, and Ethnology.)

† To make the exhaustiveness of the scope of this course of study more apparent we give the complete outlines of a scheme of classification of human learning as contained in books. Adopting Lord Bacon's fundamental categories of Philosophy, Poetry, and History—or, more properly named, *Science, Art, and History*—we have the entire field of SCIENCE divided as follows:

- I. Philosophy (the Science of Sciences).
- II. Theology (Science of God).
- III. Social and Political Sciences (treating of human institutions—state, society, and language), whose subdivisions are (1) Jurisprudence, (2) Politics, (3) Social Science, (4) Philology.
- IV. Natural Sciences and Useful Arts (Nature and its uses), subdivided into (1) Mathematics (pure form of Nature), (2) Physics, (3) Natural History, (4) Medicine, (5) Useful Arts.

The province of ART including chiefly Literature and Fine Arts, while HISTORY ends the series.

the *command of himself*. Having this, the youth can safely be left to select his own avocation. Our national idea and the interests of humanity alike protest against a one-sided education that shall predestine the youth to some special art or trade. Compared with any of these general studies here laid down, a special branch would be an impertinence and a stumbling-block, having its presuppositions in some one of the studies for which it would be substituted.

The youth must be trained to the use of books and initiated into the technics of the various branches, and, this accomplished, his elementary or school education is done and he may graduate. Surrounded by the modern appliances created through the art of printing, his whole life will be a continual university training.

THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

An extract from the preface to the first edition of Herr von Schelling's treatise: *On the Ego as the principle of Philosophy, or on the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge*. (Published in 1795.)

Translated by CHAS. L. BERNAYS.

It is rather unbecoming in philosophy to corrupt one's judgment concerning principles by previously enumerating its results, or, in general, to submit the principles of any philosophy to a measurement by the standard of the material interests of common life. Inasmuch, however, as a well-meaning person may with good intentions ask the question, what the real effects of principles could possibly be, which are enunciated as perfectly new, and whether they are destined to remain the exclusive property of the school, or to be introduced into life,—one may in all propriety answer his questions, provided that in so doing he does not mean to determine in advance the judgment of others on the principles themselves. A philosophy based upon the essence of man cannot lead to mere dead formulas—which are so many prisons to the human mind—or to a mere philosophical puzzle whereby given concepts are reduced to higher ones and the living works of the human mind buried in a dead faculty; but it is destined—to use the words of Jacobi—to reveal and unveil existence. Its essence is spirit, not a mere formula or a letter, and its

highest object is not a laborious combination of concepts, but only that which is immediately present to itself in men. Its purpose is not a mere reform in sciences, but a total revolution in the domain of philosophy. It is the second revolution which occurred in its domain. The first one happened when the knowledge of external objects was set up as the essence of all science. From that time to the second revolution change was not a change of the principles themselves, but it consisted only in a progress from one object to another; and inasmuch as it was indifferent—not to the school, but to mankind—what object absorbed its attention, the progress from one object to another could not be considered progress of the human mind. If, therefore, any philosophy can be expected to exercise a real influence upon human life, this may be expected solely of the new philosophy, which is possible only by a total revolution of principles.

It is a daring attempt of Reason to emancipate mankind and deliver it from the terrors of the objective world; but the attempt cannot fail, because man grows in the same proportion as he learns himself and his power. Give to man the consciousness of what he is, and he will soon learn to be what he ought to be. Give him theoretical self-respect, and the practical self-respect will soon follow. It is a vain hope to expect great progress on the part of men out of mere good will; for to become better he must already previously have been good: the revolution in man, therefore, ought to originate in the consciousness of his nature; he must be theoretically good before he can become so practically, and the knowledge that the essence of man consists only in unity and through unity is the safest preparation for a mode of living in harmony with one's own self. For a man who arrives at this conviction will also see that unity of volition and action should be just as natural and necessary to himself as the preservation of his existence. This ought to be the aim of man, that unity of volition and action become as natural to him as the mechanism of his body and the unity of his consciousness.

To a philosophy which sets up the assertion as its first principle, that the essence of man consists only in absolute liberty; that men are not things, nor chattels; and that, according to their essential being, they can never become objects—one should indeed promise little progress in an enervated epoch

like ours, which shudders at the sight of any peculiarly human power that is called into activity and which already attempted to lower the tone of the first great product of that philosophy, which seemed to treat the ruling spirit of the age with favor, to bring back philosophy to the old traditional submission, to the rule of objective truth, or at least to the humiliating confession, that its limits (the limits of objective truth) were not the effects of absolute freedom, but the mere consequences of the acknowledged weakness of the human mind, and the limitedness of man's faculties of knowing. But philosophy might be accused of timidity, if it had not hoped to indicate a new road to the human mind upon the new great march which it has just begun, to infuse courage and energy into the broken and contrite spirits, and to revive the exhausted forces; to shake the slaves of objective truth by intimations of liberty, and to teach those who are consistent only in their inconsistency, that they can only be saved by the unity of their actions and by a strict adherence to their principles.

It is difficult not to become enthusiastic in thinking the great thought, that just as all sciences, not excepting even the empirical ones, converge to a point of complete unity, so humanity also will realize the principle of unity which from the commencement has lain at the basis of history as the regulative principle, as a constitutive law; that just as all the rays of human knowledge and the experience of many centuries finally converge to one focus of truth, and realize the idea that all the various sciences in the end must become one—an idea that has hovered before many great minds—that the various right and wrong ways of the human race also may finally unite in one point, on which it may collect itself, and, as it were one complete person, obey the law of liberty. Even though this epoch be ever so remote, though even a haughty smile be excited by our hopes upon the progress of mankind, the great problem of at least preparing for this epoch, by their combined labors toward the perfection of sciences, is reserved to those to whom these hopes are not mere folly. For any idea must previously become realized within the domain of science before it realizes itself in history. Never can mankind become a unity before their knowledge becomes a unit also.

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Part Second.

*Knowledge posits itself for itself as a determined Freedom
of Quantitating, or as Nature.*

CONTENTS OF PART SECOND.

- § 1. Knowledge cannot posit itself for itself as a determined freedom of quantitating without both *thinking* that Freedom as the ground of all quantity, and at the same time *contemplating* a quantity as factically the prior.
- § 2. Hence all contemplating knowledge begins with a determined quantitating (World, Nature, &c.), which, however, it must think as accidental, or as having formal Freedom for its ground, and which it thus thinks by ascribing to itself a power of Attention.
- § 3. Results.
- § 4. Deduction of Space.
- § 5. Deduction of the Ground-form of Time.
- § 6. Deduction of Matter.

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- § 1. Knowledge cannot posit itself for itself as a determined freedom of quantitating without both *thinking* that Freedom as the ground of all quantity, and at the same time *contemplating* a quantity as factically the prior.

The standpoint and the result of the last reflection, which constituted absolute knowledge, was a determinedness of Freedom, as a quantitating, through absolute Being or Thinking. Let it be well understood, as a quantitating generally, but by no means yet as the positing of a fixed *quantum*. Upon this we must now reflect again, altogether in analogy with the former reflections. As absolute knowledge went beyond itself

and placed itself before itself, in its form of reflection, as a reciprocity of substantiality and accidentality, so also here.

Let us first, however, observe the following:—This reflection is, as we have seen, a multiplicity, if it views itself with respect to its components, which, in that case, are not knowledge, but merely the necessary components of knowledge; but as knowledge it is simple, and the very final point of all knowledge. We now propose to descend from this point, in order to discover *standpoints* of knowledge, which in themselves are again equally manifold. Their particular character must always be well remembered.

Now, while we said formerly, this reflection occurs; we here express ourselves thus: this reflection *must* occur. This *must* is a conditional must; it means, *if* a knowledge is to be, then a reflection must have taken place. But as knowledge, from its highest absolute point of view, is accidental, a knowledge *must* not necessarily be, and the necessity, which we have demanded, is therefore only a conditional necessity. Yet on that very account we must prove the conditional necessity of this and all other reflections which we shall hereafter put forth, i. e. we must deduce the reflection as such.

We approach this deduction. The knowledge, spoken of, is the knowledge of a determinedness of *quantitating*. But this is not possible, unless the quantitating, in its agility and mobility, as it was described above, is realized, and unless the focus of knowledge is concentrated in it. It must be well remembered: the quantitating, as such, in its form; and by no means yet a determined quantitating. The quantitating is for-itself only as a formal act. Where, then, should the determinedness come from?

This, then, would be the fundamental character of the new reflection. Let us immediately proceed to the representation of this reflection, and enter at once its central point. The act is, as we have said, a free quantitating, which is inwardly for itself, but at the same time reflects upon itself as confined and determined through absolute Being. The disjunction is clearly exposed: it is the opposition of confinedness and Freedom (of quantitating, of course, as such); the former is to be dependent *idealiter* upon the latter; the latter is to be dependent *realiter* upon the former. So much about this.

We proceed to the union of that disjunction. Only in so far as the freedom of quantitating is inwardly realized, i. e. as it contemplates itself, can it be taken hold of by a fixed Thinking. The Thinking, and whatever follows therefrom, is *idealiter* dependent upon contemplation. *Vice versa*, only in so far as this Freedom is subordinated to pure Being does this Freedom and the quantitating inseparable from it, as well as its contemplation, take place. In other words: only in so far as it is not, as it is consequently the pure Being, and presupposes its Not-Being in advance of its Being, is it an absolute originating. *Realiter* therefore, the contemplation of the quantitating, is dependent upon absolute Being and upon the determination of Freedom through absolute Being. In this closest reciprocity, this floating between the ideal and the real (in this thorough penetration of Contemplation and Thinking), and in the unity of both, which is no immediate object of knowledge, but knowledge itself, this reflection floats like every reflection—according to its specific character, of course—as reflection of the Freedom of quantitating.

We now proceed to the adjoining links of the argument.

1. The Freedom of quantitating *thinks* itself. Let us facilitate the comprehension of this proposition by calling to remembrance the conception of causality in the upper synthesis. There Freedom, as ground, was that through which the *quantum* (if any *quantum* was supposed as posited) was perceived in its determinedness. It was *realiter* thus determined in this manner, because Freedom had made it thus; and was perceived *idealiter*, because Freedom was perceived, as holding itself over and within it. But this Thinking—and this is the decisive remark—is no pure, original, but a synthetic uniting and reflecting Thinking, and Freedom was posited in it always in its factual *form* (but only the form) of determinedness. This Freedom is *here* thought pure and absolute, signifies: it is thought, in the highest universality, as the absolute, eternal, unchangeable ground of all possible quantity which can be thought. (The meaning of this can easily be explained: it is expressed in the general proposition which the Science of Knowledge has already uttered repeatedly, but which is now introduced into the real system of knowledge: *only* Freedom (whether actual or not, is here not

yet decided) *is the ground of all possible quantity*. But to us it is of importance that the derivation and the connection be understood, and, as this point is of the most important consequences, we shall add a few more words in relation to it.

In the common view, the Thinking pointed out here is related to the former as the general abstract proposition is related to the concrete: in the former, any determinedness of Freedom is posited as the ground of *some particular quantum*; in the latter, Freedom is posited as (absolutely by reason of its form) the only possible ground of all *quanta*. There we had an *application* of the conception of causality; here we have its own ground. Now we know well enough that this common view is altogether a false and wrong one; that each link presupposes the other one, and that abstractions, as commonly understood, have no existence. In the upper link Freedom was formal; could be and could not be. Here, as in the entire reflection, it is posited positively, and is materially determined, as quantitating, and as the only quantitating. The ground of this onliness, absoluteness, and universality, is itself absolute: the pure, on-itself-reposing, in itself unchangeable, and consequently an unchangeableness-asserting Thinking. Freedom is thus substantialized, and each of its possible quantitative states of determinedness becomes an accident for the very reason because the free quantitating is the connecting link of both.

2. Now to the second link. In the same way as we argued in the first synthesis, when representing absolute substantiality: Thinking is not possible unless contemplation takes place; so here also: The freedom of quantitating cannot be thought unless it has been contemplated, consequently not without the existence of a quantitating, and without this quantitating having already been found as existing. All Thinking of Freedom, as ground of all quantity, posits again a quantity, of which it cannot be said that it *is realized with (actual) Freedom* within consciousness (for here consciousness first begins), but which lies *beyond all consciousness*, in the not-being of consciousness, and which is only thought within consciousness as having its ground in the (from that very reason, not actual) Freedom. Where consciousness begins, this quantitating is not consciously produced, but is already found

existing within consciousness;—and of it we shall have to say nothing more, than that it may be the sphere of future possible acts of Freedom within consciousness, of the Freedom which posits itself and knows itself as such, or of actual Freedom. Only in so far as the contemplating consciousness—and without contemplation there is no consciousness at all—goes in itself beyond itself, thinks itself, and thinks itself as absolutely free, does it apply this contemplation to Freedom as its only possible (not actually to be *cognized*, but *thinkable*) ground. Nothing, however, is here to be said about the manner in which it is thus *ground*. This is unknown to us as yet, and nothing else is to be thought than what we have said.

Adding, however, in order to let the reader think something at least, what I can unhesitatingly add, that this latter view is ground of a nature (i. e. what is called nature, the absolute, within and before all knowledge presupposed nature), I immediately proceed to the following reflections.

- ‡ 2. Hence all contemplating knowledge begins with a determined quantitating (World, Nature, &c.), which, however, it must think as accidental, or as having formal Freedom for its ground, and which it thus thinks by ascribing to itself a power of Attention.

Contemplation (in its originality) is, as we have said, quantitability; it has also been shown that all quantitability is posited in absolute knowledge as accidental (as that which can also *not* be—passing and changeable—not eternal); consequently, if it is, as *to be connected with a ground*, and, since it is quantitability, with Freedom. Here, then, is the connecting link, which leads us further; to the thinking of the accidental there attaches itself the thinking of Freedom, and, in so far as this accidentalness is thought as absolute quantitability, the thinking of absolute Freedom. In order to comprehend this quantitability (which in itself is only *form* of quantity, but which, for the sake of a better comprehension of the following thought, I not only permit, but even request the reader to think as possibly determined)—in order to be but able to comprehend it, I say, as accidental, the contemplation must describe or reconstruct its origin within itself: must construct itself as limiting itself from the absolute and in-itself-dissolving contemplation to this quantitability; thus making it a product of Freedom within knowledge. Not as if this quantitability were cre-

ated thereby—for we have seen that it appears together with the first origin of knowledge, and originates before all real consciousness—but it thereby becomes *accidental*. (The case is very simple; in form it is the same operation which, at least, we educated men perform every day, when we distinguish our representation of a thing from the thing itself;—although it may well be presumed that, for instance, savages or children cannot even do this, since to them, lost in wondering astonishment, both representation and the thing melt together, and cannot be kept apart. Now this very same operation is to take place here, only not in regard to a single object, but applied to the absolute ground of all objectivity, to quantitability itself. This is done in form, with Freedom. To him who does not perform it, this contemplation does not become an object of his knowledge, because he does not elevate himself above it; it is to him knowledge itself: he is imprisoned within it and melted together with it, as the child is fused together with single objects. He describes within it the other natural phenomena as the mathematician, who reposes in the contemplation of space, describes his figures within it. All that we have said, the entire synthesis—with the exception of that one link in which he reposes—has for him no existence. He is one of those intelligences, mentioned before, who *have* reason, but *are* not reason, and do not elevate themselves to its conception.)

But what has *he* attained for whom it has existence? A *new* altogether unfettered contemplation—that of formal Freedom, which it is not necessary to describe here, since it will accompany us to the end; and which resigns itself to the *original* contemplation, or rather includes it, and within which, as its sphere and its Freedom, the Thinking of Freedom, and of all that which lies within absolute knowledge, is now alone possible. (This Freedom, torn loose from the original ties of contemplation, it is which lifts itself above the *found* knowledge.) The latter contemplation is to be the determining, the former the determined; consequently a relation of causality, but different from the one mentioned before, from the pure causality. The Ideal ground is the *effect*, the real ground the effecting. Here, consequently, we have the secondary relation of Causality, hinted at before. (To the primary we elevate ourselves

only by a transcendental view; and this has never occurred to former philosophers.)

Let us now review the foregoing.

From the one side, contemplating knowledge begins with a determined quantitatibility; determined, at all events, in so far as it is contemplated as quantitatibility within an altogether in-itself-dissolving freedom (i. e. for him who here realizes within himself the necessary contemplation. How it is for him who cannot do so, we are not yet able to state: his knowledge we do not describe at present.) This determined quantitatibility is the absolute, last ground of all contemplation, and, in contemplation, cannot be transcended; it is the original determinedness with which all consciousness commences and first becomes *real*; the known end of all contemplation. (This is the world, nature, objective Being, &c. There can be no more clearly defined conception: and I am sure that this one is sufficient and explains all; and yet some persons foolishly think that this last determinedness ought again to be explained and deduced.)

Now, this quantitatibility is thought, for the very reason of its immediateness, as *accidental*, but no knowledge can rest in the accidental (whose knowledge rests there does not comprehend it as accidental). We therefore penetrate necessarily beyond it through Thinking and *free* intellectual (in contraposition to the confined, sensual) contemplation. And there we find that all quantitatibility, from its very form, is simply *the result of the in-itself-reposing, in and for-itself being Freedom*, altogether as such, and has in and for itself no connection whatever with absolute Being; that there is consequently in all these representations altogether no *knowledge*, no truth and certainty, not only not of absolute Being, things *per se*, &c., but even not of any sort of connection with this absolute Being. We discover, on the contrary, as the last and highest, a *material* (we could not term it otherwise) determinedness of Freedom—i. e. in such a manner that it nevertheless remains in and for itself *formal Freedom*, and everything that follows therefrom—*through the absolute Being*. The knowledge of *this* determinedness is the real end of knowledge, and first gives knowledge. If, therefore, the contemplating knowledge is nevertheless to be a knowledge, it can be nothing

else than the *determination of the pure*, absolutely through-itself-existing, consequently not formal or quantitating *Freedom through absolute Being*, which is gathered up in the form of knowledge as an inner *formaliter* free knowledge and seen through it as through an irremovable veil, and knowledge is realized within knowledge—i. e. absolute knowledge, or certainty—enters, when this very harmony, this falling together of the two ground-forms of knowledge, the formal and the material, is realized.

Quantitability in contemplation, therefore, and its formal determinedness, deduced by us, are the result of the in-itself-existing formal Freedom. But that knowledge should *rest* in this contemplation, and should *find* itself as resting (for it is contradictory to rest in quantitability), results from the, we know not how, thought determination of pure Freedom through absolute Being. Whatever knowledge can hold stationary, whatever does not dissolve within its grasp, is nothing but that determination; and again, only through this quantitability can that determination be perceived, since quantitability, and it only, is the eye and the focus of actual *consciousness*. But let it be well remarked, that this harmony, this falling together of the two endpoints, takes place only beyond knowledge, because knowledge, as such, does not go further than to absolute quantitability. That harmony is known only in absolute Thinking; consequently only its *That* can be recognized, but its *How?* cannot be contemplated.

§ 3. Results.

The results of the foregoing may now be expressed in a generally comprehensible manner as follows; the words must, however, be taken very strictly.

1. The world—i. e. the sphere of quantitability, of the changeable—is not at all *absolute* in knowledge, nor is it absolute knowledge itself, but it arises solely on the occasion of the realization of absolute knowledge as its immediate character, as its starting-point (and this whole second synthesis, in which *absolute* knowledge realizes itself, contains something new, grounded in that knowledge). Indeed the world is altogether nothing else than the in-itself empty and unsubstantial form of the beginning of consciousness itself, the firm

background whereof is the eternal and unchangeable, or the Absolute Being.

The world of the changeable is altogether *not*; it is the pure Nothing. (However paradoxical this may sound to unconsecrated ears, it is evident to him who but for a single moment considers it thoroughly; and I cannot use expressions too strong. Whoever remains entangled in this form has not yet penetrated from appearance to Being; from supposing and guessing to knowledge. All the certainty such a person can have is, at the utmost, a conditional certainty—*if* space exists, it must contain something limited, conditioned by space;—a certainty which, however, he must at least comprehend in the *form* of absolute, pure Thinking.)

2. The imperishable does not enter the perishable, whereby it would cease to be the imperishable (the *indifference* of the Infinite and Finite of Spinoza, which we have already refuted); but the imperishable remains for itself and closed and completed within itself; equal to itself, and *only* to itself. Nor is the world perhaps a mirror, expression, revelation, symbol—or whatever name has been given, from time to time, to this half-thought—of the Eternal; for the Eternal cannot mirror itself in broken rays; but this world is picture and expression of the formal—I say, formal—Freedom, and is this for and in itself; is the described conflict of Being and Not-Being, the absolute, inner contradiction. Formal Freedom is altogether separated in the very first synthesis from Being; is for itself, and goes its own way in the production of this synthesis.

3. But knowledge lifts itself above itself and above this world, and only there, beyond this world, is it knowledge. The world, which is not wanted, joins knowledge without any coöperation on the part of knowledge. But beyond that immediateness, whereupon does knowledge repose there? Again not on absolute Being, but on a determinedness of the—not formal, of course, for that is altogether undeterminable, but *absolutely real* Freedom through absolute Being. The Highest, therefore, is a synthetical Thinking (even the seat of the highest substantiality), in which we meet absolute Being, not as *for-itself*, but as a determining, as absolute substance,—which is already a form of knowledge, as Thinking—and as absolute ground, which is the same. Hence even absolute knowledge knows only mediately of this absolute Being.

Now let the reader further remark the conception of this Freedom. It is *eternally, unchangeably determined*, even as and because that which determines it is absolute *Unity*. Even therefore in relation to it does the world proceed its own way. But again: a harmony of this determinedness is to arise in knowledge with the contemplation of quantifiability. This determinedness therefore, and only it, must enter quantifiability, or rather must be perceivable through quantifiability in order to fill up the *hiatus* between two very unlike components of knowledge. Of this we shall speak in the following.

(I first insert, however, a parallel of my system with that of Spinoza, interpreting Spinoza's as favorably as possible. He has an absolute substance as I have; this can be described, like mine, by pure Thinking. That he arbitrarily separates it into two modifications, Extension and Thinking, I shall leave unnoticed. To him as well as to me—I interpret here to his advantage, as he speaks not only from the standpoint of knowledge generally, but also from that of the knowing individual;—*finite* knowledge is, in so far as it contains truth and reality, accident of that substance; to him as to me it is an absolute accident, unalterably determined through Being itself. He acknowledges therefore, as I do, the same highest absolute synthesis, that of absolute substantiality, and he also determines substance and accident much as I do. But now in this same synthesis—where indeed the difference must necessarily be, or we should be perfectly agreeing with each other—comes the point where the Science of Knowledge turns away from him, or, plainly spoken, where it can prove to him and to all others who philosophize in the same manner, that he has quite overlooked something; i. e. the point of transition from the substance to the accident. He does not even ask for such a transition; hence, in reality, there is none; substance and accident are in reality not separated; his substance is no substance, his accident no accident; he only calls the same thing now the one and now the other. In order to obtain a distinction he afterwards causes Being, as accident, to break into infinite modifications—another grave defect; for how can he, in this infinity, which dissolves within itself, ever arrive at firm fixedness, a finished Whole? I will consequently improve his expression and say, into a *closed* or completed *system* of modifications. And now,

leaving unnoticed everything else which might be objected, I will ask only: Is Being necessarily broken into these modifications, and does it exist in no other way? How, then, do you arrive at a Thinking of it as a Whole, and what truth has this your Thinking? Or is it in itself One, as you maintain? Whence, then, the breaking of it, and the opposition of a world of extension to a world of Thinking? The short of the matter is, you realize, though unconsciously, what you deny in your whole system, formal Freedom; Being and Not-Being: the ground-form of knowledge, in which lies the necessity of a separation and of an infinity for consciousness. The Science of Knowledge, however, posits this formal Freedom at once as the point of transition, and demonstrates the separation arising from it, not as that of absolute Being, but as the accompanying ground-form of the knowledge of absolute Being, or, which means the same, of absolute knowledge. The Science of Knowledge says: Absolute Being does indeed determine; not unconditionally, however, but under the rule just described; and its *accidence* is not *within it*—whereby it would lose its substantiality—but *without it*, in the *formaliter* free. Thus only is substantiality separated from accidentality in a comprehensible manner, and each made possible. The existence of knowledge—and only knowledge has existence, and all existence has its ground in knowledge—depends simply upon knowledge; not so, however, its original determinedness. Hence the accidence of absolute Being remains simple and unchangeable as absolute Being itself; and changeability is assigned to quite another source, to the formal Freedom of knowledge.

Should, therefore, the Science of Knowledge be asked as to its character in regard to Unitism—*ἑν καὶ πᾶν*—and Dualism, the answer is: That Science is Unitism from an ideal point of view, in regard to knowledge as real knowledge—knowing that the (determining) eternal One is the ground of all knowledge, of course beyond all knowledge;—and Dualism it is from a real point of view, in relation to knowledge as actual. Thus it has two principles, absolute Freedom and absolute Being; and knows that the absolute One can never be attained—reached—in a *real*—actual—knowledge, but can be attained only in pure Thinking.—In the balancing-point between these

two views knowledge stands, and only thus is it knowledge; in the consciousness of this Unattainable—which it, nevertheless, always comprehends, but as unattainable—does its essence as knowledge consist, its eternity, infinity, and incompleteness. Only in so far as infinity is within it—which Spinoza indeed designed—is it; but only in so far as it rests with this infinity in the One does it not dissolve within itself—from which Spinoza could not protect it—but is it a world, a universe of knowledge, closed—completed—within infinity.)

4. One point, about which I have asked the reader to remain undecided during the progress of our investigation, is now clear. Freedom must be thought—from a point of view which has not yet been designated, but which will hereafter be found—as ground of the determinedness of quantifiability; not, it is true, in a *factual* manner, but the real, eternal, and unchangeable Freedom, as determined through pure Being, must turn out to be beyond all consciousness—ground of the factual view of consciousness.

§ 4. Deduction of Space.

All consciousness begins with an already existing quantifiability, to which contemplation is confined. This state of confinedness must be *in* and *for* itself, must find itself as such, reflect upon itself as such, &c. This is a new reflection.

First of all: it is generally clear, and a matter of course, that this fixedness of contemplation, like that of knowledge, must be in accordance with the groundform of knowledge, a *For-itself*. In the present case, moreover, it is to be expressly posited as a *For-itself*. In order to secure our teachings against misinterpretation, let us remark the following:—A free, empty contemplation, according to the above, resigned itself to a state of confinedness. This, when regarded more closely, leads to nothing and explains nothing. If the contemplation is free, it is empty; if it is confined, it is not *for-itself*. Both must therefore be thoroughly united in such a manner, that the contemplation is *free* in its very confinedness; passing over, as it does, all the points of that confinedness at once with Freedom. Thus we receive a *new, infinite quantifying of quantifiability itself*.—Nothing and not even the difficulty

will, I think, prevent the reader from at once strictly comprehending this point.

The former proof was merely: If Thinking is to occur, contemplation must also take place; and from that proof we derived quantitability, with which consciousness consequently commences. Now the difficult and almost incomprehensible point which remained, was this: shall this quantitability be a determined quantitability or not? Indeed it can scarcely be conceived, what, if we speak of pure quantity, a determinedness of quantity might mean. (If anyone thinks he understands it, he misconceives our entire investigation, does not view quantitability pure, but mixes a *quale* with it in order to attain a *quantum*. Quantitability in itself is nothing else than the pure in-itself undetermined possibility of infinite *quanta*, which can receive their limitation only from the determinedness of the *quale*.)

It is true, that afterwards, when we had applied to it an absolutely empty Freedom, we spoke of determinedness, and accepted it as a proved fact, but only as a limitation of Freedom to *quantitability generally*. In short, quantitability is not posited in contemplation as it is posited in Thinking—i. e. not as a production of Freedom, but as something absolutely *found or given* beyond all consciousness; and since Thinking is not without Contemplation, it is evident that quantitability must present within knowledge an entirely contradictory view. This, strictly taken, altogether only *qualitative* limitation to quantitability is here now itself contemplated, and thereby an infinite quantitating obtained. The view has indeed changed, having become more definite.

The case stands now thus: Quantitating *materialiter* takes place with Freedom, and is *contemplated* as taking place with Freedom; *formaliter* it is *thought* as something, to which knowledge is confined.

After this general view, let us now enter into the branch-syntheses, and at first into that of Contemplation. Quantitating views itself as confined to itself; it quantitates, therefore, really and with Freedom; and if only to be able to view its own confinedness, presupposes itself, in this free quantitating, as its own necessary condition. Both links are altogether one. We must first become acquainted with one of them; let it be the presupposed.

This is the *permanent, absolute* contemplation ; hence manifoldness, which holds itself in a resting light, eternally and ineradicably the same. What, then, is it ? It is, if knowledge is posited, the resting, permanent *Space*. If we know this space, we also know the pointed-out contemplation. Let the reader consider the following thought, which seems to me to light up the old darkness like a flash of lightning. Space is to be infinitely divisible. Now, if this is to be so, how then comes knowledge ever to take hold of space ? Where has it finished the infinite division, and embraced the elements of space ? Or, how does space ever attain its *inner solidity*, so that it does not fall through itself, does not thin off into a fog and vanish ? If space is therefore, nevertheless, infinitely divisible, it is at least, from a certain point of view, also not so, or it could not *be* at all, and could not be *this*. Its manifold—not that within it, for of that we know nothing yet—must therefore mutually support itself, as it were, in order that space can support itself and attain solidity. Again, contemplation teaches everyone, at least, that we can perform no construction, which is always an agility within space, unless space rests and stands still. Whence this resting of space ? Again : No one can construct a line without something mixing with the line, in the course of construction, which he has not constructed, nor ever can construct ; which he, therefore, does not add to the line while drawing it, but which he has carried along by means of space before ever commencing to draw the line : it is the solidity of the line. (If the line is a running through an infinite number of points, the line becomes impossible ; the points and the line itself fall to pieces. Nevertheless they would hang together within space, and are, in their infinite manifoldness, at the same time its continuity.)

Whence, now, this solid, resting and permanent space ? It is the sufficiently described Contemplation (the For-and-In-itself-Being of formal Freedom, which is a quantifiability), which presupposes, however, itself as *absolutely being* to itself, according to the demonstrated law of reflection of consciousness. It is the on-itself-reposing, firm glance of the intelligence ; the resting, immanent light, the eternal eye in-itself and for-itself.

How, then, is the *second* link of the synthesis related to

this? It is a free taking hold of itself within this contemplation; a constructing, remaking of the same, a loosening and again extending of space;—but let it be well remembered, a taking hold of what has already presupposed *itself*, since otherwise the first link would be lost, which must be guarded against in every reflection. Hence it is clear that the one cannot be at all without the other: no space without construction of the same, although not *it* (space), but merely the consciousness of it, is thereby generated (ideal relation); no construction without presupposing space (real relation). All knowledge of this description rests, therefore, neither in the one nor the other, but in both of the links, as was shown in the instance of the line. The mere direction of the line is a result of the last link of the freedom of construction; its concretion is the result of the permanent space. The drawing of the line is evidently synthetical.

We add the following remarks: *Firstly*, for this constructing process space is infinitely divisible; i. e. you can make an infinite number of points from which to construct within it. *Again*, space is evidently nothing but quantitability itself. The assumed determinedness is therefore and remains altogether formally a limitation to quantitability itself. We return here to the same proposition expressed above: formal Freedom, as such, is the only ground of quantitability and of all the results thereof. Even space is only quantitability, and nothing enters it which might originate from the thing *per se*. *Finally*, the substantial, solid, and resting space, is, according to the above, the original light, before all actual knowledge, only thinkable and intelligible—but not visible and not to be contemplated—as produced through Freedom. The construction of space, according to the second link of the synthesis, is a *taking hold of itself* on the part of light, a self-penetration of light, ever from one point and realized within knowledge itself; a secondary condition of light, which, for the sake of distinguishing it, we shall term *clearness*, the act *enlightening*.

COROLLARIA.—This deduction and description of space is decisive for philosophy, physics, and for all sciences. Only the last mentioned constructed and constructible space, which in itself is not at all possible, and would dissolve into Noth-

ingness were it not for the original in-itself-solid contemplation, has been held to be the only space; especially since *Kant*, whose system, in this respect, has done a bad service. (To him whose eyes have been opened there is nothing more funny than the ideas which modern philosophies promulgate about space.) Followed up, this view of the matter should have led to a formal Idealism. But people had a horror of that; so they went to positing matter (substance) into this spoiled space without considering that, if they had matter beforehand, space would have come to them without any further exertion on their part; or, that space without inner solidity (and this is the very ground of the famous matter or substance) dissolves into an infinite divisibility=Nothing.

Then they were afraid that if natural philosophy should attempt the construction of a material body, the powers of attraction and repulsion within it might one day lose their balance, without ever beginning to think that these two ideas are nothing more than a double view in the reflection of one and the same *balance*, the firm repose, which space carries within it.

§ 5. Deduction of the Groundform of Time.

We now proceed to an investigation which may lead us to the second branch-link of our synthesis. In the eternal space the manifold of it was lying quietly and steadily aside of each other before and in one glance, which is a glance, and one and the same glance only in so far as everything lies thus quietly and steadily together.

Reflect now upon any particular part of this contemplation. Whereby is such part kept in its solidity and repose? Evidently by all others and all others by it. No one part is in the view unless all the others are in it; the whole is determined by the parts, the parts by the whole, every part by every other part, and only in so far as it is thus is it the permanent contemplation which we have described. Nothing is, if all is not in the same standing unity of the view. It is the most perfect inner reciprocity and organization; and thus organization reveals itself already in the pure contemplation of space.

In the construction, on the contrary, we start from some one individual point, and the parts (for instance, the parts of the

above constructed line) come to follow in a certain order of succession, so that, this direction presupposed, you cannot arrive at the point B except from A, &c. But how have we been enabled to say what we have said just now? Only in so far as we posited such facts, formally at our pleasure; consequently, only in so far as we merely thought, and kept within the standpoint of construction. In the standing space beyond construction there are no points, no discretions, but it is the one concrete view just particularly described. Discretion, therefore—so we will express ourselves for the sake of the strictness of the investigation—has its origin in the Thinking of the constructing, and in what results therefrom, the changing of the constructing into a Thinking.

But wherein lies the ground of the determined law of succession? Firstly, *formaliter*, in the Freedom of the direction, which is altogether undetermined and changeable, floating in each point between infinity. This Freedom, therefore, must be presupposed, if a succession is but to be spoken of; and we thus arrive at the old proposition of Freedom as the ground of all quantitability—here, however, in a stricter, more definite sense. If Freedom, however, is once presupposed, then the succession is determined by the co-existence of the manifold in the standing contemplation or in space. The consciousness of the succession, therefore, like the previous consciousness, rests neither in the point of the construction, nor in that of the contemplation, but in both and in the union of both.

Now, while the lower, *objective*, Thinking or Constructing, always presupposing a determined direction grounded by its own Freedom within itself, is confined to the law of succession which contemplation furnishes, how is it *thought*? Evidently, as confined originally and beyond all Thinking and knowledge, in regard to every possible direction which it may give to itself; not *absolutely* confined, but under the condition of this or that particular direction which it gives to itself. Hence, as above, we presupposed an original necessary contemplation, so here an original, necessary Thinking is presupposed, and this itself is *thought*; for the designated point is surely a thought. But as the designated contemplation was and remained a mere quantitability, so this thought also is only quantitability, but a quantitability infinitely determinable

through Freedom of the direction. (Think one series, a second, a third, &c., and you have thought the separate determination of quantitability. But now you are to think no separate one, but simply *all* its determinations, and doing so you think a confinedness of Thinking.)

I have characterized quantitability generally above as nature, or as the material world. The law of succession, therefore, of which we here speak, is evidently the law of nature; and it is even now clear how Freedom is confined to it. Not only in so far as it must first be realized within itself in order to have a succession; but further, in so far as, after it has this succession, none of the laws of this succession apply to Freedom, unless Freedom has chosen itself a direction, of which directions an infinite number are placed before it from each point. (Space is here an altogether adequate picture.)

Even after the world is, and supposing that somebody were tied down within the world, unable to pass beyond it—were to remain in the second link of the synthesis, in which case his knowledge would be the production only of the contemplation originated beyond all knowledge—the world would still be to him not an absolute *power*. For even in the world infinite directions are possible, the choice of which depends upon him: hence his relation to the world, and the law of the world, by which he is bound, would always depend upon himself after all.

The complaints about human infirmity, weakness, dependence, &c., can no more be refuted than the complaints about the weakness of human understanding. Whoever asserts them, will probably know and have experienced them; we can trust his assurance. Only, we may beg him not to include us. Nevertheless it is often impossible to think ill enough about the immediate reality. However low we may draw its picture, experience nevertheless exceeds it. But he who thinks ill of mankind, according to its general faculty, blasphemes reason and at the same time condemns himself.

One more remark, which forces itself upon us and appertains to the subject: The described objective Thinking—each link of which is dependent upon another, which is *not* dependent upon the former (while in the conception of the resting space each link was dependent upon the other), where the dependence is therefore only one-sided, and does not move

retrogressively—carries at the same time the formal character of *Time* within it, the movements of which, as we well know, are related to each other in that manner. Nevertheless, I do not wish to be understood as having already deduced time. The succession, here pointed out, has moreover a characteristic which seems itself contradictory, that the discrete thoughts can nevertheless be also placed alongside of each other and surveyed in one glance. But we lack here still the solidity, the stoppage of the moments which we must have in time. We may, therefore, have arrived at the highest *ground of time*, but on no account have we arrived at its reality itself in the appearance. It is, however, clear that, if we are to elevate ourselves above time and to explain it we must not be tied down to its moments, but must survey them at one glance, as we just now did, with our links of Thinking, according to the law of succession.

We may, however, apprehend already what will be necessary to obtain this solid and real time; i. e. that its links must not be merely a Thinking, but, at the same time, such an organic, self-holding and supporting contemplation as we above described the contemplation of resting space to be. This, however, can be attained only after a disjunction of space from itself, after a most probably infinite multiplication of the same; and devolves, therefore, upon a new reflection. This much, however, is even now clear, that time is not that perfect correlative of space, which it has generally been considered to be. Philosophers have distinguished them as outward and inward contemplation. This is mere one-sidedness! For we should never get space outside of us if we had it not within ourselves. And are we not ourselves space? The viewing of space as an outward contemplation originated from that curious immateriality which was to be secured to us when degraded matter was no longer good enough for us. (Time stands in the same line of reflections as the true, genuine space. It is true, however, that time, on account of its relation to Thinking and as the form of Thinking, is carried higher, above all space; and this is the cause why the nature of time has been misunderstood and why it has been opposed to space.)

By the above we have made an important step toward actual knowledge. Everyone knows that all actual know-

ledge, or knowledge of the actual, must be a particular knowledge within an undetermined manifold, and that its particular character, its Being generally, consists in this very relation to the manifold. But the manifold must moreover be surveyable; must remain firm before the glance and support it. This supporting sphere we have given to Thinking by the law of succession in the eternally standing and resting space, which space, as we have described it, is precisely that which remains firm to the construction, and supports it, which does not dissolve by infinite division into nothing. But this characteristic does not *fill* space. True, it is in itself not empty (for it is full of itself), but neither is it full of anything else; in that respect it is, indeed, empty. It is nothing but the solid, same and in-itself-resting contemplation.

It is evident that our next business must be to get something into this standing sphere which can be a particular something, whereby the in-itself everywhere same space (if anyone finds that this thought, in view of the manifoldness in space, is contradictory, I have no objection) can be distinguished from itself, and the links of one series of succession can be excluded from each other. If anyone supposes, starting from the idea of space, that this something will be *matter*, he is right. But it is highly probable, in view of the peculiar character of our system, that *matter* will have here quite a different signification from the usual one. For is there not also a *spirit world*, quite as discrete as the other? We shall, therefore, probably have to proceed from the unity of these two worlds to their distinction, and prove that matter is necessarily spiritual, and spirit necessarily material; no matter without life and soul—no life except in matter.

§ 6. Deduction of Matter.

We approach the designated investigation.

Formal Freedom is *posited*. But altogether inseparable from it is a quantitating, purely as such. Formal Freedom cannot be posited, as a simple point, in and for itself, contemplating itself; for in that case it would not be posited at all; neither it nor anything would be. The point is merely its one-sided view in Thinking; but here we have *contemplation*. Necessarily, therefore, a quantitating is posited at the

same time, but only in so far as it is inseparable from the positedness of Freedom.

This quantitating, it is true, is in and for itself simple and one and the same; but thus it is again unreal and unattainable. In the reflection it is double: *Concretion* and *Discretion* in succession. Hence both are absolutely posited, and preposited to the ground-form of knowledge. We must, therefore, answer these questions: What is involved in the concretion generally, and especially in the form of formal Freedom in which it appears here? What in the discretion to a succession, in the same respect? What, finally, in the absolute identity of both?

1. The concretion is, in regard to its substance, any particular space, even a concreting and self-supporting of manifold points which may be thought *afterwards* and *arbitrarily*. Without this *possible* manifold it is no concretion, as is immediately evident. But it is, again, not merely the space which keeps itself in equilibrium and fixes its contemplation; for then it would not be at the same time construction, and construction through Freedom. What, then, is it? An in-itself *space occupying manifold*, in which *points, penetrating each other in reciprocal concretion, can be posited infinitely, which commence, continue, and give direction to any line* with the most unbounded freedom. Agility is distributed through the whole, or can be so distributed; so also is the *solidity* of space distributed throughout the whole; and the agility, whenever it has determined itself or decided itself in a particular manner, is surrendered to this solidity—but always according to its own law and so as to remain Freedom in it, as we have shown in the preceding section. The basis is that resting, standing, space: but with it the Freedom of concretion is inseparably united.

This now is *matter*; and hence matter is the *fixed constructibility of space itself*, and nothing else whatever. Matter is not space; for space rests eternally and unshaken, and *carries* all construction; but it is *in* space; it is the construction which is carried. *Space* and *matter* are the inseparable view of one and the same, of quantitability (from the standpoint of contemplation), as *standing* and *general*, and at the same time *concrete* and *constructible*.

RESULTS.—A. Matter is necessarily a manifold ; whenever it is taken hold of, it is taken hold of as such, and it cannot be taken hold of otherwise.

B. It is infinitely divisible, without dissolving into nothingness. It is carried by the abiding space in the background, which as such (as space) is not divided at all, but within which division takes place.

C. It is necessarily and in itself organic. The ground of a motion is distributed through it, for it is the constructibility in space. It may be in rest, but it can put itself in motion simply from itself.

2. If formal Freedom is posited in both, then a *constructing* is posited. But this is, however closely we may describe it, simply, a line-drawing; it produces a line, by no means a point. But the line presupposes a direction, which again is necessarily confined to an order of succession. By the positing of formal Freedom, therefore, there is necessarily posited and preposited, prior to all self-conscious Freedom, some succession of the manifold.

Now, this original succession, seized in *contemplation* (not in Thinking, as above), results in *Time*.—It is clear that the presupposed line is infinitely divisible. True, it is completed, and in regard to space a closed whole. But between every two points which stand in the relation of succession, I can put again other points which stand in the same relation. Hence, although the contemplation, of which we here speak, is evidently unity of the glance, and although every time-moment is probably a Time-Whole, discrete and separated from all other time-moments; yet, from another view, this time-moment is again an infinitely divisible moment of the one time; and only through this infinity of floating does the time-moment receive its solidity. The characteristic conception, which was wanting heretofore, is now deduced.

Again: through this very solidity does the contemplation seize itself as an objective, self-given, immanent light. For all light consists of a floating over infinite distinguishability, quantifiability, which must be at the same time infinitely determinable and constructible. The light is not something simple, but the infinite reciprocity of Freedom with itself, the

penetration of its unity, eternity, and primitiveness, by the manifoldness and infinite determinability arising therefrom. This light must appear to itself at some point, must seize itself in real knowledge; and this point of self-seizing is the described *contemplation* in the synthesis of space, matter, and time.

3. Both—concretion as well as discretion—are the position of formal Freedom, in which both are altogether united. The latter gives time, and hence actual knowledge; the former, space and matter. But the former is also the basis and condition of the latter. Hence there is no light (no knowledge) in its essential form except in matter, and, *vice versa*, no matter is (let it be well remarked *for-itself*) except in time and its light.

But let us consider each of these points more closely.

First of all, an important remark not yet dwelt upon: There is no knowledge and no life which does not necessarily last a time, and posit itself for itself in a time. Knowledge carries, by its very form, time within itself and brings it along; a timeless knowledge—for instance, an absolutely simple point within time—is impossible. But time is altogether only a confined succession of matter in space. Hence no time is *comprehended*, and—since it must be comprehended if life and knowledge is to be—no life and knowledge *is*, unless matter and space are comprehended. Matter can just as well be called a transformation of space into time, Freedom and knowledge; and thus time and space are regarded also in this central point as inseparably united.

Life necessarily describes itself in *matter*. *Vice versa*, matter cannot be described except by the construction of a line. But this line needs a direction; this direction a succession of points; these a knowledge in which a manifold can be united, for otherwise the line would become a point.

(If I had to do with somebody to whom I were compelled to prove the necessity of the idealistic view by one example, I should ask him: How can you ever attain a line except by keeping the points *asunder*, for else they fall together; and at the same time taking them together and annulling their being *asunder*, for else they never join each other? But you comprehend, undoubtedly, that this unity of the manifold-

ness, this positing and annulling of a discretion, can be only in *knowledge*; and we have just shown that it is the ground-form of knowledge. Now you ought at the same time to comprehend that space and matter consist, in exactly the same way, in such a *keeping asunder* of the points, but in a *unity*; and that they are, hence, possible only in knowledge and *as* knowledge, and that they are, indeed, the *real form of knowledge itself*.

This is now, in truth, as clear and evident as anything possibly can be; it lies right before every one who opens his eyes, and ought not first to be proved and acquired, but should be known so well that one ought to feel ashamed to have to say it.—Why, then, was it not seen? Because every thing lies nearer to us than the seeing itself, *in* which we rest; and because we have been stubbornly clinging to that objectivating which seeks outside of itself what lies only in us.)

We add two exhaustive remarks, casting light far around.

a. The ground of all actual Being (of the world of appearances) has been represented in the deepest and most exhaustive manner, partly in regard to its formal, partly in regard to its material character. The former consists in this, that the world is independent of all knowledge which is recognized by knowledge itself as knowledge; that it would be though the knowledge of it were not; again, that it is not necessarily, but could just as well not be.—We are especially particular about the first point, and it is a great error to suppose that transcendental idealism denies the *empirical* reality of the material world, &c.; it only points out in it the forms of knowledge, and annihilates it therefore as for-itself-existing and absolute.—The ground of its existence is, in one word, this: that knowledge must necessarily presuppose itself for itself, so as to be able to describe its origin and Freedom. Formal Freedom posits itself as *being*. Now this formal Freedom, in its positedness before all conscious use of Freedom, and nothing else at all, is the material world. It is related as substance to every knowledge reflecting itself as free which then is accident; hence it would be though no knowledge were. At least, this must necessarily be the conviction of him who remains in this synthesis. But everyone again who comprehends it, comprehends just what we said. (Kant calls it a

deception which we cannot get rid of. Such a phrase would merely prove that we had single light-rays, *lucida intervalla*, of the transcendental view, which vanish involuntarily. But whoever has this view in his own free power finds nowhere deception. He knows that it is necessarily thus from this standpoint, which is consequently correct; and that it is necessarily thus from the other, higher standpoint, which is consequently also correct; *but that the one absolute knowledge consists neither in the one nor in the other, but only in the knowledge of the relation of the ENTIRE system of knowledge to absolute Being.*)

b. Again: Of this resting and standing Being of the world, the two ground-qualities, spirit and matter, have been deduced from one central point as absolutely belonging to this Being, and as in themselves only a duplicity of the view of this one Being in knowledge. In so far as knowledge posits itself as being, it posits itself as matter; in so far as it posits itself as *being free*, it posits itself as a succession in time, as a standing and resting intelligence, confined to itself.

Part Third.

Knowledge posits itself for itself as an organic Power of Activity, or as a system of Feelings and Impulses.

CONTENTS OF PART THIRD.

- § 1. The determinedness of quantitating Freedom determines factical Knowledge only in part—that is, so far as it is a general determinedness;—but, in part, is determined by it—that is, so far as factical Knowledge posits the order or sequence of that determinedness. Hence knowledge is both infinite and determined.
- § 2. Knowledge in general to become factical Knowledge gathers itself into a concentration-point of reflection, infinitely repeatable, though everywhere the same; and hence, as a point or determinedness of Quantitability, a determined point of Time, Space, and Matter: a point of utterance of power.
- § 3. Knowledge posits itself for itself therefore as an acting power or a tendency, and moreover as a system of acting powers, reciprocally determined and checked, and each determined or checked utterance of which is called a *feeling*.
- § 4. The absolute power of Knowledge in manifesting itself as material *feeling* connects this feeling in perception with matter, and attributes it to matter as its cause.
- § 5. The absolute power of Knowledge cannot be thought as manifesting itself in a material feeling without being contemplated therein, and hence extended into a *direction* of feeling, and thus apprehended as *Impulse*.

INTRODUCTORY.

It is not so important to exhaust the deductions which result from our last synthesis, as to seize the spirit of the whole by the right word in the right place. What follows in the systematic progress is clear enough to him who has the right insight; to others the separate propositions also will appear dark. Hence we prepare the following by a more general reflection.

1. Let us posit the universe as consisting of a system of single, for-themselves-closed Beings, thought in accordance with our investigation = synthesis of light and matter.

2. This system is in itself organized; the Being of each is determined by its reciprocity with all others. Now, if I bring into this system changeableness, I ask—admitting such a system, and I not only admit but assert it—is not this system, if it is to be the ultimate, a system which dissolves itself into nothingness? Evidently. Each single separate is determined by the others; where, then, does the *original determinedness* commence? This is an eternal circle, with which we content ourselves only because we tire out by *despair*. It will not do forever to borrow Being from another source; we must finally arrive at a Being which has it in its own power to be.

3. Now, in this One all Beings have part. The immediate knowledge of the relation of each separate is that separate's absolute Being, its substantial root; and this relation is not first produced by the Being of the others, but itself and all the others become absolute being to it only through this relation. But this relation carries an original duplicity within itself: it is a relation to an *ever-closed whole* (the eternal One)—for otherwise we would arrive at no standing, permanent relation, and at no standing knowledge; and, at the same time, it is a relation to an in-all-eternity *not closable whole*—for otherwise we would arrive at no free knowledge. Hence, each eye, in the infinite light-ocean of knowledge, which has been opened to itself, carries at the same time its closed and completed Being, and in this Being it bears its eternity within itself. *We comprehend always the Absolute, for outside of it there is nothing comprehensible; but, at the same time, we comprehend that we shall never comprehend it completely, for between the Abso-*

lute and Knowledge lies the infinite quantitability, according to which the relation of each separate to the Whole and to the Universe is both in itself closed and completed, and infinitely changing WITHIN that completion.

4. But now comes the highest question: how can knowledge arrive at this view and comprehension of a relation, tie, or order of quantitability, a view which lies beyond its whole inner nature? Answer: The being, the *actuality* of knowledge would be altogether impossible if the order were not also absolutely posited; knowledge cannot realize itself except within that order and its thorough determinedness; and this condition is posited simply because it is posited, beyond all factual knowledge and comprehension of the How?—Remember the synthesis of the absolute substantiality. According to the central point of that synthesis, formal Freedom, and with it knowledge, quantitating, &c., could *be*, and could *not be*, therein altogether independent of absolute Being; and this result must remain. But it was shown that if this Freedom has once come to *be*, it must materially be determined by the Absolute. Determined in what? Doubtless in that which forms its nature, its root and substance, in the quantitating. *How* then? Even as the words say, determined, i. e. confined to an original order and relation of the manifold, in which quantitating consists. Absolute formal Freedom is confined to this order, but on no account is this true of any further determinedness of Freedom *within* that order.

Finally: *To what* is formal Freedom confined? To order and relation generally; on no account to this or that order, for then it would again not be formal Freedom, but would be determined in some *inner* respect. Knowledge seized itself in some one single glance (an individual=C, to whom we must, therefore, give a fixed relation to the universe). This, now, is that C's groundpoint, giving to him *his* relation to the universe unavoidably and unchangeably. Could—not *this* knowledge, for this knowledge is only that, the groundpoint whereof is the individual C, but—could not knowledge generally ignite itself equally well in other points? Evidently; and if it did, we should have here another order. Consequently, there is here in respect to the matter a reciprocity between absolute Being and knowledge, which, indeed, we had to arrive at.

5. Now this point of commencement beyond all real knowledge—the factical, before all fact—we cannot ascribe to that Freedom which we know in all knowledge. It falls into the incomprehensible. But how we, being posited by this incomprehensible reciprocity into life and knowledge, and hence in an altogether determined relation, can change this relation very much, while it nevertheless remains the ever co-determining basis, this we can see even now. The real is *absolute law* only for Freedom.

To sum up, and in order to connect what we have just said with the most general conceptions of the synthesis: Knowledge is *For-itself-Being* of the originating; this presupposes Not-Being, and, since this must be in knowledge, necessarily *Being* in knowledge as such. But this Being is nothing more than that whereby each knowledge that finds itself, finds itself determined through its nature. Now knowledge is again a quantitating; its confinedness is, therefore, a confinedness of the quantitating, altogether as such and altogether nothing else. Hence the already deduced ground-form of all actual in knowledge: space, matter, time. But knowledge, in seizing itself actually, is also the limitation of quantitating. Hence, drawn down to this region, that confinedness is the confinedness to such a fixed limitation in the deduced ground-forms of the actual. The determinedness of this limitation, however, depends itself upon Freedom; hence, also, the determinedness of the confinedness. Absolute Being is in knowledge law; knowledge can never be relieved of this law without losing itself; but how this law may appear to it, depends in all its possible contents, in all possible views and degrees, upon its Freedom. The highest relation of both is, therefore, not *causality* but *reciprocity*.

(I cannot deny myself here a continuation of the parallel of this system with that of Spinoza, for the sake of attaining the greatest clearness. According to Spinoza, i. e. where I interpreted his system most favorably, knowledge was, as with me, *accidence* of the absolute Being. He had really no connecting link between substance and accidence; both fell together. I connected them by the conception of *formal Freedom*. This Freedom is in itself equally independent; it is determined only *materialiter*, if it realizes itself. Now, in the same syn-

thesis we have discovered something additional and new: even the material determinedness is only *formally* unconditioned—knowledge cannot be at all without being confined;—but on no account *materially*—in regard to quantity and relation,—for this again is the result of formal Freedom.)

6. The knowledge arising from this synthesis, after we have considered all its links, is therefore *infinite*, but also *absolutely determined*; a conception which appears to be a contradiction, but which here is easily comprehended, and which in every-day life we realize almost every moment in spite of the apparent contradiction. Knowledge can exist in infinite, never-to-be-determined ways; but in whatever way it exists, it exists in a determined way and in the order of succession conditioned thereby. (The reader will please call to mind the game of chess.)

This, now, would give us the one, eternal, infinite *knowledge*, the whole accident of absolute Being. From Being arises neither the possibility nor the reality of knowledge, as Spinoza would have it; but merely, in case of its reality, its general determinedness. Now, this thus-to-be-comprehended knowledge is itself, in relation to the knowledge *for-itself*, substance. The knowledge produced by the position of formal Freedom is therefore doubly accident, partly of itself as knowledge, partly of absolute Being. We have hence here, in the second substantiality, explained in full the separation into a—not infinite, which, applied to reality, would be contradictory—but closed system of modifications of knowledge, which again are not modifications of knowledge in itself, but only of knowledge according to the groundpoints and successions of its seizing itself. Every such groundpoint is a *formaliter* necessary, *materialiter* altogether free limitation to one point in substantial knowledge, determined by its relation to the whole of knowledge. To the *whole*, I say. But how has that now turned into a whole, which even this very moment was a never-to-be-completed infinite? And, as we undoubtedly are not inclined to take back our word, how does it remain, together with its *totality, infinity*? (This is another important, rarely remarked, much less solved difficulty, least of all solved by Spinoza, who, without further ado, causes to proceed from the eternal substance an *infinite* series of finite

modifications, and, consequently, loses thus the conception of the *universe*, which presupposes completeness—closedness.) A whole it evidently became by the separate knowledge seizing itself even as a separate, which, as the result of a determination through all others, can be only the result of a closed sum. An Infinite it remains at the same time if this determinedness is not one of determinedness, but of determinability, as we have also posited it; from which again there results, in the same respect, the infinite modificability of that closed whole.

The actual universe is ever closed and complete, for otherwise no closed part and no knowledge could be realized within it; each would dissolve within itself. The inner substance of the universe, however, is the posited Freedom, and this is infinite. The closed and completed universe carries, therefore, an infinity within itself; and only therein is it closed, that it carries and holds this infinity.

§ 1. The determinedness of quantitating Freedom determines factual Knowledge only in part—that is, so far as it is a general determinedness;—but, in part, is determined by it—that is, so far as factual Knowledge posits the order or sequence of that determinedness. Hence Knowledge is both infinite and determined.

Now in this knowledge, which we have learned to know in its most comprehensive synthesis, of what is *absolute Being* the ground, and what does it carry within itself? Evidently, simply and purely the *Being*, the standing and reposing of knowledge, which keeps it from not dissolving within itself into an empty nothing: hence, the mere pure form of *Being*, and nothing else whatever. This, however, originates in it alone.

In this synthesis alone, as the highest of knowledge, does absolute Being appear immediate; hence it is clear that nothing more can be deduced from it in a lower synthesis. Absolute Being is in knowledge only the form of Being, and remains so forever. *That which* is known, depends altogether upon Freedom; but that *something* is, and if it comes to *this* something that it is *known* (that it completely enters and is absorbed in knowledge) is grounded in absolute Being. Only the *actual* form of knowledge, the determinedness of the *known*, but not the *matter* of knowledge (which consists in Freedom)

results from absolute Being. From it results only that such a matter (Freedom) is at all possible, that it can realize itself, can become (actual) knowledge, and thus seize itself in any particular determination. Thus Freedom as well as absolute Being are both, in their respective positions, altogether mutually determined and united; the former is completely secured in its highest significance, and all absolute incomprehensibility (*qualitas occulta*) is totally eradicated from knowledge.

One incomprehensible, it is true, remains, as we have mentioned before, viz.: the absolute Freedom which precedes all actual knowledge. But this must not be confounded with the incomprehensible Being (the inscrutable will of God), for it is at the same time comprehended at every moment and correctly, as sure as we *know* anything at all. Again: we understand very well *that* it cannot be comprehended in its primitiveness, and that we likewise do not need to comprehend it thus. For that comprehending itself in its eternity and infinity consists precisely in *infinitely continuing* to comprehend: *the very reason* why it can never comprehend its own primitiveness.

Thus then is it, and thus is it necessarily comprehended by every intelligence which elevates itself in knowledge (even without the Science of Knowledge) to this view. To prove this in separate instances we have not time here; all systems and religions, and even the views of common sense, are full of propositions which result from it.

But at the same time it has been sufficiently shown from all our previous reflections, that that knowledge (in the highest synthesis of absolute Being and infinite Freedom) can begin from out itself, can become *actual* knowledge, only by an *actual contemplation* (the contemplation *in* and *for* itself, well known to us already) which limits itself within the infinite contemplability to a fixed *quantum*. That such a contemplation must be presupposed, as originally prior to all conscious Freedom and what its results are, has also been shown sufficiently. As such, this contemplation is a point in the infinite sphere of knowledge, in which knowledge seizes itself; hence a determinedness of quantifiability, which in the contemplation is changed into the one space and matter, and the one time. This point is therefore, necessarily, altogether determined in regard to each of these instances; but it can be thus determined only

by its relation to the actual (no longer infinite or undetermined) whole; hence the point is for itself only in so far as the whole is for it. This contemplation, therefore, is possible only in *Thinking*, in the free floating over that relation, and in the singling out of this one particular point *in* the whole from the universality of the latter. Thinking and contemplation penetrate each other here again; and their basis is *Feeling*, as we called it formerly: the uniting of a determinedness of Freedom and of absolute Being. In this Feeling we may, therefore, have discovered for a knowledge, with which we are not yet acquainted, however, the principle of individuality.

It is *one* of the points of concentration for the actual being of knowledge, and we take this point, of course, as a representative of all possible others. That it has the *form* of Being, its existence, from absolute Being, is clear; for otherwise no permanency of contemplation could take place at all. But its determined Being it has only from the reciprocity between its Freedom and the whole.

What then now—this is a *new* question—is the character of actual Being? Altogether only a relation of Freedom to Freedom according to a law. The *Real* (=R), which has now been found and which carries knowledge prior to actual knowledge, is, 1st, a concentration-point of all the time of that one individual, and it is comprehended as that which it is only in so far as this time is comprehended, which is, however, always comprehended and at the same time never. It is, 2d, a concentration-point of all actual individuals in this time-moment. Hence, of all the time of these, and of all hereafter possible individuals; it is the universe of Freedom in *one* point and in *all* points.

Only in so far as it remains such a concentration-point does it remain a real; otherwise it would dissolve into a simple, i. e. into an abstract nothing.

Is R then, now, something in itself, a permanent? How can it be, since its ground-substance is Freedom, the nature of which is eternal change! How then does a knowledge, nevertheless, repose on it; for instance, that of the individual, viz., J! Answer: In so far as J with his immanent freedom, according to the first synthesis—though not *in* it—reposes upon *absolute Being* (like all other individuals), can it repose on itself and

occupy a relation towards that of the other individuals, and *vice versa*. How does J know that these numbers of individuals, of which he knows, rest with their knowledge in absolute knowledge? Because otherwise he would *not* know of himself *in such a manner* as to know of them, but in another manner.

The ultimate ground of each momentary condition of the world is now discovered; it is the being and reposing of the totality of knowledge in the Absolute. It is true, that through it also the not always clearly perceived condition of each individual is determined, which again on its part determines the condition of the whole. But this ground and its result could be otherwise at every moment, and can become otherwise at every moment of the future. The highest law of that Being which carries laws is not a law of nature (law of a material being), but a law of Freedom, and is expressed in this formula: Everything *is* precisely as Freedom makes it, and does not become otherwise unless Freedom makes it otherwise.

Let us remark, however, at this place, in order to prevent possible misunderstandings, that we have here explained only the form of the actual, empirical Being (or of the taking hold of itself of knowledge). We have proved *that* a material (a *quantum* and determined relation) must be within that form; but concerning the ground of this determinedness we have been referred to absolute Freedom, or have said that this origin was incomprehensible. Now, let no one believe that here already we actually cause Freedom—as separated and isolated—to act, thus making it a real Thing *per se* and an altogether blind *chance*, in doing which we should again bring in the occult qualities, the real enemies of science. For this Freedom is in no knowledge, but is the Freedom presupposed prior to knowledge. At present we have, however, not yet arrived at any knowledge; where, then, should this Freedom be?

At some future time—and only then will our investigation be at an end—Freedom will find itself in actual knowledge *as* Freedom. It is true this Freedom, thus finding itself, will have conditions of its own being, and amongst them a *presupposed* Freedom; but it would find the presupposed Freedom *different* if it found *itself* different. From the latter only do we infer back to the presupposed Freedom, which is only thus accessible to knowledge. (What you, for instance *act*, first

opens to you the field of knowledge, and hence of your original character of Freedom.)

Now it may nevertheless be, that even this character, taken unchangeably, admits of different views of darkness or clearness, and hence degrees of power; and that in the highest degree each one *is* not limited, but limits *himself* with Freedom in knowledge.

§ 2. Knowledge in general to become factual Knowledge gathers itself into a concentration-point of reflection, infinitely repeatable, though everywhere the same; and hence posits itself as a point or determinedness of Quantitability, a determined point of Time, Space, and Matter: a point of utterance of power.

The result of the former paragraph may be expressed in the following proposition: It is absolutely necessary that the in-itself altogether one and the same knowledge should limit itself and gather itself together in a point of reflection (concentration) if it is ever to arrive at an actual knowledge; but this point of reflection is infinitely repeatable—everywhere, however, the same. Now, if we remember that this knowledge is at the same time a pure, and in all knowledge absolutely *unchangeable Thinking*, the necessity results—after the possibility of knowledge has been ascertained from the determinedness of the standpoint—that each individual must hold himself in this altogether unchangeable Thinking. In this Thinking, therefore, all outward distinctions of individuals vanish: all of them perceive the same in the same manner, gathered up into the one fundamental contemplation of quantitability, with all other links involved in it, and carried by the one unchangeable Thinking of it. Only the *inner* difference remains; and there is, perhaps, no more proper place in the system to explain this *inwardness* of individuality than here.

I say, *I*, and thou sayest, *I*; both sayings mean altogether the same as far as the *form* is concerned; from both there follows altogether the same as far as the *matter* is concerned; and if thou didst not hear and think mine *I*, nor I thine, this no further to be distinguished *I* might just as well be only once. How does it happen that we, nevertheless, can posit it twice, and must posit it so, and that we keep both apart as never to be mistaken the one for the other?

I answer, according to our former explanations, as follows:

1. In all former knowledge a *subjective* and an *objective*

were distinguishable. The reflection rested upon an object, which it pictured only *formaliter*; and we know at present right well that this standing object originates everywhere in pure absolute Thinking, whereas its formalizing originates in the Thinking of the accidental, as also a Being. But in the absolute self-comprehension of knowledge there is no such distinction; the subjective and objective fall immediately together, and are inseparably united; and this is not, perhaps, merely *thought* as we have thought it here, and must think it; but it *is*, is absolutely, and this very Being is knowledge, as, *vice versa*, this knowledge is also again Being. It is the absolute in-itself-reposing of knowledge, without contemplating a generating, a beginning, &c.; hence it is that *in* which and *for* which all generating and all Being is: knowledge in the form of absolute, pure Thinking, immediate feeling of existence, which flows through all particular knowledge, and carries the same, as itself is carried by absolute Being—the highest and absolute synthesis of Thinking and contemplation.

But in this immediately-felt self thine *I* is not to appear; thy Ego I merely *think*, objectively, by loosening in Thinking my own self from me and putting it before me. I know very well that this signifies the same, and that thou loosenest in the same manner mine from thee; but this immediate ground of knowledge it never will and never can become for me, because I must *rest* permanently upon my standpoint in order to be I. It designates to me merely this *form* of absolute resting, and nothing else at all; and I cannot appropriate thy Ego simply because I can never get rid of my resting. It is the eternal unchangeable *That* of knowledge—and on no account some *What*—by which all individuality is *immediately* determined.

Hence everybody objectivates individuality, repeating it, and only through all individualities does he view the universe—(in its one general contemplation wherein he stands) from his own point of reflection (of individuality).

The Isolation demonstrated here, in consequence of which I place thee outside of me, only thinking, not feeling thee, well knowing that thou performest the same operation in the same way, may possibly be the innermost ground of all other isolations and sequences of series, which we discovered above,

but which here we have blotted out by the too general standpoint of our investigation.

2. The question which remained unanswered above and was posited as incomprehensible: What is the ground of the particular determinedness of the point of reflection (point of individuality)? is now answered in the following manner:

From the mere empty form of knowledge—from the possibility of a knowledge generally—follows the determinedness or the limited seizing itself of knowledge in any simple point of reflection, but only the determinedness *generally* and in regard to the form; and from it follows also the material, as everywhere and altogether the same. There is no *particular* determinedness at all.

And thus it may, perhaps, appear that the original particular determinations in space and in time, which we have nevertheless discovered in contemplation, are also merely formal and figurative, but nothing *in themselves*, nothing which would hold firm to the unchangeable Thinking; and that if, finally, distinctions amongst these individuals should nevertheless be discovered, they can not be grounded in an original Freedom beyond all knowledge, but in a Freedom which is comprehended and understood as such.

§ 3. Knowledge posits itself for itself therefore as an acting power or a tendency, and moreover as a system of acting powers, reciprocally determined and checked, and each determined or checked utterance of which is called a *feeling*.

The last result has removed an undecidedness of our former reflections, and at the same time we have obtained a further progress in the whole synthesis.

The in-itself-resting original contemplation of knowledge found itself (1) *outwardly* as a constructing, line-drawing, in a constructible *space*; (2) *inwardly* and for-itself from the one side as one and the same living *matter*, everywhere penetrated by life and liberty; and (3) and from the other side as lasting a certain time, as passing through a manifoldness of points one-sidedly dependent upon each other: *time*. This was the form of the actually posited inward and outward contemplation, its *That*, and was the immediate result of the positing of formal Freedom. But we could not account for the limitation of the *quantum* in that contemplation; the contemplation did not, therefore, appear, as in itself confined and limited,

and it was only generally asserted that the contemplation must be confined to a necessary limitation; this limitation we temporarily only pictured.

Now this omission has been supplied; through the absolute union of Thinking and contemplation we have demonstrated knowledge—in the individuality-points, in which alone it can be actual—as the absolutely finished, closed and completed result of a reciprocity within this inner manifoldness. It cannot go beyond its own limit whenever it actually seizes itself, and hence also its contemplation is limited as necessarily *its own*, and receives thus the character of empirical reality.

Again: what was designated above in the immediate For-itself-being as *Feeling*, becomes now in the contemplation—which has been united in a synthesis with Thinking, and which is necessarily an original quantitating—*Construction*; and its point of commencement—the very representative of the immediate point of self-seizing or feeling—becomes on that very account absolute, immanent *power*. This power is the found Freedom of constructing absolutely in one *point*, and hence is for the construction its point of commencement. Power is distinguished from mere Freedom as determined Being from general constructing, and as the ground of another Being from the general ground of constructing; it is the *found* (discovered) Freedom which seizes itself in such a point of individuality or of feeling, and hence—in regard to the seizing organ—the absolute synthesis of contemplation and feeling.

We thus have discovered another link for the characterization of empirical knowledge.

1. The Ego is not all (for itself) without ascribing power to itself, for it is Freedom which seizes itself in a *fixed* point; but Freedom is quantitating, and this, fixed in contemplation, is determined quantity. Hence it is impossible to posit power in self-contemplation without a manifestation of this power within this determined quantity, and as itself altogether determined. (We have here again the old synthesis, already known to us, of *Thinking* and *contemplation*, confinedness and determinedness, within a *general* sphere of quantitating.)

2. This manifestation of power, whatever it may be, is altogether originally and immediately found, and hence does not presuppose a prior Freedom in knowledge; nor is it at all an

arbitrary Freedom. For the consciousness of the power is an inseparable component of the absolutely existing knowledge, from which again the contemplation of a manifestation of the power is inseparable. Hence as soon as knowledge seizes itself, this manifestation is already there. (Which manifestation may, perhaps, be an organic one—in short, *organic life* itself.) And thus again, when we (i. e. the Science of Knowledge) elevate ourselves to Thinking, all individuals are equal. They are *all power*, in form; not this or that power. They are the positedness of formal Freedom even as a ready-found Being—and are nothing else at all—which Freedom can be repeated in infinite points, and is everywhere the same.

3. The determinedness of this Being, or of this power, is now altogether only for itself, i. e. in a knowledge existing for itself and confined to itself. But for this determinedness the power is determined not in itself, but only through its manifestations. The whole determined knowledge is therefore a knowledge not of power or powers, but of a system of manifestations of power. But these are determined only in their reciprocity with all others in the universe. By their relation to it, therefore, the power is determined in the same original manner.

4. Now this determinedness is, even if we look only upon the contemplation, a something divisible according to time and space. The Ego, therefore, whenever it seizes itself as determined power, encircles itself necessarily as living and as manifesting itself in a solid, lasting moment (it contemplates itself in the time-life), and also in space, as a *quantum* of everywhere and throughout animated and free matter (the body, the living matter which contemplates itself and is contemplated as Ego in space). But this Ego, in the empirical knowledge of which we speak here, is altogether confined to itself and cannot go beyond itself; hence it cannot also go beyond this contemplation of its time and materiality. However far perception may reach, this fundamental determinedness is its one, immovable basis. The body, thus seized in the original contemplation, remains the same, as sure as the Ego rests upon itself in all perception; and all perception, as sure as it is carried back in contemplation to its principle, its point of commencement, is carried back to the body; *all feeling, contemplation, perception of outwardness, is in reality only the*

self-feeling, self-contemplation of the change which has passed within the body. Moreover: the Ego cannot get out of its own time. This own time of the Ego now is it of which we speak here—not the general time, not the life of the one universe and the passing of events within it; a view to which the Ego can elevate itself only from *its own* time, and by abstracting from its own time. Now, it is very clear that this own time is not perceived, but only thought; it is evidently a conception. But in it is perceived whatever is perceived. *The Ego is confined to itself, and this absolute confinedness determines the character of empirical knowledge:* is a proposition which now signifies, *the Ego is confined to the identity of its body*—I say *identity*, for only from it, from the unchangeable point, can a body be at all comprehended—and *to the subjective, inner identity of its time, or of its time life.*

- § 4. The absolute power of Knowledge in manifesting itself as material *feeling* connects this feeling in perception with matter, and attributes it to matter as its cause.

A. Now, in regard to this individual time, it is important to explain the possibility of a single closed moment of perception within it, and the real significance and contents of this moment; i. e. of a moment *in* the individual time, not of itself, for itself is not perceived, but thought. According to the explanation of the system of knowledge through Thinking, the substance of this moment is reciprocity of the manifestation of my power with the power of the universe. But this manifestation is, in regard to its matter, Freedom; this Freedom is infinite, and if knowledge rested *merely* upon it, it would never become *actual* knowledge. In order to become such, it must tear itself away from it after the manner of Thinking, must seize the infinite Real—picturing it, if I may say so—within unity. This, we have seen, is the form of the law, according to which alone we can explain the occurrence of such a knowledge, completed (closed) within a moment. Hence, in order to make the application at once, the point of the single perception itself must involve a duplicity, the links of which are related to each other as Thinking is to contemplation, and between which, if we divide them in Thinking—this is important—the same absolute *hiatus* lies, which can be filled up by no reflection, but which constitutes the ultimate, the unattain-

able of knowledge, and which we have discovered everywhere between Thinking and contemplation. By the first link, the Ego seizes itself; by the second, it goes out of itself into the world and seizes itself in the world; but there is no Ego without a world, and no world without an Ego.

Now it is clear, and needs not to be recalled, that the Ego does not apply this law here with Freedom, since it is altogether confined in itself; only we, from our super-actual standpoint, explain it by that law which has been demonstrated in its universality. In the Ego itself it is thus, and if it were not thus there would be no knowledge; this determinedness of knowledge is precisely the Being of knowledge itself in *this* moment, or in *this*, &c. Without this Being of knowledge even our questions about it would be without sense.

This, for the present, merely to explain the possibility of such single moments. Next, it was important to deduce from some one point, as necessarily connected with it, others—nay, an infinite succession of other points. If this is not done, knowledge is never explained from itself and comprehended in itself; an occult quality is always necessary, from which to derive a new time, after having used up the present moment.

This, according to the foregoing, is easy, and explains again what we have just said. For in every moment the contemplation floats over an infinite: but, in order to seize it in *actual* contemplation, it must determine it, must limit it in a closed moment; actual contemplating and limiting is one. But this limiting is at the same time only a determining *within* the infinity. Thus *Thinking* is added to contemplation in an equally primitive manner; and this law of eternal reciprocity between contemplating and Thinking, a limiting and a positing of infinity, results in a never-to-be-completed infinity of single time-moments, joined together in a line. The solidity of time is derived not from limitation and closedness, but from the infinity which has been absorbed into it.

Originally there is a *series of Thinking* within the one matter of knowledge: within Freedom and quantitating. If this series of Thinking itself is *thought*, then the entire, infinite series is comprehended. But when it is *contemplated* actually, and hence *realiter* and limited, then you have *empirical knowledge*. The individualities also are such a line—not, however,

like the former one, reposing in contemplation, and *productions* of that original synthesis of contemplation and Thinking—but the infinity of that synthesis, which on its part finds its unity and basis in absolute Being, realizes and actualizes itself in those individualities.

2. Let us now drop that which in these thus described moments of perception carries the form of contemplation, and let us consider the form of identity. How, then, do the discrete moments of time hang together? Precisely in the thinking of time generally as the law of knowledge; but, as a *flowing* infinity, one-sidedly dependent upon each other. The Ego therefore, in its own self-contemplation, is in the same original manner confined to their *succession*; this succession in its partial determinedness can be no further explained or demonstrated as necessary. The law says only that some succession is necessary. (The fundamental character of empirical knowledge, or of pure perception in time-succession.) In every moment a further time is appropriated by Thinking and contemplation, and thus room is made in advance for concrete perception and a sphere prepared for it; but it cannot be ascertained by deduction what will fill up this time. This will be known only when that time shall have come, for the progressive development of the existing Ego extends into it. An actual perception is something altogether *new* for the perception itself, and can never be discovered *a priori*.

Hence so much is clear respecting the formal character of this knowledge: it is the altogether *immediate* knowledge, the knowledge which constitutes the time-being of him who knows: a Being which is simply knowledge, a knowledge which is simply Being; which, therefore, in itself isolated and discrete, is in every way primitively determined, and can, therefore, be neither actually nor genetically explained;—in one word, that which language terms most properly the *Feelings* (in the plural and *κατ' ἑξῆς*) red, green, &c. That these feelings are the result of the reciprocity between each individual and the universe is what knowledge asserts when explaining itself. But how the forces of nature accomplish it, and in accordance with what rule and law they manifest themselves precisely in this manner, this no one will ever be

able to say, and this is the very absolute *hiatus* already described. Nor shall any one ever desire to say it; for, if he did, his knowledge would have been extinguished, and hence he would not say it. At the same time, it must not be understood so, as if the forces of nature manifested themselves in these feelings; both are nothing in themselves, and both are simply the relation of knowledge to absolute Being, which can never be comprehended in contemplation and facticity.

3. One other chief characteristic: The discrete within time—the series of actual feelings—is, according to all we have previously said, a mere absolute knowledge, altogether as such. Again, it is an empirical unity; it is *my* knowledge, connecting for me through time, and through nothing else: I am this my knowledge, and this my knowledge is I. There is no other I, no general I. The significance of this knowledge in *Thinking* (if thinking goes beyond it and explains it) is, that it is the knowledge of my Being in the universe. This it is to-day as it was yesterday, and it will be in all eternity in the same manner. What, then, is changed by the progress of my knowledge? It progresses through a chain of links dependent on each other one-sidedly: it is only formal; hence it can be changed only in its *form*, not in its *matter*, which remains the same. But the pure form of knowledge in regard to quantifiability is *clearness*. Hence by its progress it increases in clearness, which it expands over the knowledge of the universe; but this gradation is infinite.

Contemplation externalizes however, and transfers upon an objective universe what lies concealed in the Ego in the ground-form of contemplation; this is known from what we have said before.

B. Having described the formal character of perception, let us now review the entire synthesis artistically. Its inner central point, the focus of knowledge, is, in form, a material feeling. This is in *Thinking* (on no account in the immediate *perception*; hence, for the present, we only know of it, but itself knows nothing of it yet) a manifestation of the absolute power of the Ego. This power is the substance of the Ego, its own, inner nature, in which knowledge reposes forever; the manifestation is accident, but only *formaliter*; it can be, or not be; but if it is, it is necessarily that mani-

festation which it is, for it is determined by its unchangeable relation to the universe.

a. Altogether the same synthetical form appears here which we met in the highest synthesis of substantiality: as the one knowledge is related to absolute Being, i. e. as its formal accident, thus individual knowledge is related to the Being of individuality, which itself is, as we know well enough, nothing but the Being of the one knowledge, finding itself actual in an infinite number of points of concentration.

b. The power, I said, is the substance of the Ego; it is always, whether the manifestation is or is not;—not in itself, however, for, unless each of these links in the synthesis is, there is no knowledge; but only after knowledge has developed itself, and thinks itself, is this power to be presupposed by every determined manifestation (which can and cannot be).

c. The entire synthesis is produced in Thinking; hence only through Freedom. The actual knowledge can be, therefore, though this Thinking is not. Knowledge itself reposes in feeling, and this is the first absolute point which must be if an actual knowledge is to be.

The material feeling is for the knowledge which compresses itself into a moment and seizes itself within it (and which, in so far as it is quantifiable, can progress infinitely in clearness)—a mere pure Being—of the Ego in immediate feeling, of the universe in contemplation.

Let this latter point be noted. True, it has been sufficiently demonstrated and explained by the foregoing, but its importance deserves some additional remarks. We know that in contemplation the contemplating intelligence loses itself: hence, in spite of the contemplation, there is in it no Ego at all; and only in the feeling does it seize *itself* in the form of Thinking. Now consciousness rests neither in the one nor in the other, but in both. Hence, if the material feeling (red, sour, &c.) is viewed from the one side as affection of the Ego, and from the other side as quality of the Thing, this duplicity itself is already a result of the dividing reflection. In actual knowledge, which no reflection can reach, it is neither the one nor the other, but both; both, however, inseparable and still undistinguishable; and in consequence of this absolute identity the distinguishing reflection must also posit both as

inseparable. No subjective feeling, no objective quality, and *vice versa*. (To speak strictly, therefore, the internal is not transferred upon the object, as transcendental Idealism may have expressed itself in opposing dogmatism, nor does the objective come into the soul; but both are thoroughly one. The soul, taken objectively—the feelings—is nothing but the world itself; and the world, with which we have to deal here, is nothing but the soul itself.)

The contemplation, which we are now discussing, is a constructing of space=matter. Hence, the feeling, as quality, is melted together with the matter—i. e. with a matter in the compact, ever-reposing space—but excluded from the matter in which I live (from my body). For, the former *I perceive*; my materiality, however, I do not perceive, but only think, as the *terminus a quo* of all perception. (Here again it appears why no individual can mistake anything outside of himself for himself, since the perceived matter is always outside of him.) But it is a constructing with a *quantum* of matter, since the infinity must be compressed by the form of thinking into a unity. Thus matter is here the bearer of the quality, which is its accident.

(There are in knowledge a number of places where dogmatism can be altogether refuted and idealism plainly proved. This is one of them: Is matter to be altogether perceptible to the feelings, even inwardly? I evidently assume this. How, then, do I know it? Not by particular perception; hence by the law of perception generally. I must have penetrated matter in my knowledge at once with the thought of perceptibility, as its continual *substratum*. Matter, therefore, is a *conception*, and is based upon the Thinking of a *relation*.)

This as a characteristic of contemplation in regard to space and matter; now the same in regard to time. The power of the Ego manifests itself only in an absolutely determined time-succession, that is, as determined by the fundamental character of time, namely: to admit only a succession of moments which are dependent upon each other one-sidedly. Evidently each new moment is a new, previously not known, character of the determined power; the power, as a determined power, is, therefore, seized by consciousness only in the progress of time, ever *clearer* and more and clearer. Entirely

clear it would be recognized only through the completion of the infinite time, which in reality is impossible, but can here well be thought figuratively. The contents of all the moments of the lifetime is, therefore, determined by the fundamental character of this power, and their succession, by the enlightenment which knowledge gets of this character. *Such* a time lies therefore in *such* a being, which knows of itself in an immediate manner. Another being, if it were possible, would give other time-contents and another time-succession. Only in pure Thinking is Being compressed into one point; in empirical knowledge it receives a time-character, which as such is altogether and irrevocably determined.

Hence in all possible time lies hidden the only possible true Being, which, however, has not yet become completely clear to itself, but has attained only a certain degree of clearness; and this Being bears at every moment that degree of clearness which is possible (and hence necessary) from the character of the time passed before it, and the time awaiting it in an infinite future.

§ 5. The absolute power of Knowledge cannot be thought as manifesting itself in a material feeling without being contemplated therein, and hence extended into a *direction* of feeling, and thus apprehended as *Impulse*.

The substance of the former reflection was, in its true significance, a manifestation of power, considered as a point in time. Its picture is the construction of a line. From every point an infinite number of lines are possible, according to the infinity of possible directions, and the actual line depends altogether upon the direction, and is itself that direction actualized.

1. The Ego, which takes hold of itself, is a point within the everywhere extended space. It cannot manifest itself except in a direction. Now, this direction is everywhere and altogether a determining of a point; but the point is the picture of the Ego. The direction, therefore, is to be considered as necessarily grounded in the Ego, or the direction is itself the Ego of the contemplation. The Ego is contemplated only in it, and by means of it as its directing power. In this knowledge of the direction lies the focus of contemplation in our new synthesis. We must at present proceed to describe it (a) in regard to its substance, and (b) in regard to its form.

a. So far as its substance is concerned it has altogether the form of a line within space, of the progressing from one point and through it to another point. Freedom, however, is in the whole line; i. e. the possibility that in each point the direction, and hence the line, may cease or change into other infinite directions. A consciousness of infinite *constructibility*, and, with regard to the actually constructed, of the *accidentality* of the same.

b. In regard to its *form*, the synthesis is a curious, and in its results, which will soon appear, very important compound of *contemplation* and *Thinking*. For if in *each* point the Freedom of direction, the taking hold of and continuing the line (for this is the intrinsic part of this contemplation) were thought, we should never arrive at a line. It is therefore necessary to assume a forgetting of self in the contemplation in order to be able to explain the concretion of the line; but it is equally necessary to assume a self-comprehension in the contemplation, a thinking within it, and a going beyond it, in order to give it the *direction*, without which it also would be no line. Hence both are necessarily united; it is a contemplating Thinking, and a thinking contemplation. In the reflection it is divided, and then we have not the one if we have the other, although the being held together of both beyond the reflection forms the real character of that conception.

(No direction, without a permanent manifold, which is not included in the direction at all; and *vice versa* no manifoldness for the Ego without direction. Thus here also real and ideal ground fall together and are one.)

2. We shall now develop the synthesis in its further connection. The Ego, of which we speak, is confined to itself—is a *Being*. The taking hold of the direction is therefore in the same manner immediate and actual, as we have described the character of empirical knowledge to be. Every one calls this Acting, i. e. altogether in a physical point of view. The picture of it is a *continued determining* of the given construction of matter through Freedom, i. e. here through material force and motion. Further than this no material acting reaches, and the ground of it is hidden here: it is a separating and external reuniting of matter, but never an organizing of matter from within, which latter is the character of the

original construction. Let it be well understood, I do not say that acting in itself takes place, for this is wrong, but that a knowledge of a real acting is the condition of all knowledge, and is in the present synthesis the lowest focus of all knowledge.

3. The Ego is in the empirical standpoint altogether tied down to its Being; but its Being, its discovered and discoverable Being, is nothing else than the result of its reciprocity with the universe, or it is itself the universe in one of its original points of penetration. A ground is posited in the Ego, means, therefore, the same as if we said: it is posited in the world. Indeed, only here does an Ego first enter knowledge; but this Ego is here nothing but the thought of the mere positedness of formal Freedom, of the *That* without any *What*; it is an objective, empirical, by no means pure Thought; it is an altogether empty, formal Ego, without any reality as yet. Hence, what we said just now: that contemplation and Thinking are here united in a peculiar manner—the Ego not positing itself in all points as giving the direction, but being swept along—receives here a more extensive and highly important significance. Its Freedom is altogether only its thought; the direction is contained in its *Being in the Universe*. The existing, actual Ego (as it ought to be called, since it is an empirical, real acting) gives itself the direction, or this point of Being in the universe *has* the direction: both statements mean altogether the same. Only the glance, the self-comprehension of knowledge, is matter of absolute Freedom, as has been exhaustively shown; if this were not, there would be no direction either, and no manifestation of power, and it would be impossible to speak any more about anything at all. But if this glance is, then the *direction* is there at the same time in its complete determinedness, and everything else which results therefrom. The manifestation of the original power, of which we have just spoken, unites, therefore, in an equally immediate manner with that glance; and hence that glance is—I believe it is called so—the feeling of an *impulse*, and its substance also is unchangeably determined by the Universe. Impulse, or the substantial in relation to an accident, it is only in so far as from its mere formal positedness, the *formaliter* free knowledge, does not follow as yet (this may join

it or not, and hence it is accidentence)—but on no account as if it could proceed in this or in a contrary direction (to a or to $-a$), which would be contradictory, and is one of the absurdities which have been ascribed to transcendental Idealism. Only in this opposition is it impulse; united with the reflection (the formal knowledge), it becomes an empirical physical acting, as we have described it.

Result.—I act never, but in me acts the universe. But in reality this does not act either, and there is no acting; I merely view as acting the doing of the universe, in the reflection of the same, as Ego. Hence, also, there is no real, empirical Freedom—i. e. within the limits of the empirical. If we desire to attain Freedom, we must elevate ourselves to another region.

(How greatly has the Science of Knowledge been misunderstood when it said, “We must start from a *pure acting*,” a proposition which, in our present exposition, is still of the future; and when this was supposed to mean the perishable acting which we carry on commonly—gathering stones and scattering them.)

4. Thus the universe, as the sphere of empirical knowledge, is still further determined, and we will at once make the application. This universe is a living system of impulses, which continues to develop itself in an infinite time in all the points, where it is seized by a knowledge according to a law contained within its own being, and which carries within it, it is true, the possibility of a knowledge, but on no account knowledge itself. (Here again we find a chief point of distinction, or rather a result from the one point which distinguishes the true idealism of the Science of Knowledge from Spinozistic* systems. In these latter systems empirical Being is assumed to carry knowledge within itself, as a necessary result, as a higher degree of it. But this is against the inner character of knowledge, which is an absolute originating, an originating from the substance of Freedom, not of Being; and shows the want of an intellectual contemplation of this knowledge. The same relation of knowledge to Being which has been discovered in absolute knowledge and Being—i. e. that the former has only an accidental Being in relation

* Alluding to Schelling's System.

to the latter as yet, is its accident, arising from the absolute (which, therefore, might also *not* be) realization of Freedom;—must everywhere and in every form remain the same. In empirical knowledge, we make the material world itself absolute Being, and with perfect justice, but the philosophical standpoint is to be a higher one, and is to be the transcendental standpoint.

5. We add the following remark:—The impulse expresses the mere Being, without any knowledge as yet; hence it is mere nature. The latter is expressed in a material body, in the form of space as form of body. It is organic manifestation. Only through Thinking does the point enter, and the form of construction from it, the form of a line. Now it is true that this is the only possible *immediate* mode of acting of the intelligences; but it has its ground simply in the form of knowledge. This is, therefore, only another view of the organizing form of body, and both are one beyond the Factual. The mechanical (we will call it so to distinguish it from the other) and organic manifestations are in themselves not different, but they are merely a duplicity of view. There is no mechanical action except through organic (evermore organically renewing itself) power—*real ground*; and again, no organization can be comprehended except through a picturing of the mechanism—*ideal ground*. Both are related like contemplation and Thinking, and each is inseparable from the other, and is the each-other-presupposing, double-point-of-viewing, the so-often-referred-to knowledge—*κατ' ἐξοχήν*.

KANT'S SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTALISM.

By A. R. KNOX.

II.

The second book of the Critic of Practical Reason treats of the Dialectic of Practical Reason, the first book, or the Analytic, having developed the principle of Practical Reason as well as the application of that principle in the empirical world. That application, or the object of that principle, was there:

shown to be the promotion of the Good. The dialectical principle of theoretical reason, therefore, which persists in connecting the conception of the unconditioned to an object of reason raises this conception of the Good to that of the Highest Good. The Highest Good, however, is a conception which involves two distinct determinations, namely, that of virtue, or Doing the Good, and that of happiness, or Enjoying the Good, and hence a dialectical conflict of opposites. Now if the conception of the Highest Good were an analytical one—that is to say, if the above two determinations were joined in it by a merely *logical* connection, then the dialectic in that conception could be easily solved by showing it to be a mere word-dispute; and the famous opposition of the Epicureans and Stoics, whereof the former said, "To be conscious that our principles lead to happiness is virtue"; whereas the latter replied, "To be conscious of our virtue is happiness,"—would have been nothing more than such a word-dispute. For as they did not consider virtue and happiness to be two utterly distinct determinations of the one conception of the Highest Good, their whole difference was one of words: the one calling the Highest Good virtue, and the other calling the Highest Good happiness.*

But the conception of the Highest Good is a *synthetical* conception—that is, a conception wherein two, lower, conceptions are *really* (and not merely logically) united; and hence stand not in the relation of identity but in that of causality to each other. The Epicureans and Stoics, therefore, instead of assuming that the endeavor to become virtuous and the endeavor to become happy were identical, ought to have regarded either the endeavor to become virtuous as of necessity (through causality) conferring happiness, or the endeavor to become happy as of necessity conferring virtue. For neither virtue alone nor happiness alone constitutes the Highest Good, but both in their real union constitute it.

The antinomy which results from the fact that the conception of the Highest Good is such a synthetical conception, is this one:

* Strange to say, even at this day most of our disputes are merely such word-disputes, and the result of mistaking analytical for synthetical conceptions.

Either the desire for happiness is the motive impelling virtue—but this is not possible, because such a motive would not be *moral*, and hence could not impel *virtue*—or virtue must be the producing cause of happiness; but this is also impossible, since the practical connection of cause and effect in the sensuous world depends not upon our obedience to the Moral Law, but upon our knowledge of nature and upon a physical power to use nature. Now, since the Moral Law impels us necessarily to promote the Highest Good—not for the sake of the happiness to result therefrom, but for the sake of the unconditioned totality of the object of the Moral Law, of the Good—and since the Highest Good has shown itself to be impossible of realization, it follows that the Moral Law itself is impossible of realization; and hence that it is a mere creation of the imagination and essentially false.

For this antinomy Kant offers the following solution: It is altogether true that the desire for happiness cannot impel virtue, but it is not equally true that virtue *may not be* the productive cause of happiness. True, it may not *necessarily* produce happiness as its necessary effect, but neither is there a reason why it should not. Hence only the first assertion of the antinomy is absolutely false, and the latter only conditionally false. And as it was discovered in the antinomies of Theoretical Reason that although the category of freedom could not be shown to be applicable in a world of natural mechanism, neither could it be shown to be inapplicable in such a world if that world were no longer regarded as a world of appearances but as an intelligible world: so may it now be said that though it cannot be shown that virtue produces its proportionate happiness in the world of nature by natural causes, it is at least quite possible that it may produce that happiness as its effect in so far as that world can also be viewed as an intelligible world wherein such a relation of causality between virtue and happiness may have been implanted by an intelligible creator. Nay, this is all the more possible as the fact of the Moral Law shows that we not only may but must view nature in that two-fold manner, as both a world of appearances and an intelligible world.

It is, therefore, quite admissible because practically possible to desire the promotion of the Highest Good, the whole

antinomy having vanished—as all antinomies vanish when we remember that the world may be viewed as both an appearance and *phenomenon*, that is, as a Non-Ego determining the Ego, and as a thing in itself and *noumenon*, that is, as absolutely determinable through the Ego—and it being thus quite possible to think virtue and happiness as necessarily associated. It is clear that the higher of these two conceptions in the synthetical conception of the Highest Good must be virtue, and that hence virtue may produce happiness as its infallible effect. *May*; that is to say, there is no theoretical reason to prove why it should not, although, to be sure, there is also no theoretical reason to prove why it should. It is only practical reason which demands this necessary connection, and demands it for the sake of the Moral Law. That Moral Law we know to be a fact in us: hence, as sure as that fact is in us, is there in the intelligible world (i. e. in the supersensuous world, independent of time-connection, precisely that world which manifests itself in us as the Moral Law) a necessary connection between virtue and happiness.

Having thus shown that the requirement of the Highest Good is a necessary and thinkable one, Kant proceeds to connect the dialectic conception of the unconditioned with the two determinations of the Highest Good: virtue, or morality, and happiness. It will appear that unconditioned morality presupposes Immortality, and unconditioned Happiness, as its necessary associate, God. For if the unconditioned Highest Good is to be attained through a will determinable by the Moral Law, that will must also be *unconditionally* conformable to the Moral Law. It must be not only a virtuous, but a *holy* will. But in the Analytic it has been shown that no finite rational being can ever attain a perfectly holy will. Hence that requirement can be realized only in the thinking of an *infinite progress* towards the realization of that holiness; and hence such an infinite progress must be assumed as the real object of our will. Kant lays particular stress on the practical use of the insight into such a progress, as once for all doing away with the fantastic and lazy expectation of an undeserved beatitude which degrades the majestic conception of Holiness; and in a foot-note insists that it is even a matter of infinite progress, and hence of continuous endeavor, to keep

fixed in that progress after having once entered upon it, or, in theological language, that no amount of conversion and sanctification can secure perfectly against a relapse.

From this infinite progress Kant argues the immortality of the soul, "*because it is possible only under the presupposition of an infinitely continuing existence and personality of the same rational being*"; which is called the immortality of the soul. Hence the Highest Good, practically, is possible only under the presupposition of the immortality of the soul, and hence the latter, being inseparably united with the Moral Law, is a *postulate* of Practical Reason; that is, it is a theoretical proposition, which, though not provable as such, is inseparably connected with an *a priori* unconditionally valid practical law."

It will be noticed that, however short and unsatisfactory this statement is, it touches the real source of immortality by connecting it with the *will*. It is because the will must become holy that *the same individual* must continue to live. Those persons who attempt to prove immortality from an infinite progress in general culture, or in higher knowledge of God, &c., invariably open themselves to the following refutation: That culture and that higher knowledge can also be attained if there is no immortality, for succeeding generations will take up our culture and knowledge and develop them higher. But no future person can take up my will and unfold and develop it. If my will is to become holier, it is I myself, the individual—for I as individual am precisely my will—who must continue to live.

But the Highest Good is also not attained unless the happiness proportionate to the virtue manifested is invariably secured. "Happiness," says Kant, "is the condition of a rational being in the world, to whom everything happens according to his wish and will." Now, the Moral Law commands unconditionally and regardless of the effect its obedience will produce in nature; hence finite rational beings, in so far as they are dependent upon nature and are not the creators of nature, cannot possibly order things so that things will happen in the world of nature according to their wish and will because they do their duty in the Moral World. Hence there must be postulated a supreme cause having a causality in nature

equal to and harmonizing with the morality manifested, and since such a causality implies *will*, and such a distribution according to a plan, *intelligence*, there must be postulated a Being who by his will and intelligence is the cause of nature: God. As sure, therefore, as there is a Moral Law in us which requires the accomplishment of the Highest Good—a requirement that is not possible unless a God is presupposed—just so sure is it morally necessary to believe in a God. It is on account of this conception of God, Kant adds, that the christian doctrine may be said to be the only one which establishes a full conception of the Highest Good; and it is because the Greeks lacked this conception, that they were never able to solve the problem of the Highest Good. The Greeks never rose from the ideal of the Cynics' *natural simplicity* and that of the Epicureans' *prudence* to any higher than that of the Stoics' *wisdom*, whereas the Christians have the ideal of *holiness*. Nay, by apprehending correctly that synthetic character of the Highest Good, and joining therefore to the conception of the highest morality that of the highest happiness, the Christian doctrine has further risen to the apprehension of a Kingdom of God, which *shall* come, "wherein nature and morals will be made to harmonize in a harmony utterly foreign to each by itself, through a holy originator."

Freedom, Immortality, and God, are, therefore, the three great cognitions which have been secured to reason by its practical function as an activity; and this result having been reached, it may be well to recapitulate the different kinds of proof whereby reason has throughout both Critiques attained its various cognitions.

Theoretical reason takes hold of a certain system of sensations given to it—or of an Ego determined by a Non-Ego—and proceeds to unite the manifold of those sensations into a unity for the purpose of perception. It appears that reason in thus uniting that manifold, or in making perception possible, can do so only in the forms of time and space, and in a certain triplicity of relation: the categories. Hence all the proof which theoretical reason furnishes for its cognitions run in this wise: *If experience or sensuous consciousness is to be possible, then this or that must be.*

Hence, also, theoretical reason applies only to experience,

or to the objects of the empirical world which appear in consciousness; in short, to appearances, or *phenomena*.

Practical reason, on the other hand, takes hold of no limitedness, of no Ego determined by a Non-Ego; *of no object, therefore, to which theoretical reason could apply*. It, as the higher function and basis of the intelligence, rests altogether upon itself; and the only cognition, therefore, which it utters is the immediate one of its own absoluteness and self-determination, its positive freedom, or the Moral Law. Upon this freedom all knowledge rests; and, to state the matter concisely: all reason is nothing but this absolute freedom; theoretical reason being merely the result of its making *visible* itself unto itself. Hence higher than any fact or cognition of theoretical reason stands this absolute fact of the Moral Law in us.

But this Moral Law, not in itself, but *in its application to the empirical world*, may and must again become the object of theoretical reason; from which fact arises the singular phenomenon that theoretical reason nevertheless applies its categories to the object of the Moral Law: the Highest Good. In this application theoretical reason postulates in an analogous manner as it does in its application to empirical objects: *If the Moral Law is to be possible*, then the immortality of the soul and a God must be assumed.

There is, therefore, no distinction between the manner in which reason grounds its cognitions of immortality and a God and the manner in which it grounds its cognition of cause and effect, for instance. The mode of argument is in each the same. But because the former objects are grounded upon an absolute immediate fact, and the latter upon a mediated knowledge of an external object, we call the cognitions of immortality and a God *Faith*, and only the latter cognitions we call knowledge. It is well to make this remark and call attention to this distinction in the character of the cognition to avoid word-disputes, and to cut off once for all idle and anthropomorphistical speculations concerning the Deity.

The Critic of Practical Reason concludes with these memorable words: "Two things fill the soul with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the oftener and longer the mind busies itself with them: *the starry heavens above me and the Moral Law within me.*" Both of

these I need not hunt up, or suppose concealed in darkness or in the region of phantasms beyond my vision: I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins at the place which I assume in the external sensuous world, and extends the connection, wherein I move, into that immensity of worlds above worlds and systems of systems, wherein the eye loses itself; and, moreover, into unlimited times of their periodic movement, of their beginning and duration. The second begins at my invisible self, my personality, and represents me in a world which has true infinity, but is apprehensible only to reason, and wherewith (and thereby at the same time with those other worlds) I recognize myself—not as there in a merely accidental—but in a universal and necessary connection. The first beholding of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an *animal creature*, which must return the matter from which it was formed to its planet (a mere point in the universe), after having been endowed with life for a short time, no one knows how. But the second, on the other hand, elevates my worth as an intelligence infinitely, through my personality; wherein the Moral Law reveals to me a life altogether independent of the world of animals, and even of the whole sensuous world, at least so far as may be presumed from the proper determination of my existence through this law, which is not limited by the conditions and limits of this life, but extends into the Infinite.”

Reason, as a practical faculty, posits itself as absolute. As a theoretical faculty it posits itself as limited. The synthesis of this thesis and antithesis is, as we have seen: precisely because reason posits itself as an absolute acting *for itself* does reason posit itself as limited. It could not be an intelligence if its absolute activity were not checked. This checkedness of its absolute activity it cannot, of course, ascribe to itself, since the conception of itself is that of an infinite activity, and hence cannot include the contradiction thereof; therefore it ascribes the check to a Non-Ego. The immediate consciousness of the check is that original system of sensations upon which all theoretical cognition is based. These sensations the Ego throws out as not belonging to it, and thus objectivates them in space, taking them in again and bringing them to consciousness in time. It relates them to each other under

the thought forms of quantity, quality and relation, and thus rises to a cognition of what it beholds as an external world. This cognition appears and must appear to it as altogether fixed and determined; hence as without freedom or the possibility of freedom. Nevertheless the Ego must become conscious of itself as absolute and positively—not merely negatively—free, if it is to become conscious of itself as Ego. Hence there must be for the Ego another mode of viewing itself than as a merely theoretical function. This other mode is the manifestation of a practical power, of an absolutely self-determined activity. But the question arises: How can the Ego entertain these two diametrically opposed views? How can it view the universe as a connected piece of mechanism, and yet also view itself as an absolute free activity interfering in it?

The answer to this question gives rise to the Critic of the Power of Judgment.

It is evident that the Ego could not posit itself as Ego if this two-fold view of the universe were not possible; and that hence there can be no rational being that does not in point of fact view the universe in this two-fold way.

Each rational being, however much he may deny it, does view the universe as not only a system of externalized sensations whereof each one is dependent upon the other mechanically and hence is necessarily what it is, but also as a system of sensations whereof each one *might be* otherwise than it is, or as a system of purposes or designs. In truth, the purely mechanical view of the universe is upheld only theoretically by philosophers (one-sided idealists) like Descartes, Swedenborg, Spinoza, &c., whilst the pretended pure naturalists invariably apply the conception of design; as, for instance, when arguing that because certain plants are produced somewhere, nature *must* have prepared such and such a soil, climate, &c., for them.

It is therefore very true that we may, and indeed should, from a certain point of view, regard* the universe simply

* "Not only does the quantity of force remain the same, however, but likewise the direction of that force,—a point which Descartes had overlooked,—and hence arises the third great principle of the

"*Pre-established Harmony*. For if, in nature, not only the sum of force and its manifestation, but likewise the sum of its directions, must be viewed as always

under the forms of theoretical cognition, that is to say, mathematically under the forms of time, space, quantity, quality, and relation; but it is equally true that this view is only a part-view, and leaves unnoticed a power in us which is quite as much a fact as the power of cognition, namely, the power of absolute acting. That power of absolute acting or the Moral Law in us once admitted—and every rational being does admit it at least secretly to himself—and we can no longer be satisfied to view the world under the forms of theoretical cognition alone, since these forms exclude real freedom, and hence do not permit the thinking of freedom together with that of the objective world. It is, therefore, through the union of the forms of theoretical cognition with the manifestations of freedom, and indeed as the only possible scheme whereby to

remaining the same, only the sum of motion increasing and decreasing in mechanical order, it follows that every movement in Nature, in so far as it has a direction, may be viewed as purely the result of a mechanical force; and since it will be possible to trace it thus to a mechanical source, it will be impossible to prove it to be originated by the self-conscious soul. If every movement of and through our body can thus be explained as the result of the universal mechanical law of motion, clearly "our body operates as if there were no soul in it and our soul as if there existed no body." Hence the possibility of a pure mathematical science of nature, without reference to a God or soul as a power in nature, and of an explanation of all possible phenomena upon mechanical principles.

"But this would exclude all relations between the monads as such, that is, as concentration-points of the pure Ego. No Ego could ever become conscious of itself, if the movements of nature could be explained altogether by the law of mechanics. The Ego could not be for itself an Ego, and, since it is Ego only in so far as it is for itself, could not be at all. The question arises: How can the characteristic of intention or the conception of an end find expression in movements which can be comprehended at the same time as purely mechanical? And the answer is: Absolutely because they can. There is a *harmony* between the world of rational ends and the mechanical changes in nature which makes this possible; and this harmony is absolute, has no external ground. When a rational being sees a piece of material nature which has been moulded for the expression of rational end, that expression makes itself absolutely known to the beholder.* To ask how would be absurd; since, if you could assign a ground, you would be merely pushing a new link between reason and matter, without at all making the relation between reason and the new link clearer. Thus you might continue to ask for a further ground, and insert new links, without at all approaching nearer to the solution. On account of the absoluteness of this relation between mind and matter, Leibnitz usually terms it a harmony; and it is this harmony which shows how we must view the existence of a world of the pure Ego within a world of pure mechanism. The world of mechanism "corresponds," as Swedenborg would express it, to the world of intelligence; or, in Fichte's terminology, the world of nature can be comprehended in its relation to the Ego only as a moral world."—[Extract from article on Leibnitz in the *North American Review* for January, 1869.

* Compare Fichte's *Science of Rights*.

make those manifestations intelligible to our reason, that there arises in us the conception of a World of Purposes, wherein each part is viewed as determined by the other no longer under the causality relation, but under the relation of design; and since this design may be viewed in a two-fold manner, as applicable either to the subject or to the object, there arise the two worlds of *Æsthetics* and of *Designs*—an art-world and a teleological world; both of them being nothing more than the different modes of viewing the Moral World in the World of Natural Mechanism. On the other hand, the fact that we do view the world both *æsthetically* and teleologically proves our freedom.

Reason views itself as absolute in the first manner—that is, by judging upon the conformability of external objects to its own subjective requirements—in all *æsthetical* judgments; since these are all absolute in character, appealing to neither mental nor emotional interest. It is only the agreeable and the good which excite our interest, the first an interest of a pathological and the second an interest of a practical character. But the simply beautiful arouses interest neither in our heart nor head; it neither delights us nor calls for our approval: it simply pleases us, and it pleases for no other reason than because it is beautiful; and, moreover, although our judgment has no *ground* for claiming universality for it, we nevertheless do postulate this universality, and ask all other rational beings to conform to our judgment. This fact that all purely *æsthetical* judgments are of a *thetical* character and at the same time claim universality, prove them to be the products of the absolute character of the Ego, and hence in giving these judgments the Ego necessarily views itself as absolute and free, although it views not its pure moral nature but an objective world.

The question, therefore, “How are *synthetical* judgments *a priori* possible?” which is at the head of the first section of the Critic of the Power of Judgment, *The Analytic*, is answered thus: They are possible because the absoluteness of reason extends even to the objective world. Each individual, as having in himself the fulness of that reason, necessarily presupposes in every other individual the same reason or the same “supersensuous substrate of humanity,” as Kant

calls it, and hence expects the same judgments; of course, however, only so far as that reason is undetermined by individual pathological or practical limitedness, and hence only in regard to objects of pure beauty. Even judgments touching the sublime have, therefore, not this element of universality; for whereas reason views itself as absolute in all pure æsthetical judgments touching the beautiful simply because it pronounces them, thereby positing the object judged upon as adequate to itself and hence as absolute in form, reason views itself as absolute in all judgments touching the sublime in precisely the opposite manner; the sublime being the name for that, to conceive which arouses in us a power of representation to which no sensuous representation can adequately correspond; and to become conscious of this is a subjective condition, which we cannot universally presuppose. The beautiful arouses in us pure pleasure, a sense of adequateness in the external world to our absoluteness, which we must presuppose in all; whereas the sublime arouses a feeling of displeasure, or a sense of the inadequateness of sensuous imagination to the absolute requirements of pure reason—an inadequateness which may be expressed both quantitatively in the mathematically sublime and qualitatively in the dynamical sublime—which we cannot presuppose in all precisely because it has a subjective presupposition.

It lies not within the purpose of this essay to follow Kant through the latter part of the first section of the Critic of Judgment, wherein he elaborates his views on the beautiful and sublime, and on art and art-matters. But it may be well to state that that part constitutes one of the most profound and elegant treatises upon Art-matters—a fit companion to the works of Schiller, Lessing, Winckelmann, and Herder; and a treatise which shows us Kant as a man of the world, eminently susceptible to all the refinements of culture, genial, witty, appreciative, and unbiased.

In the *Dialectic* of the æsthetical power of judgment, the peculiar absolute nature of all pure art-judgments is developed in the following antinomy:

Thesis: A pure æsthetical judgment is not founded on conception (reflection); for else it would be possible to decide upon it by reflective proof.

Antithesis: But it must be founded on conception (reflection); for else it would be impossible to demand universal assent to it, and hence to enter into a dispute if that assent is withheld.

This antinomy, however, is easily solved by joining both propositions together in the following

Synthesis: It is true that a pure æsthetical judgment is founded on a conception; but that conception is the *undeterminable* conception of the pure Ego, and hence admits of no proof or cognition.

Thus through beauty do we behold freedom, and in art enter the realm of absoluteness. Out of nothing does the artist create his work; the ideal is neither seen, heard, nor touched by him. He who painted the transfigured Christ, created out of himself and saw independently of his eyesight; he who wrote the Seventh Symphony, created and heard independently of his hearing. In music this absolute creativeness of the pure Ego is most clearly apparent. The whole art of music is an absolute creation, a new world made by man. Of this freedom and absoluteness every member of rationality becomes conscious in pronouncing an æsthetical judgment; and it is because art and beauty thus develop within us the consciousness of freedom that the culture of our race is so prominently indebted to its artists.

Reason views itself as absolute in the second manner—that is, by judging upon the conformability of external objects to each other—in all objective judgments expressing a purpose or design; because in all such judgments it can view the external world as created for freedom, or as the production of that absolute Ego whereof itself is an individual representation. This view Kant develops in the second book of his Critic of the Power of Judgment, or in the Critic of the *teleological* as distinguished from the *æsthetical* power of judgment.

In the first section of the second book treating of the *Analytic* of the teleological power of judgment, Kant gives the deduction of that power as having its ground in the impossibility to comprehend the universe as simply a mathematical machine, reason being constantly compelled—particularly in every case of organized life—to connect the parts into a whole by the conception of a purpose. This compulsion is evidently

grounded in our freedom, which thus endeavors to comprehend the whole universe as existing for a purpose—namely, for the purpose of freedom itself—freedom or reason being its own end, and in its own absoluteness being simply because it is.

For it is true, that it is explainable why the Ego should be *generally* limited—because the infinite activity of the Ego must be checked in order to be reflected back into it, through which procedure alone reflection can arise;—but it is absolutely not explainable why the Ego should be limited in precisely the manner in which it is limited. In other words, the determinedness of that limitedness is unexplainable; we can well understand why there should be a universe, but not why the universe should be constructed precisely as it is. To be sure, we can (like Spinoza) view the whole matter as a mechanical process, and as the necessary process of the repulsion and attraction of the atoms which fill up the universe; but it is also evident that this is an infinite process, which will never, therefore, explain fully; and that to have a full comprehension we must have another mode of explanation.

This mode of explanation must be one which has its *absolute* ground, and hence one which rests upon the conception of freedom or of the Ego, since the Ego alone is absolutely grounded in itself. Such a conception lies in the conception of purposes. In asking for purposes reason necessarily presupposes itself, and thus it comes that from the teleological point of view the universe is judged to be the production of a design. Hence this judgment has perfect validity, provided we remember its origin and hold it to be merely a necessary manner of viewing, or, as Kant terms it, the result of the peculiar constitution of our reason, but not an actual historical fact. We are compelled to view the organized universe as the result of a design, and hence as accidental and not as necessary; at the same time we know that historically it could not have been made like a work of art after a preconceived pattern. By comprehending the ground of this necessary procedure on the part of our teleological reason, we at once understand also its limitations.

The second section of the second book treats of the Dialectic that occurs in this procedure and finds concise ex-

pression for the difficulty just mentioned in the following antinomy:

Thesis: All generation of material things and their forms must be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Antithesis: Some products of material nature cannot be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Which antinomy is solved in the following

Synthesis: All products of material nature must be judged as if they were *possible* according to merely mechanical laws; but at the same time they may well be thought under another form of relation, namely, that of design. This is not only allowable, but a necessity grounded in reason; nor can it lead to any misapprehension, provided we mistake not a necessary procedure of our intellect for an objective historical fact.

Such a mistake is made when the teleological view of the world is made the basis for a proof of the existence of a God as the maker and arranger of that system of purposes in the world which we ourselves have put into it. This proof, for the reason pointed out, can never have objective validity. We may well and must indeed view the universe *as if* it were created after a preconceived plan—the reason why we must do so has been pointed out,—but we must also be careful not to place this law of the Ego in the shape of an objective cognition and attribute it to an independent Being endowed by us with personality. To do so is unwarranted, and establishes a transcendent dogmatism. Precisely, therefore, as the Critic of Pure Reason warned against applying categories of existence to anything which is not known to us empirically—to God—and as the Critic of Practical Reason warned against going any further than to say, that if we do acknowledge the fact of a Moral Law in us we must assume a God; so does the Critic of the Power of Judgment conclude by warning against the unwarranted assertion, that because we must view the world as if it were created after a plan, therefore it must have been historically created by a God.

It is this manner of keeping that which is a necessary mode of acting of our intelligence from being taken for an objective, i. e. empirical fact, which gives to Kant's system the name of transcendental idealism, and which is the key wherewith to

unlock all the mysteries of the region of thought. Whoever has it in his full possession sees everywhere clearly; for him there is nowhere darkness. The transcendental idealist cheerfully confesses that he can bring no theoretical proof to establish the existence of a God, of Freedom, and of Immortality; but he shows the absurdity of asking such proof by showing that the very nature of that proof is such that it reaches only to empirical objects. But the transcendental idealist shows directly—through pointing out in men the occurrence of a Moral Law—and indirectly—through the fact of æsthetical and teleological judgments—that rational beings not only know themselves free, but must also judge themselves to be free. And it is important to remember that the proofs of God and Immortality are based upon that of Freedom. This explains why, as Kant says: we can have no cognition of God theoretically, as to what he *is*, but only practically, as to what he does. Or, as Fichte expresses it: the conception of God cannot be determined by categories of existence, but only by predicates of an activity. Or, as we stated at the commencement of this article: a Science of Metaphysics as a science of theoretical cognitions of supersensuous objects is impossible precisely because all theoretical cognitions apply merely to empirical objects; but a Science of Knowledge itself is not only possible but even necessary, because upon it rests the possibility of any knowledge. We know of a God and of Immortality because we know of Freedom, and we know of Freedom because if we did not know of Freedom we should not be able to know at all.

In conclusion, it may be well to touch upon a peculiarity in Kant's representation of transcendental philosophy, which at first is apt to confuse the reader, namely, that he seems to distinguish between things as they are for us (phenomena) and things as they are for themselves; as if there really were such a valid distinction, and as if it really were possible for us to assume that in the eyes of other beings things might be different from what they are to us. For it ought to be præeminently clear that as rational beings we can speak and wish to speak of things only as they are *for us* (i. e. for rational beings), and that it is absurd and contradictory to presume that they might be different *really*. They are *really* for us only

that which they appear to be to us, and can never be for us otherwise. A cow is for me a cow; what it is in itself it is nonsense to speak of, since we can speak of it only in relation to something else, and—since speaking is reasoning only in relation to reasoning. In itself—i. e. unrelated to anything else—the cow is nothing; and what it is to the ant, to the horse, to the moon, and to all the *infinite* sensuous objects in the world, it is preposterous to inquire. Hence we can speak of the cow—and so of all things—only in their relation to rational beings, and things are nothing but what they are to reason. There is, however, an ineradicable tendency in the mind to forget this (an illusion Kant calls it), and always to speak as if the world might be otherwise in itself than what it appears to be, and this tendency haunts even Kant's speech. The ground is that reason adds unconsciously—but by virtue of a necessary law of reason—to every phenomenon something which does not belong to the phenomenon—namely, Being; and now assumes this Being to be given to the phenomenon from some outside power merely because itself never becomes empirically conscious of having added that Being itself.*

OUTLINES OF HEGEL'S LOGIC.

[The following compend of Hegel's Logic is translated from the same volume as the "Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology," in our last number. It forms, with the latter, the second year's course of the "Philosophical Propædeutics." It will, we trust, be of good service in familiarizing thinkers with the general features of Hegel's system;—indeed, since it is written by Hegel himself, it is far better adapted for such a purpose than any of those compends given in Cyclopædias and Histories of Philosophy, which without exception distort its more important features. The Outlines here given close the second year's course of the Propædeutics; the third year commences with a more elaborate exposition of the Comprehension (*Begriff*), which indeed forms the centre of Hegel's system. This we hope to give in our next number. The

* See article in Vol. II. of this Journal, "A Criticism of Philosophical Systems," particularly pp. 143-47.

"Philosophical Encyclopædia," or outline of Hegel's entire system, closes the third year's course, and this too may be looked for in the fourth volume of this Journal. We have added notes on important points regarding terminology.—EDITOR.]

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. The Science of Logic has for its object the thinking activity and the entire compass of its determinations. "Natural Logic" is a name given to the natural understanding which man possesses by nature, and the immediate use which he makes of it. The Science of Logic, however, is the Knowing of the Thinking in its truth.

Explanatory.—Logic considers the province of thought in general. The thinking activity is its peculiar sphere. It is a whole (complete sphere) for and by itself. Logic has for its content the determinations peculiar to the thinking activity itself—which have no other ground than the Thinking. The "heteronomical" to it, is what is given to it through representation.¹ Logic is, therefore, true science. A distinction must, of course, be made between pure thought and reality; but thought has reality in so far as *true actuality* is understood by this term. In so far, however, as sensuous external existence is meant by "the Real," Thought has a far higher reality. The thinking activity has therefore a content (namely, itself) through its autonomy. Through the study of Logic we also learn to think more correctly; for since we think the Thinking of Thinking, the mind increases thereby its power: We learn the nature of the thinking activity, and thus we can trace out the course in which it is liable to be led into error. It is well to know how to give an account of one's deed. Thereby one gains stability, and is not liable to be led astray by others.

§ 2. The thinking activity is, in general, the apprehension and bringing together of the Manifold into unity. The Manifold as such belongs to externality in general—to feeling and sensuous intuition.

1. *Note by Tr.*—"Representation" (German, *Vorstellung*) with Hegel signifies a mere notion or mental picture which is devoid of universality and necessity—that which should characterize true scientific Thinking.

Explanatory.—The thinking activity consists in bringing the Manifold into unity. When the mind thinks upon things, it brings them into simple forms, which are its pure determinations. The Manifold is, at first, external to the Thinking. In so far as we merely seize the sensuous Manifold, we do not yet “think”; but it is the *relating* of the same that is properly called Thinking. The immediate seizing of the Manifold we call *feeling* or *sensation*. When I feel, I merely know somewhat; in “intuition” [*Anschauung*], however, I look upon something as external to me in space and time. Feeling becomes “intuition” when it is determined in space and time.

§ 3. The thinking activity is *Abstraction* in so far as intelligence, beginning with concrete intuitions, neglects one of the manifold determinations, selects another, and gives to it the simple form of thought.

Explanatory.—If I neglect *all* the determinations of an object, *nothing* remains. If, on the contrary, I neglect *one* and select *another*, the latter is then abstract. The *Ego*, for example, is an abstract determination. I know of the *Ego* only in so far as I exclude all determinations from myself. This is, however, a negative means. I negate the determinations of myself, and leave myself as such, alone by myself. The act of abstraction is the *negative* side of the thinking activity.

§ 4. The *content* of representations [*Vorstellungen*=notions] is taken from experience, but the *form of unity* itself, and its further determinations, have not their source in the Immediate² as such, but in the thinking activity.

Explanatory.—The *Ego* signifies, generally, the thinking activity. If I say: “I think,” this is something tautological. The *Ego* is perfectly simple. The *Ego* is a thinking activity, and that always. We could not say, however: “I always think.” Though *potentially* so, yet what we think is not always *actually* Thought. We could however say, in the sense that we are *Ego*’s: “We always think,” for the *Ego* is always the simple identity with itself, and this simple identity with itself is Thinking. As *Ego*, we are the ground of all our determina-

2. Note by Tr.—Immediate=direct object. Thus the sensuous world is spoken of as immediate. In general, that which is most simple, most empty, most undeveloped, is “immediate.”

tions. In so far as the object is thought it receives the form of thinking and becomes a thought-object. It is made identical to the Ego, i. e. it is thought.

§ 5. This must not be understood as though this unity was added to the Manifold of objects by the thinking activity, and thereby the act of uniting was done externally; but the unity must be conceived as belonging likewise to the object, and as constituting with its determinations the proper nature thereof.

§ 6. Thoughts are of three kinds: (1) The Categories; (2) Determinations of Reflection; (3) Comprehensions.* The science of the first two constitutes the objective logic in metaphysics; the science of Comprehensions (concepts or notions) constitutes the proper or subjective logic.

Explanatory.—Logic contains the system of pure Thinking, Being is (1) the Immediate, (2) the Internal; the determinations of Thinking go back again into themselves. The objects of the common system of metaphysics are the *Thing*, the *World*, *Mind*, and *God*, through which the different metaphysical sciences arise: Ontology, Cosmology, Pneumatology, and Theology. (3) The Comprehension (concept, notion, or idea) presents us with what is *existent* and at the same time *essential*. Being stands in relation to essence as the Immediate to the Mediate. Things *are* in general, but their Being consists in this: that they manifest their Essence. Being goes over into Essence; one can express it thus: "Being presupposes Essence." But although Essence, in comparison with Being, appears as that which is *mediated*, yet Essence is the true Primitive, notwithstanding. Being goes back, in it, into

3. *Note by Tr.*—"Comprehension" (German, *Begriff*) signifies the necessary unity of determinations which belong to a whole. "Concept" or "conception" is too subjective, in its ordinary acceptance, to serve as a translation of Hegel's term "*Begriff*." A "concept" may be a mere "representation" (*Vorstellung*), i. e. arbitrary notion; but Hegel's "*Begriff*" is an *organic unity* of Universality, Particularity, and Individuality. "*Bestimmter Begriff*," as Hegel uses it in his *Logic*, is properly "concept" or "notion." The term "comprehension" has been adopted in this sense by Mr. Brockmeyer in his translation of Hegel's *Complete Logic*, and though it sounds strangely in some of its connections, it more readily than any other word suggests the *exhaustiveness* of the process in which the Manifold is grasped in unity. *Idea* and *ideal* have also been used to render the sense of *Begriff* in English: "Something is adequate to its *Begriff*," i. e. to its *ideal* or true definition, what it *ought to be*.

its ground; Being cancels⁴ itself (takes itself up) into Essence. Its Essence is in this form a *Become* or *Produced*, but what appears as "Become" is rather the Original or Primitive. The Perishable has in Essence its basis, and originates from it. We make comprehensions (i. e. exhaustive concepts). These are somewhat *posited* by us, but they contain also the Reality in and for itself. As compared with the comprehension, Essence in its turn is a "mere posited," but "the posited" in this relation still stands for the true. The comprehension is partly subjective, partly objective. The IDEA⁵ is the union of Subjective and Objective. If we say, "It is a mere conception (*blosser Begriff*)," we mean that it is without reality. The mere Objectivity is devoid of the comprehension. But the Idea is the reality determined through the comprehension. Everything actual is an IDEA.

§ 7. Science presupposes that the separation of itself from Truth is already-cancelled, or that the mind is no longer in a phenomenal stage as it was in the *Science of Consciousness* (Phenomenology of Spirit). The certitude of itself comprehends all that is object of consciousness (whether it be an external thing, or a thought produced in the mind), in so far as it does not contain in itself all moments⁶ of the *Being-in-and-*

4. *Note by Tr.*—"Cancel"—to annul as an independent something and yet to preserve as a dependent element. (German, *Aufheben*.) In its mathematical sense "cancel" is used of magnitudes which reduce each other to zero—mutually annul or suppress each other—and therefore become indifferent to the equation. In its commercial sense, a "cancelled" note or bond has still positive value as a receipt or discharge from the debt. The term "cancel" in this sense has been adopted by Mr. Brockmeyer in the work before alluded to. Other equivalents for this word, in various shadings, are these: Annul (Stallo and others), set aside (J. E. Cabot), abrogate (J. S. Sibree), abolish, repeal, transubstantiate, translate, transmute, sublate (J. H. Sterling), nullify, revoke, neutralize, subordinate, subdue, subjugate, vanquish, conquer, overcome, absorb, dissolve, swallow up, overwhelm, rescind, transmerge, subvert, destroy, submerge, "take up into," suppress, "do away with," "reduce to moments" (which is its exact signification). The Greek term is *ἀναίρεσις*.

5. *Note by Tr.*—The Idea—the absolute existing Comprehension of comprehensions; Perfect Being, i. e. Being which is in nowise deficient, but whose entire potentiality is realized. (For the distinction between Comprehension and Idea—stated in a popular form—the reader is referred to Chap. VII., Introduction to Philosophy, Vol. I., p. 236, of this Journal.)

6. *Note by Tr.*—"Moment" (German, *Moment*)—"Reciprocally complemental element" (as translated by Seelye from Schwegler's paraphrase of the term). That which is "cancelled" is reduced to a moment, i. e. has lost its immediate and independent first phase, and has sunk into a constituent phase or element—as acid and alkali, e. g., become moments of salt.

for-itself: (1) to be *in itself*, or simple identity with itself; (2) to have determinate Being or determinateness, Being for others; and (3) to be *for itself*, i. e. in its relation to others to be simple, reflected into itself, and by itself. Science does not *seek* Truth, but is *in* the Truth, and *is* the Truth itself.

PART FIRST.—BEING.

First Division—Quality.

§ 8. Quality is the immediate determinateness, whose change is the transition into a Different.

A.—Being, Naught, Becoming.

§ 9. Being is the simple empty immediateness which has its opposite in *pure Naught*, and whose union therewith is the Becoming: as transition from Naught to Being, it is Beginning; the converse is Ceasing.

(The "sound common sense," as one-sided abstraction often calls itself, will not admit the union of Being and Naught. "Either it is Being, or it is not. There is no third." "What *is*, does not begin; what is not, is *not*." It asserts, therefore, the impossibility of Beginning.)

B.—Determinate Being.⁷

§ 10. Determinate Being is *become* or *determined* Being, a Being which has a relation to another—hence to its non-being.

§ 11. (a) Determinate Being is, consequently, a somewhat divided in itself: *firstly*, it is *in-itself* (i. e. potential); *secondly*, it is relation to others. Determinate Being, thought with these two determinations is *Reality*.

7. *Note by Tr.*—Determinate Being: (German, "*Daseyn*," whose literal meaning is to be *present*, to be there or here.) It is equivalent to particular Being. Although it is frequently translated "Existence," and in several respects agrees with that word in signification, yet Hegel uses it to signify mere qualitative determinateness, while "Existence" is generally used in a more concrete sense, and involves quantity and other determinations as well as quality. The proof of the Being of a God ("*Beweis vom Daseyn Gottes*," as Hegel calls it in his *Philosophy of Religion*) may be called proof of the *existence* of God, or of the "determinate Being" of God. The loose use of the category of Being in English has allowed it to usurp the whole province of "*Daseyn*"; but for the sake of precision the latter term will be called *determinate* Being in this translation. It is a point worthy of profound consideration that the English, and Southern European nations have used the expression for a concreter mediation=Existence, where the Germans have used a more abstract one=determinate Being.

§ 12. (b) A somewhat which is definite has a relation to another. The "other" is a definite Being as the non-being of the somewhat. It has, consequently, a boundary or restraining limit and is finite. What a somewhat ought to be in itself, is called its Destination* (determination).

§ 13. The mode in which a somewhat is for another, or in which it is connected with another, and hence immediately posited through another, is called its *state or condition*.*

§ 14. The mode in which a somewhat is *in-itself*, as well for itself as for another, is its *determinateness or quality*. The limit is not only the point where the somewhat ceases, but it belongs to the somewhat in itself.

§ 15. (c) Through its quality, through *what* it is, the somewhat is exposed to CHANGE. It changes in so far as its determinateness comes into connection with another and thereby becomes state or condition [*Beschaffenheit*].

C.—Being For-itself.¹⁰

§ 16. Inasmuch as the "state or condition" is cancelled through change, change itself also is cancelled. Being, consequently, with this process, has gone back into itself and excludes otherness from itself. It is FOR ITSELF.

§ 17. It is ONE, and relates only to itself, and stands in a repellant relation towards others.

§ 18. This excluding is at the same time a *bringing-into-relation* to others, and hence it is likewise an *attracting*. No Repulsion without attraction and *vice versa*.

§ 19. Or, with the act of repulsion on the part of the One, many ones are immediately posited. But the many ones are not distinct from each other. Each one is what the other is. Hence their cancelling, i. e. their attraction, is likewise posited.

8. *Note by Tr.*—Destination: (German, *Bestimmung*, which must be translated "Determination" ordinarily.) It means nearly the "proper sphere," and is also nearly the same as "nature" in the phrase "true nature of a thing."

9. *Note by Tr.*—State or condition=(German, *Beschaffenheit*) "the being shaped or fashioned through the action of external influences and relations." "Condition" is rather more concrete and involves more mediation than *Beschaffenheit*, which here is used in the qualitative sense of "fixed state."

10. *Being-for-itself*, literal translation of "*Für-sich-seyn*"=Independent Being. For the deduction (in a reflective form) of this category, see Introduction to Philosophy, chap. 4, vol. 1, Jour. Sp. Phil., p. 119, in which place it is called "Independent Being."

§ 20. The One is the "Existent-for-itself," which is absolutely distinct from others. But since this distinction (in which Repulsion is cancelled by Attraction) is the distinction posited as cancelled, for that reason it has passed over into another determination—QUANTITY.¹¹

("Somewhat" without limits has no meaning. If I change the limits of a somewhat, it remains no longer what it is; if I change the limits of a field, it still remains a field as before though somewhat larger or smaller. In this case I have not changed its limits as field, but as a given quantity. To change its qualitative limit as ploughed field means, e. g., to make it a forest.)

Second Division—Quantity.

§ 21. Through quality a somewhat is *what* it is. Through change of quality, there is changed not merely a determination of the somewhat—or of the Finite—but the Finite somewhat, itself changes. Quantity, on the contrary, is the determination which does not constitute the nature of the object itself; it is rather an "*indifferent* distinction," which may be changed, while the object remains the same.

§ 22. Quantity is the cancelled Being-for-itself (or One). It is, therefore, an unbroken CONTINUITY in itself. But since it contains the One, moreover, it possesses also the "moment" of DISCRETENESS.

§ 23. (A) *Magnitude* is either *continuous* or *discrete*. But each of these two kinds of magnitude contains discreteness AND continuity in it; and their difference is this only, that in the discrete magnitude, it is Discreteness which constitutes the main principle, while in the continuous it is Continuity.

§ 24. (B) *Magnitude* or *Quantity* is as limited quantity, a "*Quantum*." Since this limit is nothing fixed in its nature, it follows that a "*quantum*" [i. e. a given quantity] can be

11. *Note by Tr.*—Note that Quantity is suggested by the complete grasping (comprehending) of Quality, Quality or "whatness" can only be through the self-determination of a somewhat, and such a somewhat is called a Being-for-itself or independent Being. But such determination is not merely the *ceasing* of the somewhat in its other, but likewise its *continuation* into its own externality, and this is Quantity precisely.

changed indefinitely; it can be increased or decreased at pleasure.

§ 25. The limits of the "*quantum*" in the form of "Being-in-itself" give INTENSIVE quantity; and in the form of externality give EXTENSIVE quantity. But there is no intensive Being which does not likewise at the same time possess the form of extensive Being; and conversely.

§ 26. (C) "*Quantum*" has no in-itself determined limit. There is, hence, no quantum [given quantity] beyond which a larger or smaller cannot be posited. The "*quantum*" which is, by hypothesis, the *last* one—the one which has no greater or no smaller (as the case may be)—is generally called the infinitely great or the infinitely small [Maximum and Minimum].

§ 27. But in this shape it ceases to be a "*quantum*" at all, and is by itself = 0. It has then significance only in a RATIO wherein it no longer possesses any magnitude by itself, but only in relation to another. This is the correct comprehension (conception) of the MATHEMATICAL INFINITE.

§ 28. The Infinite in general, when seized in the form of the Infinite Progress, is the process of cancelling the restraining limit whether it be qualitative or quantitative, so that this restraining limit passes for something positive, and continually reappears after its negation. The true Infinite, however, is the NEGATION OF NEGATION, inasmuch as the restraining limit is to be understood as really a negation. In it the progress beyond the Finite does not posit again a new restraining limit, but through the cancelling of the restraining limit, the Being is restored to identity with itself.

§ 29. While the "*quantum*" cancels itself in the Infinite, in the same process the indifferent, external determination which constitutes the "*quantum*" is cancelled and becomes an internal, a *qualitative* determination.

Third Division—Measure.¹²

§ 30. "Measure" is a SPECIFIC QUANTUM in so far as it is not external, but is determined through the nature of the object, through quality.

12. *Notes by Tr.*—Measure (German, *Maass*) is the reciprocal relation of Quality and Quantity. The word "measure" is used here in the sense of "due proportion," "proper extent," "the measure of its capacity."

§ 31. In the change of a "quantum," in its increase or decrease, which goes on within its "measure," there enters likewise a specifying process, in which the indifferent, external movement of magnitude up and down the scale, is determined and modified through the nature of the thing itself.

§ 32. When the "measure" of a thing is changed, the thing itself changes and ceases to be the particular somewhat that it was, through the passing beyond its "measure,"—increasing or decreasing beyond it.

PART SECOND.—ESSENCE.

§ 33. Essence is Being which has returned from its immediateness and its indifferent relation to others into simple unity with itself.

First Division—The Determinations of Essence in Itself.

§ 34. Essence (*Wesen*) appears to itself (*scheint in sich selbst*) and determines itself. But its determinations are in unity. They are only "posited-being," i. e. they are not immediately for themselves, but only such as exist in unity. They are therefore RELATIONS. They are "determinations of Reflection."

§ 35. (1) The first determination is the essential unity with itself—IDENTITY. Expressed as a proposition—namely, as a universal determination—it is the proposition " $A=A$," "everything is identical with itself"; negatively, as the proposition of contradiction: "A cannot be at the same time A and not-A."

§ 36. (2) The second determination is DISTINCTION¹³ (*a*) as the determination of DIFFERENCE—of Beings indifferent to each other, but distinguished through some determinateness or other. The proposition which expresses it, reads: "There are no two things which are perfectly identical with each other"; (*b*) as the determination of OPPOSITION (*antithesis*), the positive against the negative, in which a determinateness is posited

13. Note by Tr.—Distinction (German, "*Unterschied*"), which has also the meaning of "difference" in some instances. In this translation "*Verschiedenheit*" is translated "difference" in the sense of "diversity." For an exposition of Hegel's doctrine of Distinction, see Introduction to Philosophy, chap. IX. p. 51, Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. II.

only by means of another determinateness, and each of these determinatenesses is only in so far as the other is, but at the same time is only in so far as it is *not* the other. The proposition through which this is expressed reads: "A is either B or not-B, and there is no third."

§ 37. (3) The third in which the posited determinations are cancelled in general is Essence, which is, in this phase, GROUND.¹⁴ The proposition of Ground reads: "Every somewhat has its sufficient (reason or) ground."

§ 38. In so far as immediate Being is regarded as a merely "Posited," it has gone back into essence or into its ground. The former (i. e. Being) is here the first—that from which we started. But in this "going back" we retract that position, and recognize the ground rather as the first and essential.

§ 39. The Ground contains that which is grounded through it according to its essential determinations. But the relation of the Ground to the grounded is not a pure transition into the opposite, although the grounded existence has a different shape from its ground, which is likewise an existence, and the chief determination is their common content.

Second Division—Phenomenon.

A.—Thing.

§ 40. The Ground, through its internal determination, posits its Being, a Being which, as proceeding from the Ground, is EXISTENCE.

§ 41. As a totality of its determinations, the existing somewhat is a THING.

§ 42. The properties of a Thing are determinations of its existence which are different from each other, but at the same time independent of each other; and moreover a Thing is, as simple identity with itself (undetermined and) indifferent towards them as determinations.

§ 43. The determinations are through the *thingness* identical with themselves, and the Thing is nothing but this identity of its properties with themselves. Through this circum-

14. *Note by Tr.*—Ground (German, *Grund*)=cause or reason. In the expression, "He has reasons for his conduct," "reasons" are "grounds" in the sense here spoken of.

stance, the Thing dissolves into its properties, as into matters which subsist for and by themselves.

§ 44. Since, however, the "matters" are united in the unity of a thing, they interpenetrate each other reciprocally and cancel each other. The Thing is consequently this contradiction in itself, or it is posited as a mere self-dissolving, as Phenomenal.

B.—The Phenomenal.

§ 45. Essence has gone out of *Ground* into *Existence*. The Existing, posited as not in-and-for-itself, but as grounded in another, ~~is THE PHENOMENAL~~. Essence *must* manifest itself in so far as it is, as ground, simple immediateness, and hence ~~Being in general~~.

§ 46. On account of the Identity of the Ground and the Existing, there is nothing in the *Phenomenal* which is not in the Essence, and conversely nothing in Essence which is not in the Phenomenal.

§ 47. (The identity with itself in the Phenomenal is the Undetermined, the determination of mere CAPACITY—the PASSIVE MATTER. The identity of determinations in their relation to each other, constitutes the ACTIVE, the FORM. Since Matter is determined by Form, the two presuppose each other as self-existent and independent of each other. There is however, in general, no Matter without Form and no Form without Matter. Matter and form give rise to each other reciprocally.) The essential relation in the determinations of the Phenomenal is the LAW thereof.

§ 48. Since the determinations manifest themselves also in the form of independent existence, the Relation of the same as being determined through each other constitutes the mutual Relation. [*Verhältniss*].¹⁵

15. *Notes by Tr.*—"Verhältniss" is the behavior of one side of a relation as conditioned by the other. "Conduct" is sometimes a good equivalent for it. There is reciprocity in it, and neither side exists except in the relation. In Quantity "*Verhältniss*" is translated by the technical term "*Ratio*." Here it means that close, reciprocal relation which exists between "Whole and Parts," "Force and Manifestation," "Internal and External." "To stand in relation," and "state of relation," seem the best equivalents for "*Verhalten*" and "*Verhältniss*" in some cases, but here "Mutual Relation" is chosen as the most appropriate term.

C.—Mutual Relation.

§ 49. The **MUTUAL RELATION** is a relation to each other of two sides which have partly an indifferent subsistence, but partly each is only through the other and in this unity which determines both.

§ 50. The determinations are posited first in the form of mutual relation, secondly they are only in themselves, and manifest themselves as independent, immediate Existence. They are in this respect presupposed somewhat and internally, already in themselves, contain the totality of form, which can have existence only through that presupposition; or they are in so far conditions, and their mutual relation is a conditioned mutual relation.

§ 51. In the conditions and the conditioned mutual relation, the Phenomenal begins to return into Essence and Being-in-itself, but there exists still the difference of the Phenomenal as such, and the former (Essence, &c.) in so far as they are "*in themselves*."

§ 52. (1) The immediately conditioned Mutual Relation is the **WHOLE** and the **PARTS**. The parts as existing outside of the Relation, and subsisting for themselves, are mere matters, and, in so far, not parts. As parts they have their determination only in the whole, and the whole is what makes them to be parts, and conversely it is the parts that make it to be the whole.

§ 53. (2) The whole, as internally active Form, is **FORCE**. It has no external matter as its condition, but is in the matter itself. Its condition is only an external "occasion" which solicits it. The latter is itself the utterance of a Force and demands in turn a solicitation for its manifestation. It is a reciprocal conditioning and being conditioned, and this is as a **Whole**, therefore, unconditioned.

§ 54. According to content, Force exhibits in its utterance that which it is in itself, and there is nothing in its utterance which is not in its Internal.

§ 55. (3) The content is consequently, in respect to the distinction of Internal and External, unconditioned. It stands in mutual relation as internal, only to itself as external. The external and internal are therefore the same, only considered from different sides. The internal is the perfection of content-

determinations as conditions which themselves have determinate existence. The becoming-external is the reflection of the same or the uniting of the whole, which through this receives existence.

Third Division—Actuality.¹⁶

A.—Substance.

§ 56. Substance is the unconditioned, in-and-for-itself-subsisting Essence in so far as it has immediate Existence. (*Substantia est—causa sui: id quod per se concipitur sive cujus conceptus involvit existentiam.—Spinoza.*)

§ 57. In its existence it has manifold determinations distinct from it=ACCIDENTS. In their Totality they constitute substance, which is the subsistence, and hence the POWER of its Accidents.

§ 58. The accidents, in so far as they are contained in the substance, are POTENTIAL.

§ 59. When anything is thought merely in the form of "Being-in-itself," or as not self-contradictory, it is called potential (possible). Everything in so far as it is determined as a Being-in-itself which is only a posited, is called *merely* potential. Such a Possibility, isolated from the Actuality, has an individual content.

§ 60. *Truly* potential is somewhat as a totality of its in-itself-existent determinations. Whatever possesses this internal perfect potentiality is not merely a posited-being, but in-and-for-itself and immediately *actual*. The potentiality of substance is, therefore, its actuality. (God, e. g., is not *only* in general but truly potential. His potentiality is a necessary one. He is absolutely Actual.

§ 61. The combination of accidents in the substance, is their necessity. It is the unity of Possibility and Actuality. Necessity is blind in so far as the combination is merely an internal one, or in so far as the actual is not previously extant as an in-itself-existent unity of its determinations, but results first from the relation of the same.

16. *Note by Tr.*—For the exposition of the idea of Actuality, see Introduction to Philosophy, chap. VIII., Jour. Spec. Phil., vol. I, p. 239.

B.—Cause.

§ 62. Substance manifests itself in the origination and vanishing of its accidents. It is in so far active, or CAUSE.

§ 63. As Cause, substance makes its original content into EFFECT, i. e. into a "posited through another."

§ 64. There is nothing in the effect which is not in the cause, and the cause is cause only in the Effect.

(It is said: the fall of a brick is the cause of the death of a man: the miasma of a region is the cause of fevers. But the former was the cause only of the blow, the latter only of excessive moisture. But the effect in an actual existence which has other determinations, besides, continues to other results.)

§ 65. Cause passes over into effect. Since the cause itself has a definite content and is to be posited as effect, we obtain a regress of causes and effects in an infinite series. Conversely, in so far as that upon which the effect takes place is itself a primitive, it is a cause, and produces an effect in another, through which a progress *ad infinitum* results.

C.—Reciprocal Action.

§ 66. In so far as the effect returns to the cause, it is itself cause. It makes the cause a Posited. It is REACTION. "Action and Reaction are equal."

§ 67. The Reaction takes place against the first cause, which consequently is posited as effect, through which nothing else happens except that it is posited as it is in itself, namely, as a not truly original (primitive) but as a *Transitory*.

§ 68. Reciprocal action consists in this: that which is effect is conversely cause, and that which is cause is conversely effect. Or the reciprocal relation is the mediation of the Thing with itself, in which the Primitive determines itself or makes itself a Posited; and therein reflects itself into itself, and exists first as this reflection into itself, and is therein true Primitiveness.

APPENDIX.—THE ANTINOMIES.

§ 69. The categories, the determinations of Being are simple; but the determinations which do not constitute the primitive elements, i. e. the determinations of Essence, are simple

only in so far as their antithetical moments are reduced to simplicity. Whenever such a category is predicated of a subject and is developed through the analysis of those antithetic moments, the two are predicable of the subject, and there arise antithetic propositions, both of which have equal truth.

§ 70. Kant especially has drawn attention to the Antinomies of Reason, although he has not exhausted them, since he has made an exposition of the forms of only a few.

I. The antinomy of the Finitude or Infinitude of the world in regard to Space and Time.

(1) The antinomy in respect to Time.

(a) THESIS: The world has a beginning in Time.

§ 71. *Proof*: Let one assume that the world has no beginning in respect to time; then, up to any given point of time, an eternity has elapsed, and consequently an infinite series of successive conditions of things in the world. The infinitude of a series consists, however, in this, that it can never be completed by successive synthesis; therefore an infinite series of conditions in the world is impossible; hence a beginning of the same in time is necessitated.

(b) ANTITHESIS: The world has no beginning in time, and is infinite in respect to time.

§ 72. *Proof*: Let one suppose that it had a beginning, then there would be assumed an empty time before that beginning—a time in which the world was not. In an empty time, however, nothing can originate, for in it there is no condition for existence, since one Being always has another as its condition, i. e. is limited by finite Being only. Therefore the world can have no beginning, but every determinate Being presupposes another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

§ 73. The proof of this antinomy, when reduced to a brief form, becomes the following direct antithesis:

(1) The world is finite in respect to time; i. e. it has a limit. In the proof of the thesis such a limit is assumed, namely, the Now, or some one given point of time.

(2) Determinate Being has a limit, not in determinate non-Being, in empty time, but only in a determinate Being. The self-limiting somewhats are also positively related to each other, and the one has the same determination as the other. Since, therefore, each determinate Being is limited, or each is

a finite one, i. e. such a one as must be transcended ["passed beyond" in the act of defining it], it follows that the "Progress into infinity" is posited.

§ 74. The true solution of this antinomy is this: Neither is the mentioned limit something true for itself, nor is the Infinite spoken of, a true somewhat for-itself; for the limit is of such a kind that it must be transcended, and the Infinite spoken of is merely that to which the limit continually arises. The true infinitude is the REFLECTION-INTO-ITSELF, and Reason contemplates not the temporal world, but the world in its essence and idea.

(2) The antinomy in respect to space.

(a) THESIS: The world is limited in respect to space.

§ 75. *Proof*: Let one assume that it is unlimited; then it is an infinite given Whole of co-existent things. Such a whole can be viewed as completed only through the synthesis of the parts there contained. For this completion, however, infinite time is required, which must be assumed as already elapsed, which is impossible. Therefore an infinite aggregate of existing things cannot be viewed as a co-existent given whole. The world is accordingly not infinite in space, but included in limits.

(b) ANTITHESIS: The world is unlimited in respect to space.

§ 76. *Proof*: Let one assume that the world is spatially limited, then it finds itself in an empty unlimited space; it would, therefore, have a relation to this empty space, i. e. a relation to no object. Such a relation, however, as that of the world to empty space is nothing; therefore, the world is spatially infinite.

§ 77. The proofs of these antithetic propositions really rest on direct assertions.

(1) The proof of the thesis refers the completion of the co-existent totality or the spatial world, to the succession of time in which the synthesis must occur and be completed; and this is partly incorrect and partly superfluous, for in the spatial world precisely it is not of *succession* but of *co-existence* that one may speak. Furthermore: when an already elapsed infinite time is assumed, a Now is assumed. Likewise in space a Here is assumed, i. e. a limit in general to

space, from which afterwards the impossibility of its illimitableness can be deduced.

(2) Since the limits in space are in general to be transcended, it follows that the negative of the limit is posited; and since it is essentially a negative of the limit, it is conditioned through it [through the limit]. Hence the infinite progress is posited in the same form as in the previous antinomy.

II. The antinomy concerning the simplicity or composite nature of substances.

(a) THESIS: Every composite substance consists of simple parts.

§ 78. *Proof*: Let one assume that composite substances consist *not* of simple parts. If, now, all composition or combination were annihilated in thought, then there would be no composite part, and, since there is also no simple part, nothing would remain, and accordingly no substance would be given. Consequently it is impossible to annihilate all composition in thought. But the Composite does not consist again of substances, for composition is only an accidental relation of them, and substances must subsist as enduring entities without composition. Therefore the substantial Composite consists of simple parts. It follows hence that things in the world, without exception, are simple entities, and that composition is only an external condition of them.

(b) ANTITHESIS: No composite thing consists of simple parts, and there does not exist anywhere anything simple.

§ 79. *Proof*: Let one assume that a composite thing consists of simple parts. Inasmuch as all external relation, consequently all composition, is possible only in space, then the space which includes it must consist of as many parts as the composite consists of. Now space consists, not of simple parts but of spaces. Therefore every part of the composite must occupy a space. But the absolutely primary parts of all composites are simple. Therefore the simple occupies space. Now since everything real which occupies space contains a manifold whose parts are external to each other and is consequently composite, it follows that the simple is a substantial composite—which is self-contradictory.

§ 80. The proof of the thesis contains the direct assertion

that composition is an external relation, or something contingent; hence the Simple is the Essential. The proof of the antithesis rests likewise upon the direct assertion that substances are essentially spatial, and hence composite. In itself this antinomy is the same as the previous one, namely, the positing of a limit and then the transcending of the same, a process which is involved in the comprehension of determinate Being.

III. The antinomy concerning the antithesis of Causality according to natural laws and freedom.

(a) THESIS: Causality according to natural laws is not the only causality in the phenomena of the world; there is also a Causality of Freedom.

§ 81. *Proof*: Let one assume that there is no other Causality than according to the laws of nature; it follows that everything which happens, presupposes a previous condition from which it proceeds according to an invariable rule. Now that previous condition itself must have happened, since if it always had existed, its effect must have always existed. Therefore the Causality through which something comes to pass is itself a something which has come to pass, and which again presupposes a previous condition and its causality, and so on *ad infinitum*. There is therefore, at any given time, only a relative and no first beginning; and hence, in general, no completeness of series on the part of the connected causes. The law of nature consists, however, precisely in this: that nothing happens without an efficient *a priori* cause. Therefore the proposition that all causality is possible only according to natural laws refutes itself, and natural laws cannot be assumed as the only ones.

(b) ANTITHESIS: There is no freedom, but everything in the world comes to pass solely according to the laws of nature.

§ 82. *Proof*: Let one assume that there is freedom, to-wit, a power which can absolutely originate a state or condition, and consequently a series of results thereof, then not only the series is originated through the spontaneity, but the determination of this spontaneity itself is thus originated in such a manner that nothing can precede, through which this action is determined according to fixed laws. Each origination of

an act, however, presupposes a state or condition of the cause which is not as yet active, and a dynamical first beginning of the Act presupposes a state which has no causal connection whatever with the preceding state of the cause, i. e. which in nowise results from it. Therefore freedom is opposed to the laws of causality and such a combination of successive conditions of active causes—according to which no unity of experience is possible, and which therefore can never be met with in experience—is an empty fiction of thought.

§ 83. This antinomy, abstractly considered, rests upon the antithesis which the causal relation has in itself. Namely, the cause is: (1) an original cause, a first, self-moving cause; (2) but it is conditioned through something upon which it acts, and its activity passes over into the effect. In so far, it is to be viewed as nothing truly original but as a "Posited." If the first side is held fast, an absolute causality is assumed, a causality of freedom; but according to the second side the cause becomes a something that has happened, and with it an infinite series of conditions is posited.

§ 84. The true solution of this antinomy is RECIPROCITY: a cause which passes over into an effect has in this again a causal Reaction, by which means the first cause is reduced in turn to an effect or to a "Posited." In this reciprocity, consequently, is involved the fact that neither of the two moments of causality is for itself and absolute, but that it is only the *entire circle*, THE TOTALITY, that is in and for itself.

IV. (a) THESIS: An absolutely necessary Being belongs to the world.

§ 85. *Proof:* The sensuous world, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains at the same time, a series of changes. Every change stands under its condition, under which it is necessary. Now every Conditioned in view of its existence presupposes a perfect series of conditions up to the absolutely Unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. Therefore something absolutely necessary must exist, if change shall exist as its result. This necessary somewhat itself, however, belongs to the sensuous world; for, assume that it exists outside of it, then the series of changes in the world would derive their origin from it, and yet this necessary cause

itself would not belong to the sensuous world. Now this is impossible; for since the beginning of a series in time can be determined only through that which precedes it in time, the ultimate condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in a time when this series did not as yet exist; hence this ultimate condition belongs to time, and consequently to phenomena or to the sensuous world; therefore there is in the world itself something absolutely necessary.

(b) ANTITHESIS: There exists no absolutely necessary Being, neither in the world nor outside the world, as its cause.

§ 86. *Proof:* Let one assume that the world itself, or something in it, is a necessary entity (Being), then in the series of its changes there would be a beginning which was unconditionally necessary and consequently without cause, and this contradicts the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena. Or else the series itself would be without a beginning, and though in all its parts contingent and conditioned, yet on the whole absolutely necessary and unconditioned, which is self-contradictory, for the reason that the existence of an aggregate cannot be a necessary one if no single part of it possesses necessary existence. Furthermore, let one assume that there is an absolutely necessary cause of the world which is outside of the world: then it would begin the existence of the changes in the world and their series; since it must begin to act, its causality would belong to time and hence to the sum total of all phenomena, and hence not be outside of the world. Therefore there is neither in the world nor outside of it any absolutely necessary Being.

§ 87. This antinomy contains, on the whole, the same antithesis as the previous one. With the Conditioned a condition is posited, and indeed a condition *as such*, or an absolute condition, i. e. one which has not its necessity in something else. Since, however, it is in connection with the Conditioned, or since the Conditioned lies in its comprehension (or complete definition), it belongs itself to the sphere of the Conditioned, or is a Conditioned itself. According to the former side, an absolutely necessary Being is posited, but according to the latter only a *relative* necessity, and hence *contingence*.

PART THIRD.—COMPREHENSION.

§ 88. The science of the Comprehension (concepts), or subjective logic, has for its object the Comprehension, and not the Categories, and determinations of Reflection. The Category posits Being in a determinateness as limit; Reflection posits essence in a determination which is mediated through the presupposition of another. The Comprehension [conception?], on the other hand, is the in-and-for-itself Existent, the simple totality out of which all its determinations flow.

§ 89. Subjective logic treats of three chief objects; (1) the Comprehension, (2) the Final Cause, (3) the Idea; namely: (1) the formal Comprehension, or the Comprehension as such; (2) the Comprehension in relation to its realization or its Objectivity (the Final Cause); (3) the Idea as the real or objective Comprehension.

First Division—The Comprehension.

§ 90. Formal Logic contains (1) the comprehension as such, (2) the judgment, and (3) the syllogism.

§ 91. (1) The COMPREHENSION contains the moments of *individuality, particularity, and universality*. Individuality is the negative reflection of the comprehension into itself, through which something is in-and-for-itself, and the determinations as moments inhere in it. Universality is the positive, not excluding, unity of the comprehension with itself, which contains the opposite in itself, so that it remains indifferent and undetermined toward it. Particularity is the relation of individuality, and universality to each other. It is the Universal reduced to a determination; or, conversely, the individual elevated into universality.

§ 92. As these determinations are distinguished from each other as moments of the Comprehension, so are they distinguished by the different content they may have, as comprehensions of something universal, something particular, and something individual.

§ 93. The Universal subsumes or includes the Particular and Individual under it. The individual has the same, and at the same time several more, determinations than the Particular and Universal. Likewise the same relation exists on the part

of the Particular toward the Universal. What, therefore, possesses validity with regard to the Universal, possesses validity for the Particular and Individual; and what is valid of the Particular is valid of the individual, *but not conversely*.

§ 94. The particular determinations which belong to the same Universal are COÖRDINATED to each other. The same thing applies also to those which belong to the same individual. But those determinations which are coördinated in a Universal cannot be coördinated in one individual.

§ 95. (2) In the JUDGMENT the implicit unity in which the moments are grasped together in the comprehension, is cancelled. It (the judgment) is the *relation* of the determinations of the Comprehension in so far as each is valid by itself as a self-subsisting and consequently as a particular comprehension.

§ 96. The Judgment contains: (1) the subject as the side of individuality or particularity; (2) the predicate as the side of universality, which is at the same time a determined universality, or also particularity; (3) the simple relation (devoid of content) which the subject has to the predicate, is the COPULA.

§ 97. The species of Judgments indicate the different stages in which the external relation of subject and predicate becomes an internal relation of the comprehension. The subject is, *first*, in immediate identity with the predicate—the two are one and the same determination of content; *secondly*, they are distinguished one from the other. The subject is a more complex content than the abstract predicate, and is in regard to form contingent.

§ 98. (3) In the Judgment two determinations of the Comprehension are related immediately to each other. The SYLLOGISM is the Judgment with its ground. The two determinations are connected in the Syllogism by means of a third which is their unity. The Syllogism is, therefore, the perfect positing of the Comprehension.

§ 99. According to determined form, the two extremes of the Syllogism are the Individual and the Universal; the Particular, on the contrary, for the reason that in it these two determinations are united, is the middle term of the same. If a determination A belongs to the determination B, and the

determination B belongs to a determination C, then the determination A belongs to C.

§ 100. The relation of the two extremes (*termini extremi*) of the syllogism to the middle term is a two-fold one, and forms two judgments (*propositiones præmissæ*), each of which contains the moment of particularity—the middle term (*terminus medius*). The one premise contains, moreover, the extreme of universality (*terminus major*) as predicate (*propositio major*); the other contains the extreme of individuality (*terminus minor*) as subject (*propositio minor*); the relation of the two extremes is the third judgment; the inference (*conclusio*), “conclusion,” is mediated.

Second Division—The Final Cause, or Teleological Comprehension.

§ 101. In the Final Cause, that which is mediated, or the Inference, is at the same time *immediate*, *first*, and *ground*. The Produced, or that which is posited through mediation, has the act of producing and its immediate determination for presupposition, and conversely the act of producing happens on account of the result which is the ground, and hence is the first determination of the activity. The teleological act is a syllogism in which the same whole is brought into unity (its objective form with its subjective form, the comprehension with its reality) through the mediation of teleological activity, and the Comprehension is ground of a reality determined through it.

§ 102. External conformity to end exists in so far as a somewhat possesses the comprehension through which it is determined, not in itself, but is subordinated to it by another subject as an external form or relation.

§ 103. Internal conformity to end is this: an existence possesses its comprehension in itself and is at the same time its own object and means—self-realizing and self-realized final cause in itself.

Third Division—The Idea.

§ 104. The IDEA is the unity of the Comprehension and Reality, the comprehension in so far as it determines itself and its reality, or the Actuality which is what it ought to be, and contains its comprehension itself.

§ 105. (1) The idea in so far as the comprehension is united with its reality immediately, and does not directly distinguish itself from, and elevate itself out of it, is LIFE. The same exhibited as *physical* and likewise *spiritual* life, and freed from all the conditions and limitations of contingent existence is the BEAUTIFUL.

§ 106. (2) In the Idea of COGNITION and PRACTICAL ACTIVITY is the reality of the Comprehension; or the Subjective is opposed to the Objective and their union is brought about. In *Cognition* Reality lies at the basis as the *first* and as *Essence*; *Practical Activity*, on the other hand, makes actuality conform to the Comprehension so that the good is produced.

§ 107. (3) The ABSOLUTE IDEA is the content of SCIENCE, namely, the consideration of the universe, as it is in conformity with the Comprehension in-and-for-itself [*"sub specie aternitatis"*], or the rational Comprehension as it is in-and-for-itself, and as it is in the objective or real world.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S ÆSTHETICS.

Translated from the French of M. Ch. Bérard, by J. A. MARTLING.

LYRIC POETRY.—A. What gives birth to epic poetry, is the pleasure experienced in the recital of an action which, foreign to us, evolves itself under our eyes and forms a complete whole. Lyric poetry satisfies a totally opposite want, that of expressing what we feel and of contemplating ourselves in the manifestation of our sentiments.

In order to determine more precisely its nature and general character, we must consider it in its *content*, in its *form*, and in the diverse *modes of its development*.

1°. The content of lyric poetry is the human soul—its sentiments, its individual situations, its joys, and its sorrows. The subjects which it treats have much less extent than those of epic poetry; but if it cannot lay claim to epic breadth, it has the advantage of producing itself at all epochs of national development, while the epic belongs always to primitive times. Among the ideas which form the content of lyric poetry, we

find, in the first place, the most exalted and most general idea in the beliefs and the imaginations of a people. Then come subjects of a more particular character, thoughts individual, but profound, and mingled with general interests, with maxims, with reflections upon the progress of the world and upon human destiny. Finally, we see individual sentiment expressed in its most intimate and most personal characteristics and relations, subjects of very little importance (which must be relieved by the talent and genius of the poet), the most fugitive impressions, the outcry of the heart, the swift flashes of joy, all the shades of sorrow, the troubles of the soul, its aspirations and its melancholy, all the degrees of the scale of sentiment, find place in turn in lyric poetry. Nay, more; the novelty and freshness of ideas, surprising turns of thought, piquant phrases, and all the happy turns of the imagination, are so many sources from which it draws its inspiration.

2°. As to the form which it affects in opposition to other varieties of poetry, it seems to us from this side also to be essentially personal. It is yet man as individual, with his own imagination and sensibility, which constitutes the centre of his productions. All emanates from the heart and soul of the poet. All depends on his disposition and his particular situation. Thus the unity of his work is less the result of the subject matter of which it treats than of the point of view at which he places himself. His own thought is its proof and support. But it is necessary that this be really poetic, that it spring from a rich imagination and a soul full of sensibility. Thereby the lyric poem presents a unity wholly different from that of the epic.

Nevertheless, before arriving at the true and definitive form of lyric poetry, it is necessary to pass through many degrees which mark the transition.

Such are the *heroic odes* and the *primitive romance*, which yet belong in part to the epic. Here the subject is epic, the manner of treating it, lyric. *Epigrams*, not as simple inscription, but with an expression of sentiment added—*epitaphs*, *couplets*, present this double character. One should also mention *descriptive recitals*, and the *romance*, which retrace the various scenes of an event with isolated and hasty strokes,

and in which sentiment is mingled with description, and ballads, which in smaller proportions than the epic poem sketch the image of an event in its essential features.

But lyric poetry appears to us under its true form and with the personal character which distinguishes it, only when each real circumstance furnishes to the poet the occasion of developing his own thought, and when inspired with the situation he makes us partake of his impression and his enthusiasm. Such are the songs of Pindar. The games and conquerors are for him, in fact, only occasion for uttering his thought, his reflections, and all which he has in his soul. It is the same with the greater part of the odes of Horace.

The principal condition consists in assimilating the subject completely, and in using it as a text with which to express his own thoughts. In completely blending the facts with the ideas, the poet shows, by the manner in which he exhibits them, that it is the free movement of his thought and the expression of his sentiment which is the principal object.

Thus, that which gives unity to a lyric poem is not the occasional circumstance which forms the subject of it; it is the internal movement of the soul of the poet and his particular mode of conception.

The true lyric poet has, indeed, no need of seeking a text; he can find in himself the principle and motive of his inspirations, confining himself to the internal situations, the events and passions of his own heart. The man becomes a work of art to himself. The epic poet has need of a foreign hero; for the lyric poet, the hero is himself.

But precisely because of this unlimited liberty which characterizes this variety of poetry, it is not necessary to fancy that it may be permitted to the poet to say everything. Under his impress the most fugitive things ought to appear solid and true thought, living and profound sentiment. Otherwise one falls into an insipid and wearisome style. The music of language, singing for the sake of singing, words void of sense, are not poetry. Even the title of light poetry is not an excuse, and does not make ideas unnecessary. Besides, nothing is more difficult than to succeed here. Great poets alone know how to disguise profoundness of sentiment under lightness of form.

3°. If, meanwhile, we consider lyric poetry in its relation to the *intellectual development* of peoples, it is easy to see that if primitive times are the flourishing period of the epic, the times most favorable for lyric poetry are those where the social relations have received a fixed form, since then alone man is disposed to reflect upon himself, still without detaching himself from the true interests and ideas of his nation. Later than the epic, lyric poetry demands a more advanced culture, and more learned, more artistically elaborate forms of language. It is above all appropriate to modern times, where reflection rules, where man has acquired the habit of concentrating himself in himself, of analyzing the situations of his soul and his personal sentiments.

We can distinguish three principal *degrees* in this development of lyric poetry: 1°. the period to which belong popular songs, stamped still with a rudeness somewhat savage, but full of sap and energy; 2°. the epoch in which there rules the already perfected sense of art, but not of reflection and imitation, those of Pindar and Anacreon; 3°. a third epoch, where poetry finds beside her the prosaic and positive spirit, and, where she is obliged to fight against it, to betake herself to habits of reasoning, to rediscover freshness of imagination through force of talent and genius, and above all to free herself from the abstract formulas of language—poetry more or less reflective, learned, and philosophic. Such is the lyric poetry of Goethe and Schiller.

B. If from the general character we pass to the examination of *particular* points which the study of lyric poetry includes, there are here only a few principles and rules to be established. It is sufficient to add some reflections: 1°. upon the *unity* of the lyric poem; 2°. upon its *course* and its development; 3°. upon the external *diction* and the *measure of the verse*.

1°. Although the lyric poem does not present so vast a picture as the epic, it is nevertheless able to embrace a great number of objects. What shall be the principle of unity? The soul of the poet. But that is something vague and abstract. The true centre of unity should be a determinate situation of the soul, with which the poet identifies himself, and in which he should include himself. It is only necessary to

express whatever arises from that situation and attaches itself thereto. By that only, his thought is limited. His work presents a complete and organic whole.

2°. As to the *course* of the lyric poem, it differs essentially from that of the epic. The one is slow, the other rapid. Lyric concentration and depth of expression are opposed to epic breadth and to a developed exposition. The lyric poet does not avoid episodes, but he employs them for another end. In place of retarding the progress of the poem and rendering the parts more independent, they serve to show that the poet, without deviating from the principal subject, may display the freedom of his imagination in evoking analogous subjects and connecting them with his theme. They then have a wholly personal character. As to the sequence of ideas, we know that the greatest liberty is here accorded to the poet. He ought, however, to hold the mean between an arbitrary course and a logical sequence.

The succession of ideas exhibits the most direct modes. Sometimes it is calm and tranquil, sometimes, in the lyric flight, it presents a movement of thought irregular in appearance. In the heat and intoxication of passion, in the delirium of enthusiasm, the poet seems possessed by a power which transports and subdues him. This disorder of passion is, above all, peculiar to a certain variety of lyric poetry.

3°. With regard to the *external form*, the metre, and the musical accompaniment, there is little to be said, unless one wishes to enter upon the details of prosody. Lyric poetry, by its nature and the variety of its forms, requires the largest variety of metres, and the most skilfully combined structure. The internal movement of the thought of the poet, the nature of the sentiment which he expresses, ought to manifest themselves in the external movement of the measure and the harmony of the words, in the rhythm, the variety of the strophes, etc.

Thus lyric poetry, by its nature, as expressing sentiment, claims the aid of music; it is itself a real melody and a song. In this alliance of music and poetry, meanwhile, the latter does not lose its rights and its rank. When the sentiment and the thought have reached their perfect expression, it remains most independent. The more the sentiment is concentrated, the more it needs the aid of melody.

C. It now remains to consider lyric poetry in its different *species*, and to characterize each of its varieties.

The author, in fact, passes successively in review the principal forms of lyric poetry. In the first rank is placed religious poetry—*hymns*, *psalms*, the *dithyramb*. Their characteristic is the exaltation, the leaping up of the soul toward God: sublimity is, above all, the characteristic trait of the *Psalms* and the *Prophets*.

In the second rank we find the species of lyric poetry which we have called *odes*. Here personality appears as a prevailing characteristic. The poet, it is true, is penetrated and filled with the importance and grandeur of his subject; but he renders himself master of it and thoroughly modifies it by the bold manner in which he treats it, mingling with it his thoughts and his own sentiments. In the ode we behold the transfiguring power of the subject and the poet's freedom opposing it. This effort and this conflict render necessary boldness of language and images, and reveal to us the grandeur and exaltation of genius. This is the variety of lyric inspiration which characterizes the odes of Pindar. The tone of triumph which pervades them also animates the rhythm and determines its nature.

A third kind, which embraces an infinite variety of subjects and shadings, is that of the *song*. First there appears the song properly so called. It is distinguished from the preceding varieties by the simplicity of the content and form, of metre and language. Designed to be sung, to express some transient sentiment of the soul, it is itself transient and quickly forgotten; but it revives ceaselessly under new forms.

With regard to particular species of song we must cite, as the principal, *popular songs*, which embody national exploits and events, in which the people preserve their traditions, or which express the sentiments, the situations of various classes of society, etc.—songs which belong to a very rich and varied culture. Sometimes the expression of a joyous gaiety, sometimes more sentimental, they recall the scenes of nature and the various circumstances of human life.

Then come other more extensive varieties—*sonnets*, *elegies*, *epistles*, etc.—which already transcend the limits of the song. Here, in fact, the expression of sentiment gives place to reflection and thought. The poet casts a calmer glance upon the dispositions of the soul; and joins the descriptions of various

objects, the history of the past, of the present; but we find here neither the simplicity of the song, nor the exaltation of the ode. Song disappears in order to give place to harmony of language.

We must mention, in conclusion, a last form of lyric poetry, whose character is particularly *philosophic*. What it expresses is some grand thought, not now with dithyrambic flight, but by giving to the calm of thought, mistress of itself, a rich sensibility, a force animate with imagery, a style full of magnificence and harmony. The lyric poems of Schiller are models of this class.

After this exhibition of the principles of lyric poetry, Hegel casts a glance upon its *historic development*. This sketch, otherwise incomplete, concludes with a remarkable appreciative criticism of the poems of Klopstock.

THE TRUE FIRST PRINCIPLE.

The stage of apprenticeship in Philosophy ends when the novice has found some statement of the Concrete First Principle which he can accept as intelligible and exhaustive. Up to this point, whatever position he has taken has proved defective or partial, and has had to be replaced or amended. His highest statement held good of only one side or phase of the world. Hence he has always moved round in the circle of dogmatism; i. e. he has uttered *opinions* only, and defended them *by* opinions only. Over against *his* opinions others have set up their own, and all these have had the same right and validity, for each opinion was partial and contained only one phase of truth. There was no necessity, no exhaustiveness, in any of the views taken.

But the stage of Insight and Reason begins with the perception of the True Concrete Principle in some form or statement. This is, however, *only* the beginning. For although here ends the "Apprenticeship," the "Journeyman-ship" is long which follows.

The First Principle must be actually applied, and all objectivity must be dissolved by its touch, before the "Journeyman-ship" ceases. But the objectivity is *produced* by the same activity that dissolves it, and hence the "Journeyman-ship" is an eternal process. Man must solve Nature and Spirit by the First Principle. The dualism ("Maya") of EX-ISTENCE

must be *com-prehended* or grasped together. The "*Maya*" of THOUGHT must likewise be destroyed, and this is the first task. All the abstract categories, concepts, and principles or "laws" of the understanding must pass through the fire of the dialectic—i. e. they must be measured, tested, by the True First Principle. This procedure constitutes what Hegel calls the Science of Logic, or others call Pure Science; the Aristotelians call it *Πρώτη Φιλοσοφία* ("*Prima Philosophia*"). In this science every abstraction that may be set up as the First Principle is investigated and its limits truly defined. Every inadequate concept is shown to involve some presupposition which on final examination proves to be the True First Principle. Spinoza's Substance, for example, is shown to presuppose Self-Activity, or "Subject-Objectivity," as the Fichtians call it. That is to say, the True First Principle is not substance or lying back of Intelligence; but Reason, as self-conscious Being, is the only persistent substance of the universe; all else, whether called *matter, cause, force, effect, law*, or what not, being mere partial phases of The True Existent.

The True First Principle, which Hegel knows under the name of Idea (*Idee*), and Aristotle calls νοήσις ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν, or ἐνέργεια ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν (which the scholastics translate *Actus Purus*), is God as Self-Conscious Reason. Subject and object of Himself, Nature is his product as creator, and the world of progressive intelligent beings is his Image. This statement is odious to some who style themselves "scientific," for the reason that they are still obliged to be on the alert lest their dogmatism fall back into the mere implicit faith of Religion—an issue to be guarded against with all caution. But the strictest and severest logical procedure, followed out to its result, will inevitably lead to this Concrete First Principle—the Recognizing Reason. Mechanical cause (Matter) presupposes dynamical cause (Force), and this again presupposes Final Cause (the Ideal totality) as its condition; Final Cause presupposes Free Intelligence—self-determining and realizing—as its condition; and this presupposes only itself, and hence all dialectic ends here at the First True and Concrete, the Highest Principle, and this is PERSONALITY.

The Speculative Philosopher must, above all things, learn to recognize this Principle under the myriad forms of expression which deep thinkers have used for it.

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NEW EXPOSITION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

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Part Fourth.

*Knowledge posits itself for-itself as an absolutely determined
System of Moral Impulses ; or as a Moral World.*

CONTENTS OF PART FOURTH.

- § 1. The perception of a Factical world is not possible without a further determinedness of that world, which is known as the Moral Law.
- § 2. The perception of individual existence, and of a natural impulse, is not possible without the perception of individual Freedom.
- § 3. The *knowledge* (not mere perception) of Freedom is not possible without a contact with other free beings.
- § 4. Results.
- § 5. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factical world in sensuous perception in the form of an absolute immediately perceptible Being.
- § 6. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factical world in knowledge in a determinedness of the system of moral impulses through the absolute form of a law.
- § 7. The Science of Knowledge as the schematic representation of the whole Ego and the absolute realization of its whole Freedom, in its form of absolute reflectibility of all the relations of the Ego.

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- § 1. The perception of a Factical world is not possible without a further determinedness of that world, which is known as the Moral Law.

In the preceding part we have described and completed the conception of the material world ; a conception which, rightly understood and applied, must suffice everywhere. A natural philosophy could be erected upon it without any further preliminaries. It is to be expected that its opposite reposes in

Thinking, as itself does in contemplation, and that that opposite will be the moral world, and that it will appear how both worlds are altogether one and the same, and that the moral world is the ground of the material world; the manner in which it is thus the ground, being however incomprehensible. Hence we add at once an investigation into the transcendental ground of the material world. The question is this: In order to be able to *think* the moral world, we *contemplate* it in the material world; (or, the material world is the contemplation of the thinking of the moral world;) and this would be easily comprehended if both worlds appeared in all knowledge. But common experience teaches that this is not so; that, by far, the fewest individuals elevate themselves to pure thinking, and hence to the conception of a moral world, whilst nevertheless every one has the sense of perception of the material world; and this is confirmed by the Science of Knowledge, since it makes Thinking dependent upon the realization of Freedom within the already realized factical knowledge, and hence denies its actual necessity altogether. But how, then, do these individuals, who do not think, arrive at a knowledge of their world? It is evident that the answering of this question decides the whole fate of transcendental Idealism.

1. According to our doctrine, confirmed as it has been in all our previous reflections, all possible knowledge has only itself for an object, and no other object but itself. It has also been shown that, as a result of the contents of the Science of Knowledge, the *entire* knowledge does not always and under every condition view itself; that, therefore, what in the Science of Knowledge is only a part, may, in a determined actuality, view itself as the entire knowledge, but that it may also go beyond itself in a lower point of reflection to a higher one, though always *remaining within itself*.

2. Hence there is a manifold of reflections of knowledge within knowledge, all of which are synthetically connected and form a system. This manifoldness, its connection and relation, has been explained from the inner *laws of possibility* of a knowledge, as such; an inner, merely formal legislation in knowledge, based on the realizing or not-realizing itself of a formal Freedom; when realizing itself, doing so without any further condition; and when not, remaining in mere possibil-

ity (the possibility to realize itself whenever it chooses): in it Thinking, Contemplation, Manifoldness, Time, Space—yes, nearly everything which we have heretofore deduced—is grounded.

3. But with this merely formal legislation, knowledge, as an infinite quantitating, would dissolve into nothing. We should never arrive at a knowledge, and hence never either at the application of that legislation, if knowledge were not in some manner checked in that infinity, and checked immediately, as soon as knowledge is formed or realized; on no account, however, within an already formed (realized) knowledge, for without that primary condition also no knowledge is realized.

4. The law, just uttered, does therefore no longer belong to the system of that legislation which relates to those manifold reflections within knowledge; for this system presupposes already knowledge, so far as the Being thereof is concerned, and determines it only *formaliter* within this Being; whereas the law referred to first makes this Being itself possible; only possible, not yet real. Hence it is in reality the result of a reciprocity between the absolute actually becoming Being and an absolute Being, which, according to the Science of Knowledge, is purely thought in knowledge, and *is to be presupposed* prior to every knowledge, to the real as well as to the possible knowledge. This is to prepare the following; for:

5. This state within quantity is in a certain respect—in which we shall shortly see—always a determined state, amongst other possible states. There is consequently a law of determination, and the cause of it is evidently not within knowledge, in no possible significance of the word, but within absolute Being. This law of determination will appear in pure thinking as the *moral law*. But how does it appear where knowledge arrives at no pure thinking? This again is the question asked before.

Now let us consider the following:

a. Knowledge never penetrates and seizes itself, *because* it objectivates and dirempts itself by reflection. The diremption of the highest reflection is into an absolute thinking and contemplation, while absolute knowledge beyond them is neither contemplation nor thinking, but the identity of both.

b. In the contemplation, which is altogether inseparable

from knowledge, the contemplation is therefore lost within itself, and does not at all comprehend itself. True, in thinking it comprehends itself; but then it is no longer contemplating, but thinking. The infinity, and with it the realism of contemplation, which results from it, is done away with altogether, and in its place we obtain as its representative a totalizing picturing of the infinity. Let us, therefore, pay no attention to this thinking.

c. The knowledge which comprehends itself, as we have just described it under *a* and *b*, thinks the contemplation as an inseparable part of knowledge, and for that very reason as not comprehending itself. That knowledge, therefore, thinks and comprehends very well the absolute incomprehensibility and infinity as the condition of all knowledge, the form, the *That* of it. (This is important.)

d. In this thus understood incomprehensibility = the material world, viewed objectively, not formally, we cannot speak at all about *determinedness* or *non-determinedness*. For all determinedness is founded on a comprehending and thinking; but here we neither comprehend nor think; the object of this contemplation is posited as the absolute incomprehensibility itself.

Conclusions.—*a.* The expression “material world” involves, strictly taken, a contradiction. In this contemplation, there is in reality no universe and no totality, but only a floating, undetermined infinity, which is never comprehended. A universe exists only in thinking, but then it is already a moral universe. (This will enable us to judge certain theories respecting nature.)

b. All questions about the best world, about the infinity of the possible worlds, &c., dissolve, therefore, into nothing. A material world, in its completion and closedness, we can obtain only after the completion of time, which is a contradiction; hence we can obtain it within no time. But the moral world, which is before all time and which is the ground of all time, is not the best, but is the only possible and altogether necessary world; i. e. the simply good.

c. But there is within contemplation in every time-moment a determinedness of quality, and (since thinking applies the infinity to it) a determinedness of quantity; let it be well

remembered, for a simply objective and empirical thinking, finding itself as such at the realization of knowledge. This is the conception of an object of mere perception. Where is the ground of this determinedness? We now stand right before our question. Evidently in an *a priori*, altogether incomprehensible, and only actually in the time-moments to be comprehended absolute law of the empirical time-thinking generally.

It is an *a priori* incomprehensible law, we have said; for, if it were comprehensible by a free picturing and gathering together of time, the Ego would not be limited to itself and no knowledge would ever be realized. Hence it is an altogether immediate *determinedness through the absolute*—(only *formally* thinkable)—*Being itself*; the law of a time-succession, which lies altogether beyond all time. For every single moment carries, as we have already shown, all future moments conditionally within itself.

Result.—There is a law, which on no account forces a knowledge into being, but which, if a knowledge exists, absolutely forces its determinedness, and in consequence of which each individual sees in each moment a material, and materially thus constituted experience. The law is an immediate law of knowledge, and connects immediately with knowledge. *That* this is so, and that, if we are at all to attain a knowledge, this must be so, each one can understand; but concerning the substance of the determinedness, and the manner in which knowledge itself originates and in which that law connects with knowledge, *nothing can be comprehended*, for this very non-comprehension is the condition of the realization of knowledge. All attempts to go beyond it are empty dreams, which no one understands, or can demonstrate as true. The *moral* significance of nature can well be understood, but not any other and higher significance of nature; for pure nature is nothing more and portends nothing more than what it is.

Whoever says: there is a material world altogether constituted as I see, hear, feel and think it,—utters simply his perception, and is, so far, right. But when he says: this world affects me as in-itself-Being, produces sensations, representations, &c., within me,—he no longer gives utterance to his perception, but to an explanatory thought, in which there is not

the least grain of sense, and says something which lies beyond the possibility of knowledge. He can say only : if I open my exterior senses, I find them thus determined. More he does not know ; but every one can comprehend that, if more could be known, there would be no knowledge at all. (These are the immanent, strict proofs of transcendental Idealism.)

- ‡ 2. The perception of individual existence, and of a natural impulse, is not possible without the perception of Individual Freedom.

As the first principle of the empirical, we have discovered:
1. A law, applicable only to absolute Being (how, we know not yet, nor is that the question), connects itself immediately with a knowledge, *if* a knowledge is, in order to develop a succession of qualities, which for that knowledge is altogether accidental and *a priori* incomprehensible. (The succession, as this fixed succession, does not lie within the law but within knowledge; in the law lies only, that, since a succession must be, it must be qualitatively determined in such and such a manner.) As this law, if a knowledge is, realizes itself altogether in the same manner, we have taken only one empirical knowledge and one Ego as the representative of all empirical Egos. The Ego, therefore, which appears here, is the mere position of formal knowledge generally, *that* a knowledge is, and nothing else.

2. For this Ego the appearance of nature at each moment, i. e. each of her conditions, regarded as a whole (for we may discover another kind of moments), is, in accordance with our previous reflections, *impulse*—of course, an organic one, an impulse of nature (natural impulse).

The knowledge (feeling) of this impulse is, however, not possible without the *realization* of the same—*activity*; and since (especially empirical) activity is not a thing *per se*, but can be only a passing condition of knowledge, we say the Ego appears to itself immediately as acting. This acting alone—at least, as far as we have come at present—must be regarded as the immediate life of the Ego, from which everything else which we have heretofore met, and especially the will-less impelling nature, is first understood.

3. But this acting appears, as we have often said, in the *form of a line*; not as an organizing, but as a mechanizing, as free

motion, and hence within *time*. In so far the Ego in this acting remains confined within nature, and attached to it; it is itself the highest phenomenon of nature. But in the present nature infinite directions are possible from every point. About these directions nature, thus viewed, can determine absolutely nothing; because in nature, in the law of her contemplation, there can be altogether no determination of these directions. Hence in this point, in the giving itself a *direction*, the Ego tears itself loose, by the formal primary law of its character, from Being, or nature lets it loose, which means the same thing. Here, the *Being Free* is absolute, formal law.

4. Again: Even in so far as the intelligence gives itself up to the natural law of the concretion—as it certainly must, if it is to arrive at a knowledge of itself—it nevertheless thinks itself free in every point of this concretion; and hence makes at the same time the succession of nature its own *succession of time and motion*..

But in the same manner again the intelligence connects the single points of its freedom beyond the concretion of nature, into a higher *Thought-succession*, independent of nature; and unites the single moments of its acts in the unity of a *conception of a DESIGN* which forms a junction with nature, but, in its own connection, lies beyond it. From this we derive the following important result: Even the natural impulse elevates the Ego immediately above the *given concretion* of nature, in which it finds itself as contemplating, to a totality of acting, to a plan, &c.; because as acting it no longer merely contemplates itself, but also thinks. Hence the original self-contemplation of the Ego includes not only that it contemplates itself as free acting, giving direction, &c., but also that it should connect this acting, and hence posit independent designs within nature.

a. Through this reflection, the above assertion, "Each individual Ego comprehends itself necessarily as lasting a certain time, and as moving freely," receives its real significance and application. The conception of acting and of positing designs as the real *contents* of that individual time and motion, is here added, and it becomes clear how the individual time and experience unlooses itself from the *general* knowledge, and how

the individual Ego originates within this general ground-form of knowledge.

b. The proposition: Unless I elevate myself to moral Freedom *I* do not act, but nature acts through me; means now, regarded more closely, the following: I, although an individual and determining myself with free will, hence torn loose from and elevated above nature, have nevertheless immediately only a *natural plan* and design, which I prosecute, however, in the form and according to the law of a rational Being. The Freedom of the Ego in regard to nature is here still formal and empty.

5. The result of the preceding may therefore be expressed in the following propositions:

a. The Ego does not arrive at all to the perception of the dead, will-less, in all its time-determinations unchangeably determined nature, without finding itself as acting.

b. The ground-law of this acting, that it assumes a line-direction, does not lie in nature, which does not extend so far at all, but it is an immanent, formal law of the Ego; and the ground of it lies altogether in knowledge, as such.

c. But the direction is a fixed one, and the Ego which reposes in this standpoint necessarily ascribes to itself also the ground of the determinedness of this direction, since it cannot ascribe it to nature; and since besides nature and the Ego, there is nothing here.

d. But as there is still a something higher for us, and perhaps for all knowledge, a going beyond its actual Being, in order to ascend to the transcendental cause of its possibility, which we have not yet attempted from *this* point, we shall not yet decide whether the Ego is also the transcendental ground of the direction, contenting ourselves with stating what we know. This, strictly, is only the following: The knowledge of which we now speak is perception; the Ego, therefore, perceives itself as ground of a fixed direction; or, more strictly, *the Ego perceives in the perception of its real acting, of which fixed direction it is the ground.*

6. Here we obtain at once an important result, which we cannot pass by on account of the strictness of the system. On the one side, the result of our former deduction was: The percep-

tion of the material world is dependent upon the perception (self-realization) of Freedom; the latter is the *ideal ground* of the former, for only through means of the latter do we arrive at all at a knowledge. On the other side, we have found above: that the perception of Freedom is dependent upon the perception of the material world; the latter is the *real ground* of the former, for only the latter gives to Freedom the possibility of a real acting. The relation is the same as in contemplation between form of body and form of line, which also were mutually dependent upon each other; or, higher, in the original synthesis of knowledge, as between the absolute form of contemplation and the ground-form of Thinking. Hence, perception, κατ' ἐξουχὴν, the absolute form and the extent of *immediate* knowledge, is neither perception of the dead world nor of the world of Freedom, but altogether of both in their inseparability and in their immediate opposition as postulated through immediate reflection; its object, the universe, is also altogether in itself the One; but is in its appearance divided into a material and an intellectual world. (It appears how our investigation approaches its close. The whole factual knowledge, the material world, has now been synthetized; it only remains to bring this world into a complete relation with its higher branch-member, the intellectual world, and our work is done. For with the separate subjects and objects, and their psychological appearances and differences, a Transcendental Philosophy has nothing to do.)

This perception of Freedom can easily be changed from an individual into a general one by this remark: My Freedom is to be the ground of a *real* acting. It has been shown, however, that I am not real except as in reciprocity with all other knowledges, and reposing upon the general one knowledge—thus really actualizing one of the *real possibilities* of this knowledge within itself. Hence, whatever there is perceptible for me in me, has, in so far as it has been *really* actualized, acted, done—entered into the sphere of the real (of perception), of all. Thus, in accordance with our premises, it is apparent of itself (what no former philosophy has thoroughly explained) how free Beings know of the productions of the Freedom of others: the actualized *real* Freedom is the determined realization of a possibility of the general perception, in

which the Egos are not divided, but are rather one—are only one perceiving Ego.

§ 3. The *knowledge* (not mere perception) of Freedom is not possible without a contact with other free beings.

This connection of the general perception with Freedom and its self-realizations, and the principle of this relation, which we have touched upon only in passing, must be explained further. We introduce the explanation by the following considerations:

1. I, the individual, apply, according to a former synthesis, the particular manifestation of my power to a general power, which I did not at all perceive, but merely *thought* there, and which I placed before me in the form of contemplation as a something of an organized body (we select this expression with care). This my manifestation of power is real and enters accordingly into the general perception, means evidently: it is traced back, with all that follows from it, to the general perception, to the unity of a person, partly immediately posited in space, partly determining itself with Freedom. Now this person is at first a whole of nature, absolutely encircling a particular time-moment, and thus arising in the general time, and for the general perception, from nothing: a link of the described time-succession in nature; but at the same time the commencement of the appearance of a *rational being* in time, of which an acting, extending necessarily beyond the nature-succession, catches back into nature; finally, a determined body, at present only for the general perception of nature, but not as above, an undetermined somewhat of an organic body.

2. This free acting, accomplished through the medium of the body, according to what law can it move? Evidently according to the same law through which, in our former reflections, knowledge of Freedom generally was produced: the law that it must be immediately thought and comprehended in perception as an acting, which can manifest itself only in the form of a line, and which, therefore, takes its direction not from nature, but from out of itself. The chief point to be observed lies in the *immediateness* of this self-contemplation, which excludes everything like a deduction, comprehending from premises,

&c., since this would destroy totally the character of the perception, and hence the possibility of all knowledge.

3. Let us also add the following passing remark, which is an important hint for the future. A certain time-moment in the general time, a space-moment of the universal matter, lies immediately in the succession of perception as filled with a body which can manifest itself absolutely altogether only as Freedom. The ground-principle of the *contents* of this succession, but on no account of its formal existence, was absolute Being. But, viewed as a principle of nature, absolute Being is altogether no principle of a view of Freedom; hence it becomes here particularly, at the same time, principle of Freedom and thus the ground of that mixed perception of a nature and of a rational acting posited within it at the same time, which we have just described. This may become important.

4. But what is—on the part of the general perception and of any representative thereof (any individual Ego)—the condition of contemplating other free subjects outside of itself, of the representative Ego? Evidently, since Freedom and its ground-law can be perceived only in an individuality-point, the condition is, that that Ego must find the ground-law within itself in order to be able to find it also outside of itself: hence, expressed in general terms; the condition is, that knowledge is not merely simply confined contemplation, but likewise *reflection, knowledge of knowledge*, i. e. of Freedom and the within-itself generation of knowledge. In the self-contemplation of our own Freedom, Freedom, κατ' ἐξοχὴν, is known (direct, because it is the real substance of knowledge).

5. Again—let the *nervus probandi* be well noted which in my other writings has been very elaborately described, but which here, now that perception has been thoroughly determined, can be gathered into one word:—since the individual Ego contemplates its Freedom only within *universal* Freedom, which constitutes a closed thinking, its Freedom is *realiter* only real within a contemplation of infinite Freedom, and as a particular limitation of this infinity. But Freedom as Freedom is limited only through other Freedom; and actually manifests Freedom only through other actually manifested Freedom.

6. Hence it is the condition of a knowledge of knowledge,

of self-perception as the principle of all other perception, that, besides the free manifestation of the individual, other free manifestations, and, by their means, other free substances, should be perceived. Reciprocity through actual manifestation of free acting is condition of *all* knowledge. Each one knows of his acting only in so far as he knows generally (*a priori*, through original thinking) of acting, of Freedom. Again: Each one knows of the acting of others, *idealiter*, only by means of his own acting from out of himself. Finally: each one knows of his acting only in so far as he knows of the acting of others, *realiter*; for the character of his particular acting (and generally he himself) is in knowledge result of the knowledge of the acting of the totality.

Hence no free Being arrives at a consciousness of himself without at the same time arriving at a consciousness of other Beings of the same kind. No one, therefore, can view himself as the whole knowledge, but only as a single standpoint in the sphere of knowledge. The intelligence is within itself and in its most inner root, as existing, not One, but a manifold; at the same time, however, a closed manifold, a *system* of rational Beings.

(Nature—thus we will call her hereafter exclusively in opposition to the intelligences—is now placed before us as one and the same, coursing through infinite time and solid space, which she fills. If, as bearer of the free individuals and their actions, we must not split her further—which it is not the object of the Science of Knowledge further to do—she will always remain this One. In this very form she is the proper object of Speculative Physics, as a guide of Experimental Physics—for to nothing else must the former present claims—and must thus be received by that science. But in the world of intelligence there is absolute manifoldness, and this manifoldness remains always on the standpoint of *perception*; for knowledge is for itself a *quantitating*. Only in the sphere of pure thinking there may also be discovered a *formal*—on no account real—unity even of this world.)

§ 4. Results.

1. Each individual's knowledge of the manifestations of his Freedom is dependent upon his knowledge of the general

Freedom - manifestation and upon the general knowledge thereof. It is, as we have learned already from other examples, a determined closed thinking within another—just now discovered—thinking of a determined whole. Hence it is itself determined thereby; the Freedom in individual knowledge is result of the general Freedom, and therefore necessarily determined by it; there is no perceptible Freedom of a single individual. His character as well as the character of his acting proceeds from his reciprocity with the whole world of Freedom.

2. In the general perception of each individual, nature does not appear any further than follows from his reciprocity with his perceived system of Freedom. For the Ego of each individual, as this particular one, appears to him only in this reciprocity and is determined by it; but nature he feels and perceives and characterizes only in the impulse thus directed towards his particular Ego. Hence, if the possibility of a manifestation of Freedom is presupposed, nature results without anything further from the self-contemplation of that Freedom; is merely another view of Freedom; is the sphere and the immediately at the same time posited object of Freedom; and there is thus no further necessity at all for another absolute principle of the perception of nature. Hence nature, as manifestation of the Absolute, in which light we viewed it above, (let no one be led astray by this remark; perhaps a disjunction takes place here within nature, only without our perceiving it,) is totally annihilated, and is now merely a form of the contemplation of our Freedom, the result of a formal law of knowledge.

3. The impulse which is *idealiter* determined through the reciprocity of general Freedom and through knowledge, would thus be the only firm object remaining in the background, except the undeterminable and in so far in-itself-dissolving general Freedom. This impulse would be the *substante*, but only in regard to that part of it which enters knowledge, and on no account determined in its real contents through knowledge; and the manifestation of Freedom would be its *accidence*; but, let it be well remarked, simply a formal, in nowise a materializing accidence; for only in so far as the impulse really impels, acts (apart from its body-form in which it appears in contem-

plation which falls away here), does it enter knowledge; hence, in so far as it is posited it impels necessarily. It is, therefore, accident simply in so far as it enters the form of knowledge, in so far as it is a knowledge at all. Thus also the *general* Freedom is not *realiter* free, but only *formaliter*; it acts ever according to all its empirical knowledge, and knows only of that according to which it acts. Only this knowledge itself seems still to be *materialiter* free, if there are impulses beyond real knowledge. (Of its formal Freedom, inner absoluteness, we do not speak now.)

4. According to a former remark, knowledge, in obedience to a formal law, separates the plan, assigned to it by the natural impulse, into a succession of mutually determined, manifold acts; and only thus does it arrive at a knowledge of its *real* acting, and hence of its Freedom and of knowledge generally. But the links of this succession have significance only *in* the succession; the next following links annihilate them. Hence the Ego expressly proposes to itself the perishable, as perishable and on account of its perishability, and makes this its object: a mere living from one moment to another without ever thinking on what will come next. But, still more, even every closed moment of nature itself (hence the impulse and plan of nature) lies within an unclosed contemplation, and thus carries within itself the ground of a future moment and thereby its own annihilation in that moment; and is therefore also, an essentially perishable plan. Hence, all acts excited by the impulses of nature are necessarily directed upon the perishable; for everything in nature is perishable.

5. According to what we have said previously, nature develops herself according to a law which can have its ground only in absolute Being. Now even if we intended to restore this law to nature, in so far as nature appears in knowledge as real, as the bearer of knowledge, it would still be, for the standpoint of perception, merely a *formaliter* posited law; but on no account one which could explain to us the connection which we can only perceive. Allowing this interpretation, about which we desire not to give an opinion at present whether it will be admitted or not, it would, to be sure, give to nature an apparent (because time is infinite and never completed) unity of plan, but of which each single plan would be

merely a piece torn out, the relation of which to the whole would remain unknown to us. We should thus, in these acts, give ourselves up to a strange, concealed plan, unknown to us, which we should not know ourselves, and hence knowledge would not yet have penetrated into itself, since its origin and root would still remain in the dark.

‡ 5. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factical world in sensuous perception in the form of an absolute immediately perceptible Being.

We have advanced to the universality of the perception of empirical Freedom, and have deduced from it nature itself and the universality of the perception of nature. Only one thing remained, which we could not deduce and of which we remained ignorant, a certain impulse directed upon Freedom, which we, however, called impulse of nature, although we, it is true, knew so much of it that it was not an impulse of *dead* nature. It seemed to appear plainly that nothing more could be explained from that sphere. The empirical world may have been traced on its own ground back to its highest cause, where it becomes lost to the empirical eye.

1. Let us, therefore, commence from the other side, and from its highest point, which we know well enough already. Knowledge is an absolute origin from nothing, and this within an equally absolute *For-itself*. Looking at the latter, there is hence in knowledge a pure, absolute Being; and as soon as it comprehends this same Being, i. e. the pure thought thereof, as is required here, it is, in this respect, *itself* pure absolute Being; i. e. as knowledge. (By the last addition of the absolute self-penetration of pure thinking, the proposition becomes a new one; for pure thinking itself, as lost in the positing of objects, with the entire synthesis connected therewith, has been sufficiently explained above.)

Concerning this knowledge, its substance and its form, let the following suffice. As far as regards the substance, it is the absolute form of knowledge, of self-grasping itself; not as act, however, but as *Being*: in one word, the pure, absolute Ego. In its form it is unchangeable, eternal, imperishable; all of which, it is true, are but second-hand characteristics. In itself it is unapproachable; it is the absolute Being, the in-itself-reposing. Again, it bears, and should be

thought as bearing, the here altogether predominating character of perception; i. e. *formaliter*. This is to be understood as follows: Knowledge recognizes itself as accidental. But *how* then, and according to what premises? How does it recognize the accidental, and how does it class knowledge, let us say, as a *species* under that *genus*? Altogether according to no premises derived from experience—such an assumption would be an absurdity—but simply immediately, primarily. How does it think the absolute, in opposition to which it recognizes as only accidental? Likewise primarily. And how does it recognize in both these recognitions itself as absolute? Likewise in a primary manner. It is simply thus, and more cannot be said about it; knowledge cannot go beyond itself.

2. Now, this thus described thinking is not possible without an opposite quantitating contemplation, in accordance with the synthesis which has become so familiar to us. In this contemplation absolute knowledge, or the pure Ego, quantitates itself; i. e. it repeats itself in a (scheme) picture. This contemplation as adjoining link of a thinking is the—necessarily closed—contemplation of a system of rational Beings. Reason, therefore, in the immediate contemplation of itself places itself necessarily also outside of itself; the pure Ego is repeated in a closed number, and this results altogether from the thinking of its formal absoluteness. (Let it be well understood: it is no contradiction of the above that this system, as it enters sensuous perception, is infinite, i. e. actually unattainable for this perception and not to be completed; for between thinking and perception there enters here one of the ground-forms of quantitating—infinite time. But it does follow that in every moment wherein perception is to take place the Ego must be posited as closed for perception, although the infinite continuation of perception carries it in each future moment beyond its present. It does not, however, *follow* from any empirical premises, but *is* absolutely so, that the Ego—the Egos—beyond all perception, and as ground of the same, are closed in the pure idea of reason, or in God.)

This is the ground-point of the intelligible world. Now to that of the opposite, the sensuous world. From the manifoldness of the Egos contained in the contemplation of reason, we select one as a representative. This, in perception, is alto-

gether confined to itself as individual, and cannot, as in thinking, go beyond to the contemplation of a pure reason-world. But this confinedness is the ground of all perception, which, as being itself absolute contemplation, is the condition of the possibility of absolute thinking. As an individual, however, it is the *thus or thus* determined individual in the whole succession of individuals; but since this succession and its totality exists only in thinking, how is it then, or rather its *result*, before all thinking? And if, in the whole reason-world, no individual were to elevate himself to thinking—which is possible since thinking depends upon Freedom—how will it then be in perception? According to the above, in its form, even as an empirically absolute and only perceptible, but no further explainable *Being* (which is thus, because it is thus and finds itself thus). We touch here again, only in another form, the impulse, which remains in the dark.

But how, now, does this relation, which in pure thinking is recognized as determined through absolute Being, become here, where it is not recognized and can therefore not be the result of a recognition, nevertheless an *immediately perceptible* Being?

Important as the question is, the answer is quite as simple. This question is the highest and most important which a philosophy can propose to itself. It is the question after a harmony, and since the question concerning the harmony of things and knowledge (which presupposes a dualism), and the question concerning the harmony of the several free Beings, which is based upon the idea of automatic Egos, have vanished into empty air—because it was shown that those separates could not but harmonize since they were in reality one and the same; in the one direction, the same in the general perception; and in the other direction, the same in the *One absolute Being*, which posits itself in determined points of reflection within an infinite time-succession, according to the absolutely quantitating ground-form of knowledge—it is the question after a harmony between the *intelligible world and the world of appearances*—the material world;—(that is, where this exists, in the immediate-itself-grasping, factual ground-form of knowledge, which therefore appears even prior to the realization of Freedom—of thinking—of which it is the pre-

supposition, and where there is, on that account, not yet true individuality.) The answer is easy and immediately apparent:

The universal perception has for its ground-substance nothing else than the relation of the perceiving individual to other individuals in a purely intelligible world; for only thus is that perception, and is a knowledge at all. Without this that perception would nowhere come to itself, but would dissolve in the infinite emptiness—if, in that case, there would be any human understanding at all, to posit it for the mere sake of letting it dissolve. And this is so in consequence of its relation to absolute Being, which relation is in perception itself never recognized, but remains concealed to it for all eternity. This relation, considered in the previous paragraphs in the form of impulse, is the immanent root of the world of appearances to every one who appears to himself. Now this perception brings its time, its space, its acting, its knowledge of the acting of others, and hence its knowledge of nature along with itself, and can therefore not go beyond its really egotistical and idealistical standpoint; its world, therefore, and—since this applies to the universal perception—the whole world of appearances is purely the mere formal law of an individual knowledge, hence the mere, pure Nothing; and instead of receiving from the region of pure thinking perhaps a sort of Being, the material world is, on the contrary, from that very region decisively and eternally buried in its Nothingness.

§ 6. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factical world in knowledge in a determinedness of the system of moral impulses through the absolute form of a law.

Now to the union of the groundpoints of both worlds *within* knowledge, for outside of knowledge they are united through the absolute Being.

Empirical Being was to signify a particular, positive relation of the perceiving individual to an in so far perceived number of other individuals, according to a law of the intellectual world, which other individuals are, therefore, presupposed as differing in their primary Being. But in the contemplation of reason they do not (at present) differ at all in their essence, but are merely numerically different. Hence it would be necessary, for the possibility of perception, to presuppose another differ-

ence of the individuals, not merely a numerical, but a *real* difference, lying beyond perception; and this difference must appear in knowledge when it is to elevate itself to the thinking of perception, as having its ground in the intellectual world. It would be, what we are seeking for, our last problem, a connecting link between absolute thinking and absolute contemplation. This, now, is easily found, and has, indeed, already discovered itself to us, if the principle of perception is *thought* in the very same manner as we have just now thought it, i. e. as the result of my relation to the absolute sum of all individuals, but in such a manner that it *appear* at the same time *in perception*. This last clause is decisive, and I wish to be understood in respect to it. In point of fact, as we well know, thinking and contemplation never join together, not even in their highest point. Only through thinking are they *understood* as one and the same; but in contemplation they remain divided by the infinite gulf of time. The true state is this: It is always only perception which is thought by that intellectual conception; this perception is, it is true, beyond and imperceivably altogether one, and embraces in this oneness the relation of all individuals to each other; but I have never perceived *the whole* of my relation, awaiting, as I do, from the future further enlightenment. Hence the world of reason is never surveyed entire as a fact; its unity *is* only, but is not perceivable; and it is not known except in Thinking; in actuality it expects from that *Being* infinite enlightenment and progress.

Formaliter there results from this, firstly, that it is perception and the principle thereof which is thought. The inseparable ground-form of perception as inner contemplation is time. With this contemplation there enters a something of discovered time, and if the real substance of the perception is an acting, there enters also a plan of this acting—dividing itself into mediating acts—and with the thought of this plan an infinite time, for each moment of that time falls within an infinite contemplation which demands future moments.

Secondly, there results this, that a thinking takes place, and that it is the Ego which is thought as principle of the perception. The character of the Ego in relation to knowledge—and in that relation the Ego is to be thought here; let this be well understood—is absolute starting and causing to originate

from nothingness; hence free manifestation in a time-succession; and thus the Ego thinks itself whenever it elevates itself to the thinking of itself. There arises for the sphere of perception a succession of *absolute creating from Nothingness*, *realiter* recognizable for each moment of perception. (I express a comprehensive statement in few words; these words, however, are not to be understood metaphorically, but literally.)

Let us now gather together this infinite time with its determinations into one through a conception; we cannot abstract, in doing so, altogether from time; for, if we did, we should lose the relation to perception, the determinedness of the individual, and we should again return to the merely numerical difference of the Egos in the pure contemplation of reason. The contents of that time is the determinedness of an acting of an individual—as principle of perception—independent of and preceding all perception.

But what, moreover, is the ground-principle of this determinedness? In the idea, the absolutely closed sum of intelligences; in perception, the sum of those intelligences that have entered knowledge and been recognized at a particular time. But the intelligences are posited in the contemplation of reason as altogether harmonizing in their absolute self and world knowledge; hence, also, as harmonizing in the perception which is determined through this contemplation of reason through the uniting thinking. What everyone thinks absolutely of himself, he must be able to think that all who elevate themselves to absolute thinking, think likewise of him. The outward form of the described acting is, therefore, that everyone should do (I will express myself in this manner for brevity's sake), what all the intelligences embraced in the same system of perception, absolutely thinking, must think that he does, and what he must think, that they think it. It is an acting according to the system of the absolute harmony of all thinking, of its pure identity. (I believe we term this *moral acting*.)

Finally, what was the ground of this idea of a closed system of mutually determined intelligences in the pure thinking of the contemplation of reason, and the thinking of perception determined thereby? Absolute Being itself, constituting and

carrying knowledge : hence an absolute mutual penetration of both. The deepest root of all knowledge is, therefore, the unattainable unity of *pure* thinking, and the above described thinking of the Ego as absolute principle within perception = the moral law as highest representative of all contemplation. Now, this is on no account *this* or *that* knowledge, but simply absolute knowledge *as such*. How *this* or *that* knowledge is attained within it, we shall soon explain from one point. Now, this absolute knowledge is attained only on condition of the absolute *Being* entering even *knowledge itself*; and as sure as this knowledge is, the absolute Being is within *it*. And thus absolute Being and knowledge are united; the former enters the latter and is absorbed in the form of knowledge, by that very means making it absolute. Whoever has comprehended this, has mastered all truth, and to him there exists no longer an incomprehensible.

Thus in ascending from the one side; now let us determine the adjoining link of perception. The ground and central point of both links, of the material world and of the world of reason, is nothing else than the individual, determined through his reciprocity with the world of reason, as absolute principle of all perception. This individual *is*, for the eye of the merely sensual perception, firm and standing; but it is also a development of the absolute creative power of perception in a higher (reason-) time, starting *from an absolute point of beginning*.

(Only this point, as an apparently new addition, seems to require a proof, and this proof is easy. The knowledge of that power generally is dependent upon an absolute free thinking; hence appearing itself in consciousness as free. But this thinking again is dependent upon a contemplation, also appearing within consciousness (empirical knowledge generally) within an already ignited knowledge. Its beginning, therefore, as an absolute point falls within an already progressing succession of the knowledge of time generally. And it is necessary that this higher determinedness should be perceived, if any particular moment within it is to be perceived, which latter moment becomes then for the perceiving individual the beginning-point of a higher life.)

The Ego, therefore, is for this thinking, not reposing and

stationary, but absolutely progressing according to an eternal plan, which, in our thinking of God, is altogether closed, and *recognized* as such, though never perfectly *perceived*. But the Ego is also, in the same determinedness, absolute principle of general perception. Hence, by its progression, perception in its principle progresses also. That higher divine power in reason and Freedom (in absolute knowledge) is the eternal creative power of the material world. More expressive: The individual starts always from the perception of mere Being, for thereupon depends his knowledge generally, and particularly the thinking of his moral determination; and thus it is altogether a production of the often described reciprocity, but nothing at all in itself. But as he elevates himself to the thinking of his determination and becomes a something higher than all the world, an Eternal Being,—what, then, does the world become to him? A somewhat, in and upon which he elevates and erects what lies not in nature, but in the idea, and in the eternal, unchangeable idea which the closed system of all reason realizes in the (now free and thinking) Egos, and which it must possess in each moment of an infinite perception.

Let us take care not to carry the coarse materialistic ideas of a mechanical acting like those of an objective thing in itself, which we have already annihilated in the sphere of the empirical, over into the pure world of reason! The individual develops in thinking his individual determination: but he appears to himself as principle of sensuous perception, in the existence of which he also always rests; hence the determination of his power appears to himself here, according to our former conclusions, as actual acting. His pure thinking, therefore, becomes in perception, truly enough, an actual acting; but here only for himself and his individual consciousness. To be sure, it thus becomes a material appearance and enters the sphere of the universal perception, also according to our former deductions. But the intellectual character of his acting can be recognized only by those who by their thinking have elevated themselves into that system of reason, who contemplate themselves and the world in God. To the others it remains a mere material moving and acting, just as they act also. (It is the same with that intellectual character as with

the theory of the eternal which we teach here. Those other persons also hear our words, formulas, chains of ideas, &c. But no one, whose inner life is not awakened, discovers their meaning.)

What, then, is now—and with this I give the promised last solution—the mere, pure perception in its reality, without any thinking of the intellectual determinedness? We have already said it above: simply the condition on the part of the absolute, that knowledge is to appear at all in its empty, naked form. In thinking, the principle becomes principle of an altogether new and progressive knowledge; in the perception it is merely the connecting knowledge; hence—if it were not in regard to a possible progress of enlightenment altogether a mere nullity—the darkest, most imperfect knowledge which can be, if a knowledge is at all to remain and not to vanish into nothingness. In this lowest and darkest point the knowledge of perception remains forever, and all its apparent work is nothing but an unwinding and eternal repetition of the same pure nothing according to the mere law of a formal knowledge. They who remain in such a standpoint and such a root have indeed no existence at all; hence, also, do nothing, and are, therefore, in sum and substance, only appearances. The only thing, let it be well remarked, that still supports these appearances, relates them to and keeps them within God, is the mere possibility which lies beyond their knowledge, that they still can elevate themselves to the intellectual standpoint. The only thing, therefore, which may be said to—I do not say the vicious, the evil, the bad, but—the very best of men, as long as they remain in their immediateness—for viewed from the standpoint of truth they are equally null—to those who remain wrapped in sensuality, and do not elevate themselves to the ideas, is this: “It must not be quite impossible for you as yet to elevate yourselves to ideas, since God still tolerates you in the system of appearances.” In short, this decree of God of the continuing possibility of a Being is the only and true ground of the continuation of the appearance of an intelligence; if that is recalled, they vanish. It is the true moral ground of the whole world of appearances.

If the question, therefore, is put: why does perception stand just in that point in which it stands, and in no other? This

is the answer: *materialiter* perception stands in no point whatever; it stands in its own point as required by its formal Being and remains standing in it forever. The *real* time has not yet at all commenced within it, and its own time never produces anything new and solid (as the circular course of nature sufficiently demonstrates empirically); it is therefore, in reality, also no time at all, but a mere formal appearance (=0) awaiting a future filling up. Experience is never this or that experience, in an accidental and single manner, but always that experience which it must be according to that immanent law and the connection resulting therefrom. If persons speak about the best world and the traces of the kindness of God in this world, the reply is: The world is the very worst which can be, so far as it is in itself perfectly nothing. But on that very account the whole and only possible goodness of God is distributed over it, since from it and all its conditions the intelligence can elevate itself to the resolve to make it better. Anything further even God cannot grant us; for, even if he would, he cannot make us understand it unless we draw it from him ourselves. But that we can do infinitely. Glorification of pure truth within us; and whoever wants anything else and better knows not the Good, and will be filled with Badness in all his desires.

‡ 7. The Science of Knowledge as the schematic representation of the whole Ego and the absolute realization of its whole Freedom, in its form of absolute reflectibility of all the relations of the Ego.

Knowledge has been regarded in its highest sphere as pure originating from nothing. But in that it was regarded as positive, as real originating, not as non-originating. That was the form. But in the substance of originating it is already expressed that it might also not be; and hence the being of knowledge, when related to absolute Being, becomes accidental, a being which might also not be, an act of absolute Freedom. This accidentality of knowledge is yet to be described.

It evidently is the last remaining problem which we have to realize in actual knowledge. The realization of the idea of Being and Not-Being at the same time, which was advanced in our first synthesis, is a *thinking* by means of a picturing of the form of Being itself. Like all thinking, this also is

not without contemplation; here, not without the contemplation of knowledge, as having already realized itself. Now, this existence of knowledge, in its *reality*, is cancelled by the thinking; but, in order that it may be but cancelled, it must first be posited in *thinking*. (This is the highest picturing which has so often been mentioned, and the form of all other. Yet the thing is easy enough: only it has gone out of use by the common mode of thinking. Whoever says: A is not; to him A is on that very account in his thinking. Now, in the above, knowledge is not negated generally, that it cannot be; but it is negated in regard to absolute Being; i. e. it is *thought*, in its Being, as that which might also not be.) Now, this is Freedom, and here absolute Freedom, indifference in regard to the absolute, whole (not this or that) knowledge itself.

a. Freedom, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, is therefore only a thought, and only within him, of course, who is himself the result of Freedom.

b. It is, *negatively* considered, nothing but the thought of the *accidentality* of absolute knowledge. Remark well the seeming contradiction: Knowledge is the absolute accidental or the accidental absolute, because it reaches into the quantity and the absolute ground-form of the same, the infinite time-succession. *Positively* considered: that Freedom is the thought of the absoluteness of knowledge, of the *self-creation* of knowledge through the self-realizing of Freedom. The union of both views is the conception of Freedom in its ideal and real existence.

c. This thought of the Freedom of knowledge is not without its Being, just as there is no thinking without contemplation; it is the same thorough connection as in all our former syntheses. Now, this is Freedom, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, and all other Freedom is merely a subordinate species; hence there is no Freedom without Being (limitation, necessity), and *vice versa*. Time is under the rule of this necessity; only thinking is free. The intelligence would be altogether free after time had run out; but then it would be nothing—would be an unreal (beingless) abstraction. Hence it remains true that knowledge in its substance is Freedom, but always Freedom *limited* in a determined manner (in determined points of reflection).

2. The absolute formal character of knowledge is, that it is

real originating; hence whenever knowledge is realized, it always arrives at a knowledge of *Freedom*. The lowest point in the principle of perception is feeling—the mere analogy of thinking. (It would become a thought if that principle were to attain the described possibility of the higher Freedom.) Every individual at least feels himself free. (This feeling may be disputed by wrong thinking; it may even be denied, though no sensible man has yet done so; but still it remains ineradicable, and can be demonstrated also to every thinker who is not totally enwrapped in his particular system.)

But this feeling of freedom is not without a feeling of limitation.

Hence, all Freedom is an abstraction from some particular reality—a mere picturing of the same.

3. In every lower degree of Freedom there is consequently contained for the individual a higher real Freedom, which he does not recognize himself, but which another individual can require him to recognize, and which for him is a limitation, concretion of himself. For instance, that lower degree of Freedom we have learned to know as the conception of some arbitrary sensuous end or purpose. Generally expressed, it is that Freedom which permits you to reflect or not to reflect upon the material object to which that end or design applies. (Here necessity and Freedom unite in one point.) Here knowledge posits itself as free, indifferent only in regard to this particular object; but it is confined in perception generally, though without remarking it. This is the condition of the sensual man. Everyone who stands higher can tell him that he has the power to elevate himself also above that state of bondage; but he does not know it himself.

But he also who knows of this other world may still abstract from that world; may not want to know at present, nor to consider, what this point in the succession of appearances signifies in its intelligible character. Such a person stands in the Freedom of reciprocal conditionedness; he is kept in bondage and imprisoned by his laziness. It is impossible, however, that a person who has reflected to the end should not act in accordance with those reflections; impossible that he should allow himself to be restrained from this acting by indolence.

But even in this state of mind and in this spirit a person may be theoretically enchained, though he be practically free; and this is the case when he does not explain his own state of mind to himself, when he allows it to remain an occult quality within him. (This is the condition of all mystics, saints, and religious persons, who are not enlightened in regard to their true principles; who do what is right, but do not understand themselves in doing so. Even to these, a theory like the present one can tell that they are not yet perfectly free, for even God, the Eternal, must not keep Freedom in subjection.)

In the total abstraction from all material objects of knowledge, from the entire contemplation with all its laws, hence, in the absolute realization of Freedom and in the indifference of knowledge with regard to contemplation, nevertheless also in the limitation to the one, immanent, formal law of knowledge, and its succession and consequence, does logic consist and everything that calls itself philosophy, but is in reality only logic; that which cannot go beyond the result of that standpoint: namely, finite human understanding. Its character is, like that of logic, its highest product, always to remain within the conditioned, and never to elevate itself to an unconditioned, to an Absolute of Knowledge and of Being.

In the abstraction from even this law, and from quantity in its primary form, hence also from *all* particular knowledge, does the Science of Knowledge consist. (It might be said, from another point of view, that this science consists and arises from a transcendentalizing of logic itself; for, if a logician were to ask himself, as I have frequently exemplified in the foregoing: how do I arrive at my assertions? he would necessarily get into the Science of Knowledge, and, in this manner the science has really been found by Kant, the true discoverer of its principle.) The standpoint of the Science of Knowledge is in the elevation above all knowledge, in the pure thinking of absolute Being, and in the accidentality of knowledge; it, therefore, consists in the thinking of this thinking itself; it is a mere pure thinking of the pure thinking, or of reason, the immanence, the *For-itself* of this pure thinking. Hence its standpoint is the same as that which I described above as the standpoint of absolute Freedom.

But this thinking (according to all our former reflections)

is not possible, unless knowledge is nevertheless within the contemplation wherein it is only figuratively annihilated. And thus the last question which I have promised to answer is solved, and with that our investigation concluded: the question, how the Science of Knowledge, being forced to go beyond all knowledge, could do so; whether, it being itself a knowledge, it did not always remain within knowledge and tied down to knowledge; how, therefore, it could go beyond itself *as* knowledge? It carries knowledge forever along in contemplation. Only in thinking it annihilates knowledge in order to reproduce it *in the same*.

And thus the Science of Knowledge is distinguished from life. It generates the *real* life of contemplation figuratively (schematically) in thinking. It retains the character of thinking, the schematic paleness and emptiness; and life retains its own, the concrete fullness of contemplation. Nevertheless both are altogether one, since only the unity of thinking and contemplation is the true knowledge—which in reality is indeed unapproachable and separates into those two links, each of which excludes the other;—it is the highest central-point of the intelligence.

The Science of Knowledge is absolutely factual from the standpoint of contemplation: the highest *fact*, that of knowledge (because *it might also not be*), is its basis; and the Science of Knowledge is deduction from the standpoint of thinking, which explains the highest fact from absolute Being and Freedom; but it is both in necessary-union, connecting with the actuality, and going beyond it in Thinking to its absolute ground. But what it thinks *is* in contemplation, though only immediate; in Thinking this is linked together as necessary. And it thinks that which *is*, for Being is necessary; and that which it thinks is, *because* it thinks it; for its thinking itself becomes the Being of knowledge. (The Science of Knowledge is no going beyond and explaining of knowledge from outside, hypothetical premises—for whence should these premises be taken for the universal?)

The Science of Knowledge is theoretical and practical at the same time. *Theoretical*: in itself an empty, merely schematic knowledge, without all body, substance, charm, &c. (And let it be well understood, all this it should despise.)

Practical: knowledge is to become free in actuality; this is part of its intellectual determination. Hence the Science of Knowledge is a duty to all those intelligences who in the succession of conditions have arrived at its possibility. But to this succession of conditions we arrive only through inner honesty, truthfulness, and uprightness.

Hence the honest endeavor to distribute this science is itself the carrying out of an eternal and imperishable design; for reason and its once acquired clear insight into itself is eternal. But it must be distributed in that spirit which an eternal purpose demands, with absolute denial of all finite and perishable ends. Not with the view that to-day or to-morrow this one or that one may comprehend it, for in that case only an egotistical object would be derived; but let it be unreflectingly thrown into the stream of time, merely in order that it be there. Let him who can, grasp and understand it; let whoever does not comprehend it, mistake and abuse it; all this, as nothing, must be indifferent to him who has grasped and been grasped by it.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S ÆSTHETICS.

Translated from the French of M. Ch. Bérard, by J. A. MARTINE.

DRAMATIC POETRY.—The necessity of seeing the actions and relations of human life represented by the persons who express them, is the origin of dramatic poetry. In place of limiting itself, like the epic, to the recital of a past action, it places before our eyes the personages who accomplish it, with all the accessories of scenic representation.

Three principal points are to be considered in the study of this variety of poetry: 1°. *the nature of a dramatic work* in itself, and the *characteristics*, whether *general* or *particular*, which distinguish it; 2°. *theatrical art*, or scenic representation; 3°. the *different classes* of dramatic poetry, and its *historic development*.

1°. Considered in a general manner, the drama unites the principle of epic with that of lyric poetry.

Like the epic, the drama exhibits an action, a deed, an event. But that action which followed a fated course, and involved in it the destiny of the actors, here divests itself of this character. As the basis of the action, there appears a human person with his liberty. The events spring from the will of the personages, from their character and their passions. From another side, the sentiments of the soul take the character of internal causes, of passions which develop themselves in a complication of circumstances. The action is the will itself pursuing its end, and the consequences recoil upon itself. The dramatic hero brings upon himself the proper results of his acts.

Hence the difference which distinguishes dramatic poetry from the two other classes, and its special conditions.

In the first place, as the interest bears only upon the action, and as, moreover, it is no longer an entire people which is on exhibition, but an individual man, dramatic action is more simple than epic; it is contracted, and does not present so vast a picture. The principal hero does not combine the same *ensemble* of characters as the epic hero, and could not develop them. The interests, the passions, which are in conflict, also particularize themselves more, and oppose each other more directly.

As to the *content* of the drama, it should deal with the eternal principles of human existence, the grand passions, ideas, and moral verities. The divine thus forms the innermost and concealed essence of dramatic action. And, hence, the decisive course of events, the action and the *dénoûment*, depend not only upon the *dramatis personæ*, but also upon the divine principle and upon the general power which controls them. The drama should reveal to us action that has life through an absolute necessity which decides the conflict.

Thus the dramatic poet must have a full understanding of what constitutes the general content of the passions and of human destinies. He ought above all to recognize the moral powers which determine the fate of man according to his actions, and to trace out their presence and their action in the complication of events. For the moral powers which, in the epic, hover over the entire action, determine and oppose each other in the drama; they form the content of character for the

personages, and individualize themselves in them. It is necessary that, in spite of their opposition, the poet recognize and maintain their harmony.

This is what forms the true interest of the drama, its principle, and its essential ground.

If from this we pass to the examination of the different parts of a dramatic production, we have to consider principally: 1°. its *unity*; 2°. its mode of *organization*; 3°. the *form of the language*, or the external side—the diction and the measure of the verse.

1°. Compared with the epic, the drama, as has been said, must present a firmer and more compact unity, included in straiter limits. It requires a less extended action, more contracted in space and time, a more direct opposition of aims and interests, a stricter co-ordination of parts.

Here enters the question of the three unities, *place*, *time*, and *action*.

With regard to the first two, the strict rules which some would derive from the ancient theatre and from the Poetics of Aristotle, are conventional, at least they are not absolute. Aristotle says nothing of the first; they were not even always observed in the ancient theatre. In some cases they cannot conform to the modern theatre, where the action, less simple, contains a richer succession of character, collisions, and personages. Their strict observance would lead often to the violation of the rules of probability, in order to preserve prosaic truthfulness.

However, the opposite extreme is not necessary. Besides the fact that the unities of *time* and *place* recommend themselves by the clearness which they introduce into the action when they are possible, it should not be forgotten that it belongs as much to the essence of the drama to contract itself, as to that of the epic to expand itself; that in a spectacle which addresses itself to the eyes, one can not easily ignore the years, and that continual change of place and scene must be displeasing. But to wish to confine a complicated action within a certain number of hours, and within the precinct of an apartment or a palace, is to establish a conventional rule, and to substitute for poetic truth the conditions of prosaic

reality. A just mean is to be regarded; the true measure depends on the nature of the subject.

The only inviolable rule is *unity of action*, because that is the very law of art. In what consists this unity? In a single aim which the *dramatis personæ* pursue in the midst of the most diverse circumstances, in a principal collision, or a complication to which the characters and principal enterprises attach themselves, and which secures a natural *dénoûment*. This unity is more or less strict according to the varieties and the subjects, less so in comedy than in tragedy, in the modern drama than in the ancient tragedy.

2°. Upon the *organization* and development of dramatic work, it is sufficient to recall what every one knows upon the subject of the *extent*, the *progress*, and the *division* of a theatrical piece. We have already brought to view, as regards extent, the drama, and the epic, and assigned the reason for their difference. Compared with the lyric poem, the drama, in its turn assumes a broader extent and acquires grander proportions.

Dramatic poetry holds the middle ground between epic breadth and lyric concentration.

The *progress* of the drama is more rapid than that of the epic. In the drama, the rapid episodes, in place of retarding the action, should accelerate it. The dramatic progress, to speak properly, is a continual precipitation toward the final catastrophe. The poet should give himself time, however, to develop each situation, with the motives which it includes.

The *division* of the dramatic work rests upon the very idea of an action and of its essential moments. Every action has a beginning, a middle, and an end. The name *acts*, then, agrees perfectly with each of these divisions. Numerically there ought to be only three, though the moderns admit five. The exposition answers to the first. The three intermediate acts represent the different actions, reactions, or turns of fortune which the plot or entire conflict includes. In the fifth the conflict arrives at its *dénoûment*.

3°. As to the *external form*, it consists in the *diction*, the *dialogue*, and the *character of the verse*.

The *diction* should be pathetic. But there are two sorts of *pathetic*. The one is simply the passionate expression of the emotions of the soul; the other, in closer relationship with the action, reproduces its movement and character. In order to be natural and true, it is necessary to avoid both the conventional declamatory style, and trivial, gross, prosaic naturalness. The truth of poetic language consists in a noble, elevated, original diction, the perfect expression of the situation, character, and sentiments of the *dramatis personæ*.

The principal forms of the discourse are the *chorus*, the *monologue*, and the *dialogue*. The first two represent the lyric side. The *dialogue* is the truly dramatic form. We find here two varieties of the pathetic: the sentimental pathetic, where passion analyzes itself and diffuses itself in long speeches, which began with Euripides, and is found more particularly with the moderns; the other, more solid and true, whose effect is more profound and more durable, limits itself to being the simple expression of the situation. Sophocles is its model.

As to the *measure of the verse*, if the Alexandrine suits better the slow and majestic march of the epic, the Iambic metre, which holds the mean between the hexameter and the abrupt and broken lyric measures, is that which, as Aristotle observes, suits better the movements of dramatic action and the vivacity of dialogue.

After having studied the dramatic work in its principles and in its different parts, Hegel considers it in its *relations to the public*. The question, already stated elsewhere in a general manner, presents here a special interest and a higher importance. Scientific and lyric works have a special, accidental, and indeterminate public. The author is not in direct relation with it. It is otherwise with dramatic productions. They are addressed to a determinate, present public—to a class of spectators who have their own ideas, tastes, and habits. How ought the dramatic poet to deport himself with regard to this public? If he scorns its judgment, he fails of success; if he seeks only to please it and to flatter its tastes, he may fail of the aim of art. Above all things, let us abide by the principle that the poet must submit to the exigencies and rules of his art, in order to assure himself, not a transient success, but a reputation and an enduring glory.

We consider, now, on this topic, the conditions which he must fulfil:

1°. The ends and the enterprises which the *dramatis personæ* pursue must present a *general* interest. What is relished by one nation may not be so by another. The tragedies of Shakspeare have long been incapable of being represented on the French stage. Ancient tragedies belong to all times, because they represent the enduring, eternal side of human nature. Thus we can rest on the principle that the more a dramatic work contains of the general traits borrowed from human nature, the more it is guarded from the changes of manners and epochs.

2°. A second condition is individuality of character, or, to speak more accurately, this is the supreme condition of dramatic interest. The personages must not be merely ideas, passions personified, as happens in the case of many modern works. Noble thoughts, profound sentiments, great words, cannot compensate for this defect of vitality. It is the power to create which constitutes the true poet. We ought, then, to find here the living creation of a rich and fruitful imagination. The number of particular traits is not the essential thing. Sophocles, as well as Shakspeare, was able to create characters full of life and individuality in spite of their simplicity.

3°. The generality and individuality of characters is not sufficient, however; it is necessary that these characters be based on an action animated and interesting in itself. The aim of the action is not the exposition of the characters; for, as Aristotle says, the personages do not act in order to represent characters, but these are conceived and represented in view of the action.

The dramatic work which fulfils all these conditions cannot fail to obtain an enduring success, independent of the dispositions of the public to which it is addressed.

The position of the dramatic poet is not, in other respects, the same as that of the epic poet; the latter should sink himself in the presence of his work. A dramatic work does not need to seem to spring from the popular thought; we wish, on the contrary, to find the creation of an original genius. Nevertheless, the public does not wish to see represented in a drama the caprices and personal situations of the poet. This

is the prerogative of the lyric poet. The public has the right to demand that, in the course of the action, whether tragic or comic, reason and truth be always observed; for that which ought to be represented, is the essence of human nature and the divine government of the world, the eternal ideas which dwell at the foundation of human passions and destinies. When the poet is conscious of the exalted mission of art, he does not fear to place himself in opposition to the narrow ideas and bad taste of the public, sure that victory will not fail him, and that he will gain his cause at last. If, then, to his artistic aim he unite other issues, he should subordinate them to the supreme end of art. Dramatic poetry is a powerful means of propagating ideas, moral, political, and religious; but it is necessary that the intentions of the poet bear an elevated character, that then they do not detach themselves from the principal action, that they spring naturally from it, and do not appear a means to produce this effect. If poetic liberty must suffer from it, the interest is of a gross sort and different from that of art. What is worse is, when the poet, seriously and of premeditated design, seeks to flatter a false tendency, which rules the public, and that merely in order to please; for then he sins against both truth and art.

The pages devoted to *theatrical art*, or to the *external execution of a dramatic work*, are little susceptible of analysis. They contain a multitude of interesting and judicious remarks upon the *reading of dramatic works*, upon the playing of actors and the art of the comedian, upon the accessories and the effects of scenic representation.

After having studied dramatic poetry in its general principle, in the organization of its works, and in the external forms of representation, Hegel passes to the examination of the varieties which it admits, and of which the principal are *tragedy*, *comedy*, and the *drama*.

The principle of the division of the *varieties* in dramatic poetry is derived from the different relations of the personages to the end which they pursue, or the idea which they represent. This idea is either something good, grand, noble, as constituting the true and eternal content of human volition; or human personality, with its caprices, its fancies, its absurdities, is placed upon the scene.

Hence arise the two principal sorts, *tragedy* and *comedy*, between which the *drama* stands as a middle term uniting the two characters.

1°. *Of Tragedy.* The content of *tragic* action, as to the end which the personages pursue, is, in fact the principles, the legitimate and true interests which determine the human will, and the grand passions and lofty interests which attach themselves thereto. It is this which constitutes the moral goodness of the characters, the material of true tragic heroes. Thus the theme of high tragedy is the *divine*,—it is the divine ideas which appear as motives of volition and as a basis of action,—it is, in a word, moral truth.

The moral powers which constitute the character of the personages and the ground of their action are harmonious in their essence. But when they occur in the world of action and mingle with human passions they appear exclusive, and then they oppose one another—they become hostile. Their opposition breaks out in various ways, especially because they take on the character of human passions. A conflict arises, a plot is formed, the principal hero provokes counter-passions against himself, and thence implacable discords are engendered.

The true Tragic consists, then, in the opposition of two principles equally sacred, but exclusive and mingled with human passions, which destroy their simplicity, and involve the personages in mistakes or crimes, the source of their misfortunes.

Here behold the content, the plot of tragic action. What shall its *dénoûment* be?

This *dénoûment* ought to re-establish the broken harmony between the moral powers. In order to produce this impression, eternal justice, acting upon the individual motives and passions of men, must be permitted to enter.

The tragic Nemesis, however, is distinct from moral justice. The latter chastises and recompenses; while the former manifests itself simply through the downfall of the personages who oppose each other, by the overthrow of their designs and pretensions, by a final catastrophe, which, finally involving them, makes clear the nothingness of their passions and their interests, and this leaves in the soul of the spectator an impression of religious terror and pity.

In fact, although the personages pursue a legitimate aim, they disturb the harmony of the moral powers, by mingling with elevated designs their own passions and particular views, some faults and even some crimes. That, therefore, which is destroyed in the *dénouement*, is not the eternal principles themselves, but the personages and their narrow ends; it is that which is exclusive, passionate, and human in them. They are not able to abandon their designs and their personal passions; and they are drawn down into complete ruin, or forced to resign themselves to their lot.

The content of tragic action and representation is, then, the *True*, the *Divine*, the opposition and the harmony of the eternal powers of life or of moral ideas.

What impression ought an equivalent spectacle to produce upon the soul of the spectator? That which Aristotle so well defines in saying of tragedy, that it ought to excite *terror* and *pity*, through *purifying* them.

Tragic terror, indeed, is not ordinary fright which the view of misfortune or danger excites. That is a vulgar, egotistic, narrow sentiment.

In order that the spectacle may elevate and purify our souls it is necessary that it have a religious character; that terror be excited, not by the view of a power that menaces our material existence, but by the spectacle of moral powers at war with one another. The conflict, the antagonism of these powers, is what fills the soul with a religious fear, and elevates us above our ordinary sphere of thought. The soul is seized with alarm at seeing that menaced which appears to it inviolable and sacred. Its trouble can terminate only when it sees the harmony restored by a *dénouement* which destroys the causes of that opposition.

In like manner there are two sorts of *pity*. The one is nothing else than the sympathy which the misfortune of another excites, a natural and good sentiment, but also vulgar. The other is sympathy for unfortunate greatness, relieved by the moral principle representing the personage and the character which he displays in misfortune, as in the service of a grand cause. It is then the motive of the passion, the moral idea which joins itself to it, and which determines the nature of the sentiment which we experience in view of the sufferings

or misfortunes of a person. The picture of sufferings and misfortunes is simply heart-rending. The true Tragic attaches itself only to persons worthy of interest; that is to say, who unite to great qualities some faults and human foibles. But above the terror and the tragic sympathy, hovers the sentiment of the harmony of the moral powers. We must behold that eternal justice which shatters the relative justice of the exclusive ends and passions of the personages placed upon the scene.

Tragedy is the spectacle of such a conflict and such a *dénouement*. Hence its moral and religious effect.

2°. *Of Comedy*.—Comedy is the opposite of tragedy. The ground of tragic action is the conflict of moral powers, of eternal ideas, of the grand motives of the human heart, represented by certain noble personages, of an elevated, but exclusive and passionate character. In comedy it is no longer this solid, eternal, divine side of human nature, which is the basis of action; it is, on the contrary, the personal, subjective, arbitrary, capricious, or even perverse side of the will which is exhibited, and which occupies the first place, with the absurdities, fancies, defects and vices which are attached thereto.

Nevertheless, in order that we may be able to laugh at people when we see them fail in their designs, it is necessary that they do not themselves make too serious a matter of the aim which they pursue—that they do not absorb themselves wholly in it; that they preserve their security and their serenity; that the liberty and independence of personality reveal themselves as the content of the spectacle. Such is the nature of the true Comic.

There is always an absence of solid basis. There is a vain and false action, a contradiction between the end and the means, the folly that destroys itself with its own hands, and yet remains calm and imperturbable. Total ruin, complete seriousness, would excite in us a feeling of pain instead of laughter.

It is necessary, then, to distinguish between the *laughable* and the comic, and between the two sorts of comic. A complete contrast between the content and the form, the end and

the means, may be laughable. The comic exacts a more profound condition. Vice in itself is not comic; folly, extravagance, silliness, are no whit more so. They are the object of satire, which is serious, and frequently employs itself upon the gravest subjects.

That which characterizes the comic is the inner and profound satisfaction of the personage placed upon the scene, and who, not running into any real danger, sure of himself, can bear to see his projects and enterprises miscarry, or feels himself lifted above his own contradictions. The absence of seriousness is its essential condition.

Thus the comic, in general, bases itself upon a contradiction, upon certain contrasts, either between opposing ends, or between the end and the means, or between the true in itself and the characters or the means. This contradiction calls for a *dénoûment* yet more than in tragedy.

Now that which is destroyed in the *dénoûment* is neither the true in itself nor the true personality; it is the unreasonableness, the silliness; it is their contradictions which are placed under our eyes. What is eternally true in the life of individuals, or of peoples, cannot be turned into ridicule. The solid art of an Aristophanes, for example, only turns into ridicule the excesses of Democracy, the sophistic and bad taste of his epoch; not religion, the state, art in itself, and true morality.

If, then, comedy presents us with a false image of the truth; if that which is bad, petty, and ridiculous, is the salient side of the representation, neither that which is true in itself, nor the strong, solid personality can perish. That which is false destroys itself with its own hands. But true personality triumphs through this destruction; it is inviolable.

3°. *Of the Drama.*—Hegel says little of the drama, which presents a combination of the tragic and the comic. It is an intermediate and floating variety, little susceptible of precise rules, whose interest consists in a complication of extraordinary events calculated to excite the imagination. Above all, theatrical effect is apparent. The end is amusement or emotion, a false pathetic. Frequently the piece is written for a moral or political object foreign to art.

This theory of dramatic art concludes by a comparison of

the *ancient* with the *modern* theatre, a parallel which affords the author an occasion for developing the preceding principles. This original and interesting part of the Poetics of Hegel ought to attract our whole attention.

Note here, in the first place, the general differences which, according to him, distinguish the ancient from the modern theatre.

That which we have most to do with in the *ancient* theatre, whether in tragedy or comedy, is the general, elevated character of the object which the personages pursue. Even in comedy it is still general and public interests which are represented, statesmen, public affairs, peace, war, etc. Therefore there can be in it no place for the varied picture of the human heart and for individual character, for the details of life and the development of an intrigue. In like manner, the interest is not excited merely by the fate of the personages, but the attention is directed rather to the conflict of the moral powers and to the *dénouement* of that conflict. Hence the elevated character and the simplicity of the ancient theatre. In like manner, the comic figures represent rather the general corruption and the causes which have perverted the social institutions and the public morals.

In the *modern drama*, on the contrary, the principal object is personal passion pursuing a personal end. It is also the fate of the personages, and the development of the characters in more special situations. As to the content of the action, it is no longer the vindication of moral rights which excites our interest, but the personage himself and his destiny. The motives are great personal passions, love, ambition, honor, etc. Here greatness and energy are so much the more necessary as the morality of the ends and the means is more feeble, and as crime, committed for a personal end, is not excluded. Nevertheless the interests of country, of family, of humanity, ought always to form the essential base of the action, to develop the character and the conflict of the personages, and to give the final expression of their characters and their will. On these conditions only does the theatre preserve its elevated and moral character.

From another side, the development of the personality permits more the representing of the particular side of existence,

the entering further into the details and the complications of the internal life, and the presenting of a picture of external circumstances.

The multiplicity of personages and of extraordinary incidents, the labyrinth of intrigues, and the unexpectedness of the events, are in contrast with the simplicity of the ancient theatre, which includes only a small number of situations and characters.

In spite of this multitude of particulars, in appearance without fixed rule, the whole should remain clear and poetic. Then in the progress and *dénouement* of the action there ought to be clearly revealed the control of a superior Power who directs the events of this world. These two rules furnish a criterion by which to judge nearly all the pieces of the modern theatre.

Thus Hegel maintains the elevated and moral character of his critique in history just as in theory. But he does not limit himself to designating these general differences. He goes on and develops the parallel by a detailed analysis of the essential parts of the ancient and modern theatre in the two principal varieties, tragedy and comedy, which he considers in respect to action, to personages, to *dénouements*, etc. Let us endeavor to state concisely his thought upon each of these points :

1°. The content of *ancient tragedy* is the manifestation of the ideas and eternal principles which serve as a foundation for human life and society.

Two things are to be considered here : the opposition between the principles, the personages who represent them, the divine passions which animate them ; and, in presence of this conflict, the human consciousness which remains calm, which maintains the harmony and guards the neutrality of the moral powers. Inactive, but not indifferent, it is present purely as a spectator in this conflict, and mingles therewith only in order to represent that harmony. It therefore opposes the maxims, the counsels of wisdom to the power and violence of the passions ; it represents to the personages the greatness of their motives, and the harmony of the moral truths which they invoke.

Thus these two principles, the calm consciousness of the

harmony of moral ideas on the one hand, and on the other the passion which places the personages in antagonism, are the two constituent principles of ancient tragedy: the *chorus* and the *tragic heroes*.

The *rôle* of the *chorus* is only imperfectly explained when we say that it consists in making reflections upon the *ensemble* of the action, and that in particular it represents the public, the people, upon the stage, taking part in the action and judging it. The chorus has a more elevated *rôle*, more intimately allied to the action itself. It represents the harmony of the moral powers, which conflict with each other on the stage, and the sentiment of this harmony in the human conscience. It is the moral element of tragic action. Now this element not being fixed in a positive manner, either in the dogma of the ancient religion, or in legislation, appears here distinctly as resident in the manners. This is what explains why the chorus, which constitutes an essential part of the ancient, cannot be introduced into the modern theatre.

Among us, moreover, the action and the personages do not rest on so solid and elevated a foundation. The aim which the will of the personages pursues is more personal, less ethical, less general. This manifestation of conscience and of the fundamental harmony of the ethical powers is not then necessary. The chorus, with its lyric character, has no longer its place here, where the passions and individual collisions are at work, and where the varied play of intrigue is displayed.

2°. As to the personages and the conflicts which arise among them, we have seen that what forms the content of the tragic heroes, is an ethical motive, the vindication of a true and solid right, and not merely certain ethical traits calculated to ennoble and set off passion.

Such are the characters in the plays of Æschylus and Sophocles: Agamemnon, Electra, Orestes, Œdipus, Antigone, etc., subjects of a high poetic value, and at the same time of an eternal interest in a moral point of view.

In the conflicts in which they are engaged, these personages fall into errors and commit crimes. But they exhibit no indecision, no hesitation. The passion which causes them to act reposes upon too solid a basis to be indecisive. Hence the force, the grandeur of their character and of their language.

Their culpability and their innocence present also a wholly peculiar language. They are not culpable or innocent in the modern manner; they accept their culpability as the consequence of their acts; they do not distinguish between the acts and the will; they are all of one piece. In the same manner, they do not wish to excite compassion or pity. The pathetic which clings to them is of a higher sort. Such is the character of the ancient *dramatis personæ*.

3°. The *dénoûment* of an action of corresponding character cannot be the destruction of opposing powers. In the closing of the action, their harmony should be restored. This is a thing that takes place in many ways. Whatever may be the mode of the *dénoûment*, the soul, at first greatly moved by the spectacle of the conflict and by the destiny of the heroes, finds calmness and peace in religious and moral sentiment. Nevertheless, this is not the effect produced by the spectacle of virtue recompensed and crime punished. The idea of chastisement and recompense is not tragic; but the spectator bears away a profound sentiment of the harmony of the moral powers which are in opposition upon the stage.

Nor is it, as has been said, the idea of *destiny*, of a blind fatality, which is at the foundation of the Greek theatrical art. That which constitutes the moral and religious character of the *dénoûment*, is the idea of an absolute power which shatters and overturns the projects of men, drives back individual passion and will within their limits, makes evident their insufficiency and the nothingness of their efforts. But man is not crushed by a blind and unreasoning force, which, instead of arousing a moral impression, would only excite indignation in the breast of the spectator.

This general *dénoûment* takes place in various ways. If the personage is too much identified with his passion, to the point of not being able to detach himself from it, he must perish and may be sacrificed. The *dénoûment* is unfortunate, as in the *Antigone*. Sometimes harmony and reconciliation is possible. Such is the *dénoûment* of the *Eumenides*. Sometimes the conciliation accomplishes itself in the very soul of the hero, as in the *Philoctetes*; but in this case through an external cause, the will of the gods. Sometimes, in fine, this happens in a more profound manner, by an internal changing and

a moral transformation, by the purification and glorification of the hero, as in the *Œdipus Colonus*.

Upon all these points modern tragedy differs essentially from ancient tragedy.

If the representation of the moral powers is the basis of ancient tragedy, in modern tragedy it is the personal sentiments—such as love, honor, ambition, glory—which form the basis of the action and are the motives which cause the personages to act. These motives may have an elevated character. Indeed, in order not to be untrue, they must stay themselves upon a solid basis—must combine with the ideas, the general interests of man, of the family, of religion, of the state; but they do not the less present a profoundly personal and individual character.

It follows from this, in the first place, that these principles are less simple—that they are more particularized and diversified; then, that they are less pure, or more liable to be altered and corrupted. Whatever constitutes an obstacle to personal passion will be discarded. Injustice and crime will occupy more space—will take, above all, a character of deliberate perversity, unknown to antique personages; although crime for crime's sake, perversity for the sake of perversity, should be banished from the representation.

In opposition to this personal character of motives and acts, the end of the action may nevertheless be magnified; it may even be developed under the form of a moral truth, a philosophic idea, as in *Faust*; or may affect the character of a great general interest, as in the tragedy of *Wallenstein*. But we see that it is not the moral and general side which predominates. Personal passion—love, honor—play the principal rôle. The characters which represent these general interests or these ideas are, above all, preoccupied with themselves, and with these sentiments as identified with their existence. Let us compare, in this respect, *Hamlet* (for example) and *Orestes*. In substance, the situation is the same; we shall see how different are the motives and the characters. *Orestes* forgets himself in order to think only of his father, and of the oracle which enjoins vengeance. Moreover he is firm, decided, immovable in his resolution. *Hamlet*, with his melancholy character, wholly absorbed in himself, is irresolute,

feeble, wavering; he suffers himself to be decided by circumstances.

It is above all, indeed, when we come to study the *characters* and the *situations* of the personages that the difference makes itself felt. The ancient heroes being determined to act through a moral principle, are firm and steadfast in their design; they are opposed to other characters equally simple and firm, placed in a simple situation. Modern personages, on the contrary, are thrown, at the outset, into a multitude of relations and complications which do not permit them to decide immediately. The conflict, therefore, and the solution, depend more upon the individual character. That develops itself, not in virtue of given principles, but in order to remain true to itself. The Greek hero, on the height where he is placed, also remains true to himself; but this is for the reason that he is himself identified with his cause and with the moral principles which it represents. The modern hero decides more in accordance with external circumstances. The morality of the end and that of the character are accidental.

Hegel here returns to a point already treated elsewhere, the feebleness of the characters; and these reflections upon the modern theatre are conformed to his elevated and severe manner of judging of art in general.

Here is, in fact, the great quicksand of the modern theatre. The contradictions are, no doubt, in human nature, and the drama presents the spectacle of them; but what the poet should never forget, is that irresolution, as itself ground of character, is the very absence of all character. Tragic action hinges on a collision; now if we introduce indecision into the very soul of the personage, there is at the outset nothing very hazardous. This perplexity may, in fact, indicate feebleness, absence, obscurity, or confusion of ideas, a double or incomplete nature. It is different when a character, otherwise firm and resolute, finds itself placed between two duties, two principles equally sacred, and between which it is forced to choose. The irresolution, then, is not in the character, but in the situation. It is still admissible for a personage to stray temporarily into a passion at variance with his true *rôle*, provided that he elevate himself above that contradiction or perish through it. That is a source of the pathetic, although

frequently it has a disagreeable and painful effect. But to take incertitude itself, contradiction, hesitation, feebleness, for subject and content of representation—to make an ideal of it, so that the moral truthfulness consists in showing that no character is sure of itself, and in communicating this impression to the soul of the spectator, is to corrupt art. And the poet who gives this lesson is a sophist on the stage.

In real life, the obstacles which the human will encounters, and the resistance which it is necessary to oppose to them, are a sufficient evidence of human weakness. Irresolution, given as object of representation, as the ideal of a character which does not know what it wishes and what it does, can produce only a pitiable and dangerous effect.

The only means here of giving a moral significance to this spectacle, is by showing all change and irresolution as conducing to folly or to death. Such is the manner in which Shakspeare shows us his feeble or irresolute characters; folly, as born of feebleness, in *King Lear*; and death, as following irresolution, in *Hamlet*.

His other characters, on the contrary, even when they are criminal and perverse, elevate themselves by an immovable energy of will, as in *Macbeth*, *Othello*, *Richard III.* The conflict of a great soul, the picture of such a conflict, of a hero toiling to his own ruin, produces a tragic and moral effect.

Modern tragedy differs not less from ancient tragedy in the mode of its *dénouement* than in the nature of the action and the character of the personages. In ancient tragedy, it is absolute justice which, under the form of destiny, maintains the harmony of moral ideas. The personages perish only because their motives are exclusive. In this is the exalted morality of the spectacle. In modern times, this thought, when it exists, is more vaguely indicated, because the personages act through interested or personal motives. Moreover as the perversity is *greater*, and as the crimes which the personages commit are more deliberate, the idea of *punishment* appears more in the *dénouement*, a thing which seems more moral, but is less poetic and more frigid. Frequently the catastrophe consists in this, that the personages at length dash themselves to pieces against a stronger power—society, established order—and themselves shape their own downfall,

(*Charles Moor, Wallenstein*). It is necessary that they then preserve the feeling of their force and greatness, and that liberty crushed by fate preserve the sense of its dignity, of its superiority, and that the character unyieldingly retain, even to death, its imperturbable energy. It is then the spectacle of human liberty in itself which is presented to us.

In fine, if the catastrophe appears to depend only on the hazard of circumstances, if the spectacle which is given to us is that of human vicissitudes, it is necessary that the sentiment of melancholy sadness which it breathes into us be not born of the idea of purely material and terrible fatality. Such a *dénoûment* has power to move us; it troubles us, but it does not produce the true tragic terror which presupposes a moral idea. In order that peace may re-establish itself in the soul, it is necessary that the external circumstances and the catastrophe bring themselves into harmony with the character of the hero. Such is the moral significance of the tragedy of *Hamlet*, where we feel throughout that the destiny of the hero is written in his character; just so in *Romeo and Juliet*, the *dénoûment* springs from the contradiction between these characters and the world in which they are placed. The result is then an impression of melancholy sadness in the soul of the spectator.

The parallel between *ancient* and *modern Comedy* is not sufficiently developed. According to Hegel, the comic in general "is the personality which places its own acts in contradiction, and which, since it destroys its will by the means which it employs, does not lose its good humor on account of having effected the opposite of its intention."

Therein, says he, is the true comic, and the idea which serves as the basis for ancient comedy. According to this definition, a personage is comic only so far as he does not betake himself to the serious end which his will pursues. Thus when he miscarries in his enterprises, he abandons his end and saves himself; he remains superior to events; so that, to be exact, it is the insignificant only, the indifferent, the false, which is destroyed. The personality remains upright, and does not suffer itself to be shaken.

Such is, following Hegel, the principal characteristic of an-

cient comedy; such is the comic of Aristophanes. That which distinguishes his characters is, that they are comic in themselves, and never betake themselves wholly to acting with seriousness.

Plautus and Terence neglect this characteristic. The opposite tendency consists in this, that the comic person betakes himself to a serious end—he is merry for the sake of the spectator, not for himself. This is a more prosaic pleasantry which presents a sharp tone, and gratifies malignity of spirit. Hegel, in leaving this principle, applies it to the criticism of modern comedy, which he judges more than severely.

Moralizing upon it, he forcibly points out its abuse. It is only too true, that, frequently, in place of correcting manners by doing justice by ridicule, comedy is the school of vice and falsehood. Frequently it presents only a tissue of intrigues and delusions, directed against all that is most noble and most respectable in the world. His conclusion is that modern comedy represents private interests and personal characters, with their tricks, their absurdities, their originalities, and their fooleries; but it lacks that frank gaiety which characterizes the comedy of Aristophanes. He does not find this gaiety, this profound humor, except in the comedies of Shakspeare.

BERKELEY'S DOCTRINE ON THE NATURE OF MATTER.

By T. COLLYNS SIMON.

The whole of Berkeley's doctrine on the nature of the Material Substance and of the External Universe is contained in the single proposition, that MATTER IS A PHENOMENON, i. e. that its *Esse* is *Percipi*.

This discovery respecting the essential constitution of the Material Substance, first made by Berkeley and never afterwards abandoned by deep-thinking men, is now, under some one expression or another, part and parcel of every metaphysical system and of the convictions of every metaphysician, whether he happens to be aware that it is Berkeley's doctrine or not. Indeed many, we may even say most, of those who

hold the doctrine in foreign countries, are not aware that it is so. The hardest work of the Berkeleian advocate is often to make people aware that what they hold is Berkeley's doctrine. The tenet itself never presented any real difficulty to the metaphysician except as the disturber of something preconceived, and it is entirely a mistake which leads one or two writers to fancy that the doctrine, after it was once promulgated, was ever a neglected one. Such is never the fate of what is true. The ablest metaphysicians held the doctrine even before it was recognized as a discovery of science. Does it not seem frivolous to say that they abandoned it after they discovered it to be a scientific fact?

It consists of the two following propositions and results from them as its premises: (1.) Common sense teaches us that the real material world, and the real material objects in it, are those which we *immediately* see and feel around us, not the cause or causes of the things thus seen and thus felt. (2.) Physiology teaches us that what we *immediately* see and feel are phenomena—things whose *esse* is *percipi*—objects which consist entirely of certain real qualities delineated in, marked out by, and associated with, the other real qualities known as our sensations, *plus* these other qualities—these very sensations themselves; for phenomena consist not of the primary qualities alone, nor of the secondary qualities alone, but of both these classes of qualities combined into one concrete object. These are the two propositions upon which Berkeley's doctrine rests and of which it consists—a proposition of common sense and a proposition of science. They constitute what the Germans quaintly call his "Methode," which has however perhaps the advantage of being the briefest "Methode" known.

The chief opposition which the doctrine had to contend with originated in its utter overthrow of all the tenets of Materialism, from the supposed eternity of the material Universe, to the supposed real presence in the Eucharist. I do not deny that it effects this overthrow; but with such local and uncatholic objections the Metaphysician has, of course, as little to do as the Christian has. A large portion, however, of the opposition it has met with, and that, too, in quarters where one might have expected more discernment, has arisen from the strangest misapprehension of its import—misapprehension

upon several points. It may be of use to mention a few of these.

1. Some have supposed Berkeley to hold that the material Universe and all the material objects of which it is composed were located within our own bodies!—were not and could not be external to our bodies!—that the human body was not a phenomenon—that it was something of such a nature that all the rest of the material Universe could be located within it! Such a childish misapprehension as this could hardly have made a single opponent, were it not represented as their own view of phenomenal nature, as something not at all to be thought of as absurd, and as a necessary concomitant of all true philosophy, by men in such esteem as Professor von Schelling, who distinctly acknowledged that he denied this externality of the material Universe, saying seriously as Hume did jeeringly, that the popular belief in such externality was a mere prejudice of common sense, easily got over by a little philosophy. In the face of all this childishness—for that is its true name—and all this misrepresentation of the tenet that Matter is a Phenomenon, that its *esse* is *percipi*, it is but fair to Berkeley and to ourselves to repeat as often as may be necessary, that this nonsense is no part of his doctrine; that he considered the human body a phenomenon as much as he did the table or the chair, and the table or the chair as likely to have, or as capable of having, the material universe of the senses located within it as the human body is; that he considered the table and all the rest of the material Universe as locally placed outside the human body—the various objects at various distances both from our own bodies and from each other—locally placed outside the human body as completely as each of these objects is outside the other; that every phenomenon (a color, a pain, a sound, &c.) is essentially an object—essentially of an objective nature—objective to the Ego—and that whether he has devoted himself to Speculative Philosophy or not, it is only the lunatic who can suppose that the material Universe, which we can see and feel, is all within the compass of our cranium. What led such men as Schelling, and others still more to be wondered at than Schelling, into the notion that there is or can be the slightest disagreement between Common Sense and Metaphysics, and into a belief in

this most curious illustration of the disagreement, I cannot say, if it were not some necessity of their respective systems, for assuredly there is no pretext for it in the doctrine that Matter is a Phenomenon; but what led unspeculative people to impute to Berkeley this notion, that the vast universe of matter which we see and feel is something within our own bodies, seems to have been the fact that such people ordinarily hold the spirit to be something literally located within the head, combined with the other fact that when Berkeley and other writers have desired to point out that a phenomenon exists in relation to the spirit and can only so exist, they popularly express themselves by saying, not that phenomena exist "*in relation to*" the Spirit, but that they exist "*within*" it; just as they say that our ideas exist within the spirit. It must be remembered, however, that this is but figurative language. There is no "Inside" nor "Outside" whatever connected with a spirit. Nothing can, strictly speaking, be said to be locally "*within*" such a nature. Neither Berkeley nor any careful thinker ever meant to say it could. But if it could, and if the Spirit not only had all phenomenal nature within it, but also, at the same time, was itself within the phenomenal cranium, it would naturally follow that the material universe would be, as Schelling thought it was, within the human body instead of outside of it; and in this way, with the encouragement of a few philosophers, the unspeculative misconceived the whole of what was said.

2. Another misapprehension which has not been without its share in the manufacture of Berkeley's opponents—another distortion of the pure doctrine that Matter is a Phenomenon, by which some German writers of eminence have brought discredit on it, and thus indirectly upon the author of it, is this: It is supposed that what is immediately perceived, in any case, is part of what perceives it; that every phenomenon is a portion of the Ego, or a state of the Ego; some have even gone so far as to say, is the Ego itself—the Ego itself in one of its phases, in one of its states; that when the spirit perceives a stone it turns into a stone, or when it perceives a mountain it turns into a mountain; and so in the case of a tree, a river, &c., it is itself what it perceives. Now this is not the occasion to point out the utter want of metaphysical accuracy any more

than the utter want of common sense in all this. It is, however, but fair to Berkeley, and to the earnest student of his doctrine, to state, that there is nothing whatever of this kind in it. Berkeley does not hold that the phenomenon is the Percipient, or any portion of the Percipient, or a state of it. He holds—he states repeatedly—that it would be impossible for any two natures to differ more entirely from one another than a phenomenon does from a spirit—than that whose *esse* is *percipi* from that whose *esse* is *percipere*; that the natures are entirely heterogeneous; that we might as well speak of a sound as being a piece of a color, or a color as being a piece of a sound, as speak of these as being, either of them, the other, or a piece of the other, or a state of the other. A student who cannot understand Berkeley's doctrine, i. e. make sense of it, without attributing such grotesque conclusions to him as here alluded to, must just have the candor to say that he cannot understand it—cannot make sense of it. But why impute to him the preposterous thoughts of others, rather than to oneself a little want of discernment? Others have mixed up what is false with what is true; but why on that account oppose, why on that account misrepresent, that great and careful metaphysician?

3. Schwegler's article on Berkeley in his History of Philosophy furnishes an illustration of that entire misconception of Berkeley's doctrine, and of everything relating to it, upon the part of a highly intelligent German, which cannot fail to prove most satisfactory and gratifying to all those superficial students above alluded to, who can neither understand the doctrine (i. e. make sense of it), nor humble themselves to the confession that they cannot—whose sole result is that the doctrine is perfectly easy and perfectly wrong. Almost every passage in Schwegler's article is not only inaccurate in the extreme, but ridiculously so—such as now-a-days could only be written by a wag or a school-boy, or by one who, while he was prepared to find metaphysics entirely exempt from common sense, had (as, I doubt not, was Schwegler's case) been precluded from all opportunity of reading Berkeley's own account of the doctrine. Even from less inaccurate statements than Schwegler's, it would be impossible as well as useless to bring forward here on this occa-

sion all the misconceptions and misrepresentations which have led to the opposition that this doctrine used to encounter, and in foreign countries, chiefly in Germany, sometimes still encounters when connected with the name of its British founder. The four following, however, may be added to those already mentioned as the probable source of much hostility; but whether such misrepresentations have, in the first instance, resulted from the hostility, or the hostility from these, it is not always easy to determine. (a) Some writers say that Berkeley denies the reality of what he sees and feels, whereas that is precisely the material reality which he strenuously asserts and which these opponents as strenuously deny, endeavoring to conceal their denial even from themselves under a *double-entendre* which they have invented for the purpose, and which, strange to say, they admit to be a mere equivocation. (b) Others say that he considers a sense-phenomenon and the mere idea of one (for instance, a color and the idea of a color, a pain and the idea of a pain) to be one and the same thing; whereas he says, in the distinctest manner, that those who suppose this, do not understand what he says, and mistake the common meanings of the simple words he uses. (c) Other writers again have described him as denying that there were spirits—as asserting, either directly or indirectly, that there was nothing but phenomena (the earliest of these was Hume). (d) Others as denying that there were phenomena—that there existed anything but spirits. It is here enough to say, on both these latter points, that the imputation is entirely groundless; that it was an essential part of Berkeley's doctrine, not only that there was no other kind of nature with which we had to deal but these two, Spirits and Phenomena, but also that beyond all room for controversy there were these two totally distinct natures, the Percipient and the Non-Percipient. It is to be feared that the opposition, in these four cases, must have, at first, preceded the misconception.

The chief, indeed I may say the only, difficulty that enlightened men have at any time appeared to me to experience in connection with the doctrine that Matter is a Phenomenon, and which, on their account, is entitled here to distinct and special consideration, lies in the strange notion that phenom-

ena have only an intermittent nature; that there can be no such thing as permanence in such things as phenomena; that we have the permanence of Material Nature among the facts of consciousness, and that we must therefore seek some other interpretation of Material Nature than that it is phenomenal. Here Berkeley's opponents divide. One section of them hold that no doubt Physiology will ultimately be found to be wrong in its finding that pain, color, sound, hard things, heavy things, and all other objects of material nature, are phenomena; while the other section hold that, as there is no prospect of reversing this decree of science, we must suppose phenomena not to be the real things of material nature—that we must deny their reality, and set up the hypothesis that there *may be* (some say that there certainly *is*) something real in or behind the phenomena which perhaps produces the phenomena, although no one ever knew, nor could have known, that there really was any such thing anywhere, nor that, if there were, it could possibly produce anything, even anything unreal.

Those opponents of Berkeley who deny scientific fact,—those opponents who hope that hereafter science will discover that all which we immediately see and feel is not, as it is now known to be, phenomenal, I cannot, of course, reply to. They are not many, and they have no difficulty here which they cannot themselves best solve. But those opponents of Berkeley who accept scientific fact—who recognize honestly and frankly the phenomenal nature of the whole material universe which we see and feel, or otherwise perceive by sense, but who think that the want of permanence which they fancy they find in phenomenal nature, obliges them to deny the reality of all that is phenomenal, and to look out for some other nature more real than hard nature or heavy nature—than the nature that can be seen or can be felt—in short, than phenomena, to which other unknown kind of nature they shall impute all the missing reality, and apply all the names of phenomenal objects—all *conscientious* opponents of this class—and they are also now-a-days very few, hardly at all I may say among metaphysicians,—I earnestly exhort to attend to the two following considerations: (1) If the evil were as they suppose it, if material phenomena had not the permanence which we are

conscious our objects have, the remedy these writers propose would really be worse than the disease—reminding us of the dog in the fable, which, discontented with his substance, went in quest of something which only proved to be its shadow. They would not only deny the reality of all that we see and feel, but they would accept as a reality something which, when they arrive at it, they can neither see nor feel, nor ever under any circumstances could either see or feel, or otherwise discern, either through the senses or through the imagination; nay, something whose very reality they themselves disparage when, with suicidal absurdity, they say that it is not real enough to produce reality; that the sense-phenomena which it produces are unreal things. And, (2) Let them ask themselves with a little more strictness, whether the evil is really as they suppose it. Is it true that there is not as much permanence in Phenomena as in anything else, not only that we know of, but that we can imagine? Are not the colors in this room permanent from one day to another? Are they intermitted when we are absent? Is it common sense to say that the colors which we see around us are annihilated every time we shut our eyes? that Beethoven's music only exists when we hear it? that Homer's Iliad has not a permanent existence? and that our knowledge of algebra ceases every time we go to sleep? The *conscientious* opponent of Berkeley, upon the score of permanence, has first to determine all this. Let us endeavor to be rational, even if we cannot succeed in being speculative.

I have dwelt the less reluctantly upon this—the only point in Berkeley that I have ever found an enlightened conscientious man regarding as a difficulty—because it appears to me that the exposition of it may, for such a reader, largely contribute to the understanding of our doctrine, which however, in the case of those less acquainted with Metaphysics, can be best attained by a close study of the physiological facts connected with the question, and which may be found in any treatise on the Physiology of the Senses, but perhaps best in Dr. John Müller's admirable work in German, translated by Baly; and Müller was neither a Berkeleian nor a metaphysician.

I shall conclude these remarks by drawing the reader's

attention again to the point already alluded to, which exhibits, most clearly and briefly, the difference between Berkeley and Hegel. It is this:—Berkeley held that there is nothing whatever existing above our hemisphere of knowledge except Spirits and Phenomena; that all our objects and all our Universe, material and immaterial, consist of one or the other of these two natures; that we cannot even imagine anything of any third nature, but that we have distinctly these two totally different natures among the facts of consciousness. Hegel, on the contrary, says, No. Among the facts of consciousness we have nothing but Phenomena; there is no such thing as a Spirit or Ego, no Percipient, no Person, nothing except that action or process which we call a Phenomenon, a Thinking, or a Thought. Thus Hegel holds the whole of Berkeley's doctrine on the Nature of Matter, but only one-half of Berkeley's whole doctrine, which involves Spirits as well as Phenomena. The more important half, the earnest Hegel imitates the jeering Hume in throwing overboard. He who holds, as Hegel did, that there is nothing to be called "Spirit" but the Phenomenal, i. e. Thought, and that Matter is of that nature also, holds, *however little he may have intended to do so*, that the Spirit is of the same nature as matter—that the Spirit is material—that Matter thinks. This is Materialism, as Hume well knew; but it is not Metaphysics. And as to the Principles of the Greek Philosophy and Hegel's Bond of Being derived from them, these have their rational application in Berkeley's doctrine, not in this Identity (*Einerleiheit*) of that which thinks and of that which does not.

HEGEL'S FIRST PRINCIPLE.

(As Introduction to the Translation of the "*Science of the Comprehension*.")

It has been asserted so often by English writers that Hegel is a Pantheist, or "*Panlogist*," and that he holds that all is a relation, or that all is Pure Being (we cannot enumerate here all the absurd notions placed to his account) that no small degree of interest should attach to his own statement of his First Principle. In these outlines of the Science of the Comprehension—which are translated from the

third year's course of the Propædæutics—he concisely unfolds what he defines as “the In-and-for-itself-existent, the simple totality, creator of all its determinations.” Those who think the terms “concept” or “notion” would answer as English equivalents for the Hegelian “Begriff,” are invited to consider the eighty-eighth paragraph (§ 88) of the “*Outlines of Hegel's Logic*,” published on page 278 of this volume, as well as the second paragraph (§ 2) of the present exposition.

The exposition of that which is “In-and-for-itself-existent” is not the exposition of “a notion.” The First Principle, seized in its immediateness, i. e. in its most inadequate forms—superficially—is taken as subjective process of thought, concept, judgment, syllogism. But each of these is seized as an adumbration of the True Principle, which is called “Idea.” The region of thought in which the “Science of the Comprehension” starts must be gained by traversing the provinces of the “Objective Logic,” which includes the “Science of Being” and the “Science of Essence,” i. e. Ontology and *Ætiology* (or “*Statical and Dynamical*,” as called by C. C. Everett in his treatise on the “Science of Thought”). This preliminary work may be done by mastering the exposition, already referred to, commencing on page 257 of this volume. But in order to connect that exposition more closely with the one here translated, we give a brief survey of the field occupied by Philosophic Thought as a whole, and a more detailed examination of the *Prima Philosophia*, or Science of Science—called *Logio* by Hegel:

THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy is a closed circle, ending in its beginning; hence no one can begin his system anywhere without making some sort of a presupposition. But Philosophy, as absolute science, should have no presupposition; hence any system can become absolute science only as it completes itself to a circle, and thereby supplies the presupposition made in the beginning. Moreover, in a circle a beginning may be made anywhere; one would expect, therefore, a multitude of beginnings, according to the caprice of the philosopher. And again, since all arbitrariness—not being adequate to Freedom—produces only what is subordinate to law, these manifold beginnings can be reduced and explained, and their necessary limits drawn.

Thus all beginnings may be reduced to three: Subjective, objective, and absolute.*

The *subjective* beginning is the starting-point of subjective culture, the beginning which conscious being makes in its first act of knowl-

* See “*System der Wissenschaft*,” by Karl Rosenkranz (p. 12), for an excellent statement of the Hegelian doctrine on this point.

edge. It starts with the Here and Now, a world of alien objective existences or appearances, and proceeds to prove them and test their validity. The end of its labor is the elevation of itself to a knowledge of a fixed, permanent principle, which is adequate to the explanation of the objective world. This beginning presupposes a subjective world, and an objective world opposed to it. The result of the procedure carried out fully, explains the origin of this antithesis of subject and object with which it started. This science is the Phenomenology of Mind.

The *objective* beginning starts with Being in general, and seeks to find the adequate and true form of objective existence, or what is the true actuality. While the subjective side in the Phenomenology sought to elevate itself to the knowledge of the True, this procedure (beginning with Being) seeks to elevate the Objective to a true existence, and is called Logic by Hegel, but by most others since Aristotle "*Metaphysics*," although by Aristotle and some others *Πρώτη Φιλοσοφία* (*Prima Philosophia*). The result of the procedure carried out fully is the comprehension of the Absolute. The first principle, which is efficient and also final cause of all, the immanent cause or *causa sui*, is God.

The *absolute* beginning, accordingly, is the *Idea*, as Hegel calls it: the absolute self-conscious Reason, which is the identity of the theoretical and practical, of knowing and being. The procedure made from this beginning is the systematic exposition of the world of Nature and Spirit, as manifestation, realization, and actualization of God, or absolute self-conscious Reason. The presupposition made by this beginning is manifestly the establishment of the Idea as the highest and true form of Being—the result of the Logic. Logic had for presupposition the already existent power, on the part of the thinker, to *comprehend*, i. e. to think speculatively or exhaustively—*sub specie æternitatis percipere*—the power to apply the test of Universality (self-relation) to any category.

It is clear that the third beginning—the absolute first principle—must be present as the moving soul in all philosophical procedure. In the Phenomenology, this is the ideal that hovers before the inadequate forms of knowing and exhibits their incompleteness and self contradiction. In the Logic, this is again the ideal totality, which the inadequate categories are unable to express; in their attempt to do this they demand the aid of their opposites, and thus struggle dialectically toward the concrete *self-definition* of the Idea.

The substance of the science (*Prima Philosophia*) by which one arrives at the Comprehension as the True, may be given compendiously as follows, starting at the Second Beginning here mentioned:

LOGIC.

I.—*Being*.

(A.) If we seize the objective world *immediately* (without mediation), we seize it as *Being*. All categories of Being have this in common, that they are seized as possessing immediate truth, and not as obtaining truth through relation to another. Thus it is with *Quality*, *Quantity*, and *Mode*, or the determinations classified under them.

A short examination will test their claims to this immediate truth :

(B.) Take, then, the simple Immediate; admit no mediation into it, whether in the definition or in the "meaning" which we attach to it. Being shall be simple and self-sufficing, the pure and undetermined One:

1. In this simplicity, therefore, it neither has nor can have any determination.

2. But that which is utterly devoid of determination is likewise devoid of *relation*, and hence of self-relation, and hence neither exists for itself nor for another.

3. Hence the simple immediate is an absolute nullity.

(C.) Thus the categories of Being prove their inadequacy to express reality. The stage of consciousness which supposed that it possessed adequate knowledge through such categories would be *naïve* and self-deceived. (The sensuous consciousness is that stage in the *Phenomenology*, wherein the Ego makes the experience that all in Time and Space is mediated, composite, and therefore cannot be known adequately except by mediated knowing.)

II.—*Negativity*.

The dialectic of Being results in the negation of Being as having independence.

(A.) Hence we have the Negative for the universal result; the Immediate is the Negative.

The dialectic of the Negative.

1. Negativity is here the Universal or the All (since all is proved to be mediated); the negative is essentially a relative.

2. But since the All is the Negative, this Negative can subsist only as self-relative, or a negative of itself.

3. But a self-negative is a self-cancelling, and hence the opposite of itself while it is itself.

This gives us the category of *Appearance* or the *Phenomenal*—that which is self-nugatory.

(B.) Pure mediation is therefore pure relation, the world of the *Understanding*, a world of enchantment. All the antithetical (*reflexive*)

determinations, such as *positive* and *negative*, *thing* and *properties*, *force* and *manifestation*, occur here.

Pure mediation has truth as opposed to Being. But is it adequate to express true actuality?

1. In pure mediation we have the negative related to itself, hence, the following dualism:

(a) The Negative related to itself is a *going of the same to the same* and hence *Identity*.

(b) But at the same time, since it is a *negative* relation, it cancels that to which it relates, and hence *itself*, and thus it repels itself from itself, is pure self-opposition or self-distinction.

(c) Thus Identity and Distinction are the result of the same activity of the negative.

2. With this, Pure negativity or pure relativity finds again the repose of Being. In fact, all Being is now seen to be simply the *phase* of identity which occurs in this dual process of the self-relation of the negative. All becoming and transition in Being was merely the result of our seizing it too narrowly and including only the *self-relative* phase, or that of identity, and then being compelled to notice the *negative* self-relation or cancelling of identity. This transpires eternally as the internal nature of all that we call Beings, meaning thereby immediate existences, individual things, qualities, quantities, and modes. These are all mere phases—fragments or parts of the Totality, dependent upon and conditioned by the Totality. Each Being finds its limits in others, and these in it. So that the part has no being except in its relation to others and *through* their relation to it. Being is therefore a small segment of the Total, and in considering the dialectic of Relativity or Negativity we have found what and how Being is.

3. Thus we have a positive result. Our Whole or total process is a self-determining one, and the three moments of Identity, Distinction, and their Unity, may now be recognized as the triune process of subject-objectivity, i. e. Egohood—consciousness. Our substance—our permanent unity—is not a rigid, lifeless one, but a Personal Subject.

(C.) If objectivity in its first immediateness is called Being, then we have considered what its presuppositions are; at once finding that it must necessarily depend upon its relations for its entire subsistence. Thus we traced objectivity into the form of duality, i. e. *relation*—and this form we find possible only as self-relation when we seize it as a whole. We are now prepared to say: "Only the self-determined exists; all else is mere dependent fragment or phase of it, and merely *seems*—it does not exist, it depends." What this self-determined Being is, must be considered:

1. As self-related *Negative*, it is the Universal, the Generic, the Simple; it is the undetermined possibility of all.

2. But since this Negation *relates to itself*, its activity determines it; the very nature of the Generic *creates*; hence arises the Particular, the diremption, scission, or internal division produced through self-opposition.

3. But the Generic and its specializing are one unity—the Individual. That which *actually* exists is neither the pure Generic—which thus isolated would be the pure nought—nor the particularizations which are the results of the negative activity of the former, *but the active process itself as Individual Ego*—the complete negativity which elevates the individual out of any determination, restraint, or limit, so that he is always Universal, i. e. the possibility of self-contemplation. I can always, in whatever I am doing, drop at once the object of my contemplation and take up another, or make the empty form of subject the object, by thinking of the pure Ego. No NATURAL Being could do this, for the reason that whatever has essential relations to the Without, and depends upon other Beings, is not Whole and has no Self. Its negativity is not self-related *within it*, but *without (outside) it*. Were the stone conscious, it would know itself as almost utterly outside itself, or rather its knowing would necessarily be outside of it, i. e. in the Rational being who looks upon it. “Almost utterly,” we said, because if *utterly*, then the stone would melt into the pure space which it occupies. It therefore *does* take a step towards knowing itself; it *falls* towards the centre of the planet—a dumb confession that its Being lies outside of it in the centre of the planet.

One is liable to fall into error here unless he is careful to comprehend fully the essential point, to-wit: that the individual is no process in the sense that it is “thinking without a thinker.” It is *ἐνέργεια* (or *νοησις*) *not as an abstract concept*, but *ἡ κατ’ αὐτὴν*, not *ideas* or *activities* in the abstract—as if one should say that the concept or archetype of a table or house is indestructible, and outlasts all tables or houses, or as if one should say that the ultimate truth is the CORRELATION OF FORCES, a perpetual circular movement, the eternal passage of FORCE through a series of phases, now electricity, now heat, now attraction, &c. In these cases no SUBJECT in a proper sense is stated or thought by those who hold such doctrines. In the self-relation (*ἡ κατ’ αὐτὴν*) the monad is stated—“atomic subjectivity”—which, however, finds its truth in Personality, or the “Pro-established Harmony”—not a harmony forced upon the monad, but a harmony into which he ascends by his own activity, dissolving the objective, and widening his subjectivity until the *atomic* becomes *cosmic*. Is Goethe or Shakespeare more or less of a person than the semi-cultured man who fears to study those authors too much lest he “lose his personality”? Is not rather the man of most personality he who has broken in most

ways the narrow limits of his natural individuality and has given himself up heart and soul to the greatest geniuses, borrowing negative force from each to cancel his own finitude? All this movement in the form of self-relation is the achievement of conscious Selfhood.

But Hegel's greatest merit lies in this: that he does not stop at this point of Platonic idealism, high though it be. He seizes it in its history—as Aristotle did in his time—and rises to the standpoint of the "Idea," as he calls it—not merely the monad with its self-relation and a pre-established harmony or an abstract world-order, but a concrete realization of all this. He finds the system of freedom, RATIONAL FREEDOM, to be the Substantial World. Not the *Système du Monde* of Laplace, with its blind forces, but a system of the World which is exhibited as plastic to the Divine Reason. Mechanical and Dynamical to matter and finite relations, this immanent principle is the Ideal or Final Cause to the conscious Being. As Dante expresses it:

Ed è NATURA

Ch' al sommo pinge nol di collo in collo.

Or, as the *Chorus Mysticus* in Faust names it:

DAS EWIGE WEIBLICHE zieht uns hinan.

God as self-conscious Reason: (1) Separating Himself from Himself in the act of knowing Himself as *object*, thereby creating all forms of chaos and the chaotic; (2) in the recognition of Himself as object, annulling the chaos and chaotic, creating the rising spiral of Nature, and resting from creation with the contemplation of His IMAGE = self-conscious intelligence in man. The Idea is the Comprehension of Comprehensions, the Truth as the form of the Absolute Actuality = the Self-conscious Divine Reason.*

THE SCIENCE OF THE COMPREHENSION.

Translated from the German of G. W. F. Hegel.

§ 1. Objective Logic is the science of the Comprehension *in itself*, or the science of the Categories. Subjective Logic, which we treat of here, is the science of the Comprehension *as* Comprehension, or of the Comprehension of somewhat. It is divided into three parts:

- (1) The science of the Comprehension;
- (2) The science of its Realization;
- (3) The science of the Idea.

* See Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I., pp. 20 & 21, and also pp. 236 to 240.

First Division.

SCIENCE OF THE COMPREHENSION.

I.—Comprehension.

§ 2. The Comprehension is the Universal, which is at the same time determined; that which remains in its determination the same Whole or Universal; or it is the determinateness which comprehends—grasps together—in itself the different determinations of an object as unity.

Note by Translator.—By the Objective Logic we have arrived at the Adequate form of True Being, and this is the self-determined—*causa sui*. Now we come to consider it; and we find it as the process of subsumption of itself under itself. At first this is merely *formal*, for the reason that it subsumes itself only fragmentarily under its Infinite form. Gradually, however, it comes to subsume itself as a Totality, and when it reaches this goal it is the *IDEA*.

The Comprehension is the "adequate form of True Being," i. e. it is a *TOTALITY*, and this must be kept in mind constantly in order to understand the dialectical movement in the Judgment and Syllogism.

§ 3. The moments of the Comprehension are Universality, Particularity, and Individuality. It is their unity.

§ 4. The Universal is this unity as positive, self-identical, undetermined unity; the Particular is the determination of the Universal, but such a one as is cancelled [or reduced to a moment] in the Universal, i. e. the Universal remains in it what it is; the Individual is the negative unity, or the determination which forms a unity with itself through self-determination.

§ 5. The Universal includes *under it* the Particular and Individual; so likewise the Particular includes under it the Individual; on the contrary, the Individual includes *in it* the Particular and the Universal, and the Particular includes *in it* the Universal. The Universal is more *extensive* than the Particular or Individual, but the latter are more *comprehensive* than the former, which for the reason that it is included in the Individual is a determinateness of it. The Universal *inheres in* the Particular and Individual, while the latter are *subsumed under* the former.

§ 6. Since the Comprehension contains in itself the moments of Individuality, Particularity, and Universality, it is manifoldly determined with regard to its content, and is the comprehension of something Individual, Particular, or Universal.

§ 7. The particularizations of the Universal, i. e. determina-

tions which have one and the same common sphere, these and likewise the individuals which are subsumed under the same Particular or Universal, are said to be COÖRDINATE; what is subsumed is also said to be SUBORDINATE to that under which it is subsumed.

§ 8. The coördinated particular determinations of the Universal are opposed to each other, and, in case the one is to be taken as the negation of the other, they are CONTRADICTORY; but whenever the other also has positiveness and through this falls within the same general sphere as the former, they are opposed merely as CONTRARIES. Such determinations, coördinated in the Universal, cannot co-exist in the Individual; but those which are coördinated in the Individual are [merely] DIFFERENT ones [i. e. disparate], i. e. they do not have the same universal sphere in their distinction, but are in harmony (accord) with the Individual.

§ 9. The coördinate determinations of the Universal, considered more in detail, are: (1) the one the negative of the other in general, without regard to the question whether they have the same universal sphere or not; (2) in so far as they have the same sphere in common, and the one determination is positive, the other negative, so that this negativity toward each other constitutes their nature, they are properly termed *contradictories*; (3) in so far as they stand in opposition in the same common sphere, or the one is positive in the same sense as the other, and each consequently can be called positive as well as negative in relation to the other, they are *contraries*.

§ 10. With the determination of Contrariety, which is indifferent as regards the antithesis of positive and negative, the transition is effected into the Being determined-in-and-for-itself and out of the determinateness-through-others, and by this the mutual participation of the same sphere is differentiated and becomes individuality, whose determinations differ from each other without a common sphere and are thereby determined in and for themselves.

II.—Judgment.

§ 11. The Judgment is the presentation of an object as unfolded into the three moments of the Comprehension. It contains it: (a) in the determination of individuality as *subject*;

(b) in its determination of universality or its *predicate*, by which means the subject can also stand in relation to the predicate itself as individuality to particularity and as particularity to universality; (c) the simple *relation* of the predicate to the subject, without content—the IS, the *copula*.

§ 12. The Judgment is to be distinguished from the Proposition: in the latter something quite individual—an occurrence—is expressed of a subject, or, as in general propositions, something is affirmed of the subject as having a necessary connection with it, and which it becomes or to which it stands in opposition. Since in the Comprehension the moments are seized as in one unity, in the Judgment also (as presenting the Comprehension), although there is determination, there is no Becoming or antithesis. The inferior determination—the subject—elevates itself to the Universal, which differs from it, i. e. to the predicate; or *is* it immediately.

§ 13. In Logic the Judgment is considered according to its pure form without regard to any definite empirical content. Judgments are classified by the relation in which the subject and predicate stand to each other—in how far their relation is through and in the Comprehension, or is a relation of objectivity to the Comprehension. Upon the character of this relation depends the higher or absolute truth of the Judgment. Truth is the harmony of the Comprehension with its objectivity. In the Judgment this presentation of the Comprehension and its objectivity begins, and hence the sphere of Truth begins here.

§ 14. Inasmuch as the Judgment is the presentation of an object in the different moments of the Comprehension, it is moreover the exhibition of the Comprehension in its determinate Being, not so much because of the definite content which the moments of the Comprehension have, as because in the Judgment these latter issue forth from their (implicit) unity. As the entire judgment exhibits the Comprehension in its determinate Being, so this distinction comes again into the form of the Judgment itself. The subject is the object, and the predicate is the generality of the same which is intended to express it as Comprehension. The movement of the Judgment through its different species elevates this universality (generality) to a higher stage, wherein it comes to correspond as nearly to

the Comprehension as is possible for it in so far as it is a mere predicate.

A.—Quality of Judgments, or the Judgment of Inherence.

§ 15. The predicate in the most elementary form of the Judgment (*unmittelbar*) is a property which belongs to the subject in such a manner, that, although it stands in relation to it as universal in general, yet at the same time it is only the particular existence of it, which as such has several determinatenesses. Universality, the predicate, has here the meaning only of an immediate (or sensuous) universality—a mere possessing in common with others.

§ 16. In the qualitative Judgment the predicate is just as well something universal, which side constitutes the form of the Judgment, as a determined quality of the subject which manifests itself as content. According to the former side, the Judgment takes as its pure form: "*the individual is a universal*"; according to the latter, the side of content: "*the individual is thus and so determined*";—and this is the *positive* judgment in general. ("This is good"; "This is bad"; "This rose is red"; "This rose is white," &c.)

§ 17. For the reason that (1) the individual is just as well *not* universal, and (2) the subject has other determinations besides *this one*, the qualitative judgment must be expressed negatively in both respects; hence arises the *negative judgment*. ("This is not good"; "This is not bad"; "This rose is not red, but white"—yellow, &c.; "This rose is not white, but red," &c.)

§ 18. According to form, therefore, this judgment is: "*The individual is not a universal but a particular*"; according to content: "*The individual is not thus, but otherwise determined*." In both respects this negative judgment is at the same time also positive. In the first respect, the negation is only the limitation of the Universality to the particularity; in the other respect, only some one determinateness is negated, and through this negation the Universality or the higher sphere makes its appearance.

§ 19. Finally: (1) *According to form*, the individual is not a mere particular somewhat—for particularity is more exten-

sive than individuality—but the individual is only the individual; and this is the *Identical judgment*.

Conversely: (2) *According to content*, the subject is not only not this particular determinateness, but also not any other determinateness merely. Such a content is too narrow for the subject. Through this negation of determinateness is cancelled the entire sphere of the predicate and the positive relation which subsisted in the preceding negative judgment; and this gives the *Infinite judgment*.

§ 20. The mentioned *identical* and *infinite* judgments are no proper judgments. That is to say, the mutual relation which subsists between the subject and predicate in the Qualitative Judgment is cancelled, which relation was this: that there was expressed only some one of the immediate determinatenesses of its Being—a determinateness to which belonged only a superficial generality. In the infinite judgment, a universality is demanded which is not a mere individual determinateness. The mentioned identical judgment signifies that the subject is determined for and by itself, and is in its determination returned into itself [i. e. is completely exhausted by the predicate].

§ 21. In the identical and infinite judgments the mutual relation of subject and predicate is cancelled. This is to be taken first as that side of the judgment according to which subject and predicate can be regarded as standing through the copula in a relation of identity, abstracting from their difference. In this respect the positive judgment can become inverted in so far as the predicate is taken only in the same extent of significance as the subject is.

§ 22. The negative judgment contains the separation of a determinateness from its subject in such a manner that the subject is still related positively to the universal (though not expressly stated) sphere of the determinateness. Whenever the negated predicate is made the subject, the universal sphere mentioned falls away, and leaves only the non-identity of two determinatenesses in general, and it is indifferent which of them is made subject or which predicate. The negative judgment can therefore (and so also the identical judgment) be inverted without altering it.

Note by Translator.—The qualitative Judgment deals with the Finite—the sphere where the Individual is not a Totality, and where the Universal is only a Common

or General, and the Particular some determinateness coördinate with or antithetic to some other. Hence arises its *dialectic*. It attempts to express its content, but says too much; there is untruth in the content, and untruth again in the form of expression. Hegel traces out, §§ 15-22, the course of the ascending series of judgments, pointing out the defects in form and content separately, and at the same time shows their incongruity with each other. These defects and incongruities may be seen readily by any one who will consider that the equality of subject and predicate expressed by the copula IS can only exist in the case where each is the Total Comprehension (i. e. universal as regards extension and "comprehension"). Hence the identical judgment is the true form, and the content falls into the infinite judgment. "A red rose is a red rose" as identical judgment, though true in form expresses nothing, but merely implies that its content is self-determined. "The rose is not an elephant," as infinite judgment, likewise expresses nothing, since all relation is denied between the subject and predicate, and not any implied even, as there is in the case of the negative judgment, "The rose is not red, but white," &c. Every sensuous quality is inadequate as predicate to a Totality: it falls both in *extent* and in *comprehension*. This is the positive import of the infinite judgment. With the identical judgment, a "point of indifference" has been reached, and inversion can take place. The form of *reflection-into-itself* is reached.

B.—Quantity of Judgments, or Judgments of Reflection.

§ 23. Where judgments can be inverted, the distinction of subject and predicate is ignored. This distinction is however, since it is now cancelled as qualitative, to be taken quantitatively.

§ 24. Since the individual determinatenesses which the predicate contained cancel themselves, the predicate has to include the manifold determinations of the subject taken together. Through this circumstance the universality ceases to be a mere community with others. It is the universality which belongs to the subject's own nature, which consequently implies that the subject returns into itself in [is exhausted by] its predicate.

§ 25. Such a judgment is consequently a judgment of *Reflection*, since *Reflection* implies the going through several determinations of an object and the grasping together of the same in unity.

§ 26. In so far as the identity of the subject with the predicate makes its appearance, the subject is a Universal which is subject through confining it to individuality. The quantitative judgment is therefore (1) a singular somewhat which has in the determination of subject perfect individuality and is a THIS Universal.

§ 27. A THIS is determined in infinitely manifold ways, i. e. it is indefinitely determinable. The predicate of Reflection,

since it is a complex, expresses not only the general determination of *one* This, but also of *other* This's; that is to say, the singular judgment goes over (2) into the Particular.

§ 28. The particular judgment in which the subject is determined as "some" is only a determined judgment, which can be expressed immediately just as well positively as negatively.

§ 29. The subject receives its perfect determination, according to extent of form, (3) through the "All-ness" in the universal judgment. Since the "All-ness" enters in place of particularity, and has at the same time the extent of the latter, the extent of the content of the subject must be limited according to it.

§ 30. The subject becomes partly through this a particular as regards its predicate, partly there enters a relation of necessity between subject and predicate.

Note by Translator.—Judgments of reflection, therefore, are (1) the Singular: "This man is mortal"; (2) the Particular: "Some men are mortal"; (3) the Universal: "All men are mortal." They ascend from the Individual to the Universal, and the latter rest upon the perceived *necessity* in the relation of subject and predicate.

C.—Relation of Judgments, or Judgments of Necessity.

§ 31. Through the cancelling of the qualitative and quantitative determinations, the unity of content of subject and predicate is posited, which latter therefore differ only through their form, so that the same object is posited at one time merely as subject; at another, as predicate.

§ 32. Since the subject is a particular somewhat as opposed to its predicate, conversely the subject is now in contradistinction to the qualitative judgment a determinateness of the predicate and immediately subsumed under the same. The universality of the predicate expresses, therefore, not merely a complex of determinatenesses of the subject like the predicate of Reflection, but the universal internal nature of the subject; and this is the *Categorical* judgment. ("The body is heavy." "Gold is a metal." "Mind is rational.")

§ 33. In so far as subject and predicate are also distinct, their unity also must be expressed as *unity of contraries*, i. e. as necessary relation; and this is the *hypothetical judgment*.

§ 34. The Identity of content (which is found in the categorical judgment) and the Relation of contraries (in the hypo-

thetical judgment) are united in the *disjunctive judgment*, wherein the subject is a universal sphere or is considered in regard to such a one, and this (universal sphere) constitutes the predicate; and the particularization or various determinations of the predicate express this. Of these, the one as well as the other belongs to the universal. According to their particularization and in respect to the subject, however, they exclude each other.

D.—Modality of Judgments, or Judgments of the Relation of the Comprehension to Being.

§ 35. In the disjunctive judgment, a Being is posited in the complete series of moments of the Comprehension. Modality of judgments consists in this, that a Being is related to its comprehension as such, and the predicate expresses the conformity or non-conformity of the two.

§ 36. The first judgment of modality is the *assertorical*, which contains a mere assertion, inasmuch as only the *state* or *condition* of the subject which is to be compared with the comprehension, and not the comprehension itself is expressed; hence this judgment has at first only a subjective confirmation. ("This deed is bad"; "This remark is true.")

§ 37. Against the assurances of assertorical judgments, therefore, the opposite may just as well be asserted; the predicate expresses only one of those opposite determinatenesses of which the subject, considered as universal sphere, contains both. This judgment, therefore, passes over into the *problematical*, which expresses merely the *possibility* of the conformity or non-conformity of the given existence to the Comprehension.

§ 38. The universality of the subject is therefore posited with a limitation which expresses the state or condition in which lies the conformity or non-conformity of the given existence with the Comprehension. The predicate expresses nothing else than this identity or non-identity of the state or condition with the Comprehension of the object. This is the *APODEICTIC* judgment.

Note by Translator.—The correspondence of the classification of judgments with the divisions of the Objective Logic is manifest. Qualitative judgments express the perceptions of immediateness or Being; judgments of Reflection and Necessity express perceptions of mediation in its three aspects, (a) as Essence, (b) as

Phenomenon, (c) as Actuality; judgments of Modality express perceptions of absolute mediation or of the Comprehension.

A general survey of the classification of Judgments is here given. (See P. VI. Vol. III. Hegel's Great Logic, 2d Ed.)

- A. Judgments of Belug:
 - a. The positive judgment;
 - b. The negative judgment;
 - c. The infinite judgment.
- B. Judgments of Reflection:
 - a. The singular judgment;
 - b. The particular Judgment;
 - c. The universal judgment.
- C. Judgments of Necessity:
 - a. The categorical judgment;
 - b. The hypothetical judgment;
 - c. The disjunctive judgment.
- D. Judgments of the Comprehension:
 - a. The assertorical judgment;
 - b. The problematical judgment;
 - c. The apodeictic judgment.

III.—Syllogism.

§ 39. The syllogism is the perfect exhibition of the Comprehension. It contains, as such, *the judgment with its ground*. There are in it two determinations which are united by means of a third which is their unity. It is a comprehension extant as unity (the middle term of the syllogism) and as diremption (the extremes of the syllogism).

§ 40. The relation of the two extremes of the syllogism to the middle term is an immediate one; their relation to each other, however, is mediated through the middle term. The former, the two immediate relations, are the judgments which are called *premises*; the relation which is mediated is called the *conclusion*.

§ 41. In the first place, the syllogism expresses its moments through the mere *form*, in such a manner that the middle term is a peculiar determinateness as opposed to the extremes, and the ground or unity of the moments is a mere *subjective* one. That which is really the primitive is in this case a deduced, and has the signification of a result.

A.—Syllogisms of Quality or of Inherence.

§ 42. The form of this syllogism I—P—U (Individual—Particular—Universal)—that the Individual is connected with the Universal through the Particular, is the general rule of the

sylllogism as such. In the first, immediate, syllogism, the Particular or the middle term is *a quality* or determinateness of the Individual, and, likewise, the Universal is a determinateness of the Particular. Therefore a transition might be made from the Individual through another one of its determinations (of which it has several) to *another universal*; and so likewise from the Particular to another Universal, since the Particular also contains within itself different determinations. This syllogism appears to be correct so far as its form is concerned, but according to its content arbitrary and contingent. ("Green is a pleasant color; this leaf is green; hence it is pleasant." "The sensuous is neither good nor bad; but man is a sensuous being; hence he is neither good nor bad." "Bravery is a virtue; Alexander possessed bravery; hence he was virtuous." "Drunkenness is a vice; Alexander was addicted to drunkenness; hence he was vicious," &c.)

§ 43. According to form, the two premises are immediate relations. The form of the syllogism contains, however, the demand that they should be mediated, or according to the common expression, the premises should be proved. But the proof through this form of the syllogism would be only a repetition of it, and thus the same demand would recur again *ad infinitum*.

§ 44. The mediation—and hence the Particularity and Universality must therefore be brought in through the moment of Individuality. This gives the second form of the syllogism: U—I—P. This syllogism is correct, in the first place, only in so far as the judgment U—I has validity. In order that this may be the case, U must be Particular. In this case, the Individual is not really the middle term. The syllogism is brought back to the form of the first, but the conclusion is particular. This syllogism has however, in general, the signification (in contradistinction to the other), that immediate determinations or qualities are connected through individuality, and in so far contingently.

§ 45. The Individual connected with the Particular through the Universal gives the third form of the syllogism: P—U—I. The Universal is here the mediating determination and predicate in both premises. But it does not follow that two determinations are the same because they inhere in the same in-

dividual; it follows rather that the two determinations are subsumed under the same Universal, and not that they can be united as subject and predicate. Only in so far as the major premise is *negative*, and thus can be inverted, does this syllogism admit of reduction to the first and consequently possess the correct form. ("No finite Being is holy; God is no finite Being; hence God is holy.")

§ 46. The objective signification of this syllogism is that the union of particularity with individuality has its ground alone in the identical nature of the two.

§ 47. (1) In this series of syllogisms each of the three determinations has in succession constituted the middle term. The reduction of the second and third syllogistic forms is the cancelling of the *qualitative*. (2) Although each immediate relation of the first syllogism is mediated through the succeeding one, yet each of the latter presupposes the preceding one, i. e. the mediated unity presupposes the immediate identity.

Note by Translator. — The qualitative Syllogism is realized in all finite existences: in them, only a phase of the totality exists at one time. They belong to Time and Space for the very reason that they (1) are spread out in space, i. e. sundered into self-externality, and (2) are changeable, i. e. their Total is only in part real, and for the most part only potential. No thing would change did other potentialities not exist for it. Since the qualitative Syllogism is the form in which the Universal = Total or Comprehension is realized (i. e. becomes individual) in only one of its particularities (potentialities), it follows that this is the Syllogism of Finitude and perpetual change.

The finite side of life takes this form; e. g. one fashion follows another: some special defect or inconvenience being discovered in the former, a new one is adopted with special reference to correcting it; the latter being a mere particular is defective in some *other* respect, and has in turn to give way.

That "Truth is the correspondence of an object with the Comprehension" (§ 66), is easy to see from this point of view. The Comprehension being the Totality, if an object is in anywise defective it will be because part of its determinations are merely *potential* and not *actual*. Alkali is deficient for the reason that its proximate Comprehension is its union with acid in the form of salt. No Being has truth except as a Total or as adequate to its Comprehension; out of this it is changeable and perishable.

B.—Syllogisms of Quantity or Reflection.

§ 48. The immediate non-qualitative [quantitative] syllogism is the *mathematical* one. The middle term of this syllogism is only such a somewhat as is *equal* to the two others. As proposition it is expressed thus: If two magnitudes are equal to a third, they are equal to each other.

§ 49. Secondly, in the quantitative syllogism, Individuality, not as *one* individual, but as *all* individuals, constitutes the middle term. In so far as some one quality belongs to all, this quality is expressed as quality of that universal sphere or of the *genus* itself to which the individuals belong. This is the syllogism of *Induction*.

§ 50. The syllogism in which the Universal is the middle term, infers through *analogy* that, in the case of two subjects which are the same according to their general determinations, a particular determinateness which belongs to one, also belongs to the other.

(a. Several individuals have a common nature;

b. One of the individuals has a certain quality;

c. Therefore the other individuals have this quality.")

(In the case of Induction, the question arises what ought to be the subject or predicate in the conclusion; e. g. "What moves itself with freedom is an animal", or, "An animal is what moves itself with freedom." "The lion is a mammal", or, "What a mammal is, is a lion." In the case of Analogy, on the contrary, the mediation lies in the fact that another individual has the same common nature. While in the case of Induction the particular determinateness of the common nature is grounded in the individual, Analogy infers from the common nature the particular determinateness of the Individual; e. g. Jupiter and the Earth are planets; the Earth has inhabitants; therefore Jupiter has inhabitants.)

C.—Syllogisms of Relation.

§ 51. The *categorical* syllogism has for middle term the in-and-for-itself-existing Universality or the nature of the individual subject, of which, as such, an essential property is expressed and is connected to this subject.

§ 52. The *hypothetical* syllogism expresses another Being as the ground of some particular Being. If A is, then B is; but A is; therefore B is. The determinations are no longer in relation as Individual, Particular, and Universal, but a determination, B, which in the first place is only in-itself-existent, or potential, is connected with existence through A as middle term, which is existent as well as ground.

§ 53. In the *disjunctive* syllogism, the ground that a determination is connected with a subject consists in this, that

one part of the particular determinations of a total sphere do not belong to it, and consequently the rest do belong to it; or, *vice versa*. A is either B, C, or D: but it is not B nor C; therefore it is D.

§ 54. The middle term is therefore the subject as a total (universal) sphere in its complete particularization, and contains at the same time the excluding or positing of a part of these its determinations. The subject is as a Universal [totality] in itself the potentiality of several determinations. From its Universality [Totality] or Potentiality a transition is to be made to its determinateness or actuality.

§ 55. A survey of the forms of the syllogism adduces the fact that: (1) in the *qualitative* syllogisms the moments have validity only in their qualitative difference. They need therefore a mediating link, but this falls outside of them, and is their immediate unity. (2) In the *quantitative* syllogisms, the qualitative difference of moments is suppressed, and with it the mutual relation and distinction of mediate from immediate are obliterated. (3) In the syllogisms of Relation, the mediation contains at the same time immediateness. Therefore from this the comprehension of an immediateness of Nature or of qualitative difference has made its appearance, which at the same time is mediation in-and-for-itself; and this is FINAL CAUSE and PROCESS.

Note by Translator.—The syllogisms are, therefore,

A. Syllogisms of Inherence:

- a. I—P—U;
- b. U—I—P, or P—I—U;
- c. P—U—I.

B. Syllogisms of Reflection:

- a. A—A—A, or I—I—I: *the mathematical*.
- b. U—i+i+i+i+&c.—P: *the inductive*.
- c. I—U—P: *the analogical*.

C. Syllogisms of Relation or Necessity:

- a. *Categorical*;
- b. *Hypothetical*;
- c. *Disjunctive*.

The movement (or dialectic) of the syllogism consists in mediating each term so that in the higher forms each (term) becomes a complete realization of the Comprehension (or Totality); major and minor premises and conclusion—each becomes a complete syllogism in itself. With this the transition is made to the "Realization of the Comprehension," i. e. to its complete existence, which has three stages of perfection: (1) Mechanical, (2) Chemical, (3) Teleological. In the Teleological, a transition is found to the Idea. (See note on § 47, *sub finem*.) Truth = the Idea = Reality (or Objectivity) which exists as a complete systematic Totality = Spirit.

Second Division.**THE REALIZATION OF THE COMPREHENSION.**

§ 56. In the Judgment as well as in the Syllogism, the Comprehension is in immediate reality, i. e. in the indifferent existence of the subject and predicate; or the extremes of the syllogism are opposed to each other and to the middle term. The OBJECTIVE consists in this: that these moments become in themselves the whole, so that their Immediateness is precisely this, to be the whole.

§ 57. In the Final Cause, that which is inference and result is at the same time the immediate active cause. It is as a subjective somewhat separated from the external Being which is extant, and the activity consists in the translation of the subjective form into objectivity. In this transition the final cause returns into its comprehension.

§ 58. The syllogism of the activity which is in conformity with design (teleological activity) has three moments: the subjective purpose, the mediation, and the existent (realized) design. Each of these moments is the Totality of all the determinations of the syllogism.

§ 59. (1) The subjective purpose contains: (a) the undetermined *free activity* of a subject in general, which (b) determines itself or particularizes its universality and gives itself a determined content; (c) it has the moment of individuality, according to which it is negative toward itself, cancels the subjective, and produces an external existence independent of the subject.

§ 60. (2) The mediation or the transition into objectivity has two sides in it: (a) that of objectivity—this is an external thing as means, which, through the power of the subject, becomes a *means*, and is turned against external Being; (b) the side of subjectivity is the mediating activity, which on the one hand brings the means into relation to the purpose (design) and subordinates it thereto, and on the other hand turns it against the objective, and through the cancelling of the determinations of the External gives reality to the purpose (or design).

§ 61. (3) The realized purpose (or design) is: (a) Being of the objectivity in general, (b) not however a mere immediate

Being but a posited and mediated one, and (c) of the same content as the subjective purpose (or design).

§ 62. The defect of this teleological relation is the immediate existence of each of the three moments which enter into mutual relation, for which therefore the relation and the determinations which those moments receive in it are externally brought together. The entire movement of this realization of the Comprehension is therefore, in general, a subjective affair. As objective, the realization is the process as internal relation of the moments of the syllogism according to their peculiar nature. In the process actual objects stand in relation as independent extremes, whose internal determination is however that which causes it to be through the mediation of others and to be in union with them.

§ 63. (1) In the sphere of *Mechanism* objects are united or changed by a third force, so that this union or change does not lie already determined in their nature beforehand, but is external or contingent to them, and they remain consequently in it independent of each other.

§ 64. (2) In the sphere of *Chemism* [the Chemical] each of the two extremes is: (a) according to its particular Being, a Determinate and at the same time essentially opposite to the other; (b) as in opposition, *in itself* a relation to the other. It is not only itself, but it has the peculiarity to exist only in union with the other, or its nature is in itself a tension and active against the other; (c) the unity of the extremes is the neutral product which constitutes the ground of its relation and of its entrance into the process, but this unity is extant in them only as in-itself-existent (potential) relation. It exists not free for itself anterior to the process. This is the case in Teleology.

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§ 65. (3) The higher unity is therefore: that the activity preserves itself in the product, or that the product is self-producing, and consequently that the neutralizing of the moments is likewise their diremption, or that the quenching of the process in the union of the extremes is at the same time the rekindling of the process. The activity of this productive product is consequently self-preservation. It only reproduces itself and yet is itself already existent.

Third Division.**SCIENCE OF THE IDEA.**

§ 66. The Idea is the objective True or the adequate Comprehension in which particular Being is determined through its immanent comprehension, and in which Existence, as self-producing product, is in external unity with its final cause. The Idea is, not that actuality which corresponds to some external notion or other which is already extant, but that which corresponds to its own comprehension; which, therefore, is in such a form as it ought to be in-and-for-itself, and contains this its comprehension itself. The "*ideal*" is the Idea considered on the side of *Existence*, but as such a somewhat as is in conformity with the Comprehension. It is therefore the Actual in its highest truth. In contradistinction to the expression *Ideal*, one would call *Idea* rather the True considered from the side of the Comprehension.

§ 67. There are three ideas: (1) The Idea of *Life*; (2) The Idea of Cognition and of the Good; and (3) The Idea of Science or of Truth itself.

I.—Idea of Life.

§ 68. Life is the Idea in its immediate determinate Being, through which it enters the field of Phenomena or of changeable Being, and stands in opposition to inorganic nature and manifoldly and externally determined Being.

§ 69. Life is as immediate unity of the Comprehension and of extant Being, such a whole as contains the parts not for themselves, but through the whole and in the whole, and the whole is just as much through the parts. It is an organic system.

II.—Idea of Cognition and of the Good.

§ 70. In this Idea the comprehension and actuality fall asunder. The former (the comprehension), on the one hand, empty by itself, is to receive its determination and filling up from the Actuality; on the other hand, the latter should receive its determination from the independent determination of the former.

(1) Cognition.

§ 71. Cognition is the relation of the comprehension and

actuality. The thinking which concerns only itself, and is in so far empty, becomes replete with a particular content, through this relation, and the particular content is thus elevated from Being to universality (universal exhibition of it).

§ 72. The *definition* expresses of an object which stands in relation to it as an individual or a particular, its *genus* as its general essence, and the particular determinateness thereof through which it is *this* object.

§ 73. The *classification* expresses of a *genus* or Universal in general, a race, or an order, &c., the *particulars* in which it as a manifoldness of species exists. These particulars which are contained in a unity, must flow from a common ground of division.

§ 74. Cognition is partly *analytical*, partly *synthetical*.

§ 75. The *analytical* cognition proceeds from a comprehension or a concrete determination, and develops only the manifoldness of the immediate or identical simple determinations which are therein contained.

§ 76. The *synthetical* cognition develops, on the contrary, the determinations of a Whole which are not contained in it immediately, and do not flow from each other by the principle of identity, but have the form of difference towards each other, and it (synthesis) shows the necessity of their determined relation to each other.

§ 77. This happens through *Construction* and *Proof*. Construction exhibits the comprehension or proposition, partly in its real determinations, partly in behalf of the proof it exhibits this its reality in its division and dissolution through which its transition into the comprehension begins.

§ 78. The *Proof* seizes the dissolved parts, and produces through comparison of their relations to each other that union of the same which constitutes the expressed relation of the whole in the *Theorem*; or it shows how the real determinations are moments of the Comprehension, and exhibits in their mutual relation the Comprehension in its totality.

§ 79. In this cognition, which in its strictest form is the geometrical, (1) the construction does not proceed from the comprehension, but is a contrivance that has been discovered which shows itself to be adopted with special reference to the proof; in other cases, it is only an empirical description. (2)

In the [synthetical or mathematical] proof, instead of analytical determinations otherwise well-known or settled, synthetical propositions are brought in from outside and the subject-matter under consideration subsumed or united under them. The proof receives through this the appearance of contingency, since it exhibits necessity merely for the insight, not the internal necessity of the object itself and its own process.

(2) The "Thou Shalt" or the Good.

§ 80. In the Idea of cognition the Comprehension is sought, and it ought to be adequate to the object. In the Idea of the Good conversely, the comprehension passes for that which has the first importance and as the in-itself-existing final cause, which *ought to be* realized in the Actuality.

§ 81. The in-itself-Good, since it has yet first to be realized, stands in opposition to a world and nature which does not correspond to it, and which has its own laws that are under necessity, and is therefore indifferent to the laws of freedom.

§ 82. The Good is as absolute final cause, on the one hand, in itself to be carried out without any regard to consequences, since it has an actuality committed to its charge which is independent of it, and may utterly thwart it.

§ 83. At the same time, however, it is implied that the actuality in its true nature harmonizes with the Good; or there is a faith in a moral order of the world.

III.—*Idea of Scientific Knowledge, or Truth.*

§ 84. The absolute Knowing is the comprehension which has itself for object and content, and consequently is its own reality.

§ 85. The course or the *method* of the Absolute Knowing is both analytical and synthetical. The development of that which is contained in the comprehension—analysis—is the evolution of different determinations which are contained in the comprehension, *but are not as such immediately given*, and for this reason the procedure is at the same time synthetical. The exposition of the comprehension in its real determinations proceeds from the comprehension itself, and that which constitutes the proof in the ordinary cognition is here the return into unity on the part of the moments of the compre-

hension out of the diversity into which they have gone ; this result is therefore *Totality*—a comprehension which has become replete and a content to itself.

§ 86. This mediation of the comprehension with itself is not only a course of subjective cognition, but likewise the internal movement of the object itself. In the absolute cognition, the comprehension forms the *beginning*, and is also the *result*.

§ 87. The progress to further comprehensions, or to a new sphere, is likewise pointed out as necessary through what has preceded. The comprehension which became reality is at the same time again become a unity which must exhibit the movement of the realization in itself. But the development of the antithesis contained in it is not a mere dissolution into the moments from whence it has originated, but these moments have now another form through the fact that they have gone through the unity. In the new development, they are now posited as that which they are, through their relation to each other. They have received, consequently, a new determination.

APPENDIX.

[*Note by Translator.*—The following passages are translated from the Complete Logic of Hegel, and inserted here for the purpose of setting forth more clearly the position and significance of the Idea as Hegel conceives it.]

(Vol. V. Complete Works, p. 317 of 2d ed.)

“The Absolute Idea, as it has here been developed, is the identity of the Theoretical and Practical—each of these sides being inadequate by itself for the reason that the Idea is in those spheres only an unattainable Ideal which hovers before the seeker. The Theoretical and Practical Ideas [i. e. of Cognition and the Good] are each a synthesis of endeavor—of an eternal striving which realizes the Idea only partially ; each is a continual transition into the other [from the Practical to Theoretical and from Theoretical to Practical] ; but since neither side can unite both in one, they remain standing in contradiction. The Absolute Idea as the Rational Comprehension which, in its reality, encounters only itself, is on account of this immediateness of identity with the Objective, on the one hand, a recurrence of the sphere of LIFE. [The *first* sphere of the Idea is Life. But the Absolute Idea, too, possesses the Immediateness of Life, but Life in a higher sense than in Nature ; it is, in fact, Divine Life, as Hegel goes on to

say.] But it has also cancelled this form of its immediateness and contains in itself the highest antithesis. The Comprehension here is not merely SOUL, but FREE SUBJECTIVE Comprehension, which exists for itself and possesses PERSONALITY—the *practical*, in-and-for-itself-determined, objective Comprehension, which as PERSON is impenetrable atomic subjectivity—but which likewise [as Theoretical] is not mere all-excluding individuality, but also for-itself-existing universality or COGNITION, and as such recognizes, in its object, itself *as* object. [The Reasonable self-consciousness is the one which recognizes in the world the supreme might thereof as Reason, and hence sees everywhere the Becoming of Reason, or—in the language of Theology—‘God in his manifestation as Creator—as maker of his Image.’] All else [than the Absolute Idea] is error, darkness, opinion, striving, arbitrariness, and perishableness; the Absolute Idea alone is Being, everlasting Life, self-knowing Truth, and is All Truth.”

(Again, p. 339:)

“The Richest [result of scientific procedure] is therefore the concretest and most subjective; and that which withdraws itself into the simplest depth, the mightiest and most comprehensive.

“*The highest, steepest summit is the PURE PERSONALITY, which alone, through the absolute dialectic forming its nature, ENCLOSES AND HOLDS ALL IN ITSELF, for the reason that it elevates itself to FREEDOM—to that simplicity which is the primitive* [i. e. ‘from Eternity’] *Immediateness*, [i. e. Being which is not involved with others] *and Universality* [i. e. it is simple self-consciousness; as Hegel expresses it in the Encyclopædia, Vol. I., § 236 (Vol. VI. Complete Works, 2d ed.): ‘This (i. e. the Absolute Idea) is the νόσις νοήσας which Aristotle characterized as the highest form of the Idea.’]

[For a conclusion to this translation, the following passage from Erdmann’s *Geschichte der Philosophie* (Vol. II. p. 599) is offered as a neat statement of the content and relation of the whole Logic:]

“The categories treated in Logic are the general rational relations, which, because they rule every rational system, are called souls of all actuality, but, because they are everywhere the equally ruling laws, and are not affected by the distinctions of Nature from Spirit, they are abstractions, so that Logic leads into a shadow realm.”

“The entrance into it is necessary for the reason that the problem of all science, i. e. to recognize Reason in the different spheres, can be solved only when one knows, first, *what* Reason is, and, secondly, *how* to find it. Both these things, and,

only these, Logic teaches—the former through the perfect determination of the Comprehensions of Reason, and the latter through its being a science of Method. Hence Logic is *Philosophia Prima*, the true one. Hegel's definition of Logic—it is the science of the Idea in the abstract elements of Thinking asserts that it considers the Truth (not merely its abstract form) but how it shapes itself in abstract thought—hence not as intuited (Nature) nor as self-conscious (Spirit). With the word *Begriff*, which he takes in the wide sense that he gives to it as title of the third part, he means: *the internal self-active nature, or the essence which impels itself into Being; hence that which he calls also SUBJECT or SUBJECTIVITY.*"

THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

By E. VON HARTMANN.

[The following article, sent to this Journal by Dr. Hartmann of Berlin, gives a compendious view of the position taken by that Professor in a series of treatises—some published as articles in the (Berlin) *Philosophische Monatshefte*; others as books: *Ueber die dialektische Methode*, and *Philosophie des Unbewussten*. We have in hand a short article on the latter named book, prepared for this Journal by Dr. Ernst Kapp of Düsseldorf, which we propose to give our readers in the next number. Differing as widely as we do from some of the views expressed in the following article, we cannot but venture our opinion that Goethe's apostrophe to America,

"Du hast es besser
Als unser Continent,"

applies with force to our conceptions of the systems of Philosophers. For we are obliged to gain our knowledge of such systems from the original works themselves, whereas in Germany the student hears and adopts from the mouth of the professor the traditional version of those doctrines. Otherwise it is unaccountable to us how any one can read Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts* and *Philosophie der Geschichte*, and still suppose him to neglect the Will as real principle. But against that traditional Hegellianism we must concede that Schopenhauer is a most excellent prophylactic, and that Professor Von Hartmann has undertaken a valuable labor. — We are indebted to Mr. Davidson for the translation from the German original.—EDITOR.]

In Spinoza's monism, and Leibnitz's Monadology, idealism and realism are still undifferentiated; they have not yet been separated or recognized in their antithesis by the consciousness. If the Anglo-French philosophy isolated and developed realism, the side of idealism fell mainly into the hands of German philosophy. However, in order to raise idealism, which lies much farther from the common understanding than realism, to a complete system, three steps were

necessary, (1) subjective idealism, (2) objective idealism, (3) absolute idealism. After Kant had laid the critical basis of idealism, Fichte developed upon these the system of subjective idealism; Schelling not only supplemented this by the objective idealism of the Nature-philosophy, but he distinctly affirmed that the two were mere sides of the one full and complete (absolute) idealism, or of the system of pure reason (Panlogism), which latter Hegel worked out in all directions. When, however, the development had arrived at this point, the reaction in favor of the neglected Realism began at once to show itself in Schopenhauer (1818), after Schelling had already (in 1809) broken in principle with Panlogism. Schopenhauer ignored the, to him, unintelligible developments since Fichte, and the necessary step which subjective idealism had taken in him, in that it showed that the Kantian "Thing-in-itself" or the Non-Ego could be nothing other than something posited by the Ego; and without repudiating the Kantian form of subjective idealism, which he even amalgamated with French materialism, he set up the principle of all reality which had been entirely neglected by Hegel—namely, the Will—as the corner-stone of his system, declaring: "The thing-in-itself, the intelligible essence of the world, is will," the only thing which according to Schelling is the ground of reality.

Hereupon Schelling produced his famous Critique of Absolute Idealism, which refuted it, and set up in opposition to it a demand for a positive philosophy. He showed that absolute idealism can only say: *If* anything is, it must be in such a manner; but that it cannot say *that* anything is in such a manner; moreover, he united Hegel's Logical Idea and Schopenhauer's Will as co-ordinate principles, and removed, once for all, the possibility of any relapse into subjective idealism by exposing the fundamental error of Kant's *Critique*, which consists in this: that from the proved *a priori* nature of time and space as forms of subjective intuition, the unjustifiable conclusion is drawn that these cannot at the same time be *a priori* forms of existence. When space and time are restored to their rank as *a priori* forms of being, the transcendental reality of nature and history is again invested with its rights.

In opposition to this entire development, which moves in the sphere of monism, Herbart comes forward with his pluralistic individualism, and in this sense stands related to the former as Leibnitz does to Spinoza. He rejects monism, because in all its forms, so far, it has been unable to render individuality conceivable, and the individual is shorn of his rights. So considered, he forms a complement to monism such as history demands and justifies. It must therefore be the task of any system of philosophy at the present time to imitate the later Schelling in uniting in itself the principles of Hegel and Schopenhauer, and to assign to the individual, within the limits of monism, the place that belongs to him, as well as to explain individualization. Finally, it must be able organically to unite the pessimism which follows from a philosophy of blind will (Schopenhauer) with the optimism (Hegel) which results from a philosophy of the rational idea, without taking off the edge of the antithesis. Thus the metaphysical material for a system of philosophy at the present time is essentially prescribed by the historical development of philosophy; the only question remaining is: What will its philosophical method have to be?

We have to choose between the dialectic, the deductive, and the inductive methods. The dialectic method (according to Hegel) cancels in the first place the axiom of identity, according to which *A* must always be only *A*, and can never be *not-A*; and affirms that *A* is in a flux, and may be *A* and likewise *not-A*. On this principle all reliable standard for thinking disappears, inasmuch as the measure is no less in a flux than the thing to be measured; for example, by the flux of the middle term, the syllogism, which presupposes the identity of the middle term in the major and minor premises, is rendered impossible. Secondly, again, the dialectic lays down contradiction as something everywhere and necessarily existing, as something that must be everywhere and necessarily thought, and the identity of contradictions as the truth. With this cancelling of the principle of contradiction, all formal criteria of truth vanish, all possibility of a *reductio ad absurdum*, and indeed all possibility of discussion vanishes. A part of the Hegelian school inconsequently labors to avoid the cancelling of the principle of contradiction, but by

so doing renders the dialectic method incapable of life. Thirdly, dialectic progress is as little possible through the unity of opposites as the identity of contradictories; for, apart from the fact that all concepts do not by any means have contrary opposites (only such can be considered here), the uniting of two contrary opposites never gives anything else but the zero of the genus in question (e. g. a red and green ray of light, when united, produce a colorless light). Thus the dialectic method cannot, under any circumstances, lead to new results; but at best, if it is rightly understood, to the critical sifting of already existing views—the purpose for which Aristotle uses it. As concerns the deductive method, again, everything (according to Aristotle) is deducible save the principles. The principles, however, may be given in three ways: either by formal certainty, in which case they are only of a formal kind, and from the merely formal it is impossible to arrive at any material content; or by mystic intuition—this, however, is something individual, and cannot therefore ever be a basis for objective science; or finally by the inductive method, in which case deduction is superfluous, inasmuch as it would merely repeat that which was already reached by induction. It thus appears that the inductive method is the only one remaining which is capable of bringing to light material truths, and at the same time placing them upon a scientific foundation. Besides, deduction recommends itself for other reasons to philosophy at the present time. It is to it that recent times owe their enormous progress in all branches of science, and it is it, therefore, that would be best calculated, as far as method is concerned, to bring philosophy into connection with the efforts of the present time. Moreover, even in a material point of view, it affords the best opportunity of bringing about an entire reconciliation between empiricism and speculative philosophy, of spiritualizing and unifying the empirical sciences by means of speculation, and of enriching philosophy, through the treasures of modern science, with an abundance of important and interesting material. The broader the empirical basis, the surer and richer will be the results of induction. As, at all times, philosophy has had its root principally in what formed the main spiritual interests of the different periods, so, at the present

time, it must have its roots mainly in natural science and history; then and only then has it a right to hope that it will regain that interest on the part of the educated public which it has lost.

IS THOUGHT THE THINKER?

To the Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

MY DEAR SIR:—Allow me to draw your attention to a proposition in Philosophy of vast importance, which has as yet had no discussion nor the least attempt at justification upon the part of those who put it forward, and who only thus quietly assume its truth as a mere matter of course. The proposition I allude to is this:—Thinking is that which thinks. Perceiving is the Percipient. Action is, in all cases, the only Agent. "*Das Denken*," says Hegel, "*ist das Ich*." The same thing is also otherwise expressed by saying that there is nothing existing except things whose *esse* is *percipi*—the things commonly, in Metaphysics, called Phenomena. This tenet which was originally put forward by David Hume for the obvious purpose of turning all Metaphysics into ridicule, especially the doctrine that had been recently taught with so much success by Berkeley, had to some little extent the desired effect in England, Scotland and Ireland among the less speculative portion of the educated. Even now we have occasionally a History of Speculative Philosophy to show that there can be no such thing at all as Speculative Philosophy, and a criticism of Berkeley's doctrine to show, without a blush, that the critic could see no sense in it. The fate of Hume's supposed metaphysical tenet, however, in Germany was very different. It there, indeed, effectually obstructed Berkeley's reputation for nearly a whole century even among the metaphysicians of that country. But it did not obstruct metaphysical research, nor did it even obstruct the progress of Berkeley's doctrine there. On the contrary, it was under the influence of Hume's silly tenet that metaphysical research, involving the phenomenal nature of matter, has had its bright career in Germany. It was under its influence that this began at Königsberg and ended at Berlin. Kant gravely rejected Hume's jest, and Hegel as gravely accepted it with all the

rest of Schelling's tenets then propounded. Hegel, instead of allowing it to turn Speculative Philosophy into ridicule as Hume intended that it should, took the bull by the horns as Schelling had done before him, and boldly, but silently, as it were unconsciously, incorporated the fantastic tenet with his own system. He nowhere seeks to justify it, nor does Schelling. Neither of them seems to think that any one could possibly differ from Hume upon the point in question.

The most popular English writer whom I know of as now gravely holding Hume's jest, is Professor Huxley, as may be seen in his recent article in the *Fortnightly Review* for February (this year), where also may be observed this utter absence of all attempt at justification, which I find equally in the case of every one who holds this view. Let it be said, however, for England that Professor Huxley does not pretend to be a metaphysician.

The want of discussion hitherto upon this point as to whether there exists anything except Phenomena and their laws, the want even of explicit statement upon the part of those who hold that there is nothing else existing, leaves it entirely uncertain upon what grounds they entertain the tenet, and even what it, in its full extent, amounts to. On this latter point four conjectures present themselves: Do these writers mean to say, (1) that a phenomenon can perceive itself? or (2) that one phenomenon is able to perceive another? or (3) that, as Hume assured us, a group of Phenomena can perceive, although one isolated phenomenon cannot? or do they mean that (4) there is nothing at all which can perceive anything—nothing at all which can perceive even a phenomenon—nothing at all which can perceive even pain, or light, or sound—things whose *esse* is *percipi*?*

A frank statement upon this point, and some little hint as to a ground or reason for holding such a doctrine at all, would constitute at this moment a valuable contribution to Speculative Philosophy, and would, in your columns, accord well with the grand purpose of the Journal, and the deserved favor in which it stands with thinking men in all quarters of the world.

Faithfully yours,

T. COLLYNS SIMON.

* The points here mentioned are discussed in the Introduction on page 344 of this number of the Journal.



